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1 Introduction
1.1 Subject
The subject of this dissertation is Norwegian modal verbs, modal auxiliaries or, if one prefers,
simply modals. The term modals will be employed in this dissertation, since this term, unlike
the other two, is not inherently encumbered with theoretical assumptions about the categorical
status of these linguistic elements. 
There exists a comprehensive literature on modal verbs in Germanic languages. This
literature covers a vast array of topics associated with these verbs, and as it seems, the debate
never fades. Some of the topics of this debate have been around, literally, for centuries (cf.
e.g. Öhlschläger 1989:19 ff and the references therein); reinvented, rephrased and reinvoked
by every new generation of linguists and philosophers. It follows that no contemporary work
on Germanic modals can claim with any hope of credibility to cover all and every facet of this
debate; at best, one may strive to shed some light on certain selected aspects of this
discussion. My specific selection of topics for scrutiny is influenced by a number of factors,
but most of all, I have selected topics that I myself find interesting. 
Thus, the two main topics of this dissertation is the argument structure of Norwegian
modals and their possible insertion points in a syntactic structure. The argument structure of
Norwegian modals is the topic of chapter 4, whereas the possible insertion points of modals is
the subject of chapter 5. However, the discussion of such insertion points is highly related to
the question of how modals interact semantically with some major syntactico-semantic
categories in a sentence structure as regards e.g. possible readings of a modal and the relative
scope between modals and the aforementioned syntactico-semantic categories. Hence, chapter
5 is called How modals interact with other categories. 
Capters 2 and 3 constitute the preliminaries to the discussion in chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 2 examines the morphological, semantic and syntactic properties of Norwegian
modals; the chapter concludes with a summary and a revised inventory of the entire class of
modals in Norwegian. Chapter 3 contains a survey of 11 recent analyses of modals, with
Roberts (1985) and Vikner (1988) as the earliest of the proposals and Roberts and Roussou
(2000) as the most recent paper. With the exception of Picallo's (1990) paper, which deals
with Romance modals, the accounts in this survey concentrate on modals in Germanic
languages. 
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A summary of what I consider to be the main achievements of the present work
constitutes the last chapter, chapter 6. In this chapter, I sum up some important empricial
findings, some important generalizations and some theoretical innovations of this dissertation.
Thus, it is a summary of the summaries presented at the end of the previous chapters.
One important question in the literature on modals it whether or not modals belong to
a syntactic category different from lexical verbs, e.g. whether modals are auxiliaries or
ordinary lexical verbs. A second, related question is whether the set of modals belong to two
different categories, e.g. whether a subset of modals are best described as main verbs, whereas
the complementary set of modals belong to the category of auxiliaries. An often invoked
candidate for a demarcation line between two categorial types of modals is the root vs.
epistemic distinction, i.e. the two distinct readings that modals typically display; cf. (1)
(1)
Jon må være på kontoret.
Jon must be in office-DEF
'Jon must be in his office.'
(I) Jon is obligated to be in his office (root reading).
(II) It must be the case that Jon is in his office (epistemic reading).
These two readings (i.e. root vs. epistemic) of what seems to be the same linguistic element
have been claimed to have a range of differing formal properties; e.g. Ross (1969), Lødrup
(1996a), Dyvik (1999). 
My examination of morphological, semantic and syntactic properties of Norwegian
modals in chapter 2 supports the assumption that the inventory of Norwegian modals contains
modal main verbs as well as modal auxiliaries. However, the demaraction line does not follow
the root vs. epistemic distinction. Instead, there exists a small group of Norwegian modals
(best represented by kunne 'can' and ville 'want-to') that take proper arguments (i.e. DP/CP) as
direct objects and pattern with lexical verbs as regards a range of syntactic properties (e.g. do-
replacement, passive and imperative formation). These modals are best described as modal
main verbs. The class of modal auxiliaries, on the other hand, contains epistemic modals,
deontic root modals and dispositional root modals, where each subtype has certain syntactic
and especially a range of semantic properties that pertain to them. However, there is no
conclusive evidence that these subtypes belong to different categories syntactically, since the
differences that exist between them seem to be explainable on semantic grounds. 
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Differences between the group of root modals and the group of epistemic modals that
do amount to valid generalizations, according to my findings, are the following.
( 2)
a. root modals, but not epistemic modals, can be construed as two-place relations.
b. root modals, but not epistemic modals, accept a pseudoclefted complement.
c. root modals, but not epistemic modals, take non-verbal small clause complements.
The property listed as ( 2)b follows from the property listed in ( 2)a, as shown in section 4.2.
The remaining properties follow from the assumption that epistemic modals target the truth-
value of their embedded proposition; or rather, of their embedded assertion. It is argued in
section 5.4.3 that an assertion is a proposition with a truth-value. A proposition may consitute
an assertion just in case this proposition is explicitly temporally anchored, and a proposition is
explicitly temporally anchored only when it contains a verb. Thus, non-verbal small clauses
do not in and by themselves give rise to a truth-value, and therefore, they are not felicitous as
the complement of an epistemic modal (cf. section 5.4.3. for a more detailed account).
Likewise, since epistemic modals take one argument only, notably the embedded assertion,
they can never be construed as two-place relations, unlike root modals (cf. e.g. section 2.2.2).
Hence, in my opinion, it is possible to describe the formal differences between root and
epistemic modals as a consequence of the semantic properties of these linguistic elements. 
In this dissertation, the question of the possibly different categorial status of root and
epistemic modals is explicitly addressed on a few occasions only. Nevertheless, the question
is saliently present throughout the entire discussion. First and foremost, the question is
relevant when I address alleged formal differences between root and epistemic modals and
show that the majority of these alleged differences do not amount to sound generalizations.
For instance, there exist a range of claims regarding the argument-taking properties of root vs.
epistemic modals; these are addressed and (mostly) rejected in section 4.1. Furthermore, the
finiteness requirement claimed to pertain to epistemic modals and not root modals is
addressed and rejected in section 5.4.3. Likewise, the claim made by numerous authors that a
modal preceding an aspectual always gets an epistemic reading is addressed and rejected in
section 5.2. 
Secondly, the semantic description of modals in section 4.6 requires an explicit choice
between the two alternatives; i.e. whether the root and epistemic reading of any given modal
should be described as two different uses of one separate lexeme, or alternatively, if these two
readings are best described as two different entries in the lexicon. 
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1.2 The framework
The general framework of this dissertation is the (Chomskyan, generativist) Principle- and
Parameters Theory as discussed in Chomsky (1981, 1986a, 1986b, 1995a, 2000, 2001). No
presentation of the general Principles and Parameters Theory (the P&P framework) is given in
this dissertation. Readers unfamiliar with this theory may consult works like van Riemsdijk
and Williams (1986), Haegeman (1991) or Radford (1997). More specific theoretical
assumptions will be discussed at relevant places in the following chapters.
A fundamental assumption of this research program is that the language capacity
constitutes an autonomous component in the human brain, specific to all and only humans and
part of the human genetic endowment. This designated component is often referred to as
"Universal Grammar". Cf. Chomsky (1980:187):
What many linguists call "universal grammar" may be regarded as a theory of innate
mechanisms, an underlying biological matrix that provides a framework within which
the growth of language proceeds. [...] Proposed principles of universal grammar may
be regarded as an abstract partial specification of the genetic program that enables the
child to interpret certain events as linguistic experience and to construct a system of
rules and principles on the basis of this experience.
However, the principles and generalizations proposed in this dissertation is not formulated so
as to refer to this "biological matrix" of language learning, though they should be translatable
in principle into a language which refers directly to such biological phenomena. Moreover,
the hypothesis of inateness has not played any part in the formulation of the principles and
generalizations presented here; cf. Newmeyer (1998: 89):
To read the critical literature, one would think that there is some logical connection
between the generativist research program and the need to posit a set of purely
syntactic innate universals - a distasteful conclusion for so many. But innateness is a
conclusion, not an assumption, and plays no role in the formulation of the principles.
In other words, the question of the adequacy of such principles is independent of the
question of where they 'come from'. If somebody were able to show that they could be
learned inductively, then well and good. The generative research program would not
have to budge one centimeter. 
Furthermore, it is no goal of this disseration to employ an extensive formalism to express
generalizations that can be formulated just as accurately without employing any formalism at
all. This is a conscious choice, as I agree with Jackendoff (1997: 4) that 
[...] an excessive preoccupation with formal technology can overwhelm the search for
genuine insight into language; and a theory's choice of formalism can set up [...]
barriers to communication with researchers in other frameworks. 
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I do of course agree that the formalization of certain generalizations serves a useful purpose;
to quote Jackendoff once more (op.cit.): 
At a more methodological level, formalization permits one to be more abstract,
rigorous, and compact in stating and examining one's claims and assumptions. And, as
Chomsky stressed in a much-quoted passage from Syntactic Structures, a
formalization uncovers consequences, good or bad, that one might not otherwise have
noticed. 
I had the opportunity to experience the validity of the latter claim a number of times
throughout my work on this dissertation.
However, there is a certain tradition within the Principles and Parameters framework
for what Jackendoff thinks is an excessive preoccupation with formal technology, and I might
add, theoretical ontology. Sometimes one is left with the impression that moulding the theory
is more important than explaining and accounting for the linguistic data. Harris (1993:11)
states that 
Noam Chomsky, in particular, says flatly and often that he has very little concern for
language in and of itself; never has, never will. His driving concern is with mental
structure, and language is the most revealing tool he has for getting at the mind. Most
linguists these days follow Chomsky's lead here.  
This is not the case for the present proposal. I readily and straightforwardly confess that I
harbour a fascination for languge and linguistic data, and I select specific bits and pieces of
the Principles and Parameters Theory with the explicit aim to account for these data. Of
course, this does not amount to rejecting the hypothesis that language reflects mental
structures and cognitive capacities; instead, I find this hypothesis to be most credible.
Newmeyer (1998:7) describes the field of linguistics as follows:
There are [...] two broad orientations in the field [...]. One orientation sees as a central
task for linguists characterizing the formal relationships among grammatical elements
independently of any characterization of the semantic and pragmatic properties of
those elements. The other orientation rejects that task on the grounds that the function
of conveying meaning (in its broadest sense) has so affected grammatical form that it
is senseless to compartmentalize it. It is the former orientation, of course, that I have
been referring to as 'formalist' and the latter as 'functionalist'. 
I have quoted a number of 'functionalist' proposals in this dissertation. One important reason
is that there exists a comprehensive literature on modals within this orientation. This is not too
surprising, since modals constitute a class of linguistic elements which could be said to
illustrate the functionalist fundamental assumption in that their formal properties cannot be
characterized independently of their semantic (and in part, pragmatic) properties; e.g
Chapter 1
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independently of their root vs. epistemic reading. Another important reason for my reading
and quoting a number of functionalist proposals is that I have discovered here the same
fascination and respect for linguistic data that I recongnize as my own. However, in my view,
data are interesting and fascinating only in so far as they support or contradict specific
hypotheses and proposed generalizations; or, alternatively, in so far as they may trigger a line
of thought that would lead to the formulation of new hypotheses and generalizations. 
My choice of framework signals that my perspective in this dissertation will be a
comparative one. A large bulk of the works quoted in the text represents research conducted
on languages other than Norwegian. Thus, modal auxiliaries, modal particles and inflectional
mood from various languages constitute important evidence and a background against which I
investigate Norwegian modals. However, this dissertation does not concentrate on
formulating specific possible parameters e.g. within the Germanic languages bearing on the
behavior of modals in various languages. This is not to say that e.g. the theory of Tense-
chains developed in chapter 5 does not carry over to other Germanic languages. The theory of
Tense-Chains is simply not tested on other Germanic languages. Thus, first and foremost, this
is an investigation of Norwegian modals. 
1.3 The data
The data employed and quoted in this dissertation come from a number of sources. Most of
all, I have found data in books, newspapers, TV and Radio; also, by shamelessly
eavesdropping to other people's conversations on any possible occasion, e.g. on the bus. Some
of my most surprising and unexpected observations have been made by means of these
sources. To mention just one example, the discovery of the surprising interpretational patterns
of modals and negation depending on the relative position of the subject (elaborated on in
section 5.5) was triggered by a sentence uttered in a news program on TV. I started thinking
about this sentence and I soon realized that it was ambigous. Next, I started playing around
with the data, changing the word order, employing a weak pronoun subject instead of a full
lexical DP subject and turning the sentence into an embedded sentence. My next step was to
test my judgments against those of a number of informants. Normally, any set of data would
be presented to at least six or seven informants. Where grammaticality judgments differed
greatly, I would ask more informants. The informants in questions range from linguists via
highly educated informants such as teachers (and one journalist) to people with no linguistic
training whatsoever. 
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My claims about English; German and Icelandic data are made on the basis of the
grammaticality judgments and intuitions of native speakers of the respective languages. In
most cases, I have tested specific hypotheses by means of such grammaticality judgments,
which means that I have presented native speakers with a number of sentences which
typically all illustrate a certain phenomenon. These sentences have typically not been
provided with contexts, nor have I tried to hide in any way what specific property I am
looking for. 
In addition to my consulting informants to test specific hypotheses, I have utilized
language resources on the internet. I would like to mention especially one search program that
I have used e.g. to test hypotheses on co-occurrence facts of Norwegian modals, notably the
program søk i norske tekster med IMS CWB at the University of Bergen. This is a corpus
containing approximately 14 million Norwegian words; mainly texts from newspapers. I
found this program to be very useful. 
Evidently, my own intuitions and grammaticality judgments have played a significant
part in this dissertation, especially when I have translated sentences from other languages into
Norwegian to investigate whether or not a certain generalization holds for Norwegian.
However, even in many other cases, my own grammaticality judgments constitute the basis
for specific hypotheses. I would like to say, though, that I do not, in any part of this
dissertation,  present hypotheses that rest solely on my own grammaticality judgments. Thus,
this dissertation draws on a number of empirical sources beyond my own intuitions about the
Norwegian language. 
2 A theory-neutral description of Norwegian modals
In this chapter I will describe the morphological, semantic and syntactic properties of
Norwegian modals in a theory-neutral way. I am of course aware that the ideal aim of a
theory-neutral description can never be reached in practice, since any non-trivial description
of linguistic elements inevitably employs at least terms and basic premises that are inherently
encumbered with a set of theoretical assumptions. What I will try to achieve, though, is to
avoid any commitment to a specific formalism or framework that would impede the
accessibility of the insights that I present.
As a first approximation, I define the class of modals extensionally, with the following
five members (cf. e.g. Faarlund et al. 1997: 527):
 (1)
burde 'should'  skulle 'will'
kunne 'can' ville 'want-to/will1'
måtte 'must'
These modals have root readings and epistemic readings. We look to Platzack (1979:44)  for a
working definition of the terms root and epistemic2.
The epistemic sense [...] qualifies the truth value of the sentence containing the modal;
the root sense [...] expresses necessity, obligation, permission, volition, or ability on
behalf of an agent which usually, but not necessarily, is expressed by the [...] subject
of the sentence.
To illustrate, the sentence in (2) is ambiguous between a root reading; i.e. an obligation
reading paraphrased in I and an epistemic reading where the modal qualifies the truth value of
the sentence, paraphrased in II:
 (2)
Jon må være på kontoret.
'Jon must be in his office.'
I. Jon is obligated to be in his office (root reading)
II. It must be the case that Jon is in his office (epistemic reading)
In subsections 2.1 through 2.3 we consider the morphological, semantic and syntactic
properties of Norwegian modals. We start out by considering properties that serve to
distinguish modals from other verbs, before we consider which properties that apply to a
subset of modals only. Our findings are summarized at the end of each subsection.
                                                
1 The former is the root reading, while the latter is the epistemic reading.
2 The term root as opposed to epistemic was coined by Hofmann (1976).
                                                                      A theory-neutral description of Norwegian modals
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In section 2.4 we summarize and systematize our observations. Based on our findings,
we examine what characterizes the set of Norwegian modals (section 2.4.1). Furthermore, we
consider three potential new candidates for the class of modals (section 2.4.2). In section 2.4.3
we revise our inventory of Norwegian modals according to our findings. The chapter
concludes with a table of Norwegian modals and their prototypical readings.
2.1 Morphologial characteristics
In English grammars, modals are characterized as morphologically distinguished from other
verbs by the property of having no -s forms for their 3. person singular present tense (e.g.
Palmer 1986:33). Their German counterparts behave much in the same way, as the lack of
explicit agreement marking in 1. and 3. person singular present tense indicative is one
morphological characteristic specific to modals (cf. e.g. Öhlscläger 1989:43). Modals lack
agreement marking in Norwegian as well. However, this lack of agreement is not specific to
modals, since Norwegian lacks subject-verb agreement altogether, with any type of verb4. But
there exists one morphological property that separates modals from almost any other verb5 in
Norwegian. Modals are "preterite-present" verbs6.
"Preterite-present" is the term used to describe the vocal shift pattern of a group of
Germanic verbs of which modals constitute the major part. The term alludes to the fact that
their "present forms […] are traceable to strong preterites even though their meaning is clearly
present" (Bybee et. al 1994:77) 7. Although this is a property of a specific diachronic language
development that is not likely to have any bearing on the way synchronic internalized
language is organized in a specific language user8, one might quite justifiably claim that the
                                                
3 The two other exlusively morphological features mentioned by Öhlschläger (1989:4) for German modals are
i) the stem vocal changes from indicative present singular and indicative present plural
ii) the stem vocal changes from infinitve to indicative preterite.
None of these characteristics apply to Norwegian modals.
4 In Nynorsk and some non-standard dialects, the passive participle may have agreement markers displaying a
gender (i.e.neuter (N) vs. non-neuter (NN)) and number distinction:
(i)  Han vart skoten /Ho vart skoten/ Dyret vart skote/Dyra vart skotne
      He was shot-NN/She was shot-NN/ The animal (neut) was shot-N/The animals (plural) were shot-PL
5 The single non-modal preterite present verb in contemporary Norwegian Bokmål is vite 'know'.
6 Cf. Faarlund et al. (1997:526). There is,  however, an inconsitency in this work concerning the verb burde
'ought-to': Cf. p. 485, where burde is listed as a weak verb, class 2b, and p. 526, where it is stated that burde is a
preterite-presentic verb.
7 The claim that the present form of these verbs is the original preterite form, is found in many descriptions of
Germanic modals, e.g. Faarlund (1991:63), Faarlund, Lie & Vannebo (1997:491) for Norwegian; Öhlschläger
(1989:4, fn. 7) for German; Bybee et al. (1994:77-78) for Germanic.
8Andrew Carnie's review of Newmeyer (1998) Language Form and Language Function on Linguist List January
15th (2000) launched a long and heated debate between 'formalists' and 'functionalists' on questions like this one,
as well as other important and interesting issues. The trigger for this debate was the following statement:
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more tangible consequences of this diachronic shift in the paradigm of modals synchronically
set them apart from other verbs (particularly strong verbs9) in the speaker's internalised
vocabulary10. In Norwegian, some of these consequences are the following:
(3)
(a) These verbs lack the ending -er/-r in the present tense.
(b) The stem vocal changes from infinitive to present tense.
(c) The stem vocal does not change from infinitive to past tense.
This gives the paradigm in (4) for Norwegian modals. I have provided an ordinary strong verb
drikke (drink) for comparison:
(4) 
Infinitive Present Preterite Perfect
burde bør burde burdet 'should'
kunne kan kunne kunnet 'can'
måtte må måtte måttet 'must'
skulle skal skulle skullet 'will'
ville vil ville villet 'want-to/will'
drikke drikker drakk drukket 'drink'
Paradigm for modals vs. strong verb drikke.
                                                                                                                                                        
"Perhaps it is my MIT training showing through and blinding me to the obvious, but I simply fail to see how it is
at all possible  that a two-year old child has direct access to diachronic influences like OE word order or the great
vowel shift. As far as I can tell, without time-machines or university degrees, infants only have access to what
they hear spoken around them, which makes this approach psychologically incoherent." Objections to this
paragraph appeared e.g. on January 21st and 23rd respectively; Pavel Oratro: "No functionalist makes the absurd
claim that children practice a form of mental time-travel (though didn't Chomsky and Halle sort-of say this in
_Sound Pattern of English_?). What they do say is that language isn't fixed at the age of two. It keeps on
changing. That means that the processes that cause language change are also functional in the language facilities
of individual speakers. So the grammar of a speaker of a language exhibits diachronic change through his life."
Debra Ziegeler: "While a Child's acquisitional paths of grammatical development may not coincide with
complete accuracy with the paths of diachronic development of a grammatical item, the motivation for the
development in either case may be similarly built on the pragmatic forces which mechanise the process of
grammaticalisation, and create latent grammatical material out of existing lexical items. There is no question of
the individual 'accessing' the diachronic developments[...]. The coincide of ontogenic grammaticalisation with
diachronic grammaticalisation is not a factor of individual awareness; the parallels exist merely because the
processes are similar, and the similarity appears to be created by similar levels of pragmatic inferencing with
different contexts."
9 Modals are different from weak verbs in any case, since weak verbs have no vocal shift while most modals do,
just like strong verbs.
10 Lightfoot (1974:237) lists as one of the prerequisites for the categorical shift of "pre-modals" (belonging to the
category of verbs into modals (belonging to the category of aux) that these verbs were an morphologically
identifiable class of verbs: "One can only assume that it was an accident that in this inflexional class
[i.e..preterito-presents] only the pre-modals survived. It does seem remarkable that almost all the pre-modals did
have past forms with present meanings and that modern 'past tense' modals (should, would, could and,
historically must) generally have present sense. On the other hand, it does not seem possible to define a class of
modals (and therefore of preterite-presents) on semantic grounds, and furthermore preterite-presents in different
languages encompass a very wide range of verbs semantically ('hate', 'know', 'grant', 'be able', 'think', 'need' etc.).
However, the crucial effect of the loss of the non-pre-modal present-preterites was that the pre-modals (including
the now uncommon mun) became an identifiable class of verbs, with the unique characteristic that they did not
have a fricative suffix for the 3rd person singular."
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As can be readily observed, (3)a does not apply to burde, but in this case, -r belongs to the
stem and does not signal an inflectional suffix. Furthermore, (3)b does not apply to måtte,
'must' and ville 'want-to'. With this exception, the properties listed in (3) are morphological
characteristics of modals in contemporary Norwegian.
However, modals are not the only verbs that are preterite-presents in Norwegian. The
non-modal verb vite 'know', is a preterite-present verb too11 (cf. Faarlund et al. 1997: 491).
Unlike modern English modals, Norwegian modals have non-finite forms as well as
finite forms. That is, Norwegian modals have a close to full formal paradigm of finite and
non-finite forms. There are three gaps in this paradigm; notably, Norwegian modals lack
present participles, and most modals lack imperatives and passives. Whereas these features
are sometimes considered morphological properties of modals (cf. Öhlschläger 1989:59 fn 10;
Palmer 1986: 33), there is some evidence that these gaps in the formal paradigm could and
should be given a syntactic and/or semantic explanation. However, since these questions
concern the range of forms a Norwegian modal employs, they nevertheless defend their place
in a discussion of morphological properties of Norwegian modals, even if the explanation for
the lack of these forms are semantic, syntactic or pragmatic.
Lødrup (1996:fn 5) notes that modals do not employ present participles:
[Modals12] lack present participles. In Norwegian, present participles are adjectives.
The conditions for deriving them are not absolutely clear. However, the main rule
seems to be that they can only be derived from verbs that take one syntactic argument
(Sveen 1990:IV.3).
If this is correct, it is reasonable to consider the lack of present participles to be a syntactic
property of modals. As implied by the quote from Lødrup (1996), not only modals lack
present participles in Norwegian, e.g. weather-verbs (like snø 'snow') typically lack these
forms as well.
Although modals do not in general passivize, there are two modals that may undergo
passive, notably kunne 'can' and ville 'want-to' (data from Lødrup 1996):
(5)
a. Leksen må kunnes i morgen.
   The lesson must can-PASSIVE tomorrow
   'You should know your lesson by tomorrow.'
                                                
11 Also, the modal ville 'want-to' is historically not a present-preterite verb; cf. Faarlund et al. (1997: 491).
12 Lødrup specifically adresses root modals in this quote, but the same property applies to epistemic modals.
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b. Dette må ikke bare ønskes, det må villes.
   This must not only wish-PASSIVE, it must will-PASSIVE
   'You must not only wish this, you must want it.'
Thus, there are at least certain members of the class of modals that passivize.
The lack of imperative with modals is often described as being due to a semantic (e.g
Faarlund et al. 1997: 590; Öhlshcläger 1989:59) or a pragmatic constraint, belonging to the
language user's knowledge of the world and stemming from an incompatibility of the lexical
meaning of a modal and the task performed by an imperative form. This suggests that the lack
of imperative with most modals is due not to a deprived morphological paradigm, but rather
to a semantic incompatibility of the lexical content of the modal with the communicative
function of the imperative.
However, one of the Norwegian modals may occur with an imperative, notably kunne,
'know', which seems to have a lexical specification compatible with the task performed by the
imperative form, cf (6):
(6)
Kunn dette diktet til i morgen!
' know this poem by tomorrow!'
Thus, at least one modal occurs in an imperative form, which means that not even this
property separates all modals from other verbs.
No context, however farfetched, will allow for an imperative that at the same time
allows for an epistemic reading of the modal:
(7)
A: Jeg vil ikke akseptere konklusjonen, med mindre det viser seg at Jon kan være tyven.
B:      #Kunn være tyven da, Jon!
A: 'I will not accept this conclusion, unless it turns out that Jon may be the thief.'
B:       #'May be the thief then, Jon!'
That is, although the semantics of the modal kunne on a root reading allows the modal to
occur in the imperative, the imperative is unacceptable with an epistemic reading of the
modal.
It was stated above that modals display a close to full paradigm of non-finite and finite
forms. While this is true for root modals, this is more questionable with epistemic modals. It
has been claimed (e.g. Plank 1984) that epistemic modals occur in finite forms only, whereas
no finiteness-requirement applies to root modals. However, epistemic modals too occur in
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non-finite forms in Norwegian, cf. (8) from Faarlund et al. (1997: 578), where the epistemic
'hear-say' reading is the natural reading:
(8)
a. De påstås å skulle ha reist.
   they claim-PASSIVE to shall-INFINITIVE have left
  'They are claimed to be supposed to have left.'
b. De ble påstått å skulle ha reist.
       they were claim-PASSIVE to shall-INFINITIVE have left
  'They were claimed to be supposed to have left.'
Furthermore, Dyvik (1999) claims that the perfect (or past) participle is reserved for root
modals:
[...]In the previous examples epistemic modals are never complements. Examples
where they are seem possible, but then only as a complement of another epistemic
modal [...]. From these syntactic facts it follows that epistemic modals only occur in
finite forms (present and past tense) and the infinitive, while the past participle is
reserved for the root modals.
While this is a sound generalization for the standard dialects of Norwegian (i.e. Bokmål and
Nynorsk), it does not apply to several non-standard dialects. In the northern and western
dialects13, there is no restriction ruling out the epistemic reading of a modal in the past
participle, cf. (9).
(9)
a. Han har måtta arbeidd med det i heile natt.
    He has must-PERFECT work-PERFECT on it all night
   'He must have worked on it all night.'
b. Hu har kunna vorre her og forre igjen.
    She has can-PERFECT be-PERFECT here and leave-PERFECT again
    'She might have been here and left again.'
Summing up so far, what serves to morphologically distinguish modals from most other verbs
in Norwegian is that modals are preterite-present verbs, which means that they lack the
ending -er/-r in the present tense, their stem vocal (normally) changes from infinitive to
present tense, and their stem vocal does not change from infinitive to past tense. However,
                                                
13 Some speakers of dialects close to the Norwegian standard bokmål have informed me that this restriction seem
to be lacking in  numerous speakers in their dialects, as well. Cf. also Vikner (1988:7) for the same type of data
from Danish; e.g. Han har skullet bo i Århus 'He has been said to live in Århus'.
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this property does not separate modals from all other verbs, since the verb vite 'know' is
preterite-present as well.
Modals lack present participles, but so do a number of other verbs, e.g. weather-verbs.
Certain modals marginally occur in the passive (i.e. kunne 'know' and ville 'want-to'), and the
imperative (kunne 'know'). Thus, neither of these properties separate all modals from all other
verbs. However, I will ask the reader to note that the modal kunne 'can' is the only modal
which is compatible with the imperative, and the two modals kunne 'can' and ville 'want-to'
are the only two modals that may undergo passive. These idiosyncracies of the modals kunne
and ville will be important to our investigation later on.
Furthermore, the finiteness requirement on epistemic modals claimed by Plank (1984)
to pertain to ("probably all") Germanic languages does not hold for epistemic modals in
Norwegian (cf. (8) above). Finally, the generalization presented by Dyvik (1999) that
epistemic modals do not employ a perfect participle holds for standard dialects of Norwegian,
but not for a number of non-standard dialects; cf. the examples in (9).
2.2 Semantic characteristics
In this section, I want to examine whether there exists any semantic properties that serve to
distinguish Norwegian modals from (most) other verbs. As a preliminary to this investigation,
I will address the debate considering the semantic properties of modals in other languages.
This discussion is the subject of section 2.2.1. Section 2.2.2 investigates semantic properties
of the individual Norwegian modals in the light of the aforementioned discussion.
2.2.1 A discussion of semantic properties of modals
In the literature on the semantic and syntactic status of Germanic modals, a much debated
question has been whether modals should be considered main verbs or auxiliaries. According
to Öhlschläger (1989:19 ff), this is a question which (for the German modals at least) is
rooted back in the 17th century (cf. e.g. Bödiker 1690:82,109). Within this debate, one main
line of argument raises the question whether modals contribute any lexical meaning at all, or
if their contribution is exlusively grammatical; cf. Öhlschläger (1989:56):
...the view, that auxiliaries - or more general, non-main verbs - unlike main verbs,
supposedly have no lexical meaning, only grammatical meaning; that they have no
independent semantic value of their own. Applied to modals, this view is expressed as
                                                                      A theory-neutral description of Norwegian modals
15
the idea that the semantic function of modals is conceived to be "the modification of
the content of another verb".14
Öhlschläger himself rejects the idea that modals as a class lack lexical semantic content, and
in my opinion, rightfully so. However, one might claim, like numerous authors have done,
that there exists a semantic continuum ranging from epistemic modals, expressing the
speaker's commitment to the truth of the embedded proposition (Palmer 1986:51) and
displaying the least "lexical content", to dynamic modals, expressing the ability and
disposition of an individual, notably the subject referent (the term dynamic is due to von
Wright 1951); the latter are taken to have the richest lexical content among modals, Cf.
Öhlschläger's (1989:50) discussion of Plank (1981:59):
...that among modals there exists a hierarchy of modality types, that display their
distance from autonomous lexical main verbs, where epistemic modality show the
strongest tendency towards auxiliary status, while dynamic modality possess more of a
lexical autonomy15.
The question of the possible auxiliary status of modals (or alternatively, some modals) will be
thoroughly examined in section 2.4.1. For the moment, I want to express my opinion that the
status of a lingustic element as "auxiliary" or "main verb" should be determined by
distributional and formal criteria, not by the linguist's intuitions about degree of lexical
semantic content.
Considering how extremely difficult it seems to be to isolate 'an area of meaning'
encompassing all modals, the core inventory of modals in different languages is surprisingly
similar from a semantic point of view. This also pertains to so-called semi-modals (Picallo
1990) and quasi-modals16 (Hopper and Traugott 1993:48; Plank 1984:320) in various
languages; their semantic similarity to what is traditionally conceived as modals is usually an
author's main argument for employing these and similar terms. Even so, the 'modal domain of
meaning' is typically extremely hard to formulate. One reason for this is obviously that
"necessity, obligation, permission, volition, ability and likelihood" hardly constitute what is
                                                
14 ..die Auffassung, nach der sich Hilfsverben - bzw. allgemeiner: Nichtvollverben - dadurch von Vollverben
unterscheiden, dass sie keine lexikalische, sonern nur grammatische Bedeutung besässen, dass sie keinen
semantischen Eigenwert hätten. Bezogen auf die Modalverben äussert sich diese Auffassung meist darin, dass es
als ihre semantishe Funktion angesehen wird, dass sie "den Inhalt eines anderen Verbs modifizieren" (Duden-
Grammatik 1959; 1984:94)[...]
15 Dass es bei den Modalverben eine Hiearchie von Modalitätstypen" gebe "die ihre Entfernung von autonomen
lexikalischen Vollverben" abbilde, wobei die "epistemische Modalität die stärkste Auxiliarisierungstendenz"
aufweise, während die dynamische Modalität noch am ehesten an der "lexikalischen Autonomie"teilhabe.
16 These terms are employed for verbs and compounds that have some, but not all properties pertaining to 'proper
modals' in a given language. E.g. have to is often considered a 'quasi-modal' in English.
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intuitively conceived as one coherent conceptual-semantic field. The challenge, to employ
Bybee's (1985:191) words, is to "define the general conceptual domain covered by the
category" of modals. Lightfoot (1974:237) seems highly pessimistic as regards the potential
success of such a mission:
 [I]t does not seem possible to define a class of modals [...] on semantic grounds[...].
Nevertheless, several attempts have been made to find a conceptual domain common to both
root and epistemic modals.
The methodological path often chosen by authors in such a mission is to focus on
some (possibly prototypical) subset of the entire class; a subset that could be argued to share a
conceptual domain. The subset of modals that presents itself as particularly inviting to this
type of investigation are the modals denoting a point on a scale from necessity/obligation, e.g.
must, to possibility/permission, e.g. may. It seems relatively easier to describe a common
semantic domain that would cover deontic (term due to Mally 1926) modals and their
epistemic counterparts, as opposed to the dynamic (von Wright 1951) or dispositional (the
term is ascribed to Klooster 1986 by Barbiers 199517) modals like can, will and their epistemic
counterparts. In such approaches, deontic is taken to denote "modality which is concerned
with the necessity or possiblility of acts performed by morally responsible agents" (Lyons
1977:823, von Wright 1951) and epistemic could be taken to denote the necessity or
possibility of situations in the real world, according to the speaker's knowledge. Cf. for
instance Chung and Timberlake (1985:246 ff.).
There is considerable parallelism between the epistemic and deontic modes. Both can
be described in terms of alternative worlds[...]. As a morphosyntactic realization of
this parallelism, modal auxiliaries in many languages, notably English, often have both
epistemic and deontic senses [...].  The crucial difference between the two, then, is that
the epistemic mode deals with a set of alternative worlds at a given time [the
alternative worlds are those that could exist instead of the given world], while the
deontic mode deals with a set of alternative worlds that develop out of a given world
and time [i.e. alternative futures of a given world].
Within the 'functionalist'18 literature, the common domain of meaning for deontic and
                                                
17 However, Öhlschläger (1986:fn.53) refers to Wunderlich (1981b:116) for the term "dispositionell"  describing
one of the uses of können 'can': "innere Dispositionen einer Person...als deren Fähigkeiten gelten". This appears
to be the same term as Klooster's (1986).
18 I adopt this term from Newmeyer (1998:7), who describes the field of linguistics this way: There are [...] two
broad orientations in the field[...]. One orientation sees as a central task for linguists characterizing the formal
relationships among grammatical elements independently of any characterization of the semantic and pragmatic
properties of those elements. The other orientation rejects that task on the grounds that the function of conveying
meaning (in its broadest sense) has so affected grammatical form that it is senseless to compartmentalize it. It is
the former orientation, of course, that I have been referring to as 'formalist' and the latter as 'functionalist'.
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epistemic modals is often believed to hinge on the fact that epistemic uses of modals derive
diachronically from the use of their deontic counterparts; cf. Bybee et al. (1994:195):
It is clear that the epistemic senses develop later than, and out of, the agent-oriented
senses. In fact, for the English modals, where the case is best documented, the
epistemic uses do not become common until quite late. Horn 1972, Steele 1975, and
Coates 1983 all point out that the force of the epistemic sense expressed by a modal is
directly related to the force of the agent-oriented sense from which it derives. Horn
further points out that the strength of the modal meaning in both domains is scalar:
agent-oriented: epistemic:
strong obligation gives inferred certainty (must)
weak obligation gives probability (should)
ability gives possibility (may)
Notice that a subset of modals is picked out, a subset of deontic modals and their epistemic
counterparts that in some sense belongs to the same conceptual domain, ranging from
necessity to possibility.
However, there are authors who opt for specific semantic criteria for demarcating the
whole category of modals from other verbs. Here Thráinsson and Vikner (1995: 53):
[W]e propose the following tentative "definition" of modal verbs:
Modal verbs are verbs that can have both an epistemic and a root modal sense.
Even to maintain this rather basic description19, one will have to use the term epistemic in a
somewhat wide sense to encompass all of the non-root readings of Norwegian modals, since
at least one of the Norwegian modals; notably skulle 'shall' seems to belong to the system of
evidential modality rather than epistemic (cf. Palmer 1986 for skulle's German counterpart
sollen). While epistemic modality is taken to deal with the speaker's knowledge and beliefs,
evidential modality deals with what kind of evidence the speaker has for assuming the truth of
the proposition (cf. e.g. Palmer 1986:20). On its non-root reading skulle denotes 'hear-say',
which is typically considered one type of evidential modality. It is not uncommon, however,
to extend the term epistemic in this way; cf. e.g. Palmer (1986; discussing Lyons 1977):
Epistemic modality [...] is concerned with matters of knowledge, belief (p 793) [or]
opinion rather than fact (681-2).
Hence, the term epistemic has one wide sense (encompassing evidential) and one narrow
sense (excluding evidential). In what follows, we will employ this term in a wide sense,
unless it is explicitly stated that the narrow term is intended.
                                                
19 Note that this is not employed as a defining property of modals in all proposals; e.g. Picallo (1990) lists as
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2.2.2 The semantic properties of Norwegian modals
In what follows, we adopt the tentative "definition" from Thráinsson and Vikner (1995) as a
description of Norwegian modals as well, since the five modals that we listed at the beginning
of this chapter all exhibit this 'dual reading' property, i.e. they can have both root and
epistemic readings (as mentioned already at the beginning of this chapter). The semantic
property that applies to all modals in Norwegian as opposed to most other verbs20 thus regards
their ability to take on two different senses; one that "qualifies the truth value of the sentence
containing the modal" and one that "expresses necessity, obligation, permission, volition, or
ability on behalf of an agent" (Platzack 1979:44). I have listed examples of these two different
senses for each modal in  (10) below.
 (10) 
burde    Jon bør være på kontoret.
   'Jon should be in his office.
    It is likely that Jon is in his office (Epistemic).
    Jon has a weak obligation to be in his office (Root).
kunne      Jon kan være på kontoret.
'Jon may be in his office.'
It is possible that Jon is in his office (Epistemic).
Jon is allowed to be in his office (Root).
måtte Jon må være på kontoret.
'Jon must be in his office.'
It must be the case that Jon is in his office (Epistemic).
Jon is obligated to be in his office (Root).
skulle Jon skal være på kontoret.
'Jon is supposed to be in his office.'
Somebody says that Jon is in his office (Epistemic/Evidential).
Jon is required (by some authority) to be in his office (Root).
ville Jon vil være på kontoret.
'Jon will/wants to be in his office.'
It will be the case that Jon is in his office (Epistemic/Prediction).
Jon wants to be in his office (Root).
This list solely that all Norwegian modals each display two distinct readings; the root sense
on one hand and the epistemic sense on the other.
                                                                                                                                                        
modals several verbs that have only one of these readings.
20 Note that there exist other verbal compounds that give rise to root and epistemic senses; e.g. være nødt til,
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However, it is possible and desirable to make more fine-grained distictions between
the various readings of Norwegian modals. As a first approximation, let us display the various
readings of Norwegian modals in a figure like the following.
(11)
Norwegian modals
Root Epistemic (wide sense)
Deontic Dispositional  Evidential           Epistemic
Burde 'should' Kunne 'can/know' Skulle 'be supposed to'     Burde 'should'
Måtte 'must' Ville 'want to'       Måtte 'must'
Kunne 'may'                  Kunne 'may'
Skulle 'be required to'       Ville 'will'
Note that the modal kunne is listed with two different root senses; one deontic (denoting
permission) and one dipositional (denoting the subject's mental and physical abilities), i.e.
kunne is at least three-ways ambiguous between one epistemic and two root readings. This
will be an important point later on.
To repeat, deontic modality is taken to deal with "modality which is concerned with
the necessity or possiblility of acts performed by morally responsible agents" (Lyons
1977:823). Dispositional is used instead of the more common term dynamic; as the name
suggests, dispositional refers to the specific abilities, capacities or tendencies of a subject (cf.
e.g. Barbiers 1995:142). Evidential refers to a system of modality where the speaker indicates
what kind of evidence he has for assuming the truth of a proposition, in the case of skulle the
type of evidence is 'hear-say'. Finally, epistemic is used both in a wide and a narrow sense, the
wide sense encompassing evidential as well as 'proper' epistemic senses21 concerned with the
speaker's knowledge and beliefs.
It has often been assumed in the literature on modals that the root senses denote two-
place semantic relations, whereas the epistemic senses denote one-place relations. That is, on
the root reading of e.g. must "there is such a role as someone who must something" (Vikner
1988:14), hence there seems to exist a predication or Theta-relation between the subject
                                                                                                                                                        
'need to'.  
21 One should perhaps single out a third branch under the (wide term) epistemic senses. The epistemic reading of
ville is one of prediction; a sense that may be said to fall outside the scope of epistemic, which deals with the
speaker's knowledge and beliefs. There may also be reason to treat ville in its non-root reading as simply a tense
particle denoting future, in which case it might not belong to the proper modals at all. This question will be
addressed in section 5.3.3.2.
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referent and the modal, unlike what is the case on the epistemic reading, where the intuition is
that there exists no such relation between the two. Cf. e.g. Dyvik (1999:4):
Every modal can be interpreted either as a one-place epistemic modal or as a two-
place root modal. Under the epistemic interpretations the subject referent is not an
argument of the modal, which only takes the entire proposition as an argument [...].
Under the root interpretation the subject referent is an argument of the modal.
While this generalization may be said to hold for epistemic vs. dispositional root modals, the
statement is not entirely true for the deontic root senses. As pointed out by numerous authors
(e.g. Huddleston 197422, Newmeyer 1975, Pullum and Wilson 1977, Brennan 1993,
Wurmbrand 1999), deontic root modals may very well have so-called proposition-scope
readings where the root modal seems to 'take the entire proposition as an argument'. Cf.
Feldman (1986:179):
Sometimes, instead of saying that a certain person ought to do a certain thing, we may
say that a certain state of affairs ought to be, or ought to occur [...]. The ought-to-do
involves a relation between an agent and a state of affairs. The ought-to-be involves a
property of a state of affairs.
The latter sense, i.e. 'ought-to-be' is sometimes referred to as the non-directed (cf. e.g.
Barbiers 1995) root reading, since the obligation or permission is not directed towards the
subject referent. That is, it is not the subject who has an obligation or permission to do
something. Examples of such readings are the data in (12).
(12)
a. Jon skal dø.
'Jon must die.' (# Jon has an obligation to die)
b. Skilpadden bør være i badekaret.
'The turtle should stay in the bath tub.' (#The turtle has an obligation)
c. Det må komme minst femti mennesker for at festen skal lønne seg.
'At least fifty people must show up for the party to pay off.'
(# There are fifty people and each has an obligation to come)
d. Det kan komme ti gjester i fødselsdagen din. (permissive; i.e.deontic)
'There may come ten guests to your birthday (party).'
(# There are ten guests and each has the permission to come)
                                                
22 Huddleston concludes that there are only two modals that lack a proposition-scope reading, dare and volitional
will. However, Pullum and Wilson (1977) quote the following attested example to suggest that even dare may be
used 'intransitively': Inflation is a problem which dare not be neglected.
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The dispositional root modals, on the other hand, resist a proposition-scope reading, so it
seems fair to say that they always denote two-place relations, cf. (13).  Notice that while (12)
d is perfectly acceptable on the permissive reading (belonging to the deontic senses), it cannot
be forced into a proposition-scope reading in the 'ability' (i.e. dispositional) sense, see (13) b:
(13)
a. Det vil komme en mann hit i morgen.
'There wants to come a man here tomorrow.' (#root reading)
b. Det kan komme ti gjester i fødselsdagen din.
'There can come ten guests to your party.' (#dispositional)
(# There are able to come ten guests)
The proposition-scope or non-directed readings of deontic modals contrast with the directed
deontic readings, which may be construed as two-place relations, just like dispositional
modals.
(14)
a. Jeg må være på kontoret i hele dag.
'I must stay in my office all day.'
(I have an obligation to stay in my office all day)
b. Du skal rydde på rommet ditt.
'You must clean your room.'
(You have an obligation to clean your room)
c. Hun bør gjøre leksene før hun går på kino.
'She should do her homework before going to the movies.'
(She has an obligation to do her homework ...)
Although the one-place vs. two-place relation hence cannot be maintained as a dichotomy
between root modals on one side and epistemic modals on the other, it is still the case that
epistemic modals can never be construed as a relation between the subject and the embedded
proposition, whereas the dispositional root modals always encode such a relation. Deontic
root modals are ambiguous between two possible readings; one 'ought to do' reading and one
'ought to be' reading. Hence, our findings suggest that epistemic modals are always one-place
predicates, dispositional root modals are always two-place predicates, whereas deontic root
modals are ambiguous between a one-place predicate and a two-place predicate construal; (cf.
also Brennan 1993, Barbiers 199523). This is illustrated below.
                                                
23 I should mention here that Barbiers considers dispositional senses to be available for most modals in Dutch.
I believe that this might be said for Norwegian modals as well, where e.g. måtte 'must' is construed as an urge or
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(15)
Readings available for Norwegian modals:
          Dispositional: Two-place (property of individual)
      Root reading           Two-place (directed deontic)
Modals            Deontic
             One-place (non-directed deontic)
     Epistemic reading:           One-place (proposition-scope)
This illustration sums up some important semantic characteristics of Norwegian modals. The
main distinction between modals and (most) other verbs is that all modals have both root
readings and epistemic readings. In the literature, it has often been assumed that root modals
denote two-place relations whereas epistemic modals denote one-place predicates. We have
seen that this is not entirely correct. Although epistemic modals always have proposition-
scope (or one-place predicate readings) and dispositional modals are always two-place
relations, any deontic modal may be construed as either a one-place (non directed deontic) or
a two-place (directed deontic) predicate.
2.3 Syntactic characteristics
While modals in contemporary English have a range of syntactic properties that are
characteristic of that specific category, Norwegian and other Scandinavian modals, like their
counterparts in German and earlier stages of English24, share many of their properties with
ordinary lexical verbs. Thus, Jackendoff (1972:100 ff.) observes the following for
contemporary English modals:
Consider the differences. Modals do not undergo number agreement, though all verbs
do. Modals do not occur together, and they do not appear in gerunds and infinitives
[...]. Modals also differ from all main verbs but be and some uses of have in that they
undergo subject-aux inversion, precede not, and block do-support [...]. Thus we can
treat modals as verbs only if we are willing to concede that they represent a
remarkable coincidence of a large number of purely syntactic aberrations.
                                                                                                                                                        
need of the subject. However, I will reserve the term dispositional for kunne and ville.
24 Evidently,  modals in earlier stages of English were a lot like German and Norwegian ones, cf. e.g. Lightfoot
(1974:241), who claims that there was " a whole series of changes taking place in the sixteenth century..." (a)
The old pre-modals could no longer appear in infinitive constructions[...] (b) The old pre-modals could no longer
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Jackendoff (1972) thus proposes that English modals do not belong to the category of lexical
verbs. Instead, he suggests that modals are auxiliaries in modern English.
However, even the advocates of this hypothesis (cf. e.g. Lightfoot 1974, Jackendoff
1972) admit that although modals in contemporary English beyond doubt should be
considered auxiliaries and not lexical verbs, this issue is a lot more unsettled for modals in
Old and Middle English and contemporary German (Jackendoff 1972:100). Some authors
propose explicitly that modals are auxiliaries in contemporary English only, while modals are
to be considered main verbs in Old and Middle English and in German (Jackendoff 1972,
Lightfoot 1974, Roberts 1985). Since Norwegian and other Scandinavian modals resemble
their German and Old/Middle English counterparts in many respects, these authors would
presumably categorize Scandinavian modals as main verbs and not as auxiliaries.
To state some observable syntactic differences between modals in modern English and
Norwegian, the contemporary Standard English25 ban against co-occurence of modals does
not hold for their Scandinavian or German counterparts, although there are certain restrictions
for this co-occurence even in these languages (cf. e.g Thrainsson and Vikner 1995); cf. (16)a.
Furthermore, in English, provided a modal is at all present, it will always be the leftmost verb
in any verbal sequence, since English modals do not occur in non-finite forms. Mainland
Scandinavian modals, although frequently found in this leftmost position, may in addition
occur as complements of e.g. aspectual auxiliaries, cf. (16)b, as well as embedded under
lexical verbs, cf. (16)c.
(16)
a. Det må kunne finnes en løsning.
   there must canINF findPASS a solution
  'It must be possible to find a solution.'
a. Ofrene hadde måttet flykte.
   victimsDEF had mustPERF flee
   'The victims had had to flee.'
b. Jon antas å måtte være morderen.
   Jon presumePASS to mustINF be killerDEF
  'Jon is presumed to have to be the killer.'
                                                                                                                                                        
occur with -ing affixes [...]. (c) As from the mid-sixth century there could only be one modal in any clause[...].
(d) The old pre-modals could no longer occur with have and an -en affix." See also Denison (1993: chapter 11).
25 There exist English dialects where co-occurrence is allowed, cf. e.g. Denison (1993:294) but only for a limited
set of constructions, and only for specific combinations of specific modals. Cf. also Thráinsson and Vikner
(1995:72) for some differences between double modal constructions in English dialects and those found in
Scandinavian.
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 The difference w.r.t. these two properties between Mainland Scandinavian and German on
one side and English on the other entails that the distribution of English modals is much more
restricted than the distribution of their Norwegian and German counterparts. A modern
English sentence may contain at most one proper modal26, and the modal is always the
leftmost verb. A Norwegian or German27 sentence may contain pairs or clusters of proper
modals, and a modal may or may not be the leftmost verb.
2.3.1 Complements of Norwegian modals
There do however exist certain syntactic differences between modals and (most) other verbs
even in Norwegian. First of all, we will consider the complement-taking properties of
Norwegian modals. Norwegian modals take infinitival complements, perfect complements,
small clause complements, and pseudoclefted complements. The latter two apply to root
modals only. In addition, the two dispositional root modals take CP or DP complements.
Specifically, the modal kunne 'can' takes DP complements, whereas ville 'want-to' takes CP
complements; i.e. finite clauses headed by the complementizer at 'that'. We will address the
latter property of the two dispositional modals in section 2.3.2. Here, we consider the
remainder of the list above.
Norwegian modals take bare infinitival complements, whereas most other verbs taking
infintival complements require the presence of the infinitival marker å 'to'28.
  (17)
a. Jon bør (*å) være på kontoret.
'Jon should be in his office.'
                                                
26 Obviously, English sentences may express the same content as their Norwegian and German counterparts, by
means of lexical combinations semantically corresponding to modals, such as have to, be to, be able to etc.  By
many authors within the functionalist tradition, such combinations are considered (quasi-) modals as well; cf.
e.g. Hopper and Traugott (1993:143).
27 An extreme example from German is the following (Thanks to Herbert Pütz for this example):
i)Wer können soll muss wollen dürfen.
  who canINF  shall  must wantINF mayINF
 'He who is expected to be able, must be allowed to have a will'
28 According to Thráinsson and Vikner (1995:67), this is true for Danish modals as well, but not for all Icelandic
modals: "[...]  some of the Icelandic modals take complements with the infinitival að  whereas Danish modals
take bare infinitives." German modals take bare infinitivals (i.e., without the infinitival marker zu) cf.
Öhlschläger (1989:4). These apparent differences between Norwegian, Danish and German on one side and
Icelandic on the other  may  very well boil down to a question of definition, as the ability to take bare infinitival
complements is frequently used as a demarcation line for 'proper modals' in the literature on modals in Mainland
Scandinavian languages as well as German. Although there are other candidates aspiring to a categorical status
as modals based solely on semantic properties and communicative function (e.g. være nødt til å  'be obligated to',
ha å  'have to'), these combinations are simply not considered proper modals, exactly because they fail to take
bare infinitival complements.
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b. Marit kan (*å) svømme29.
'Marit can/may  swim/be swimming.'
c. Pasienten må (*å) behandles forsiktig.
'The patient must be treated carefully.'
d. Begge skal (*å) reise i morgen.
'Both (of them) are supposed to leave tomorrow.'
e. Myndighetene vil (*å) rive huset.
'The authorities want to/will demolish the house.'
The fact that modals take bare infinitival complements sets them apart from almost any other
lexical verb30. On the other hand, since the property of taking bare verbal complements is a
property that modals share with perfect auxiliaries, this property is frequently invoked as an
argument in defence of the hypothesis that modals are auxiliaries even in Norwegian. The
data in  (17) are all ambiguous between a root reading and an epistemic reading, although
most of them are more natural in a root reading. Given a context, though, it is possible to
force an epistemic reading of any of the sentences in  (17).
Modals in Norwegian may also take verbal complements morphologically marked as
perfect (i.e. perfect participles), as shown by the data in (18).
(18)
a. Jon burde (ha) vært på  kontoret.
'Jon should (have) been in his office.'
b. Marit kunne (ha) svømt.
'Marit could (have) swum.'
                                                
29 In fact, the presence of the infinitive marker is allowed in certain Norwegian non-standard dialects for this
specific construction, for the modal kunne in the 'ability' sense. For these particular dialects, the presence vs.
absence of the infinitival marker å disambiguates the modal kunne; +å  gives the modal an unambigous reading
as habilitative, while the absence of this marker gives a 'permission' reading. In my own dialect (Trøndersk) as
well as northern dialects, skulle is also found with infinitivals +å :
 (i)  Skull          dokker         å  fesk?
             shall-PRET you-PLUR to fish
            'Were you going fishing?'
(ii)  Skull          dokker         fesk?
           shall-PRET you-PLUR  fish
            'Were you going to fish?'
Again, the presence vs. absence of the infinitival marker å disambiguates the construction; this time not the
modal itself,but its complement, in that the presence of the marker gives the complement a progressive reading,
while a complement lacking this marker lacks the progressive aspect.
30 But cf. Johannessen (1998: 87) for various other Norwegian verbs that may take bare infinitival complements
when they occur with negation word ikke 'not'. Also, perception verbs, la 'let' and be 'ask' that may take ACI
small clause complements, but then with a visible small clause subject different from the matrix subject, e.g.
Marit så Jon bade 'Marit saw Jon take a bath'.
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c. Pasienten måtte (ha) blitt behandlet straks.
'The patient had to (have) been treated immidiately.'
d. Begge skulle (ha) reist i morgen.
'Both (of them) should (have) left tomorrow.'
e. Myndighetene ville (ha) revet huset.
'The authorities would (have) demolished the house.'
In each of the sentences in (18), a perfective verb ha, 'have', or være, 'be',  may be inserted
between the modal and the perfect complement, thus numerous authors have considered this
phenomenon to be best described as the workings of a phonological reduction, causing the
phenomenon to be known by the term "ha-stryking", i.e. 'ha-deletion/ha-omission', cf. e.g.
Nordgård and Åfarli (1990:100).
One reason to assume that there is an underlying, phonologically omitted perfective
verb in these instances is exactly the fact that modals normally take infinitival complements,
while the perfect participle should normally be licenced by a perfective verb. Moreover,
several authors have claimed that the reading of the sentence remains the same, with or
without ha, cf. e.g. Faarlund et al. (1997:526) 31. However, Taraldsen (1984) claims that this
is not correct. Note that a prerequisite for ha-omission is that the modal has preterite
morphology; a modal in the present tense disallows a perfect participle complement.
Taraldsen observes that ha-omission is only licit on a counterfactual reading of the modal;
whenever the preterite marking signals 'past', not counterfactuality32, ha-omission is illicit, cf.
(19):
(19)
a. Han krevde at vi skulle *(ha) gjort det innen mandag.
    'He required that we should have done it by Monday.'
Thus, the reading of a modal with a perfect participle complement is always a counterfactual
reading in Norwegian. Furthermore, the readings in (18) are counterfactual readings of root
modals; except for (18)e, which may have an epistemic reading. We return to these
constructions in chapter 5, section 5.3.3.3.
                                                
31 See Wiklund (1998) for a different wiev. In Swedish, the phenomenon ha-deletion affects a wider range of
constructions than in Norwegian; Wiklund (1998:14): "A tensed auxiliary ha can always be ommitted in
subordinate clauses in Swedish, whereas an untensed ha can be omitted if preceded by a modal verb in past tense
[...] Footnote 10: Tensed ha can never be omitted in Norwegian (see Taraldsen 1984). In Swedish it may also
occasionally be omitted in raising contexts (see Hedlund 1992)."
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Unlike their contemporary English counterparts33 and like their German and Dutch
counterparts34, Norwegian modals may take non-verbal complements, particularly adverbs or
preposition phrases denoting directional locatives and resultatives35, cf. (20). Notice that this
property applies to root modals only, as epistemic readings are definitely unavailable in these
constructions (cf. chapter 5, section 5.4.3 for a possible explanation for this fact).
(20)
a. Marit bør hjem.
Marit ought-to home
'Marit should go home.'
b. Jon må på skolen.
Jon must to school
'Jon must go to school.'
c. Greina skal av36.
The branch must off
'The branch must be cut off/in two.'
d. Alle vil tilbake tidlig.
All want-to back early
'Everyone wants to get back early.'
e. Jeg kan ikke på kino likevel.
I can not to cinema anyway
'I cannot go to the cinema anyway.'
According to my own intuitions, these constructions are OK with all modals; however, not all
speakers allow all modals in these constructions. All speakers allow måtte, skulle og ville, but
some speakers do not allow burde37, and some speakers do not allow kunne. Non-standard
                                                                                                                                                        
32 Cf. e.g. Faarlund et al (1997: 575 ff; 587 ff) for the 'modal' uses of preterite in Norwegian, which is
particularly frequent with modals. Fretheim (1977) discusses the 'modal' use of plus perfect in Norwegian.
33 Denison (1993: 305): " Modal+directional adverbial is often used in Germanic languages as if a verb of
motion is to be understood. The usage is virtually dead in Present-day English (consider proverbial murder will
out, or with non-modal WANT the Am[erican] E[nglish] Bugsy wants out) but was common in earlier periods."
34 Of the languages Dutch, German and Norwegian, Dutch allows a greater range of complements than do
German and Norwegian, cf. Barbiers (1999): "I discuss Dutch data only. The construction also exists in German
and Afrikaans, but with more restrictions on the complement of the modal: these languages allow only a subset
of the complements that can occur with a modal in Dutch." Barbiers does not elaborate on the nature of the
differing restrictions. However, I will mention that one difference is the fact that Dutch accepts adjectival small
clause complements. This is unacceptable in Norwegian, and, I believe, German.
35 Faarlund et al. (1997: 527, 582) refer to this phenomenon as reduction, too. The idea is that there exists a
deleted verb of movement in these constructions, which is tantamount to saying that the complement is in fact
verbal after all. We will return to this question in section 3.2.7 (i.e. in Barbiers' proposals).
36 This sentence is ambigous between two readings: a) The branch must be detached; b) The branch must be cut
in two.
37 One reason why burde is disallowed by many speakers is probably that Modal + non-verbal complement
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dialects (specially in the western and northern part of Norway) tend to be more liberal than
standard dialects in the latter respect.
Finally, Thrainsson and Vikner (1995) claim that pseudocleft constructions serve to
distinguish  root modals from epistemic modals in Scandinavian languages, as root modals
allow their complement to be pseudoclefted, whereas epistemic modals do not, cf.(21).
(21)
a. Det eneste du skal, er å legge deg.
   'The only thing you will (do), is to get to bed (root reading)'.
b.  *Det eneste Jon skal, er å ha stjålet en bil.
  ' The only thing Jon is supposed to, is to have stolen a car (epistemic reading).'
c. Det Jon må, er å være hyggelig.
   'What Jon must, is to be nice (root reading).'
d. *Det Jon må, er å være morderen.
  'What Jon must, is to be the killer (epistemic reading).'
In fact, Thrainsson and Vikner's (1995) generalization is inaccurate. Root modals accept a
pseudoclefted complement provided they have a 'two-place' reading (cf.section 2.2.2 above).
In constructions where a proposition-scope reading of the root modal is the natural reading,
they reject a pseudoclefted complement, just like epistemic modals:
(22)
a. *Det en kvinne bør, er å bli vår neste statsminister.
    it   a woman should, is to be our next prime minister.
    (Intended: 'What should happen is that a woman becomes our next prime minister.')
b. *Det apene ikke må, er å mates av besøkende.
    it    the monkeys not must, is to feed-PASSIVE by visitors
               (Intended: 'What must not take place is that the monkeys are fed by visitors.')
These facts are accounted for in section 4.2. Now, we turn to modals in tag questions and
elliptic constructions.
2.3.2 Modals and tags
English modals are characterized by what Huddleston (1976:333) dub the NICE properties,
alluding to the observation that modals take part in syntactic processes where an ordinary
                                                                                                                                                        
typically occurs in oral contexts. Burde, on the other hand, does not belong to the active vocabulary of many
speakers of non-standard dialects.
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lexical verb would require the assistance of a semantically devoid do, the phenomenon known
as 'do-support' (cf. also the quote from Jackendoff 1972:100 above). These properties are
illustrated in (23) and quoted from Palmer (1986:90-91):
(23)
Negative: I can't go vs He doesn't go
Inversion: Must I come? vs Does he go?
'Code': He can swim and so can she  vs He goes and so does she
Emphatic affirmation: He will be there vs He does go
It has sometimes been claimed in the literature on English modals that what has become
known as the NICE properties does not apply equally to root and epistemic modals. More
specifically, epistemic modals have been claimed to be unavailable in interrogative sentences
and topicalized constructions, both of which require subject-auxiliary inversion in English, cf.
e.g. (24); data from Brennan (1997). However, as noted e.g. by Jackendoff (1972), although
epistemic modals typically resist subject-auxiliary inversion, this is not an absolute constraint,
cf.(25); (25)b is taken from Brennan, op.cit. Correspondingly, Jackendoff claims, this should
be considered a semantic restriction, not a syntactic constraint.
(24)
a. Must Carrie leave?
b. Only three people may Mary see.
(25)
a. OK, so John is a thief. Must he therefore be a murderer?
b. Few people must your father have seen, and fewer saw him.
Recall that Norwegian modals behave no differently from other verbs as regards subject-verb
inversion, but the availability of epistemic readings in interrogative or topicalized
constructions seem to be governed by the same semantic restrictions in Norwegian as in
English; i.e. epistemic readings are typically marginal in such constructions, although they are
by no means ruled out.
Norwegian modals behave no differently than other verbs as regards negation,
inversion or emphatic affirmation. Thus, only "code", is relevant in distinguishing Norwegian
modals from lexical verbs. Lexical verbs are replaced by the proverb gjøre 'do' in elliptical
constructions, cf. (26)a, while modals are repeated, cf. (26)b. I.e. in this respect, Norwegian
modals follow the English pattern. Notice also that in this respect, Norwegian modals behave
like Norwegian aspectual auxiliaries, e.g. ha 'have', which are also repeated in these
constructions, cf.(26)c.
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(26)
a. Marit svømmer og det *svømmer/gjør Jon også.
Marit swims and that swims/does Jon too
'Marit swims and so does Jon.'
b. Marit skal svømme og det skal/*gjør Jon også.
Marit shall swim and that shall/does Jon too
'Marit is going to swim and so is Jon.'
c. Marit har svømt og det har/*gjør Jon også. 38
Marit has swum and that has/does Jon too
'Marit has swum and so has Jon.'
A phenomenon closely related to "code" is "tag questions"; hence it is not very  surprising that
modals depart from lexical verbs also in these constructions, cf. (27). Note that once again,
modals pattern with aspectuals.
 (27)
a. Jon går i butikken, *går/gjør han ikke det?
Jon goes in store-DEF, goes/does he not that
'Jon goes to the store, doesn't he?'
b. Jon må gå i butikken, må/*gjør han ikke det?
Jon must go in store-DEF, must/does he not that
John must go to the market, mustn't he?
c. Jon har gått i butikken, har/*gjør han ikke det?
Jon has gone in store-DEF, has/does he not that
John has gone to the market, hasn't he?
Again, in the tag question, the lexical verb occurring in the matrix clause cannot be repeated;
it must be replaced by the pro-verb gjøre; cf.  (27)a.  Modals and aspectuals, on the other
                                                
38 In (26)a, the pro-form det must pertain to the whole VP, including the verb, for the pro-verb gjøre 'do' to be
required. If the proform pertains to only the direct obejct, for instance, one may repeat the lexical verb:
(i) Marit spiser pannekaker og det gjør/spiser Jon også.
Marit eats pancakes an that does/eats Jon too.
'Marit eats pancakes and so does Jon'
In these cases, however, the lexical verb may just as well be replaced by another lexical verb:
Marit spiser pannekaker og det liker Jon også.
Marit eats pancakes and that likes Jon too
'Marit eats pancakes and Jon likes them, too'
The important thing to notice here is that in one case det (that) refers to the whole VP [eats pancakes] while in
the other case, it refers to the direct object [pancakes] only.
Likewise, in(26)c, the sentence Marit har svømt og det gjør Jon også 'Marit has swum as so does Jon' is
possible if the intention is that Jon is presently engaged in the activity of swimming, whereas Marit was formerly
engaged in tis activity. However, the relevant meaning here is that 'Marit has swum and Jon has swum'. On this
reading, the aspectual ha cannot be replaced by gjøre.
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hand, may, and in fact, must be repeated in the tag, in the sense that they may not be replaced
by the proverb gjøre, as shown in  (27)b.
The German counterpart of do-so-ellipsis, VP-pronominalization39, or rather its
unavailability for epistemic modals, was one of Ross' (1969) main arguments for postulating
two different argument structures for root and epistemic modals. Although this may be correct
for German (see Öhlscläger 1989:47), in Norwegian this kind of ellipsis, which resembles the
German VP-pronominalization, is typically available for both root and epistemic modals. VP-
pronominalization of the complement of root and epistemic modals in Norwegian is examined
and discussed in Lødrup (1994) 40, the data in (28)a and b are from Lødrup (1994:2). Note also
that aspectuals allow for this type of ellipsis; cf. (28)c.
(28)
a. Kan du strikke? Ja, jeg kan det.
 can you knit? Yes, I can that
'Do you know how to knit? Yes, I do.'
b. Kan bussen ha kommet nå? Nei, den kan ikke det.
  can the bus have come now? No it can not that
   'May the bus have arrived already? No it may not.'
c. Har bussen kommet nå? Nei, den har ikke det.
    has the bus come now? No it has not that
   'Has the bus arrived already? No it hasn't.'
Likewise, in tag questions, there seems to be little difference between root modals and
epistemic modals, as tag questions are available and felicitous with both types of modals, and
the restriction on gjøre 'do'-replacement holds for epistemic as well as most root modals. That
is, the modal is not replaced by gjøre in tags, unlike lexical verbs. Instead, the modal is
repeated in the tag, and this applies to root modals and epistemic modals alike.
                                                
39 Ross himself referred to this phenomenon as S-deletion.
40 See also Vikner (1988: 10-11) and Thrainsson and Vikner (1995:61): "...it is usually possible in Danish to get
a topicaized object-like det 'it, that' with epistemic modal verbs, although it is much worse when it is not
topicalized [...]:
Han vil være hjemme hele dagen.
 'He will be home all day.
Det vil hun desuden også.
that will she actually too; 'so will she, actually'."
Chapter 2
32
(29)
a. Han skal være en hyggelig fyr, skal han ikke det?
he shall be a nice chap, shall he not that
   'He is supposed to be a nice chap, isn't he?' (epistemic)
b. Marit må være kommet hjem nå, må hun ikke det?
Marit must be come home now, must she not that
  'Marit must have come home (by) now, mustn't she?' (epistemic)
c. Du bør vel dra nå, bør du ikke det?
you should well go now, should you not that
  'You should probably leave now, shouldn't you?' (root)
d. Hun kan gå på kino, kan hun ikke det?
she can go to movie can she not that
   ' She may go to the movies, may she not?' (root)
However, there are two Norwegian root modals that allow for replacement by proverb gjøre
'do' in tags41. These are the two root modals listed as dispositional in 2.2.2 above, ville 'want-
to' and kunne 'can/know'; the latter on the 'mental ablility' reading, cf. (30).
(30)
a. Du vil at han skal komme, vil/gjør du ikke det?
you will that he comes, will/do you not that
'You want him to come, don't you?'
b. Du kan fransk/nasjonalsangen, kan/gjør du ikke det?
you can French/the national anthem, can/do you not that
'You speak French/know the national anthem, don't you?'
These two modals are special in other respects as well. For instance, these are the only two
Norwegian modals that may take proper arguments (i.e. DP or CP) as complements, as seen in
(30) above. Crucially, the proper argument complement is a prerequisite for gjøre-
replacement to be licit. Note that when these modals take infinitival complements, gjøre-
replacement is impossible, and the modal must once again be repeated:
(31)
a.  Du vil komme, vil/*gjør du ikke det?
you want come, want/do you not that
'You want to come, don't you?
                                                
41Not all speakers of Norwegian accept this kind of replacement, however; typically, speakers of non-standard
dialects of Norwegian are more 'liberal' than speakers of standard dialects in this respect. To complicate matters
even further, some speakers accept gjøre-replacement with ville, but not with kunne.
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b. Du kan snakke Fransk, kan/*gjør du ikke?
you can speak French, can/do you not
'You can speak french, can't you?
Recall also that these are the only two modals, root or epistemic, that passivize in Norwegian,
albeit marginally. The data (originally from Lødrup 1996) are repeated here for convenience
as (32):
(32)
a. Leksen må kunnes i morgen.
   The lesson must can-PASSIVE tomorrow
   'You should know your lesson by tomorrow.'
b. Dette må ikke bare ønskes, det må villes.
   This must not only wish-PASSIVE, it must will-PASSIVE
   'You must not only wish this, you must want it.'
Importantly, only in those cases where these two modals behave in a manner reminicent of
ordinary transitive verbs, with an agentive subject and a nominal or clausal direct object, may
they undergo passivization (Öhlschläger 1989:59, footnote 12 makes a similar remark about
German modals). With a bare infinitival complement, passivization is unacceptable. Adding
the infinitival marker å makes the construction slightly better, but it is still dramatically worse
than the sentences in (32));  cf. (33).
(33)
a. * (??Å) sykle må kunnes i morgen.
    to ride a bike must can-PASSIVE tomorrow
    'One must know how to ride a bike tomorrow.'
b. * (??Å) bli danser må ikke bare ønskes, det må villes.
    to become dancer must not only wish-PASSIVE, it must will-PASSIVE
   ' One must not only wish to become a dancer, one must want it.'
Furthermore, recall that the modal kunne 'can' may occur in the imperative, but crucially, only
when it takes a DP complement; cf. (34)a. When it takes an infinitive complement, the
imperative becomes impossible; cf. (34)b:
(34)
a. Kunn dette diktet til imorgen!
  know this poem by tomorrow
   '(You must) Know this poem by tomorrow!'
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b. *Kunn sykle til imorgen!
     know ride-a-bicycle by tomorrow
    '(You must) Know how to ride a bicycle by tomorrow!
That is, kunne and ville accept gjøre-replacement, like lexical verbs, exactly when they take
proper (DP/CP) arguments as complements42. Secondly, they may passivize, like lexical
verbs, exactly when they take proper arguments as complements. Thirdly, the modal kunne
occurs in the imperative exactly when it takes a proper argument DP as a complement.
Crucially, when these modals take infinitival complements, they pattern with the other
modals, not with lexical verbs, in all these respects.
 Thus, at this point, we have two possibilities. Either we are dealing with two pairs of
homonyms kunne 'can' and ville 'want-to', where the versions that accept gjøre-replacement,
passivize and occur in the imperative are in fact lexical transitive verbs. In addition, they have
another version that is grouped with the other modals and with perfect auxiliaries. Or,
alternatively, we are dealing with two modals that display radically different behavior
depending on their complement. I find the latter possibility extremely unlikely and I will
discard it here. Thus, we are left with the assumption that the root modals kunne and ville
have main verb versions. This is exactly what I will propose.
Roberts and Roussou (2000) state that "Šcur (1968) (cited in Plank 1984) points out
dialectal examples where can and will survive as lexical verbs [...]". Evidently, this is the case
even in Norwegian. The Norwegian cognates of can and will; i.e. kunne and ville, display
main verb-like behavior exactly when they take a proper argument, that is, exactly when they
function like ordinary transitive verbs. The reason for this, I claim, is that they are in fact
ordinary transitive verbs.
Thus, I want to assume that the modals kunne and ville come in main verb versions,
which accept gjøre-replacement, passivize, and w.r.t. kunne, occur in the imperative. It is
implied by this statement that I consider the second version of kunne and ville, which take
infinitival complements and pattern with other modals and perfect auxiliaries, as non-main
verbs; hence, as modal auxiliaries.
Since the "tags-test" has proven useful to separate a main verb version of kunne and
ville from an auxiliary version, I propose that this test can be utilized to determine the status
of modals with non-verbal small clause complements as well. It has sometimes been argued
(cf. Barbiers 1995) that the modal in these constructions must be a main verb, since there is
                                                
42 I should mention that not all speakers allow for gjøre-replacement in the case of kunne.
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no other verbal predicate of which the modal may be an auxiliary. However, the gjøre-
replacement test shows that the modal in these constructions is in fact an auxiliary as well:
(35)
a. Jon må hjem, må/*gjør han ikke det?
    Jon must home, must/does he not that
   'Jon must go home, mustn't he?'
b. Marit vil på kino, vil/*gjør hun ikke det?
   Marit wants to movie, wants she not that
  'Marit wants to go to the movies, doesn't she?'
This means that a Norwegian modal auxiliary accepts non-verbal small clause complements
in addition to verbal complements. The tags-test, supported by the passive and imperative
data, shows that there exist modal main verbs in addition to modal auxiliaries. Furthermore,
the same test shows that modals with non-verbal small clause complements are auxiliaries,
even though there is no main verb to which they could be an auxiliary. Norwegian grammar
does evidently not distinguish categorically between modals with non-verbal small clause
complements and modals with infinitival comeplements, judging from the gjøre-replacement
test. However, whenever a modal kunne or ville occurs with a DP/CP complement,
Norwegian grammar recognizes the modal as a transitive main verb instead of a modal
auxiliary.
A note of caution is in order. With ordinary lexical verbs, gjøre-replacement is
obligatory. This is not the case with the main verb versions of kunne and ville, since even
when they function as main verbs, gjøre-replacement is not obligatory. I have no explanation
for this fact. Nevertheless, the passive and imperative data lend strong support to the
hypothesis that there exist modal main verbs i Norwegian.
2.3.3 Summing up our findings so far
Summing up the syntactic properties of Norwegian modals that we have examined in this
section, we find that these properties can be collected into three different bundles. There are
properties that apply to all modals (whereof some do not apply to most other verbs), there are
properties that apply to root modals only, and there are properties that apply to the modal
main verbs kunne 'can' and ville 'want-to' only.
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Syntactic properties of Norwegian modals:
Pertaining to all modals:
a. Modals resist replacement by the pro-verb gjøre in elliptical constructions like "do-
    so" constructions and tag-questions (exception: main verb modals kunne and ville)
    However, modals accept VP-pronominalization  of their infinitival complement.
b. Modals take bare infinitival complements (without the infinitival marker å43).
c. Modals with preterite morphology take perfect complements on a counterfactual
    reading.
d. Modals lack present participles.
Pertaining to root modals but not to epistemic modals:
e. Root modals take small clause adverbial directional locatives as complements.
f. The complement of a root modal may be pseudoclefted if it has a directed deontic
    reading.
Pertaining to modal main verbs kunne and ville only:
h. kunne and ville take proper arguments as complements (kunne:DP; ville:CP)
g. kunne and ville accept replacement of proverb gjøre 'do' in elipsis.
i. kunne and ville may marginally passivize (and kunne occurs in the imperative).
2.4 Summary and revised inventory
2.4.1 Examining our results
Although Norwegian and other Scandinavian modals are not as different from other (or
lexical) verbs as their English counterparts, there exist certain properties that apply to modals
and not to (most) other Norwegian verbs. Summing up the morphological, semantic and
syntactic characteristics of Norwegian modals, what serves to morphologically distinguish
modals from most other verbs in Norwegian is that modals are preterite-present verbs. Only
one (main verb) modal employs an imperative form. Root modals are more comfortable with
                                                
43 There exist constructions where this marker is obligatory even for a "complement of a modal",  notably
pseudoclefts, that constitute an exception to this generalization:
(i) Det du skal, er å legge deg.   'What  you should (do), is to get to bed'
(ii) Noe du virkelig kan, er å strikke.    'Something you really can (do), is to knit'
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nonfinite forms, although there exist infinitival epistemic modals, as well as epistemic
readings of perfect participle modals (in non-standard dialects). As the major semantic
characteristic of Norwegian modals, we listed that all modals have both root readings and
epistemic readings.
As regards other semantic, as well as syntactic properties of Norwegian modals, we
have seen that there are several properties that apply to some modals and not to others. This
awareness is crucial. Without an accurate semantic and syntactic description, important
premises for our analysis would be merely conjectures. Several works on modals are flawed
by the author's tendency to support his or her analysis by invoking some property found with
some modals only, with the implicit or explicit assumption that this property carries over to
all modals. As an important example we could mention that it has often been assumed that
root modals denote two-place relations whereas epistemic modals denote one-place
predicates. We have seen that this is not correct. Although epistemic modals always have one-
place predicate readings and dispositional modals are always two-place relations, any deontic
modal may be construed as either a one-place or a two-place predicate. Likewise,  there are
several syntactic properties that apply to some modals only.
As a result of our investigation so far, we may sum up the semantic and syntactic
characteristics of Norwegian modals in a figure like the following (note that main verb
modals have no present participle either, although this is suggested by the figure):
Semantics
Syntax:
Two-place
reading only
Two-place
reading only
Two-place &
one-place
reading
One-place
reading only
Imperative;
Accepts
do-replacement;
Takes proper
arguments;
Passivizes
 kunne main
kunne main
ville   main
Takes Advp/PP
complements;
Accepts pseudo-
clefted
complement;
Takes bare
infinitival
complements;
ModalPRET takes
perfect
complement;
Lacks present
participle;
Deontic
root:
burde
kunne
måtte
skulle
Epistemic
burde
kunne
måtte
skulle
ville
Dispositional
root:
kunneABILITY
ville
kunne main
ville main
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At this point, let us review the landscape of Norwegian modals once more. So far, we have
reached the conclusion that there exist main verb modals and modal auxiliaries. Furthermore,
among the modal auxiliaries, we have epistemic (encompassing epistemic and evidential)
modals, and root modals, encompassing deontic and dispositional modals. This gives us a
picture like the following:
(36)
       Norwegian modals
Modal main verbs               Modal auxiliaries
 Kunne 'know'
 Ville 'want-to'
Root Epistemic (wide sense)
Deontic Dispositional  Evidential           Epistemic
Burde 'should' Kunne 'can/know' Skulle 'be supposed to'     Burde 'should'
Måtte 'must'44 Ville 'want to'       Måtte 'must'
Kunne 'may'                   Kunne 'may'
Skulle 'be required to'       Ville 'will'
2.4.2 Three potential candidates
There are three verbs that keep popping up as possible 'modal candidates' in my investigation
of Norwegian modals. These verbs are få 'get', behøve 'need', and trenge 'need'. We will
consider each of these candidates. Note that the latter two have very similar properties.
                                                
44 One use of måtte that has not been mentioned at all in this investigation, is the 'hypothetical' use, where måtte
is used like a subjunctive marker; e.g. ...de situasjoner som måtte oppstå  'those situations that might occur',
...når det måtte bli aktuelt  'when it turns out to be due; i.e. in due time' , ...den som måtte ha noe å innvende,
'those who might want to object'. This use of this modal is mentioned in Faarlund, Lie and Vannebo (1997: 603)
as somewhat rare, but in fact, I have noticed that politicians use it quite frequently. This specific reading of måtte
expresses potentiality or possibillity, and it is tempting to compare this situation to the situation in Danish, where
there are two different uses of måtte. The Danish modal måtte notably displays two distinct (root) readings; one
denoting permission and one denoting obligation (cf. Vikner 1988:5); the version denoting permission does not
have an epistemic reading. However, the 'potential' reading of the Norwegian modal måtte is confined to
constructions like the ones mentioned; where måtte seems to work shift as a subjunctive, and it never denotes
permission. Falk and Torp ([1903-06] 1992:491) describes the meaning of potentiality as a third, distinct
meaning in old Norse, in addition to permission (which is retained in Danish) and necessity; which is a later
development than 'permission'. They further describe the potentiality reading as lost; a claim that needs to be
modified, since this reading is certainly retained in 'subjunctive' surroundings. On the other hand, one may agree
that it is a relict, as it needs exactly these surroundings to give the reading of potentiality.
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Få is mentioned in Faarlund et al. (1997:528) as a verb with 'clearly a modal meaning'
(cf. also Lødrup, 1996:fn. 2). It seems to belong to the deontic modals semantically (see van
der Auwera, 1999 for the Swedish modal få), in that it frequently expresses permission, and in
general, få is interchangeable with permissive kunne 'can'. Like the 'proper' modals, it lacks a
present participle (*fående), it takes bare infinitival complements (cf.(37) a), and it may take a
perfect participle as a complement (cf. (37)b). Moreover, like all root modals, it accepts a
pseudoclefted complement (c), and it may take an AdvP/PP complement (d). It also has the
core properties of main verb modals, in that it passivizes (e), takes proper arguments (f), and
accepts do-replacement; the latter most readily when it has a proper argument complement,
like the main verb modals. It allows for a two-place predicate reading (a) as well as a one-
place predicate reading (g), like the deontic modals. Finally, it employs the imperative (h). In
short, it seems to have nearly all properties of main verb modals and modal auxiliaries.
(37)
 a. Fikk du gå på kino?
   got you go to cinema
  'Did you get to go to the movies?'
b. Jeg fikk skiftet olje på bilen45.
    I got changed oil on car-DEF
   'I had an oil change on my car.'
c. Det eneste Jon får, er å gjøre lekser.
   the only-thing Jon gets, is to do his homework
  ' The only thing Jon gets to do, is his homework.'
d. Han fikk ut i verden for å lære (from Faarlund et al 1997).
   he got out in world-DEF to learn
  'He got to travel around the world to learn.'
e. Billetter fås ved inngangen.
    tickets get-PASSIVE at the entrance
   ' One can get tickets at the entrance.'
f. Marit får ikke kake/kjøre, får/gjør hun?
   Marit get not cake/drive, get/does she
   'Marit doesn't get cake/to drive, does she?'
                                                
45 Although this is not mentioned in Faarlund et al. (1997),  få  is actually somewhat different from modals in
this particular respect. Remember that modals must have preterite morphology to take a perfect participle as a
complement. Not so for få, cf. (i)
(i) Jeg får skiftet olje på bilen.
'I am getting an oil change in my car'
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g. Det får komme ti gjester i fødselsdagen din.
   there get come ten guests in birthdayDEF your
   'There may come ten guests to your birthday.'
h. Få deg en jobb!
    get you a job
   'Get yourself a job!'
However, it is a well-known fact among Norwegian lingusts that få is used in so many
different meanings in Norwegian that it would be surprising if at least one of the uses did not
turn up with the 'right' property in each case, which amounts to saying that the data in (37) are
best described as a display of several different, homonymous verbs with varying properties.
Thus, there exists an ordinary transitive verb få meaning 'receive' ((37) e and the first reading
of f),  an 'active' verb få meaning roughly 'achieve, manage to' (one possible reading of (37)b,
also, (37)h), a non-active verb få ((37) b and d) meaning that the event denoted by the
complement VP takes place to the advantage or disadvantage of the subject (cf. Lødrup
1996b), in addition to the få that resembles the deontic modal kunne, meaning 'be allowed'
(which is the reading of (37) a, c, g and the second reading of f).
Obviously, the fact that the form få corresponds to a range of different verbs is not in
and by itself enough to dismiss it from the class of modals. However, there is another major
flaw jeopardizing the candidacy of få as a modal, notably that it seems impossible to get
epistemic readings with this verb46. Now, since we have listed this as an important semantic
feature of modals - in fact, the only property distinguishing all modals from other verbs - I am
reluctant to count få among the proper modals; in fact too reluctant to admit to få membership
in the class of Norwegian modals.
The next two candidates that should be examined are behøve and trenge, both mean
'need' (mentioned in Faarlund et al. 1997:600; Thráinsson and Vikner 1995:54 mention
Danish behøve; van der Auwera 1999:11 mentions Danish behøve, Dutch hoeven and German
brauchen). These two verbs have some interesting properties. For starters, they evidently have
very differing properties, depending on whether or not they are used in combination with
negation ikke 'not'. The non-negated use have less auxiliary-like or modal-like properties. For
instance, this is very striking when it comes to possible one-place or two-place readings, as
                                                
46 One possible exception is (i):
(i) Det får bli deg som blir vår neste statsminister.
It get become you who become our next prime minister
'I guess you should be our nexct prime minister'
However, my intuition is that this is still a permissive reading. And anyhow, this is the only construction where I
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the negated version may have one-place (i.e. non-directed deontic) readings  as well as two-
place (directed deontic) readings, while the non-negated version has only the latter, cf. (38).
(38)
a. Du trenger/behøver ikke (å) pakke den inn.
    you need                 not pack it in
    'You need not wrap it/There is no need to wrap it.'
b. Du trenger/behøver * (å) pakke den inn47.
    you need                to pack it in
     'You need to wrap it/ #It is necessary to wrap it.'
The difference between the negated and non-negated version of behøve/trenge is also striking
in their ability to take bare infinitival complements, as the negated version optionally takes
bare infinitivals or infinitivals with the infinitival marker å, while the non-negated version
takes only the latter, cf. (38) (see also Johannessen, 1998:87). Perfect participle complements
are dubious with both negated and non-negated versions; likewise, AdvP/PP complements are
marginal in standard dialects, but OK in some non-standard dialects. For the latter property
there is once again a difference. Though AdvP/PP complements are unacceptable for both the
negated and the non-negated versions in the standard dialects of Norwegian, the difference is
striking as regards the degree of acceptability (cf. (39)a vs. b). Again, the negated version is
definitely better than the non-negated version; i.e. the negated version displays more of a
modal-like behavior. Both versions accept do-replacement, unlike the deontic modals, but the
negated version seems more ready to allow for repetition in tags (c vs. d). Both versions take
proper arguments as complements (e), both versions accept pseudoclefted complements (f),
both versions may marginally passivize (g). Note that in all these uses, non-negated behøve
sounds more archaic than non-negated trenge for most Norwegian speakers. Both negated and
non-negated versions are equally good or bad as present participles, since trenge does employ
a present participle, whereas behøve does not (trengende, *behøvende).
(39)
a. ?Du behøver/trenger ikke på skolen i dag.
     you need not to school today
    'You need not go to school today.'
                                                                                                                                                        
have found anything resembling an epistemic reading of this verb.
47 Actually, although behøve is quite fine in its negated version, many speakers would never use it in its non-
negated version at all, since it has a very archaic ring to it.  Trenge on the other hand seems quite fine in both
versions, negated or non-negated.
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b. * Du behøver/trenger på skolen i dag.
      you need    to school today
      'You need to go to school today.'
c.  Jon trenger/behøver ikke (å) spise først, gjør/trenger/behøver han vel?
                 Jon need                  not (to) eat first, does/need he well (=disc.particle)
     'Jon need not eat first, does he?'
d. Jon trenger/behøver å spise først, gjør/trenger/??behøver han ikke?
         Jon needs to eat first, does needs                  he not
   'Jon needs to eat first, doesn't he?'
e. Du trenger/behøver (ikke) denne sprøyten.
               you need                  (not)  this injection
   'You (don't) need this injection.'
f. Det eneste Jon (ikke) trenger/behøver, er denne sprøyten.
   the only     Jon  (not) need                   is this injection
   'The only thing Jon (doesn't) need(s) is this injection.'
g. Det trengs/?behøves (ikke) mer lys her.
               there   need-PASSIVE more light here
   'We need more light here.'
In short, the negated versions of trenge/behøve definitely show more modal-like behavior
than their non-negated counterparts, although they seem dubious as regards some of the
syntactic properties associated with modals. The final and perhaps crucial reason to dismiss
non-negated trenge/behøve as possible modals is that they do not have any epistemic reading,
unlike their negated versions, cf. (40).
(40)
a.  Jon trenger/behøver ikke (å) være morderen.
   ' Jon need not be the killer (epistemic/root reading OK).'
b. Jon trenger/behøver å være morderen.
    'Jon needs to be the killer (i.e. non-epistemic reading only).'
Summing up, there are two good reasons in the semantic domain to support the hypothesis
that trenger ikke/behøver ikke 'need not' are modals. Firstly, they have both root readings and
epistemic readings (which is a crucial feature separating modals from other verbs), and
secondly, they have both one-place (non directed deontic) and two-place (directed deontic)
readings.  The syntactic property that first and foremost supports the candidacy of these two
verbs as modals is their ability to take bare infinitivals. The gjøre-replacement facts and the
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ability to take AdvP/PP complements seem less clearcut, but as we have seen, even here
negated trenge/behøve makes a much stronger case than its non-negated counterpart48.
As mentioned above, negated trenge/behøve are able to take proper arguments, they
may passivize, and they accept do-replacement, like their non-negated versions. In the
investigation of Norwegian modals above, we pointed out that these are properties normally
associated with transitive verbs, and that modals with proper argument complements therefore
should be considered transitive lexical verbs. Does that mean that negated trenge/behøve
should be considered transitive lexical verbs too? Not exclusively. Remember that non-
negated trenge/behøve have all the properties of lexical transitive verbs. There is of course no
reason to believe that there exists a ban against negating these two transitive verbs, and that
the transitive verb properties should not carry over to the negated version. Thus, exactly the
main verb version of negated trenge/behøve obligatorily has the two-place reading, e.g. when
negated trenge/behøve take proper arguments as complements, the two-place reading is the
only possible reading. But in addition, the negated version of trenge/behøve has aquired
certain modal-like or, if one prefers, auxiliary-like properties, like e.g. the epistemic reading,
which is of course unavailable in those instances where negated trenge/behøve function as
transitive verbs (in the passive or when taking proper arguments).
There exists yet another, more global reason to count the auxiliary-like version of
trenger ikke/behøver ikke as modals. This is the fact that many languages, i.e. Germanic,
Romance, other Indo-European languages as well as non-Indo-European languages, employ a
similar negated modal. Öhlschläger (1989:3) gives a list of authors that have treated (nicht)
brauchen as a modal in German, and Roberts and Roussou (2000) claim in fn. 4 that "[M]odal
need is a negative polarity item in present-day English".
Furthermore, van der Wouden (1996) examines the properties of the 'Negative Polarity
Items' German brauchen, Dutch hoeven and English need, while van der Auwera (1999)
studies 'negative modals' across a wide range of languages. Particularly van der Wouden
(1996) investigates the striking fact that in a lot of these languages, the 'negative modal'
displays a range of semantic and syntactic properties different from their non-negated
counterpart, such as lack of agreement, the ability to take bare infinitival complements, and/or
specific readings.
                                                
48 Faarlund et al. (1997) and Thrainnson and Vikner (1995) fail to observe that there are important differences
between the negated and the non-negated version of behøve (trenge), although all their examples employ the
negated version only.  Faarlund et al. (1997) is in part sharply criticized by Johannessen (1998) for not observing
the obvious rule that negation is what triggers the possibilty to omit the infinitival marker å.
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The 'functionalist' as well as the 'formal semantic' explanation for the development of
such negative modals is that there is in some sense a gap in the paradigm for deontic modals.
The reason for this is that the combination of måtte 'must' (and other modals denoting
something like 'necessity') with negation renders the scopal relation between the modal and
the negation ambigous:
(41)
Marit må ikke gå ut.
'Marit must not go outside.'
I. What Marit must do is [not [ go out]]].       ¬p
II. It is not the case that Marit [must[go out]].      ¬p
In many languages, the latter sense may be expressed by a specialized negative polarity item
meaning something like need.
All in all, in my opinion, trenger ikke/behøver ikke makes a much stronger case for
modal status than the first candidate,  få. This is the case in spite of the fact that få seems to
have nearly all syntactic properties associated with all types of root modals. Its major
shortcoming, however, is that it does not allow for an epistemic reading, unlike trenger
ikke/behøver ikke. I will opt for the solution that the latter two should in fact be considered
true modals in Norwegian,  although they lack certain properties that are normally associated
with modals. They belong to the deontic modals in their root reading, and their epistemic
reading is, informally49: It is not the case that [it must be true that [p]]. In addition, these two
modals have 'lexical dublets', that are simply the negated transitive verbs trenge and behøve.
This complicates the picture a great deal, but for the purpose of accuracy, we include trenger
ikke/behøver ikke in our investigation as well.
2.4.3 Revised inventory
At this point, we revise our inventory so as to include the two new members of the class of
Norwegian modals. Hence, the following picture of Norwegian modals is equal to the figure
in (36) in all relevant resepects, except that we have added the two new members trenger ikke
and behøver ikke in the deontic domain and the epistemic domain. For the sake of exposition
and clarification, we have also added their lexical Doppelgänger in the set of main verb
modals. However, the only reason for counting trenge and behøve as 'modal main verbs' is the
                                                
49 Cf. section 4.6 for a fuller description of the semantics of these modals.
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fact that they have modal auxiliary versions; or rather, the negated versions of these two main
verbs have deontic root counterparts.
(42)
       Norwegian modals
Modal main verbs                 Modal auxiliaries
Kunne 'know'
Ville 'want-to'
Trenge'need'
Behøve 'need' Root Epistemic (wide sense)
Deontic Dispositional  Evidential           Epistemic
Burde 'should' Kunne 'can/know' Skulle 'be supposed to'       Burde 'should'
Måtte 'must' Ville 'want to'         Måtte 'must'
Kunne 'may'                    Kunne 'may'
Skulle 'be required to'        Ville 'will'
Ikke trenge 'need not'           Ikke trenge 'need not'
Ikke behøve 'need not'          Ikke behøve 'need not'
Of these modals, one might quite justifiably claim that the main verb modals should be left
out of the remainder of the investigation, since they are not modal auxiliaries. However, since
so many authors have argued for specific analyses based on the properties of two of these
modals, notably kunne and ville, it is important to be aware of their position in this picture.
Thus, we will include them in our inventory of Norwegian modals even in what follows.
3 A Survey of recent proposals
3.1 Some central notions
As mentioned in the introduction (section 1.1), the literature on modals covers a wide range of
topics. In the following survey of recent proposals, I will focus on two questions in particular.
Firstly; whether or not the author suggest that modals assign a semantic role to their subjects,
and secondly, whether or not the author proposes a specific (base generated) insertion site for
the modal. As a preliminary to this discussion, I address the two notions theta role (θ−role)
and functional projection, two theoretical constructions within the Principles and Parameters
Theory (the P&P framework) that have proven themselves to be particularly important within
the literature on modals.
3.1.1 Theta roles
Most of the works quoted in the following survey of recent literature on modals is conducted
within the P&P framework.  In this literature, a much debated question has been the argument
structure and the theta-properties of modals; specifically: Do modals assign theta-roles or not?
Hence, an important issue is how to understand the term theta-role (θ−role), since our
conception of this term will influence on how we may choose to answer this question.
Unfortunately, most authors investigating the possible θ−properties of modals never address
explicitly the semantic nature of the theta-roles potentially present in modal constructions, but
I will present here some widely held assumptions that serve as an implicit background for
most of the proposals in this survey.
For linguists studying the relation between verbs and their arguments, a crucial
question has always been whether or not it is possible to make semantic generalizations about
(NP/DP) arguments occurring in the same position of different verbs, e.g. if there exists
anything like prototypical subjects (e.g. agent) or prototypical objects (e.g. patient),
displaying specific properties that might be attributed to the subject-position and the object-
position respectively. A much quoted hypothesis on this topic within the P&P framework is
Baker's (1988) Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH), which proposes a one-
to-one relation between syntactic configurations and semantic roles. A more recent, non-
Chomskyan, approach to this question, an approach known as Construction Grammar (cf. e.g.
Goldberg 1995), represents what might be seen as one extreme of the continuum of views on
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this question, in that it argues that proto-properties of specific argument positions stem from
the mental existence of so-called (argument structure) constructions; i.e. "form-meaning
correspondences that exist independently of particular verbs. That is, [...] constructions
themselves carry meaning, independently of the words in the sentence. (p.1)"  Within such an
approach, the verb itself is seen as an element that might enrich the construction, but it is not
the verb that is primarly responsible for the given proto-properties (or thematic properties) of
specific argument positions in a specific construction, since the the semantic properties of any
position in a given construction will be (to a large extent) predetermined.
At the other extreme in the aforementioned continuum of views, we find works like
Marantz (1984), who argues for Individual Thematic Roles (term due to Dowty 1991); i.e. that
the thematic (i.e. semantic) roles assigned by a specific verb is unique to that particular verb;
cf. e.g. Marantz (1984:31):
[...] each semantic role assigner may, in principle, assign a unique role or a unique set
of roles. For example, although their logical objects are both things acted upon so that
they move, throw and push need not assign precisely the same semantic role; that is,
the throwee and pushee roles may be distinct1.
A recent work dealing with argument structure and thematic roles is Arad (1998). In her
survey of various theories of lexical specification, she states the following (p. 21):
The term thematic relations is introduced by Gruber (1965) to refer to the
interpretation of NP arguments. These relations include, primarily, a theme, that is the
NP which is understood as going through some motion (hence the term thematic
relations), as well as agent, location, goal, source (among others). Further
developments of these relations are in Fillmore (1968)2 and Jackendoff (1972).
Arad herself choses to deal with theta-roles in aspectual terms. She concludes that there exist
syntactically encoded theta-roles, but roles of a more abstract kind than what has often been
assumed (p.59):
                                                
1 Marantz does not entirely dismiss terms such as 'agent' and 'theme', as he still sees them as "semantic role
classes". However, these classes are not linked to positions such as the subject or direct object position (p. 31):
"Nevertheless, although semantic role assigners may assign their own unique roles, there are, apparently,
linguistically significant classes of semantic roles. I consider terms like 'agent' and 'theme' as naming such
classes. On this view there is no reason to exclude a given semantic role, say that role assigned by swim down
the river, from being both an agent and a theme, that is, from belonging to more than one semantic class." And
he continues in footnote 6: "Alternatively, these terms may be seen as naming features of semantic roles. For
example, the logical subject of run in Elmer ran away from the rabid porcupine might be [+agent], since Elmer
is an active participant of the running, and [+theme], since Elmer undergoes a change of state (from a position
near the rabid porcupine to a position farther away).
2 Goldberg (1995:6 ff) states that "Construction Grammar has grown largely out of work on frame semantics
Fillmore (1975,1977,1982, 1985)[...]"; the basic tenet of Construction Grammar is developed in Fillmore and
Kay (1993), Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988), Lakoff (1987), Brugman (1988), and Lambrecht (1994).
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Aspect, or event structure, is that part of a verb's meaning which is relevant for its
interface with syntax. Thematic roles are best characterized in aspectual terms.
Building on Dowty's two proto-roles, I will take the proto-agent role to be an
Originator of an event, and the proto-patient to be a Measurer of an event. Some part
of the mening of a verb, in particular, the part which is related to its event structure, is
given by the syntax in which the verb is projected. Syntactic positions themselves are
associated with some aspectual interpretation which is assigned to arguments by virtue
of occupying that position3.
Within the literature on modals in the Chomskyan framework, authors typically remain silent
on the specific theta-role potentially assigned by a modal. This is a practice not restricted to
works on modals;  it is quite common to invoke the term theta-role (or θ−role) without ever
going into the specific role (agent, patient, experiencer etc.) one has in mind. In fact, it is not
necessarily seen as part of θ-theory itself to address this type of question, cf. e.g. Culicover
(1997:21):
The θ−roles assigned by a given lexical item form part of the lexical entry of that item
in the Lexicon. [...] The question of what these θ−roles are, how they differ from one
another, and what the possible θ−roles are is not generally taken to be the
responsibility of θ−theory in a narrow sense. The function of  θ−theory is to explain
the syntax of θ−roles, that is, to explain how syntactic structure determines the
assignment of θ−roles to particular constituents of the sentence. For example,
θ−theory seeks to show how the object θ−role of a verb is assigned to the direct object,
without accounting for the fact that the object θ−role of one verb (say arrest) is
different from that of another verb (say resemble).
Two core ingredients of theta-theory within the Government and Binding (GB)-variety of the
P&P framework are the two principles known as the Projection Principle and the Theta-
criterion (Chomsky 1981: 29,36). Since several of the proposals included in the survey are
cast in a GB-version of P&P, I state these two principles below to facilitate a better
understanding of the analyses described4:
The Projection principle:
Representations at each syntactic level (i.e., LF, and D- and S-structure) are projected
from the lexicon, in that they observe the subcategorization properties of lexical items.
                                                
3 Arad investigates what types of theta-roles that are relevant for syntactic realization, e.g. (p 261): "Experiencers
have no relevance for syntactic realization. [...] any argument can be interpreted as an experiencer under certain
circumstances. (p. 225): [m]aking reference to the "experiencer" in the theta-grid is misleading. (p 124): ...we did
not come across any evidence which indicates that agents and causers are in different structural positions. I
suggest that we should distinguish not between agents and causers as such, but between predicates selecting for
an agent and predicates which allow a causer."
4 The Theta-criterion is retained in the Minimalist Program version of P&P, although the Projection Principle
(and the level of D-structure) is by and large abandoned; cf. Chomsky (1995a:188-189).
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The Theta-criterion:
Each argument bears one and only one θ−role, and each θ−role is assigned to one and
only one argument.
The projection principle simply states that (subcategorized) θ-roles cannot disappear or be
added during the course of a syntactic derivation. The theta-criterion (or θ-criterion) states
that the relationship between arguments and theta-roles is 1:1. Particularly the latter principle,
the theta-criterion, has proven to be an important issue within the recent literature on modals.
Within this literature, it is a widely held assumption that root modals, as opposed to
epistemic modals, display a θ-relation to their subject; i.e. that the root modal, perhaps
obligatorily, assigns a semantic role to its subject. E.g. in the sentence John must stay in his
office there is a 'must-relation' between the complement stay in his office and the subject John,
such that John is the one who must something. Since the complement lexical verb or predicate
(in this case, stay in his office) is taken to assign a theta role to this subject as well, one has to
come up with some kind of story to avoid violating the aforementioned θ-criterion, i.e. to
avoid a situation where the one argument John receives two theta-roles. A much preferred
approach of this kind is to analyze root modals as control verbs, whereas epistemic modals are
analysed as rasing verbs. This is meant to capture the intuition that epistemic modals do not
seem to assign a θ−role to their subject, a property attributed to raising verbs in general (cf.
also the disussion on root modals as two-place predicates and epistemic modals as one-place
predicates referred to in section 2.2.2). This can be illustrated as in  (1) below.
(1)
θ         θ
a. DPSUBJ    MVROOT     [ PRO       V ...]  =  control verb
           Jon             må                          være på kontoret  (obligation)
           Jon       must   be     in office-DEF
'John must stay in his office'
        θ
b.   e             MVEP      [  DPSUBJ   V...]   = raising verb
             JonI             må             tI             være på kontoret  (it must be the case that)
             Jon          must        be in his office
 'John must be in his office'
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In the control structure, the base-generated subject of the modal obligatorily controls or gives
reference to the PRO subject of the main verb. In the raising structure, the base-generated
subject of the main verb raises to fill the subject position of the modal, but the relation
between the modal and the subject in the latter case is purely a syntactic relation which does
not signal an underlying semantic (θ-) relation.
We will subject this hypothesis to scrutiny in section 4.1. In the exposition of earlier
proposals in section 3.2, we will look into how different authors position their analysis w.r.t.
the 'control vs. raising' analysis of root and epistemic modals.
3.1.2 Functional projections
One might quite rightfully claim that one very central issue within P&P in the nineties has
been the possible inventory of functional projections.  Here Epstein  et al. (1996:11 ff):
A standard distinction exists in linguistic theory between contentful elements and
functional elements. Word stems are contentful elements, whereas inflectional
morphemes are functional elements. [...] In the Government and Binding framework,
the distinction between contentful (or lexical) elements gradually took the following
shape. Functional elements are generated as heads of independent phrasal projections.
[...]The functional heads [...] consist of features associated with inflectional
morphology.
The major 'piece de resistance' in a theory of functional projections has been the assumption
that the inventory of functional categories and thereby the inventory of functional projections
should be universal. Cinque (1999:52):
If we ignore agreement and negation, the partial relative orders of functional heads for
which there is overt evidence[...5] in different languages appear to be compatible with
a single overall order. Thus, putting the partial relative orders of functional heads
found into a single, more comprehensive, order seems to provide no contradiction, at
least in a more careful examination. I take this to be significant, that is, nonaccidental.
In the interpretation I suggest, this is so because the partial orders found overtly in
different languages are subsequences of a single universal sequence of functional
heads, present in all languages.
Numerous authors have disagreed with this hypothesis. An early protest is found in Iatridou
(1990:552):
The question that arises at that point is more general: are data from one language in
favor of a functional projection sufficient for us to postulate that the same functional
category exists in all languages? If the null hypothesis is that all languages are
                                                
5 Cinque argues that this overt evidence is of one of the following four kinds: The order of "non-closing"
(agglutinating) suffixes, the order of "closing" (inflectional) suffixes and auxiliaries, the order of functional
particles, and the order of various combinations of these elements in mixed cases.
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maximally alike, the answer is yes [...]. However, it unavoidably leads to an explosion
of functional categories.
And such an "explosion" of functional categories has indeed taken place, cf. Cinque
(1999:106) 6:
[T]he functional structure of the clause that we arrive at [...] is very rich; at first sight,
outrageously rich:
The universal hierarchy of clausal functional projection (a second approximation)
[ franklyMoodspeech act [ fortunatelyMoodevaluative [ allegedly Moodevidental
[ probably Moodepistemic [ once T(Past) [ thenT(Future) [ perhaps Moodirrealis
[ necessarily Modnecessity [possibly Modpossibility [usually Asphabitual
[ again Asprepetitive (I) [ often Aspfrequentative (I) [ intentionally Modvolitional
[ quickly Aspcelerative (I)  [ already T(Anterior) [ no longer Aspterminative [ still Aspcontinuative
[ always Aspperfect (?) [ just Aspretrospective [ soon Aspproximative
[ briefly Aspdurative [ characteristically(?) Aspgeneric/progressive [ almost Aspprospective
[ completetly AspSgCompletive (I) [ tutto AspPlCompletive [ well Voice [ fast/early
Aspcelerative(II) [ again Asprepetitive (II) [ often Aspfrequentative(II) [completetly AspSgCompletive(II)
To maintain such a rich, hierarchally fixed inventory of functional projections, authors have
come up with various ways of accounting for the fact that no language seems to overtly
employ all functional heads in Cinque's list. Roberts and Roussou (2000):
Let us notate a functional feature F that requires a PF-realisation [i.e. a phonological
realisation] as F*. Parametrisation is seen as the random assignment of the diacritic *
to features typically associated with functional heads. Where the diacritic is assigned
to a feature, that feature, F*, must have a PF realisation. Again, * is assigned to F in
the lexicon, following Borer's (1984) idea that parametric variation is a facet of the
lexicon. The overall conception of the lexicon, then, is that it contains the following
elements:
a. Lexical items, specified as +/-V, +/-N, with PF and LF properties given.
b. Substantive universals encoded as interpretable features of functional heads.
c. * assigned in a language-particular fashion to (b).
 [...] Notice that under this view of variation there is no selection among the universal
set of features. In other words, all languages have the same set of functional features;
what varies is whether and how these features are realised in PF. This seems to be the
null hypothesis and is in principle open to falsification, although Cinque's (1999)
results suggests that the null hypothesis is correct. Thus there is no parametric
variation in this respect.
                                                
6 And still, this list leaves out some potential important functional heads menitoned elsewhere; p.(90): "All in all,
there is some evidence that the different classes of root modal adverbs [...] enter into a systematic relation with
the three distinct root modals isolated above, thus justifying the postulation of three distinct root modal
projections, in the order: ...>Modvolition > Modobligation > Modability/permission..."
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However, there are various ways in which authors have imagined this scenario. Say, e.g. that
one would concede that 'there is no selection among the universal set of features'. One could
still imagine that one overt element (e.g. a verb) could realize more than one functional head
by means of insertion into one head and subsequent movement to another (e.g. Roberts and
Roussou 2000). There is also another possible option where two or more features could be
spelled out by the same head, cf. e.g. Bouchard (1995:388):
[...] Tense in French is a strong morpheme, and so it licenses an independent syntactic
node. The complex of features V+T occupies two nodes in syntax, one licensed by the
features of T, one licensed by V. [...] Both the lower position of the V+T complex (the
verbal position) and the higher position of the V+T complex (the Tense position) are
licensed with respect to the semantic representation [...].In English, on the other hand,
Tense is weak, so the V+T complex licenses only one node in syntax.
Thus, this would be an example of parametrization w.r.t. whether or not a certain Universal
Feature F licences a separate head H. That is, either F is 'strong' and licences the projection of
a separate functional head H, like Tense in French, according to Bouchard. Or, alternatively,
F is 'weak' and must resort to being hosted by a head H which is licenced by some other F, as
is the case for Tense in English, according to Bouchard, where Tense must be hosted by the
head V licenced by the verb. In the latter case, F is a freeloader with no projection of its own,
but it still is a universal feature, hence, it must be represented in the syntactic structure.
Furthermore, one might of course question the axiom that 'there is no selection among
the universal set of features'. Here Åfarli (1995:140):
There is a possibility that the functional structure of clauses is canonically given, such
that all languages employ the same set of functional seeds [i.e. features]. I find this
possiblity extremely unlikely and I leave it out of further consideration. The
alternative possiblity is that the pool of possible functional seeds is universal, but that
languages and even different clause types within a language actually employ a subset
of seeds from this pool. In that case it is an empirical question whether a given seed is
employed in some language or clause type.
Åfarli goes on to list two possible criteria that might constrain what is seen as empirical
evidence for a functional projection:
The empirical evidence for the number and kinds of functional seeds employed in a
clause is possibly quite complex. Here, I will briefly discuss two simple criteria that
may be relevant:
(a) A clause type exhibits a functional morpheme, only if that clause type
employs a corresponding functional seed (& projection).
(b) A clause type exhibits a functional morpheme, if and only if that clause
type employs a corresponding functional seed (& projection).
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(a) takes the presence of functional morphology as empirical evidence for the
existence of a functional seed and projection, but it does not exclude the possibility
that there exist functional seeds and projections without any morphological correlate.
(b) excludes the latter possibility. (b) thus amounts to a kind of naive recoverability
constraint to the effect that every functional seed, and in particular every covert
functional seed, must somehow have a morphologically visible effect (which does not
necessarily mean that the seed itsef is visible [...]).
Even within this type of approach, where each language selects from a pool of universal
features, one could still maintain something along the lines of a universal hierarchy; here
Thrainsson (1996:2547):
Clausal architecture is determined by UG in the sense that UG defines a set of
functional categories, {F1, F2, ... Fn} that languages "select" from. For any functional
categories Fi and Fj, the sequence will be uniform whenever they occur, i.e. if L1 and
L2 each instantiate both Fi and Fj and Fi c-commands Fj in L1, then Fi c-commands Fj in
L2.
And of course, the possibility exists that not all and every functional category or feature is
subject to selection, cf. Epstein et al. (1996:fn 9):
One way to think of this is to assume that a small number of inflectional features are
present in all languages of the world, whereas a larger number may be relevant to
specific languages only8.
Thus, the locus of parametrization w.r.t. Functional Categories will be different, depending on
which of these assumptions one assumes as premises for one's theory. For expository
purposes, we will list some of the assumptions alluded to above.
(2)
a. Functional Categories are not subject to selection. All languages employ all
Functional Categories in all clause types.
a'. Functional Categories are subject to selection. Not all languages employ all
Functional categories in all clause types.
                                                
7 This is Thrainsson's "weak version" of The Structural Uniformity Hypothesis, (SUH). I would also like to
mention that Thráinsson (1996: 257) presents another hypothesis, The Limited Diversion Hypothesis which
allows for a) selection of only certain Functional categories in each language; b) variation between clause types
within one and the same language w.r.t. which Functional Categories are employed; and c) variation from one
language to another w.r.t. the dominance relations between the functional projections hosting the Functional
Categories.
8 The note continues: "What is syntactically universal, however, is the way the presence of inflectional features
determines movement and word order." I would also like to mention that Thráinsson (1996: 257) presents
another hypothesis, The Limited Diversion Hypothesis which allows for a) selection of only certain Functional
categories in each language; b) variation between clause types within one and the same language w.r.t. which
Functional Categories are employed; and c) variation from one language to another w.r.t. the dominance
relations between the functional projections hosting the Functional Categories.
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b. Each Functional Category licences the projection of a separate functional head H in
a syntactic structure.
b'. Some Functional Categories do not licence the projection of a separate functional
head H1 in a syntactic structure. Instead, they are hosted by some other head H2.
c. Not all Functional Categories are spelled out. Only those categories that are marked
 F* (+phonological realization) in the lexicon of a given language must be given a
phonological realization.
d. An F* (i.e. an F which requires a phonologcial realization) may be satisfied in one
out of two ways. Either there exists a designated morpheme (e.g. a Tense morpheme)
which is inserted directly into this position (satisfaction via Merge9). Or, alternatively,
there does not exist a designated morpheme, and some other element raises to spell out
the feature F* (e.g. in languages without designated Tense morphemes).
For instance, if we choose the assumptions in (2)a', b', c and d as the premises of our theory,
the locus of parametrization (i.e the source of variation between two different languages) may
be any of the following (where F is an arbitrary Functional Category)10:
(3)
Possible parametrization: 
a'. [F] v [¬F]11  Language L selects for F or not.
      b'. [F=H1] v [H2F ] Language L selects for F as a separate
head or F is hosted by some other head12
c. [F*] v [¬F*] Language L selects for F as spelled out or
not.
       d. [F*Move ] v [F*Merge] F* is satisfied via Move or Merge in L.
The reason we have been dwelling on the question of functional projections here is, as already
suggested in Cique's thirty-something functional projections above, that several authors have
                                                
9 In fact, there is a certain discrepancy in employing the term insertion  together with the term Merge. Insertion
encodes that some element is placed into a pre-existing slot in a phrase marker. However, the opertation Merge
takes a pair of syntactic objects (SO1 and SO2) and replaces them by a new combined syntactic object SO1-2 ; cf.
e.g. Chomsky (1995: 226).
10 The present proposal will follow Åfarli (1995), Thrainnson (1996) and others in assuming that functional
categories are subject to selection; some functional features are possibly universal to all languages, while others
are language specific. I will also follow Åfarli (1995) in assuming that what counts as evidence for the presence
of a specific functional projection in a given clause type is a visible effect; e.g. a functional morpheme, a
morphological effect, or change in word order as compared to the unmarked word order. Cf. e.g. section 5.5.2,
where it is proposed that Norwegian main clauses employ a Functional Projection lacking in (some) embedded
clauses. Here, word order facts and possible interpretation are the visible effects.
11 The formalism employed here simply follows the lead of Roberts and Roussou (2000). However, it will not be
employed anywhere else in this dissertation and plays no role to the analyses presented here.
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tried to account for the properties of modals by means of postulating specific functional
projections that modals may occupy; typically, the modal is seen as constituting or spelling
out the head of a designated functional projection; a ModP of some kind. The various
readings and other properties of specific modals is thus taken to be side effects of the specific
slot occupied by the modal in a given sentence. Different authors have taken different views
on the specific, possibly designated slot(s) where modals may occur. In what follows, we will
go into some proposals bearing on this and other questions.
3.2 Some earlier proposals
In this survey of some earlier proposals, I will focus in particular on the two questions already
alluded to in the discussion above; i.e. firstly, the author's view on the possible θ-properties of
modals and by association, the author's implicit or explicit adoption or rejection of the
"control vs. raising" analysis, and secondly, the author's assumptions w.r.t. the specific
insertion site/slot/functional projection occupied by the modal in the sentence structure. Some
of the proposals in this survey address the diachronic development of English modal
auxiliaries, and one might very well wonder about the relevance of these works for
Norwegian modals. As already mentioned in sections 2.1 and 2.3, modals in present-day
English exhibit a number of properties that do not apply to their Norwegian counterparts.
However, I have also mentioned that modals in earlier stages of English resembled
Norwegian modals in many respects; i.e. they displayed a number of properties that are
retained by contemporary Norwegian modals. Proposals investigating the diachronic
development of English modals, highlighting the differences between Old/Middle English
modals on one hand and present-day English modals on the other, may poentially give a
number of insights into the underlying differences  between contemporary Norwegian and
English modals as well.
The proposals are not presented entirely in a chronological order. However, I have
started out with the oldest proposal (Roberts 1985) before I present the analyses building on
this proposal (Roberts 1993), Roberts and Roussou (2000). Cinque (1999) comes next, since
this poposal shares many of the assumptions with Roberts and Roussou (2000). Then we look
at another relatively old paper, notably Vikner (1988), before examining Thráinsson and
                                                                                                                                                        
12 In this case, one could imagine that F itself is not *; i.e. F does not require a phonological realization, but it
might be spelled out anyway, as a 'free rider', if the host head also contains a functional feature F2 that is marked
* ; i.e. requires a phonological realization.
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Vikner (1995), who build (in part) on Vikner's (1988) proposal. For the remainder of the
chapter, chronological order is respected with one exception; thus, Barbiers (1995, 1999)
precedes Lødrup (1996); Dyvik (1999) and Wurmbrand (1999), whereas Picallo's (1990)
proposal constitutes the final proposal because it deals with Romance, not Germanic modals.
3.2.1 Roberts (1985)
Roberts (1985) conducts an investigation of the diachronic development of English modals in
a Government and Binding version of P&P. He argues that the differences between present-
day English modals and their Middle English counterparts can be traced back to a shifted
value of one specific parameter (p.56):
Now imagine a parameter P with the potential values [+F] and [-F]. For concreteness,
take P to be agreement systems and [+F] to morphological agreement, with [-F]
therefore syntactic agreement.
  This shift was due to a number of (independent) changes, perhaps most prominently (p. 46):
The frequent occurence of periphrastic constructions involving modals and do,
combined with the impoverishment of agreement inflection led to a change in the
agreement system in the sixteenth century. The change was from a morphological
agreement system to a syntactic system. In other words, V no longer moved into INFL
in tensed clauses in order to be morphologically governed by an agreement affix [...].
Instead, V [was] being syntactically governed in its base position by some element in
INFL, an auxiliary or abstract agreement features (AGR).
This shift is illustrated in the following way (adopted from Roberts' (34)):
(4)
a. Middle English:Af [an agreement affix]morphologically governs V [V moves into INFL]
 S
NP         INFL     VP
      [W  Af]      V           ......
b. Modern English:[Abstract] AGR/Aux syntactically governs V[V does not move into INFL]
S
NP         INFL     VP
        AGR      V           ....
        Aux
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This shift is argued to be important to the specific characteristics of present-day English
modals as compared to lexical verbs. Roberts argues that modals in Middle English were like
all other verbs in that they were inserted in VP with the subsequent movement to INFL. But
after the 16th century, modals were "reanalyzed as auxiliaries13" and came to be directly
inserted into INFL. This shift had a range of consequences for the English modals. One
important consequence was that modals lost their ability to assign proper ("main") θ−roles.
This because of a condition on θ−role assignment (holding on S-structure) that Roberts
proposes (Roberts' (17)):
 (5)
V assigns  θ−roles iff V is governed.
Since INFL is an ungoverned position (p.30) in present-day English, as a result of the loss of
morphological government, it follows that only modals, and not main verbs, can appear here.
Main verbs assign θ−roles, and are thus confined to be inserted into the VP where they are
governed by an auxiliary or an abstract AGR present in INFL.  Modals, on the other hand,
loose the ability to assign (main) θ−roles because they are banned from the VP. This proposal
is not as circular as it may appear from this abstract, since Roberts supports his proposal with
a range of empirical evidence; such as the apparent ability of (at least some) modals to assign
θ−roles on earlier stages of English, the fact that Modern English modals, unlike their
ancestors, lack infinite forms, and the observation that Modern English modals, unlike main
verbs, precede negation; "assuming that negation and inversion are operations on INFL"
(p.47).
Roberts finally introduces Zubizarreta's (1982) term adjunct θ−role to account for the
"nature of the root/epistemic distinction in present-day English". Zubizarreta treat root modals
essentially as modifiers, analogous to Jackendoff's (1972) agent-oriented adverbs. According
to this account, both root modals and agent-oriented adverbs require an agent, i.e. they have a
semantic argument (p.51):
However, this argument is always the argument of some other predicate. So, given the
θ−criterion, we are led to suppose that root modals and agent-oriented adverbs do not
                                                
13 Actually, Roberts states in fn 1 that he takes modals to be ordinary verbs. "The motive for proposing that
modals are members of a separate category of auxiliaries, or are verbs marked [+Aux] is precisely the exeptional
properties of modals compared to main verbs[...]." Roberts argues that these properties derive from the condition
on modals to occur only in INFL, and that this condition allows us to continue to regard modals as verbs.
Nevertheless, Roberts states several times that modals were reanalysed as auxiliaries. One should possibly take
this formulation to be a metaphor alluding to the reanalysis of modals as base-generated in INFL.
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assign θ−roles to their arguments. However, there is a modification relation between
the root modal and the argument [...]. Zubizarreta captures this by proposing a
different class of thematic relations: adjunct θ−roles. Adjunct θ−roles differ from
'main' θ−roles [...] in that they are not subject to the θ−criterion. So adjunct θ−roles
can be assigned to some argument already bearing a θ−role. Also adjunct θ−role
assignment is optional. [...] So root modals appear in ungoverned positions in present-
day English and assign adjunct θ−roles to the agent argument in the clause in which
they appear.
Although Roberts is somewhat vague on this point, he implicitly says that epistemic modals
do not assign such adjunct θ−roles; that this is what constitutes the root/epistemic distinction.
Roberts also assumes (p. 39) that Middel English (ME) modals did assign 'main' θ-roles to
their subjects at least in some cases, as opposed to their modern English descendants.
W.r.t. the "control vs. raising" analysis, Roberts suggests (p. 37) that modals were
raising verbs in Middle English:
Further plausibility is added to this idea by the fact that the equivalents of modals in a
number of languages are raising verbs (e.g., most Germanic and Romance languages).
However,  Roberts also provides examples that may be problematic to such an assumption,
notably sentences with what later has become known as quirky subjects, i.e. "oblique Case-
marked NPs associated with the subject of the complement clause" (p. 38). On the assumption
that oblique Case is inherent, and that raising is motivated by the Case filter, there would be
no need for the oblique NP to raise, thus, Roberts states, oblique Case-marked NPs are
probably not raised, but base-generated as the subject of the modal, where it "controls the
PRO subject of the complement"14. Hence, there is "the possibility that ME modals were
raising verbs", However, "crucial evidence is lacking"15.
What Roberts does not address, however, is why the oblique case marking of the
modal co-varies with the case-requirements of the embedded predicate instead of the modal
(which is the case at least in Modern Icelandic). It would be possible to find a theoretical
solution to this. One might argue that the embedded subject, i.e. PRO, needs to be controlled
by an argument bearing a case marking compatible with the case assigned by the embedded
                                                
14 Note that exactly the type of data utilized by Roberts to indicate that some Middle English  modals were
control verbs ( i.e. modals with quirky subjects) are used by Wurmbrand (1999) to argue that modals are raising
verbs. This is a matter of theoretical development; i.e. the assumptions regarding the possible driving force of
DP movement were quite different in the Government and Binding Theory than in The Minimalist Program. Cf.
also fn 10 in section 4.1.
15 Roberts also relate the theta-properties of modals to their increasing epistemic use; cf. p.34 The use of modals
as functional substitutes for the moribund system of subjunctive inflections[...] meant that modals were
interpreted as clausal operators specifying the mood of the clause, exactly like subjunctive inflections. Clausal
operators do not assign θ−roles, and so modals could be construed as not assigning θ−roles.
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predicate. This might very well be the case in spite of the crucial assumption that PRO itself is
not assigned overt Case. However, Roberts (1985) does not address this question (neither is
this question addressed in Roberts 1993) .
Moreover, there are certain theoretical problems with this account, and some of its
predications are not borne out. One such case is pointed out by Roberts himself (p.31):
Since [the stipulation that V assigns  θ−roles iff V is governed] prevents auxiliaries
from appearing in governed positions, we predict auxiliaries to be incompatible with
agreement. This prediction is correct for modals, but incorrect for the aspectuals have
and be. [...]For the purposes of this paper, we make the simplyfying assumption that
aspectuals show inherent agreement, and so are in fact not governed by AGR.
This is not the only problem, however. Even if one makes the assumption above, the aspectual
auxiliaries constitute a problem. They may appear in INFL because they assign no θ−roles (fn
8), but at the same time, Roberts is assuming that "INFL, like any other node, contains only
one position" (p.47). Like Norwegian, English has sentences with modals preceding a perfect
auxiliary (an aspectual), e.g. John must have passed his exam (before going abroad). So the
obvious question would be, what is the position of the aspectual in this scenario? To clarify,
look at Roberts' proposed structure for modern English once more:
(6)
S
NP         INFL     VP
        AGR      V           ....
        Aux
In the case of the string John must have passed his exam, the modal must occupies INFL.
Now,  either the aspectual must be part of INFL, which is impossible, since INFL contains
only one position, which is occupied by the modal. Alternativly, the aspectual is part of the
VP. In this case, it is not obvious that the aspectual would not be governed by the modal, and
as such constitute a counterexample to the generalization that only verbs assigning θ−roles
may be governed; recall that "V assigns  θ−roles iff V is governed".
Another problem concerns the possible universality of this approach. Roberts proposes
that "languages with "rich" agreement systems in fact lack AGR" (p.32), hence the possibility
to employ "syntactic agreement" (p.32); which means that obligatory V-to-INFL movement
of main verbs should apply to languages with "rich" agreement systems only.
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However, it seems counterintuitive at best to describe the Mainland Scandinavian
languages like Norwegian as a language with a "rich agreement system". As already
mentioned in section 2.1, Norwegian lacks subject-verb agreement; in fact, in this respect it
has even less agreement than English. And yet, Norwegian has V2, i.e. obligatory movement
of the verb into INFL (V to-INFL) in the scenario presented here. That is, Norwegian exhibits
V-to-INFL, a phenomenon which should be found in languges with "rich" agreements
systems only, according to Roberts.
Furthermore, Norwegian modals have none of the effects that Roberts attributes to the
obligatory insertion of modals into INFL, like e.g. the loss of non-finite forms. According to
Roberts, the insertion of the modal into INFL should take place obligatorily in languages with
poor agreement systems. But Norwegian modals show no signs of being directly inserted into
INFL, in spite of its poor agreement system. Thus, it seems that Norwegian exhibits a number
of properties associated by Roberts with languages of "rich" agreement systems, although it
seems counterintuitive at best to describe Norwegian as a language with a "rich" agreement
system.
3.2.2 Roberts (1993)
Although this proposal is reminicent of Roberts' (1985) proposal in important respects, this
work also contains a comparison between NE (Modern English), ME (Middle English) and
MSc (Mainland Scandinavian; i.e. Danish, Swedish and Norwegian) modals. Furthermore, the
clausal architecture that Roberts proposes in this later work is much more complex than in the
(1985) account, cf. (7) (Roberts' (68c), p. 280):
(7)
C'
    AgrP
C0            Agr'
   NP                NegP
         Agro          Neg'
  Spec           TP
      Nego      T'
         Spec
     To          VP
          Vo
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Still, the VP is the domain where (main) theta-roles are assigned, and some important
differences between  MSc/ME modals on one hand and  NE modals on the other is the
following (p.320):
MSc modals are lexically inserted in V rather than in T. This analysis captures the
similarity between MSc and ME, and the differences between both of these systems
and NE.
Underlying this difference, Roberts claims, is a Diachronic Reanalysis that took place in the
early 16th century (Roberts' (96)):
 NPi [To do/Mj T-1] tj [ti VP] => NP [To did/M] VP16
which states that English modals came to be inserted directly into T, whereas they earlier
were inserted in V. The T-1 in the first square brackets is a functional head parasittic on the T-
head in ME and MSc, spelling out an affix and forcing the verb to move to T. The reason
MSc has retained this head, while NE lost it in the course of diachronic development, is that
MSc languages never lost their infinitival endings, whereas English did (p. 320):
This reanalysis [in English] was triggered by the loss of the infinitival affix, making To
a possible site of lexical insertion of Xo -elements. In MSc, we find that an infinitival
affix has been preserved, as the ending -e/-a e.g. Da. køb-e Nor. kjøp-e, Sw. köp-a
('buy'). That this is the infinitive ending can be seen by comparing the imperative
forms, which are just the bare stems køb, kjøp, köp with the infinitive forms. So we
take -e/-a to be a realization of T-1 in MSc.
So one of the problems from Roberts (1985), namely linking the particular behavior of
modals to loss of agreement, is taken care of in this work (p. 320 ff)17:
Given that [...] MSc has undergone a development parallel to English in losing its
agreement system and in losing V-to-Agr, this in turn means that the D[iachronic]
R[eanalysis] [...] must be independent of the loss of the agreement system and the loss
of V-to-Agr.  This conclusion is consistent with what we have said in this chapter, but
inconsistent with the claims in Roberts (1985). [...] So we arrive at the following
comparative picture of the development of English and of MSc:
a. loss of agreement = loss of Agr-1.
  b. Development of modals/do = loss of T-1.
       ([...]a) holds for both English and MSc. ([...]b) holds only for English.
                                                
16 I presume that did signals that do is inserted directly into T(ense), whereas do earlier were inserted in V and
raised to T. Thus, the element inserted in T is necessarily tensed, whereas the element inserted in V could be
construed as non-inflected, subsequently picking up the inflection residing in T.
17 Cf. also p. 319: There are thus no grounds in MSc for assigning modals to a special syntactic position, in the
way that there are in NE.
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The other problem mentioned from Roberts (1985), the status of aspectuals, is also addressed
in this work, in that Roberts suggests "that they are best treated as base-generated as heads of
their own VPs" (p.312). Since theta-assignment is no longer explained in terms of
government, the more acute problems with aspectuals seem to disappear on this account.
However, the status of aspectuals remains somewhat unclear. If aspectuals constitute the head
of their own VP, they still constitute a peculiar type of Vs, since they are the only V-heads
that may move to Agr, just like modals (p. 312):
As is well known, the NE aspectual auxiliaries have and be raise to Agr.
And still, they constitute an exeptional class of Vs since they do not assign theta-roles,
whereas ordinary verbs do.
Roberts (1993:315) also addresses the possible syntactic differences between root and
epistemic modals in ME; i.e. the control vs. raising-hypothesis (ME modals are dubbed
premodals, a term adopted from Lightfoot 1974):
Many cases of premodals are formally ambiguous between raising and control
interpretations. It is plausible to identify root readings (ability, volition, obligation)
with control and epistemic readings (necessity and possibility) with raising since in
root readings the subject receives a theta-role (roughly experiencer) from the
premodal, while in the epistemic reading it does not.
And the possible assignment of theta-roles still consitutes a difference between root and
epistemic modals, in that root modals assign adjunct theta-roles (p.316), whereas this is not so
for epistemic modals (p. 325):
[...]epistemic [sic18] modality can be syntactically expressed either through assigning a
theta-role or not. Since epistemic modality is an operator, where the theta-assignment
option is not taken, the modal will occupy an operator position in syntax, typically To .
The former choice gives rise to a raising verb; the latter to a modal auxiliary.
Still, the reader is left with the impression that Roberts (1993) has a somewhat rudimentary
account for possible differences between root and epistemic modals in NE English. He does
not go into the specific possible readings that he would classify as root on one hand and
epistemic on the other, and the discriptions concerning these matters remain rather vague and
somewhat unsatisfactory.
                                                
18 As it stands, this quote seems to me to be somewhat contradictory. Thus, to make sense, the first epistemic in
this quote should probably be omitted.
Some recent proposals
63
3.2.3 Roberts and Roussou (2000)
Roberts and Roussou (2000) present an analysis of English modals that is once again a
variation on the theme presented above. This analysis is cast in a framework adopting (as a
possibility)  Cinque's (1999) universal hierarchy of functional projections, although nothing in
their analysis crucially hinges on this choice. Pre-16th-century examples containing a modal
and a bare infinitive complement "must have had a biclausal structure [...given that...]
infinitival complements contain T and main clauses feature V-to-T movement" (p. 11):
[TP Sone [TP hit mæi [VP tmæi [TP T [VP ilimpen]]]]] soon it may happen
Once again, the infinitival endings (-en) play an important part; now as "clear evidence for the
lower T" (p. 14). The loss of these endings leads to the aquirer reanalysing the biclausal
structure as a monoclausal structure, whereas the modals are grammaticalized as elements of
T:
 [TP Sone [TP hit mæi [VP ilimpen]]] soon it may happen
Then Roberts and Roussou (R&R) go on to "take into account the possibility of a richer
functional structure". The relevant sub-structure of Cinque's universal hierarchy is the
following:
Modepistemic T (past) T (future) Moodirrealis ModNecessity ModPossibility ModRoot 19
R&R take the basic difference between lexical verbs and verbal functional heads to be the
possession of argument structure, i.e. "merger directly into the functional system correlates
with the absence of argument structure" (p. 17). However, the aforementioned "adjunct theta-
role" might be expressed by "scopal properties of functional heads" (p.18).  In either case, in
ME, modals were inserted in one of the Mood/Mod positions below T, with subsequent
movement to the highest T. After the reanalysis, they were merged higher in the structure,
which "economises on movement steps, and so is preferred by the learner". This explains the
absence of participle and infinitival forms with modals:
Merging these modals directly rather "high" in the functional structure meant that
certain properties that had to be licensed (or checked) by lower functional heads could
not be licensed. In particular, below the lowest modal head are a series of aspectual
                                                
19 But see section 3.2.4 where it is described that Cinque also argues for three more Mod heads; Mod volition >
Mod obligation > Mod ability/permission. R&R conflate these as ModROOT.
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heads [...]. It is plausible that participal morphology is licensed there[...]. We must also
assume [...] that infinitival morphology is checked lower in the structure than the
modal heads.
According to Warner (1993), epistemic interpretations of pre-modals emerge in ME. R&R
interpret this as a further reanalysis of (some) pre-modals as being merged in the MoodEpistemic
position. "If reanalysis is local [...], this might imply that a (pre)modal  must have a root
interpretation before it develops an epistemic interpretation (after which point the earlier root
interpretation may be lost)" (p. 18). This high merger of modals imply that epistemic modals
are "opaque to the usual past/non-past relation" (p. 19), as they are directly merged higher
than T(past). In ME, this direct merger of modals were an option or "a tendency", but after the
loss of relevant infinitival morphology, this merger became categorical. And the full syntactic
effects of the reanalysis of modals were not apparent until after the loss of V-movement into
the functional system, which made the modals stick out as a category distinct from verbs.
R&R also mention MSc modals in this account (p.19):
 What we observe in many languages is evidence for grammaticalisation [direct
merger into functional head instead of movement to the same head] of individual
modals, although the existence of a morpho-syntactically distinct class of the NE type
is not attested elsewhere in Germanic or Romance. The reason for this [...] is that all
the Germanic and Romance languages have infinitival morphology and so the
reanalysis [from biclausal to monoclausal structure] was not possible.
According to Vikner (1988), epistemic modals cannot be non-finite in Danish, and van
Kemenade (1985) argues the same for Dutch. R&R take this as instances of the
grammaticalization of certain modals on certain interpretations. To maintain this assumption
for MSc, R&R need some kind of technical device (fn 7):
It may seem strange to propose that epistemic modals in Danish occupy a very high
functional position like ModEpistemic when the evidence is that all verbs, including
modals, occupy just two positions in this language: The V2 position (presumably C)
and what appears to [be] the base V-Position (see Vikner 1995 and the references
given there). The problem really concerns associating the epistemic interpretation with
the low position. This problem is just an instance of the general problem that arises in
Mainland Scandinavian languages [...] of associating functional information (at the
very least Tense) with the in-situ verb, and as such is not created by assuming the
Cinque hierarchy. Whatever the technical device we postulate to associate tense with
the in-situ verb (affix-hopping, chain-formation, LF-movement, etc.) can be exploited
to associate an epistemic modal with its functional position.
This turns out to be a more profound problem, however. If modals surfacing in a "low"
position could be associated with a "high" epistemic modal projection in this way, what would
prevent the modal from being associated with any of the other intermediate Mod-positions?
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One might expect that this would lead to multiple ambiguity in each sentence where a modal
occurs. One might be able to restrict this type of association when it applies to the leftmost
modal only, by stipulating that it occupies the head of a Modepistemic projection. However, with
the modal in situ, possibly within its own VP, any one of the intermediate Mod heads could
associate its features with the modal. One would have to stipulate that only certain modals
have "access" to certain ModPs. And one would still need auxiliary hypotheses to explain e.g.
why one never gets epistemic readings from modals with Adv/PP complements, just to
mention one example.
In my view, the attractive feature of this account (e.g. in comparison to Roberts 1993)
boils down to the attempt to show the following (p. 1):
[G]rammaticalisation-type changes follow a 'path', which is structurally defined along
a hierarchy of functional categories in the clause structure.
Such "paths" have been assumed for decades to have some significance within the
grammaticalisation literature, cf. e.g. Bybee et al. (1994:10), who claim that there are
great similarities in grammaticalization paths across genetically and areally unrelated
languages.
An account along these lines also allows for a gradual "leakage" of modals into the functional
domain, where certain modals on certain stages are associated with more functional properties
than some of other, contemporary modals. In short, this account allows for an individual
history of each modal, where it is not (necessarily) expected that all changes happen to all
modals at once; a picture that seems to be in accordance with the observable facts (cf. e.g.
Plank 1984, Warner 1993).
My main objection to R&R's article is that it does not fully exploit the advantage of a
possible individual account, since the treatment of modals comes across as sketchy and
superficial, at some points straightforwardly confusing. For instance, I would have liked to
see the history of one specific modal, (say may) with a full description of the exact insertion
site(s) of this specific modal previous to any reanalysis or grammaticalization. Furthermore, I
would like to see an outline of the possible diachronically intermediary positions proposed,
and finally, the possible insertion sites of this modal (e.g. in Modepistemic and possibly others)
after the grammaticalization path has been completed. Unfortunately, there is no exposition or
illustration of the possible diahronic development of one specific modal, which would have
clarified the matters considerably.
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Also, there seems to be a vagueness concerning the terms epistemic vs. root in this
work, like in Roberts (1985, 1993), since what counts as an epistemic or a root reading of a
modal is never explicitly addressed.
3.2.4 Cinque (1999)
As already mentioned in section 3.1.2, Cinque (1999) argues (p.52) that
[...]the partial orders found overtly in different languages are subsequences of a single
universal sequence of functional heads, present in all languages.
And not only is this universal sequence of functional heads present in all languages; this
sequence is also present in all clause types of all these languages (preface):
[...] Universal Grammar is often still assumed to allow a wide variation among
languages in the number and type of functional projections that they admit and/or their
realtive order. Moreover, it is often assumed that in a single language, different clause
types may instantiate different sets of functional projections. Here I try to construct a
plausibility argument against these assumptions, suggesting that no such variation is
allowed by UG and that the same number, type and order (hierarchy) of functional
projections holds across languages and clause types, despite apparent counterevidence.
The functional projections assumed to be accessible to modals is of particular interest to us
here; these projections constitute a subset of the projections conceived as headed by mood or
modality heads20. Moreover, other relevant clausal heads are tense and certain aspectual
projections;  specifically perfect aspect (since Norwegian ha/være 'have/be' arguably belongs
to this type of aspect).
Considering the order of suffixes in Korean complex verbal forms and invoking
Baker's (1985) Mirror Principle, Cinque proposes separate functional heads for evidential and
epistemic modality. Moreover, taking Germanic double modal constructions as evidence, he
proposes separate projections for epistemic and root modality (p. 54):
Although this traditional semantic difference [i.e. root vs. epistemic] is generally not
related to a difference in structure, some evidence exists that the two modals do not
occupy the same position and that epistemic modals are higher than root modals. In
double modal variteties of English, like Scots English [...] and in various American
variteties [...], the first modal has an epistemic, and the second a root sense.
                                                
20 Cinque does separate between mood and modality, although the difference is in many cases virtually non-
significant (p. 78): [...] the same category may be expressed via mood in one language and with a modal in
another, thus suggesting a close link between the two. "Mood" is traditionally restricted to modal categories [...]
which are expressed in verbal morphology. Modals instead are typically independent words (verbs, auxiliaries,
or particles).
Some recent proposals
67
After examining a range of typological studies dealing with tense, modality and aspect,
Cinque proposes the following order (we consider only the relevant sequence of Cinque's
hierarchy here), still with "certain indeterminacies and arbitrary choices". Note that the sign >
is employed by Cinque to encode precedence and scope; e.g. T (Past) > T (Future) means that
T (Past) precedes and scopes over T (Future).
Moodevidential > Modepistemic > T (Past) > T (Future) > Moodirrealis >
Aspperfect > Modroot > Aspcompletive
But Cinque soon finds reason to refine the hierarchy above. Firstly, because "Root modals [...]
comprise different semantic subclasses (volition, obligation, ability, permission)"; a question
to which we will return below. Secondly, because there might be reason to separate epistemic
modality from alethic modality:
In logic, epistemic modality is sometimes contrasted with alethic modality [...]. The
former is concerned with the speaker's deductions or opinions, the latter with
necessary truths (i.e. propositions that are true in all possible worlds) and with
possible truths (i.e. propositions that are not necessarily false, being true in at least one
possible world).
Cinque recognizes the fact that although one can distinguish epistemic from alethic modality
from a logical point of view, there is no reason to assume that these two modalities should
differ structurally; he quotes Palmer (1986:11) who says that there is no formal grammatical
distinction between the two in English ("and perhaps, in no other language either").  However,
Cinque invokes some facts from English multiple modal varieties (pointed out by Brown
1992:75; Cinque's (2), p. 79), where will is taken to mark future, and might denotes 'pure
possibility'; i.e. 'alethic possibility'. Since epistemic modality is proposed to be higher in the
clausal structure than future (cf. the sequence above21), modality occupying a position lower
than future could not be epistemic modality; thus, alethic modality cannot be subsumed by
epistemic modality.
(8)
He'll might could do it for you (= 'he might be able in the future to do it for you')
Cinque also finds relevant support for this hypothesis in Danish (Cinque's (3)a ), where the
alethic modal kunne, but not the epistemic/evidential modal skulle, can be found following the
modal vil marking future:
                                                
21 Cf also e.g. Cinque (1999:78): "Epistemic modals are located higher in clausal structure than root modals, in
fact higher than T(Past)/T(Future) (and negation), apparently".
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(9)
Der vil let kunne gå noget galt.
'It will easily be possible that something goes wrong.'
*Han vil skulle have læst bogen.
'He will be said to (must) have read the book.'
Furthermore, Cinque claims that in view of Italian data (Cinque's (4))
[...] there is evidence for distinguishing a head of alethic possibility from a head of
alethic necessity. The two can co-occur in the order "necessity" > "possibility" (though
not the converse).
Cinque then goes on to consider root modals. These are, in contrast to epistemic and alethic
modalities, strictly subject-oriented, as volition, obligation, ability and permission are
properly attributed to an (animate) subject, he claims22.  Although English does not provide a
clear answer to the question of possible separate structural heads for each subclass of root
modals, Italian data seem to suggest that these subclasses enter into a fixed relative scope
among each other. Although it is difficult to decide in some cases, Cinque opts for the
following strict (scope) hierarchy of modalities (Cinque's (12), p.81):
Modepistemic > Modnecessity > Modpossibility > Modvolition > Modobligation > Modability/permission
Ability and permission is here taken to be two different values of the same head, though
"eventually this might prove simplistic". Cinque also admits that the evidence provided may,
by itself, be insufficient to motivate five distinct modal heads, in addition to an epistemic one:
However, the existence of different classes of AdvPs corresponding to the different
modalities, and ordered in a similar fashion [...], can be taken as additional evidence
for the hierarchy of modal heads in (12).
One should also notice that there is at least one more modality head and one tense head which
are relevant to Germanic modals in addition to the ones mentioned above. The author
suggests (p.85) that the head Modevidential may be occupied by the Danish modal skulle and the
German modal sollen, and by association then, the Norwegian modal skulle; all denoting
'hear-say' or in Cinque's terms, "quotative evidentiality". In addition, as we saw above, Cinque
assumes the T(future) head to be able to host the English modal will and the Danish modal vil.
This means that there are eight or possibly nine (if permission and ability do in fact belong to
                                                
22 In fact, this is not the case. Although volition and possibly ability may be attributed to animate subjects only,
obligation and permission may have proposition-scope readings with inanimate and even expletive subjects:
Denne døra skal alltid være låst 'This door must always stay closed';  Heisen kan ta opptil ti passasjerer  'The
elevator may/is able to take up to ten passangers' Det må komme minst femti personer for at festen skal lønne seg
'There must come at least fify people for the party to pay off'.
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separate heads) functional heads that may be occupied by Germanic modals in Cinque's
account.
Cinque's universal hierarchy has already been faced with many counterarguments.
Firstly, I will just briefly mention one of the critics, notably Costa (1999). Costa argues
against two of Cinque's most important claims; first, that adverbs are specifiers and second,
that there exists a universal hierachy of Functional Projections that is always projected23.
Armed with evidence from European Portugese, Costa shows that adverbs behave unlike
specifiers and like adjuncts w.r.t. a range of constructions, e.g. cleft constructions.
Furthermore, the adjunction of adverbs seem to be highly dependent on the existence of a
lexical head (cf. also Costa 1998), i.e. the more verbs and auxiliaries there are in a given
sentence, the higher the number of adverbs possible in this sentence. This is unexpected if
there exists an underlying universal hierearchy of Functional Projections which is always
projected – Cinque claims that the specifiers are available for insertion of an adverbial
irrespective of the morphological realization of the functional head.
Moreover, as Costa notes, the number of adverbs should not be expected to rise in a
sentence if adverbs are inserted in specifier positions. Afer all, subjects are inserted in
specifier positions too, but you cannot normally multiply the number of subjects in a sentence
just because you provide it with more auxiliaries. You can, however, multiply the number of
adverbs if you add more auxiliaries. Thus, adverbs are subject to a restriction that does not
hold for other specifiers, such as subjects.
It is also a problem for Cinque's hierarchy that adverbs display a mirror-effect when
they are extraposed, e.g. as shown by Åfarli (1997) and Bowers (1993):
(10)
 John (probably) will (quickly) learn French perfectly, (quickly), (probably).
This mirror-effect is expected on an account where adverbs are adjoined to an X'-level of
syntactic projections, since the scope relations are preserved even when the adverb is
extraposed, cf. (11), adopted from Bowers (1993):
                                                
23 Cinque (1999:106): "[...] if each adverb class indeed corresponds to a different functional head, then, we have
evidence that the entire array of functional heads (and projections) is available where there is no overt
morphology corresponding to the heads, as the respective specifiers are available."
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(11)
IP
NP I'
AdvP I'     AdvP
  I PrP
NP Pr'
AdvP Pr'                         AdvP
 Pr VP
  NP24 V'
AdvP V'     AdvP
            V
        John   probably   will     e      quickly   learn     French   perfectly       e
However, on Cinque's account, this mirror-effect is unexpected and hard to explain.
Moreover, if the universal hierarchy is always projected, it seems quite remarkable
that e.g. small clauses seem to lack any phonetic realization of (most) functional heads
typically associated with full clauses cross-linguistically; cf. e.g. Starke (1995:257) who
mentions as one difference between full clauses and small clauses their
[...] relative lack of morphology (functional heads are not realized in Small Clauses,
except for C0) [...]
Furthermore, Cinque's universal hierarchy seems to have difficulties with accounting for the
Norwegian data mentioned in section 2.1, where we get epistemic readings of a modal
following what seems to be an aspectual head:
(12)
a. Han har måtta arbeidd med det i heile natt.
    He has mustPERF workPERF on it all night
   'He must have worked on it all night.'
b. Hu har kunna vorre her og forre igjen.
    She has canPERF bePERF here and leavePERF again
    'She might have been here and left again.'
                                                
24 Bowers assumes that Direct Objects are situated in <Spec, VP> whereas subjects are situated in <Spec, PrP>.
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If we want to claim that these are alethic readings and not epistemic readings (which seems
counterintuitive, at least for (12) a), there is no aspectual node that scopes over the projections
of alethic modality, either. Even if we allow for the aspectual ha 'have' to occupy the T(past)
head, we would get into trouble, since there is also similar data with the evidential modal
skulle, cf. (13):
(13)
a. Han har skulla vorre en sjarmør i sine yngre daga, har æ hørt.
   He has shallPERF bePERF a charmeur in his younger days, have I heard
   ' He is supposed to have been a prince charming in his youth, so I've heard.'
By Cinque's own statement, evidential modality, like epistemic modality, scopes over all
tense (and  aspectual) heads in the universal hierarchy. So the data seem to imply that even
the vast number of projections suggested by Cinque (1999) is insufficient to account for data
like (13), and that more projections would have to be added to provide explanations of such
word orders.
3.2.5 Vikner (1988)
Vikner's analysis of modals emerges from an attempt to explain some peculiar restrictions on
the co-occurrence of specific root modals like ville 'want-to' with "event-verbs" like  få 'get'
and blive 'become'.
(14)
a. Hun vil ha/*få tre biler i 1990
   'She wants to get three cars in 1990'
b. Hun vil være/*blive klog
   'She wants to become wise'
After making a first distinction between root and epistemic modals (quoting Platzack 1979)
and listing some of the possible readings that should be considered root and epistemic
respectively, Vikner goes on to make further distinctions within the domain of root modals.
The distinction crucial to his analysis is the separation between deontic obligation modals
(ville, skulle, måtte (obligation), burde) and another group of root modals "consisting of all
the others" (måtte (permission), kunne (permission), kunne (ability), turde, gide).  Since the
'event-verbs' may appear with the latter group, but not with the deontic obligation modals,
Vikner proposes that obligation root modals assign an additional theta-role to its subject. The
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term additional theta-role is reminicent of Zubizarreta's (1982) term adjunct theta role (which
is also mentioned in connection with Roberts' work quoted above). However, Vikner
emphasizes that there are differences between Zubizarreta's notion of adjunct theta-role and
his own additional theta role (p.12):
This additional theta-role may be assigned to an argument that already has a theta-role,
cf. the idea in Zubizarreta (1982:41,123) that theta-roles exist that are invisible for the
theta-criterion. However, as opposed to Zubizarreta, I want to suggest that one
additional theta-role may be assigned to each argument, BUT NOT TWO. The
intuition is that two additional theta roles would give the argument too much "theta-
burden", much like an argument cannot receive more than one normal theta-role,
which again suggests that additional theta roles are not completely invisible to the
theta-criterion. Thus one half of the theta-criterion seems to hold completely for
additional theta-roles as they must be assigned to one and only one argument. The
other half of the theta-criterion only holds halfway, as an argument may not receive
more than one additional theta-role (in addition to a normal theta-role), but it may
receive less than one additional theta-role.
The restriction that only one, and not two, additional theta-roles may be assigned to one and
the same argument is essential to Vikner's explanation of the aforementioned co-occurence
restrictions on these root modals and 'event-verbs' like  få 'get' and blive 'become', since the
assumption on which his entire analysis rests is that obligation root modals as well as these
"event-verbs" each assign one additional theta-role. It follows that  co-occurrence of
obligation root modals and the event-verbs is banned, since the subject would end up with two
additional theta-roles in such a sentence.
Following Zubizarreta's (1982) suggestion for French, Vikner analyzes all modals as
raising verbs, i.e. he claims that they are like raising verbs, although there are certain
differences between modals and raising verbs (fn. 8 p. 13):
It should be noted that raising verbs and modals are different in important ways, e.g. in
that raising verbs allow expletive subjects, and modals do not.
On the other hand, note that the obligation root modals at the same time are somewhat like
control verbs in assigning a theta-role to their subjects, albeit an 'additional theta-role'.
Vikner also lists a range of differences between root modals (in general) and epistemic
modals in this article. Epistemic modals do not occur in the perfect tense (examples where
they do anyway, are analysed by Vikner as "misplaced tense" that really belongs to the main
verb) whereas root modals do; epistemic modals cannot have PRO subjects whereas root
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modals do25; epistemic modals do not occur in pseudo-clefts while root modals do; and
epistemic modals cannot be embedded under root modals while the opposite is possible. Two
epistemic modals or two root modals are both possible, but only if the latter modal is kunne
'can/may' for both types of modals26.
Vikner admits that his analysis "admittedly is not based on strong independent
evidence". I agree that this is a problem. Furthermore, his analysis employing additional theta-
roles does not really explain even his core problem (the co-occurrence facts) very well, since
Vikner needs a number of auxiliary assumptions and ad hoc hypotheses to make this work.
For instance, s-passives embedded under a modal do not follow the distinctions that Vikner
makes, which represents a problem, as pointed out by Vikner himself.
My major objection to this analysis is that the separation between obligation root
modals and "all the others" seem arbitrary and not very well founded. For one thing, it is not
obvious to me why ville 'want-to' belongs with the obligation root modals (since it denotes
volition and not obligation). Furthermore, to ascribe a theta-assigning property (albeit an
additional theta-role) to e.g. måtte 'must' and not to ability kunne 'can' seems arbitrary, if not
straightforwardly  counterintuitive, especially considering that ability-kunne is one of the
                                                
25 Vikner illustrates this claim by a range of sentences with infinitival markers and infinitive verbs, where the
epistemic reading of the modal leads to ungrammaticality. However, it is not completely impossible to have
epistemic modals in constructions like this in Norwegian:
i) De ble påstått     å   skulle være reist.
    they claimPASS to be supposed to be gone
   'One claims that they are supposedly gone'
ii) Dette  antas               å ville få visse følger
                   this presumePASS  to will get certain consequences'
    'This will presumably have certain consequences'
iii) Dette fryktes      å kunne bli et stort problem.
                    this     fearPASS to may become a big problem
     'One fears that this may become a big problem'
Vikner claims that epistemic modals accept neither arbitrary PRO or non-arbitrary PRO. Although epistemic
modals in Norwegian accept non-arbitrary PRO (cf. i-iii), they do not accept arbitrary PRO:
iv) Det er tragisk å ville få slike følger (root OK; epistemic*)
     it    is  tragic  to will get such consequences
26 Kunne is not among those root modals that assigns an additional theta-role, according to Vikner's analysis, so
the combination [obligation root modal+ kunne] is expected to be allowed. However, this does not explain why
kunne could not be the first of the two root modals, or why turde/gide (the other two non-obligation root modals)
should be banned as the second modal in these constructions. Furthermore, Vikner mentions (fn. 7, p.15) that
Jane Grimshaw has pointed out to him the fact that his analysis does not explain the co-occurence restrictions on
epistemic modals, that by Vikner's own statement seem to be the subject to exactly the same restrictions as root
modals w.r.t. combination possibilities.
Chapter 3
74
(two) modals that have the most lexical-verb-like behaviour cross-linguistically, at least
within the group of Germanic modals. In fact, this separation is conducted exactly to explain
the co-occurence facts of the event verbs få/blive with some root modals that represents the
data to be explained. Thus, one might claim that this analysis more or less amounts to
restating these facts within a theoretical terminology, where the term additional theta role is a
paraphrase for *co-occurrence. The way the term theta-role is normally employed, it seeks to
capture what is conceived to be rooted in semantic relations between theta-assigners and
arguments, although it may be syntactically encoded. An additional theta role, the way it is
employed here, does not seem to have any such connotations.
3.2.6 Thráinsson and Vikner (1995)
By the authors own statement (first note), this paper is partially based on Thráinsson (1986)
and Vikner (1988). The paper starts out by listing properties of modals in English and
Scandinavian, and conclude that most of these properties seem to be language-specific, with
the exception that modals in English as well as Scandinavian are characterized by the
semantic property of having "modal meanings" of two kinds, notably (at least) one root and
one epistemic sense. The authors go on to list what they conceive to be modals in Danish (Da)
and Icelandic (Ic) respectively, with no claim that this list is exhaustive (Thráinsson and
Vikner's (11)):
Danish modal verbs: ville 'will', skulle 'shall', måtte 'must', kunne 'can', burde 'ought
(to)', turde 'dare', behøve 'need'
Icelandic modal verbs: munu 'will', skulu 'shall', mega 'may', vilja 'will', eiga 'ought
(to)', hljóta 'must', kunna 'can', verða 'must', Þurfa 'need', ætla 'intend', geta 'can'
After listing some examples of various root and epistemic readings, Thráinsson and Vikner
(T&V) consider some syntactic differences between epistemic and root modals. These
syntactic differences are to a great extent traced back to the assumption (attributed to Ross
1969, Kiparsky 1970 and Perlmutter 1970) that root modals assign a theta-role to their
subject, whereas epistemic modals do not, i.e. that epistemic modals pattern with raising
verbs, while root modals pattern with control verbs. The obvious (as well as perhaps less
obvious) syntactic consequences of this difference between root and epistemic modals may be
summed up in a table like the following (T&V's claims; my table):
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Epistemic modals Root modals
Take expletive subjects yes no
Take weather-det/Það 'it' yes no
Take idiom-chunk subjects yes no
Allow quirky subjects (Ic only) yes no
Allow pseudo-clefted complement no yes
The first three properties in this table are expected on the hypothesis that root modals do and
epistemic modals do not assign a theta role to their subject, since expletives, weather-it, and
idiom-chunk subjects are considered non-arguments; hence they would be expected with
epistemic modals and raising verbs, but not with root modals and control verbs.
Quirky subjects, i.e. oblique case-marked NP subjects, have their case determined by
the downstairs or embedded verb (which also assigns thematic role to it), and a raising verb
has no influence on the case marking of a quirky subject appearing in its subject position.
This indicates that epistemic modals are raising verbs in Icelandic, since epistemic modals
accept quirky subjects; cf. (15), where the embedded verb vanta 'lack' takes an accusative
subject. This quirky case is retained when the subject is raised. On the other hand, whenever
verbs that take quirky subjects are embedded under a control verb, the case of the subject is
nominative, as determined by the control verb, and not a quirky case. Cf. (15)b, where the
matrix verb is a control verb vonast 'hope', and the embedded verb vanta 'lack' takes an
accusative subject. In this structure, the quirky case cannot be retained (T&V's (31)a and
(32)a):
(15)
a. Harald vill oft vanta peninga.
Harold (Acc) will frequently lack money
'Harold frequently tends to lack money'; i.e. epistemic reading only
b. Haraldur/*Harald vonast til að vanta ekki peninga.
Harold (Nom/*Acc) hopes for to not lack money
'Harold hopes not to lack money'
According to T&V, it does not seem possible to get the root sense at all when a verb that takes
a quirky subject is embedded under a modal (p.60), whereas epistemic modals are fine with
quirky subjects, cf. (15) a.
To explain the latter of the properties mentioned in the table above, T&V utilizes
Burzio's generalization (Burzio 1986:178-179), which says that verbs that do not assign a
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thematic role to their subjects are unable to assign structural Case. T&V proposes the
structure in  (16) a for pseudo-cleft sentences like the ones in  (16) b (Da)  and  (16)c (Ic):
 (16)
a. Xi [CP  (OPi )   (that) ... ti ... ] was Y
b. Det enestei [CP (som) Marie købte ti ] var klipfisk
the only (that) Mary  bought   was dried-fish
'The only thing mary bought was dried fish.'
c.  Þaði [CP sem María keypti  ti ] var harðfiskur.
 it that   Mary bought was dried-fish
 'What Mary bought was dried fish.'
Under the assumption that the trace ti is a wh-trace that needs Case, T&V can explain why
root modals, but not epistemic modals occur in pseudo-cleft constructions. Since root modals
assign a theta-role to their subject, they also assign structural Case (by Burzio's
generalization) in this case, to the wh-trace ti. Epistemic modals do not assign a theta-role to
their subject and hence do not assign structural Case, which is why they are banned from
pseudo-cleft constructions.
 One might be led to think that the evidence presented so far would prompt the authors
to analyze all Scandinavian modals in a control- vs. raising model, since root modals seem to
pattern with control verbs and epistemic modals with raising verbs. And indeed, this is the
option chosen for Icelandic modals. However, Vikner's (1988) analysis of all Danish modals
as raising verbs is kept even in this account, on the same basis as before; i.e. the co-
occurrence restrictions on some root modals in Danish with the aforementioned event-verbs
få/blive (cf. the previous section).  Still, the authors maintain that ("at least some") root
modals assign a thematic role to their subject, notably an additional theta role as in Vikner
(1988). The crucial properties of additional thematic roles are listed as follows (T&V's (45)):
(17)
a. No argument may have more than one additional theta-role.
b. Each additional theta-role must be assigned to one and only one argument.
c. An additional theta-role may be assigned to an argument that already has a theta-
   role.
The first property maintains the account of the Danish co-occurrence facts (modals/event-
verbs), while the latter ensures that Danish root modals cannot occur with non-thematic
subjects (expletives, idiom-chunk subjects, weather-it).
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What is gained by these different analyses for Icelandic and Danish modals is an
account of the aforementioned co-occurrence facts for some root modals and  få/blive in
Danish, which is not relevant for Icelandic, at the expence of loss of one (admittedly quite
forceful) generalization, namely the generalization that all Scandinavian root modals seem to
be control verbs, whereas all Scandinavian epistemic verbs seem to be raising verbs.
T&V discuss the possibility of base-generating e.g. epistemic modals in Danish in
I(nfl), as is "frequently assumed for English modal verbs" (p.73).
The problem with such an anlysis is that modal verbs are just like other finite verbs in
Danish in that they follow adverbials like the negation in embedded clauses, as
illustrated in (77):
(77) ... at de ikke skal ville bygge et hus.
    that they not shall want to build a house
'... that they shall not want to build a house.'
On the assumption that negation is adjoined to VP in Danish, and that Danish has no V-to-I
movement in embedded clauses, data like T&V's (77) indicate that epistemic modals are base
generated under V like other verbs. T&V choose not to go into the syntactic details of the
insertion site of Icelandic modals.
In the last part of this paper, T&V consider restrictions on iterating modals in Danish
and Icelandic. They note that "double modal constructions in Scandinavian are of a very
different nature than those that can be found dialectally in English" (p. 72), illustrated by the
inversion data in (18)a from Battistella (1992) and T&V's own data in b and c (T&V's (72)-
(74)):
(18)
a. You might could buy that at Bruno's
*Might you could buy that at Bruno's?
Could you might buy that at Bruno's?
Might could you buy that at Bruno's?
b. De skal ville bygge et hus.
'They are said to want to build a house'
Skal de ville bygge et hus?
'Are they said to want to bulid a house?'
* Ville de skal bygge et hus?
* Skal ville de bygge et hus?
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c. Hann verður að kunna að synda.
he must       to can      to swim
'He has to be able to swim'
Verður hann að kunna að synda?
must  he    to can  to swim
'Does he have to be able to swim?'
*Kunna hann verður að (að) synda?
*Verður að kunna hann að synda?
As seen from the data in (18), in Scandinavian, only the first modal (and always the finite
one) may precede the subject in yes/no questions. Battistella's data seem to indicate that the
second modal, or both, but not only the first, precedes the subject in such questions in this
English dialect27.
Root modals embedded under root modals should be impossible in Danish, on account
of the restriction on additional theta-roles: No more than one additional theta-role for each
argument. According to T&V, this is by and large borne out, with the exception of the root
modal kunne 'can', which seems to be able to appear embedded under other root modals28. The
authors propose two possible accounts (by their own statement, none of them very
satisfactory) of this exception. Either the root modal kunne does not assign an additional theta
role, just like epistemic modals (which is the solution proposed in Vikner 1988). This is
problematic, since kunne patterns with the other root modals as regards pseudo-clefts.
Alternatively, kunne could be analyzed as a control verb (like Icelandic root modals). This
solution has problems too, since T&V present evidence in fn. 27 that (at least) kunne is a
raising verb. In Icelandic root modals combine much more freely, although it is not the case
that anything goes. This is not unexpected, since there exist restrictions on "regular" control
verbs as well.
There is no syntactic reason to expect restrictions on the combination on epistemic
modals with other epistemic modals in Scandinavian in the picture painted here. However,
there seem to exist such restrictions. In Danish it seems that epistemic + epistemic
combinations are good only if the second modal is kunne 'may'. This is a total mystery under
this analysis, as admitted by the authors. In Icelandic, there are fewer restrictions, but the
                                                
27According to Roberts (1993:333), Battistella discusses double-modal constructions in some detail. The
discussion in Roberts refers to "some dialects of American English in the Southern States of the USA".
28 This generalization does not hold for Norwegian. Cf. e.g the following (authentic) example:
i) Det er absurd at vi skal måtte gå til domstolene med dette.
   it is absurd that we shall must go to courtsDEF with this
  'It is absurd that we are supposed to be required to go to the court with this.'
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modals munu 'will' and skulu 'shall' (in the epistemic reading) can never follow any auxiliary,
including other modals29. The authors have no syntactic explanation for this either.
The combination epistemic + root does not seem to be subject to particular restrictions
neither in Icelandic nor Danish, and the combination root + epistemic is always unacceptable
(or so it seems). The latter assumption is given a semantic explanation (p. 78):
Since epistemic modals predicate of a whole proposition whereas root modals
predicate of one of the arguments (typically the subject) of a proposition, we would
not expect root modals to be able to take scope over epistemic modals.
Some of my objections to the account proposed here are the same as my objections to Vikner
(1988), although in this paper, the problems seem even more severe. In my view, the gain by
analysing the Danish root modals as raising verbs that assign additional theta-roles seems
simply too small to motivate the difference in analysis between Danish and Icelandic. In my
view, the co-occurrence of some Danish root modals with the aforementioned event-verbs
does not receive a satisfactory explanation in this account anyway (cf. my objections to
Vikner 1988 in the previous section); thus, one should preferably seek some other explanation
for these co-occurence facts. This would allow the authors to maintain the distinction across
the Scandinavian languages that root modals are (like) control verbs whereas epistemic
modals are (like) raising verbs. There is of course nothing wrong in principle with assuming
two different structural types for Danish and Icelandic root modals, if the data convinces one
to maintain such an hypothesis, but in my opinion, the data are simply not sufficiently
convincing to force this difference.
However, a more serious objection to this analysis is that it makes a range of
predictions that simply do not hold up against the observable empirical facts, at least not for
Norwegian, and according to Vikner (p.c.), in fact neither for Danish. This concerns in
particular the alleged theta-properties of the subject of root modals.
Recall that this analysis proposes that root modals, being (like) control verbs, assign
a(n additional) theta role to their subject, unlike epistemic modals. This implies that only
epistemic modals and not root modals, should be able to take non-argument subjects like
expletives, weather-arguments and idiom-chunk subjects. As shown by the data in (19), this is
simply not correct.  Although what I have been calling dispositional root modals typically
take theta subjects (but see (19) i), deontic root modals occur with all types of "non-
                                                
29 On page 79, T&V mention the possibility that the verbs munu and skulu developed epistemic sense earlier than
the other modals, on the basis of examples of double modals in the Old Norse Sagas. Most of the examples of
double modals in these texts seem to be a root modal embedded under the epistemic modals munu and skulu.
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argument" subjects, contrary to T&V's claims (cf. also Brennan 1993 and Brennan 1997 for
English data illustrating the same facts for English). (19)a-d exemplify root modals with
expletive subjects, e - g are root modals with wheather-it, and h-i are root modals with idiom-
chunk subjects. I should mention that some of these sentences are ambiguous between a root
and an epistemic reading. However, the important fact is that all these sentences are
grammatical on a root reading as well.
(19)
a. Det skal bestandig være minst to voksne til stede.
  'There should always be at least two adults present.'
b. Det må komme minst femti personer for at festen skal lønne seg.
    there must come at least fifty people for the party to pay off
   'At least fifty people must show up for the party to pay off.'
c. Det bør bli forandringer m.h.t. denne praksisen.
   there should occur changes w.r.t. this (code of) practice
   'This code of practice ought to change.'
d. Det kan være opptil fire patroner i hylsa pr. ladning
    'There may/can be up to four cartridges in the case in one load.'
e. Nå bør det snart regne; gresset er så tørt.
   now should it soon rain; the grass is so dry
  ' It ought to rain soon; the grass is so dry.'
f. Det kan ikke snø nå som vi er på landtur!
   'It cannot snow now that we are on a picnic!= negated permission'
g. Det må blåse sterkere for at draken skal lette.
    'it must blow harder for the kite to fly'
  'It must be windier for the kite to fly.'
h. M.h.t. Jon, så kan fanden ta ham (idiom: Fanden ta Jon!)
   ' As for John, the devil may take him = permission.'
i. Nød kan lære naken kvinne å spinne (idiom: Nød lærer naken kvinne å spinne)
               'Need can teach naked woman to spin = ability'
If we want to maintain that control verbs obligatorily assign a theta-role, it follows that root
modals cannot possibly be control verbs. The question remains whether we want to make the
claim that control verbs always assign a theta-role. But in either case, one cannot maintain the
analysis of T&V in face of the data presented in (19), since they show that root modals do in
fact take non-argument subjects.
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An observation that seems to hold, however, is that (some) root modals may occur
with pseudo-clefted complements whereas epistemic modals do not. This seems to be a sound
observation and a fact that calls for an explanation. This phenomenon is thoroughly
investigated in section 4.2.
3.2.7 Barbiers (1995, 1999)
Barbiers (1999) is a short version of the analysis of modals that constitutes one chapter in
Barbiers (1995). I will present these two works as one single analysis and, in the course of
this presentation, comment on the points where there is a discrepancy between the (1999)
article and the (1995) analysis.
Barbiers' point of departure is his presentation of four different kinds of interpretations
possible with Dutch modals (1995:142):
(20)
Jan moet scaatsen
'John must skate'
I. 'John definitely wants to skate' dispositional
II. 'John has the obligation to skate' directed deontic
III. 'It is required that John skates' non-directed deontic
IV. 'It must be the case that John is skating' probability
The dispositional interpretation denotes some force, tendency or capacity internal to a subject;
the directed deontic interpretation denotes an obligation or permission which has an external
source directed towards a subject (which means that the subject has this obligation or
permission); the non-directed deontic interpretation also denotes permission, obligation or
requirement, but one that is not directed to the subject of the sentence (i.e. the situation is
required or permitted, but independent of the subject's actions or attitudes)30, and finally, the
probability interpretation involves a qualification of the truth value of the proposition
expressed by the sentence, "i.e. an estimation of the degree of probability of a proposition"
(p.145).
After arguing that these four interpretations are a result of real ambiguity and not
merely vagueness, Barbiers describes the aforementioned interpretations as a result of "two
parameters for modal interpretations" (1998:14), specifically [± subject-oriented] and [±
(potential) polarity transition], where the latter refers to a negative and a positive stage of the
event embedded under the modal, such that the negative stage holds at the speech time and is
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required, possible, desirable or permitted at some point in the future. These two parameters
yield the following possibilities (1995:149):
(21)
Classification of
modal interpretations
[+ subject-oriented] [¬ subject-oriented]
[+ polarity transition]31 Dispositional/directed deontic Non-directed deontic
[¬ polarity transition] Sympathy/Antipathy32 Probability [epistemic]
Applying these parameters to the interpretations of (20) above, I and II involve subject-
orientation, whereas III and IV do not, and I-III involve a polarity transition, unlike IV. This
is to say that in interpretation I-III, the embedded proposition  John skate is false at the time
of utterance and required to be true some time in the future, whereas no such polarity
transition is involved in the probability interpretation, since the speaker here expresses his
belief that the embedded proposition is in fact true at the time of utterance. Barbiers
continues:
If the polarity interpretations involve a switch of truth value, we expect individual-
level predicates to disambiguate modal sentences. Since an individul-level predicate
expresses a permanent property of an entity, it disallows a switch of truth value: there
are no stages in which the entity does not have the property. The expectation is
correct: the sentence in (10) only has a probability interpretation.
(10) Jan moet een native speaker van het Vlaams zijn.
'John must be a native speaker of Flemish'
Whether or not a modal sentence is interpreted as involving a polarity transition is
semantically and syntactically determined by the complement of the modal. To illustrate this
claim, Barbiers utilizes one specific property of Dutch modals: the property of taking non-
verbal complements.
The range of possible non-verbal complements of Dutch modals seems to be much
wider than the possible non-verbal complements of Norwegian and German modals33. A
                                                                                                                                                        
30 Notice that "the modal willen 'want' has no directed deontic interpretation.
31 Both terms 'polarity transition' are modified by potential in the (1999) article.
32 These terms (from the 1999 article) replace the terms like-dislike relation in the (1995) analysis and refers to
the 'like-dislike' denotation of certain Dutch modals, e.g.  moeten, mogen, e.g Marie moet die jongen niet 'Mary
does not like that boy'
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traditional way of accounting for these non-verbal complements of modals is to assume that a
"silent infinitive" is present in all such cases. Barbiers (1999) presents several arguments
against this assumption, e.g. that PF-deletion of the infinitive should not reduce the ambiguity
of the modal, since a PF-deletion should not have any influence on the interpretation.
However, a modal with a non-verbal complement can never be interpreted epistemically,
unlike a corresponding sentence where the infinitive is present:
(22)
a. Jan mag weggaan
   'John may go away'; root/epistemic both possible
b. Jan mag weg
'John may (go) away'; root reading OK/ epistemic reading *
Futhermore, agreement facts seem to indicate that there is no PF-deletion of the infinitive:
(23)
a. Stiletto's mogen/*mag  tegenwoordig niet meer
   'Switchblades are/*is not allowed anymore nowadays'
b. [Stiletto's hebben] mag /*mogen tegenwordig niet meer
   'Having switchblades is/*are not allowed anymore nowadays'
But the strongest argument, in Barbiers' view, is that only constituents that denote a value on a
scale from 0 to 1 can be the non-verbal complement of a modal. To exemplify, an adjective
like vol 'full' may constitute the non-verbal complement of a modal because it denotes a
property which either applies to an entity (1) or it does not (0); e.g. there is no notion
somewhat full. On the other hand, there exist properties that do not denote such values on a
scale from 0 to 1, instead, they denote much more gradual properties. For instance, it makes
less sense to say that a person is either intelligent (1) or he is not intelligent (0); instead, we
would perhaps want to characterize a person as somewhat intelligent. Thus, an adjective like
intelligent would not fit as a complement of a modal, according to Barbiers' claims, since it
does not denote a value on a bounded scale from 0 to 1.
Now, if modals have these semantic requirements towards what appears to be their
non-verbal complements, and if there existed a silent infinitive between the modal and the
                                                                                                                                                        
33 Barbiers (1999:fn.1) mentions that German and Afrikaans have more restrictions on the complement of the
modal than the corresponding Dutch constructions since these languages allow only a subset of the complements
that can occur with a modal in Dutch. On my own account, I may add that one such restriction seems to be a
restriction on possible category, in that Norwegian and German (at least to my knowledge) seem to disallow
adjectival small clauses as complements, while permitting PP/AdvP resultative small clauses.
Chapter 3
84
non-verbal complement, one would have to say that the modal imposes selectional
requirements on the complement (the non-verbal constituent) of its complement (the silent
infinitive).
Having argued that there is no silent infinitive in these contructions and that these
comstructions that seem to be non-verbal complements are in fact non-verbal, Barbiers uses
these non-verbal complements as an argument against the control vs. raising analysis. The
argument goes as follows.
Using an "uncontroversial diagnostic" that small clause complements cannot be
extraposed, Barbiers establishes that the non-verbal predicative complements of modals are
indeed small clauses, cf. (24) (Barbiers' 1999: (14)):
(24)
a. dat Jan morgen <naar Amsterdam> moet <*naar Amsterdam>
  'that John tomorrow to Amsterdam must to Amsterdam.'
b. dat de brief morgen <in de prullenbak> mag <*in de prullenbak>
   'that the letter tomorrow into the trashcan may into the trashcan.'
If the bracketed constituents are small clauses complements, then the DPs Jan and de brief
must be their subjects. Their subjects cannot be PRO, since a small clause complement cannot
have PRO as its subject (cf. (25)a; Barbiers' 1999: 15a), so the subject must have raised from
a position inside the small clause (cf. (25)b; op.cit. (15b)) :
(25)
a. Jan drinkt [SC  zich /*PRO ziek]
  'John drinks   SE    sick'
b. Jani moet [PP ti naar Amsterdam]
   'John must to Amsterdam'
Within a control vs. raising analysis of modals, the raising structure yields an epistemic
interpretation. But modals with small clause complements only have root interpretations,
never epistemic ones. The conclusion is that the control vs. raising anslysis cannot be correct.
As mentioned above, Barbiers claims that the non-verbal complement of a modal must
denote a value on a scale from 0 to 1. If it does not, it is ungrammatical. Cf. e.g. (26):
(26)
Deze fles moet vol
'this bottle must full'
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The value that the bottle has on the scale of empty (0) to full (1) is not 1 when the sentence is
uttered and should become 1 at some point in the future. This is two essential properties of all
root interpretations, Barbiers claims:
(i) the complement of the modal must denote a value on a bounded scale, and
(ii) this value is not the actual value at the moment T denoted by the modal.
This is why individual-level predicates are unacceptable as complements of root modals (cf.
the quote above), since they denote a fixed property of the subject (which must have a
constant reference as well, in order for the complement to count as an individual-level
predicate). All non-verbal and verbal complements of Dutch root modals must denote a
variable property, and a value on a bounded scale. The latter means that many stage-level
predicates cannot constitute the complement of a modal either, if they do not denote such a
value on a bounded scale (e.g. ziek 'sick' is out for this reason). In the case of infinitival
complements, the bounded scale is provided by the infinitive itself, in its denotation as an
event. The scale is simply a numerical scale from 0 to 1, counting the number of events. As a
result, any verb can be the complement of a modal, since the infinitive always introduces a
bounded scale.
Barbiers (1999:16) lists the following differences between  epistemic and root
interpretations:
( 27)
Differences between epistemic and root interpretations
Epistemic Root
Potential polarity transition no yes
Scale of complement false-true (or: no – yes) 0-1 (number of events)
Category of complement verbal only all categories
Definite complement yes no
Root modals involve a polarity transition such that the event embedded under the modal is
false (0) at the moment of utterance and required/permitted/possible/desired to hold (1) at
some point in the future. Epistemic modals involve no such polarity transition. Moreover,
recall that Barbiers claims that any complement of any modal must denote a value on a
bounded scale, or else it is ungrammatical. The "scale" of the complement in the case of
epistemic modals is the scale ranging from true to false. The (verbal) complement of a root
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modal introduces a numerical scale from 0 to 1, counting the number of events (i.e. ONE
event).
Barbiers goes on to claim that epistemic modals take verbal complements only,
whereas root modals take complements of all categories. We have seen examples where root
modals take non-verbal small clause complements (APs and PPs). However, Barbiers'
ambition is to account for all possible types of complement of all modals in his analysis;
hence, he claims that modals taking DP arguments as complements should be accounted for
by the same means. Thus, he lists examples where modals take DP arguments as
complements:
( 28)
a. Jan moet een /*het vriendinnetje.
    Jan must a /the girl friend
   'Jan wants (to find) a girlfriend.'
b. Jan moet het vriendinnetje niet/wel.
    Jan must the girl friend not/well
    'Jan does not like the girlfriend/Jan likes the girlfriend very much'
Note that whereas the construction in ( 28)a gives rise to a polarity-transition reading, i.e. it is
an ordinary root modal construction (i.e. Jan does not have a girlfriend at present (0) but he
wants to have one in the future (1)), ( 28)b exemplifies what Barbiers dubs the
Sympathy/Antipathy interpretation (cf. the table in (21), repeated here for convenience as
(29)):
(29)
Classification of
modal interpretations
[+ subject-oriented] [¬ subject-oriented]
[+ polarity transition]34 Dispositional/directed deontic Non-directed deontic
[¬ polarity transition] Sympathy/Antipathy Probability [epistemic]
There is no polarity transition in the case of ( 28)b involving a transition from a present
situation to a future situation.
                                                
34 Both terms 'polarity transition' are modified by potential in the (1999) article.
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Now, Barbiers envisages that the common property of the epistemic interpretation and
the sympathy/antipathy interpretation, notably that neither of them give rise to a polarity
transition, should be accounted for by the same means. Crucially, he points out the fact that
whereas a definite noun phrase is unacceptable as the complement of a root modal, a definite
noun phrase is acceptable in the sympathy/antipathy construction. Thus, he proposes that the
definiteness of the complement is what rules out the polarity-transition interpretation in (
28)b.
His next step is to propose that the complement of epistemic modals are in some sense
definite as well, since the definiteness of the complement evidently is what rules out a polarity
transition reading in the case of modals with nominal complements. Plausibly, Barbiers
continues, the impossibility of a transition here has to do with the fact that definite
constituents have a fixed reference. Hence, he proposes that definiteness and indefiniteness
are properties that can be ascribed to verbal constituents as well as nominal constituents,
encoded by functional projections that we normally think of as belonging to the functional
layer of nominal constituents.
That is, root modals take indefinite verbal (as well as non-verbal) complements, IndPs,
whereas epistemic modals take definite verbal complement DPs. Hence, the IndP
("Individuator Phrase") with the abstract head ONE is the verbal counterpart of an indefinite
noun phrase, whereas the DP complement of an epistemic modal is the verbal counterpart of
a definite noun phrase, headed by an abstract head D.
This abstract head D thus makes the verbal complement definite. Only an epistemic
modal may have a definite verbal complement (although modals encoding
sympathy/antipathy may take definite nominal complements), hence the presence of D in the
modal's verbal complement inevitably gives the modal an epistemic interpretation. The reason
for this, Barbiers claims, is that when the complement is definite, a polarity transition is
impossible.
One further important property of D is that this head is what establishes the semantic
relation between subject and event, identifying the subject as source, starting point, agent, or
posessor of the event. Thus, this head can be employed to encode subject-orientedness of a
modal as well, in that the modal's base position relative to this D head determines whether a
semantic relation of subject-orientedness will be established between the subject and modal or
not. Cf.  (30); Barbiers' (1999:29):
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 (30)
a. root b. epistemic
DP ModP
Subject DP Mod DP
     D ModP Subject DP
Mod IndP        D IndP
    Ind    VP      Ind VP
Given that D establishes the relation between the subject and the modal, it follows from the
proposed structure that epistemic modals are never subject-oriented. Since epistemic modals
are generated above the subject, and the D head is generated even lower than the subject, the
abstract head D is prevented from establishing a relation between the epistemic modal and the
subject.
Directed deontic interpreations and dispositional interpretations, on the other hand, are
subject-oriented, a relation established by the D head, since the subject in this case is
generated above D and the modal is generated below D. Now, what about non-directed
deontic interpretations? According to Barbiers (1999:20), these may arise in two ways. (i) DP
is entirely absent in these interpretations, or (ii) DP is present, but the subject reconstructs at
LF into a position within the scope of the modal (e.g. <Spec,VP>). The ambiguity between a
dispositional interpretation and a directed deontic interpretation is ascribed to the ambiguity
(or rather the abstractness) of D; as D may encode 'source' as well as 'possessor'35: When the
subject is taken to be the source of modality, we get the dispositional reading, but when the
subject is taken to be the possessor of modality, we get the directed deontic reading.
The assumption that the complement of root modals is indefinite, whereas the
complement of epistemic modals is definite, is supported by a range of arguments in Barbiers
(1995:189 ff). He argues, for instance, that the complement of root modals behaves like
indefinite noun phrases w.r.t. focus movement and constructions with the quantifier wat 'what
                                                
35 Barbiers (1995: 186): "The relations established by D are the other building blocks: the possibility of the [...]
event is determined and the subject is the determiner. Since the notion of determiner is taken to subsume notions
such as source, possessor, origin and so on, the subject [...] can be interpreted as the source of the possibility,
which yields the ability interpretation, or as the possessor of the possibility, which yields the permission reading.
The ambiguity between a dispositional and a directed deontic interpretation is thus ascribed to the ambiguity of,
or rather the abstractness of D, just as in the case of John's portrait, where the semantic relations between John
and portrait established by D can be interpreted as posessor, artist, source and so on."
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an X!', whereas complements of epistemic modals, like definite noun phrases, are
ungrammatical in these constructions (cf. (31); Barbiers 1995:(81)):
(31)
a.Een huis/*het huis dat Jan heeft!
a house/the house that John has
'John has an extraordinary house!'
b. Werken dat Jan kan!
   work that John can
' John is able to/allowed to work very hard
# 'It is permitted that John is working very hard'
# 'It is possible that John is working very hard'
c. Wat heeft Jan een boeken/* de boeken'
   what has John a books       the books
   'John has a whole lot of books'
d. Wat kan Jan schaatsen!
    what can John skate
    'John is a very good skater'
   # 'It is possible that John is skating'
Another piece of evidence for the structure in  (30) is the nature of auxiliary selection in
modal environments, according to Barbiers (1995:197). Following Kayne (1993), Barbiers
considers selection of HAVE to involve incorporation of D into BE (i.e. BE is the primitive
auxiliary, and HAVE is a derivative). Assuming that BE and D must be adjacent, i.e. DP must
be the complement of BE for incorporation to be possible, the modal can be in two positions
(irrelevant material omitted):
(32)
a. BE     D   Mod   Ind   ->  HAVE   Mod   Ind -> Root
b. Mod  BE   D      Ind   ->  Mod    HAVE   Ind  -> Epistemic
This indicates, according to Barbiers, that the modal is generated below D in the case of root
modals, but above D in the case of epistemic modals, just like he proposes (cf. the structure in
(30)). However, Barbiers comments (in 1995:fn 41) that the correspondence of the position of
the modal relative to HAVE and the reading of the modal as root or epistemic is not perfect,
since the order Mod AUX can also have the polarity interpretation, not only the epistemic
interpretation36.
                                                
36 On my own account, I might add that in my own dialect of Norwegian (cf. section 3.2.4), it is also possible to
get epistemic readings of a modal following a perfect auxiliary.
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Barbiers (1995,1999) thus assumes the same raising structure for all modals, and
essentially, the same argument structure. The various readings are a result of the nature of the
complement (denoting a value on a bounded scale, a possible polarity transition or not, i.e.
indefinite or definite), and the base position of the modal; in particular relative to the abstract
head D.
One obvious objection to a syntactico-sentric approach such as this one, is that the
various underlying structures proposed for the different readings all may give rise to exactly
the same string, i.e. sentence; e.g. the subject obviously raises to what seems to be the
specifier position of an epistemic modal as well, without giving rise to any kind of subject-
orientation, so this raising obviously must take place for some other reason. Furthermore, the
apparatus requires a range of abstract, invisible heads that never seem to have any
morphological realization. Also, the author invokes a somewhat cryptic notion of a "bounded
scale", LF-reconstructions and covert movements to account for all the facts (cf. Barbiers
1995). Barbiers ambition to account for all types of modals with all kinds of complements,
including DP/noun phrase complements, leads to the assumption that verbal constituents
project functional heads that we normally associate only with nominal categories. As pointed
out by Harley (1998), the latter speculations are "perhaps less successful". For one thing, it
remains unexplained why the interpretation of the verb moeten 'must' denotes like/dislike with
names/definite DPs rather than 'want/need', as it seems do denote with indefinites and verbal
complements. One natural assumption to make is that we are dealing two different, but
homonymous modals in these cases. For further counterarguments along these lines, cf.
Harley (1998).
 Another problem is Barbiers' two essential claims about root interpretations, repeated
here for convenience:
(i) the complement of the modal must denote a value on a bounded scale, and
(ii) this value is not the actual value at the moment T denoted by the modal.
For the latter of these two, one might object that although this principle seems to be accurate
for non-verbal complements of root modals (for their Norwegian counterparts as well), this is
obviously not correct for verbal complements, cf. e.g.
(33)
a. Jon må være på kontoret.
  'Jon must stay in his office'
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Barbiers claims that the embedded proposition Jon være på kontoret 'Jon be in his office'
should be false at the time of utterance and required to be true at some point in the future. But
it seems to me that (33) may perfectly well be uttered in a situation where Jon is already in his
office, i.e. where the value "1" already obtains to the event. So there must be some temporal
and/or other semantic differences between verbal and non-verbal complements.
Whatever the objections, Barbiers' approach represents an innovative perspective to
modals and their various interpreations, although substantial parts of this analysis remain
highly speculative and important aspects are 'left for future research'.
3.2.8 Lødrup (1996a)
Lødrup (1996a) addresses almost solely Norwegian data (except for one English and one
German sentence), where modals constitute a significant part. This work hooks up to the
discussion surrounding the categorical status of modals; i.e. whether they should be
considered auxiliaries or not.
Lødrup's point of departure is two sets of syntactic criteria typically used to define
auxiliaries, i.e. language-specific criteria and language-independent criteria. Language-
specific criteria include word-order facts as well as possible governors and governees of the
auxiliary. Language-independent criteria include the requirement that an auxiliary occurs with
a main verb and the criterion that an auxiliary does not impose any semantic restrictions on its
subject; the latter as a consequence of the fact that they have no independent subject position.
This in fact amounts to saying that all auxiliaries are raising verbs (but not vice versa). Now,
the problem Lødrup focusses on, is that in many languages, e.g. Norwegian, the two sets of
criteria (the language-specific ones and the language-independent ones) pick out different
groups of verbs. Modals are of specific interest here, since according to Lødrup, root modals
are picked out by the language-specific criteria, but fail to meet the language-independent
criteria, while epistemic modals meet both sets of criteria. I.e. epistemic modals are indeed
raising verbs, but root modals are control verbs, according to this analysis, in the tradition
stemming from Ross (1969).
As evidence for the appropriateness of this analysis for Nowegian modals, Lødrup
presents data illustrating the difference in behaviour between root modals and epistemic
modals in passive and impersonal constructions. Root modals have an independent subject
position, Lødrup says, so the "well-known fact" that epistemic modals and root modals pattern
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differently w.r.t. passive and impersonal constructions is expected. The following data are
presented to support this claim (Lødrup's (5) and (6)):
(34)
a. Maten vil bli servert snart.
  'The food will be served soon.'
b. Det vil komme noen.
   there will come someone
   'Someone will come.'
The only reading available of the modal in these two sentences, is the epistemic reading
(future/prediction); the root reading (volition) is not available37. This is indicative of a pattern
where the root modal, being a control verb, has an independent subject position and therefore
imposes specific selectional requirements onto the subject. The epistemic modal, lacking an
independent subject position, is unable to impose such selectional requirements onto its
subject, as expected from a true raising verb.
As another interesting difference between root modals and epistemic modals, Lødrup
says that root modals, unlike epistemic modals, are able to take "ordinary NP objects", i.e.
what seems to be definite pro-forms substituting for the VP complement38. The modals in
(35) all have root readings only.
 (35)
Dette kan/vil/skal/må/bør jeg ikke
this can/will/shall/must/ought I not
'I can't/won't/shouldn't/mustn't/ought not to do this.'
Also, root modals, unlike epistemic modals, may appear with  adverbial complements:
(36)
Jeg vil/skal ut
I will/shall out
'I want to go out/I am going out.'
Lødrup mentions as a possible snag to the analysis of root modals as control verbs the fact
that root modals do not passivize, with the marginal exception of kunne and ville:
                                                
37 It is possible to ascribe a human-like quality to maten 'the food' in (34)a; i.e. it is possible to 'animate' the
argument, as is often the case in poetry and metaphor. If the food is ascribed such human-like properties, it is of
course possible to obtain the 'volition'-reading. We will not cosider such cases here.
38 Lødrup himself claims that these are not elliptical constructions, but modals lacking a VP complement
whatsoever.
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(37)
a. Leksen må kunnes i morgen.
   The lesson must can-PASSIVE tomorrow
   'You should know your lesson by tomorrow.'
b. Dette må ikke bare ønskes, det må villes.
   This must not only wish-PASSIVE, it must will-PASSIVE
   'You must not only wish this, you must want it.'
As a possible explanation for the general ban against passivized root modals, Lødrup claims
that most root modals take benefactive subjects, and that other Norwegian verbs with
benefactive subjects seem marginal as passives too (examples are e.g. ha 'have', få 'get').
Lødrup goes on to search for differences between auxiliaries and other raising verbs
(since it seems obvious that not all raising verbs are auxiliaries). He lists two such differences,
auxiliaries (here, epistemic modals)  allow for their VP complement to undergo topicalization
as well as pronominalization, while non-auxiliary raising verbs (illustrated by the raising verb
forekomme, 'seem') do not (cf. (38); Lødrup's (13), (15), (17) and (19)).
(38)
a.Regne kan det ikke.
  rain can it not
  'It couldn't be raining.'
b. *Å spille golf forekommer han meg.
     to play golf seems he to me
     'He seems to me to play golf.'
c. (Kan det regne?) Det kan det.
    (can it rain?) It can that
     ' Could it be raining? So it can.'
d. (Kan Per sies å være lur?) *Han forekommer meg det39.
     (can per say-PASSIVE to be smart?) he seems to me that
     '(Could one say that Per is smart?) He seems so to me.'
If the possiblity for VP-topicalization and VP-pronominalisation should be considered criteria
for auxiliaries, Lødrup says, we get some new auxiliaries, e.g. pleie 'use to', behøve 'need',
trenge 'need'. These differ from the traditional auxiliaries by allowing the infinitival marker40
and allowing the pro-form gjøre in tags.
                                                
39 One of my informants states that this sentence is OK according to his grammaticality judgments.
40 Trenge/behøve both allow for the infinitival marker å to be omitted in their negated forms, cf. chapter 2.
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Finally, Lødrup derives the auxiliary-like properties of root modals (the possiblity of
taking bare infinitivals, for instance) from the fact that they have epistemic counterparts. This
is because "aux-properties" of root modals are parasitic on epistemic modals. Lødrup supports
his claim by facts regarding the Danish modal turde 'dare', where the epistemic reading has
become archaic, and as a result, the root version now accepts infinitivals with the infinitival
marker. "The parasite has lost its host" (p. 11).  Likewise, in English, the main verb have
seems to have certain auxiliary properties that must be parasitic, according to McCawley
(1988:246).
This work presents some very interesting data and observations. In particular, I find it
interesting that behøve/trenge 'need' seem to pattern with epistemic modals w.r.t.
topicalization and pronominalization of their VP complements, and that root modals may take
definite VP pro-forms (dette, this), unlike epistemic modals. But there are also some severe
shortcomings in this account. What in particular flaws the analysis is that many crucial
(alleged) properties of root modals are illustrated by kunne 'can' and ville 'only'. As discussed
in chapter two, these two root modals have a range of properties that are specific to them and
make them untypical root modals. For instance, to illustrate his crucial claim that root modals
are control verbs in Norwegian, Lødrup provides data with the root modal vil 'want-to' in
passive and impersonal constructions (cf. (34) above, repeated here for convenience):
(39)
a. Maten vil bli servert snart.
  'The food will be served soon.'
b. Det vil komme noen.
   there will come someone
   'Someone will come.'
Lødrup correctly claims that root readings of the modal are unavailable in these sentences (but
cf. fn 37). However, what Lødrup fails to notice, is that root readings are fine with all other
modals in these constructions; i.e. ville is in fact the only modal that behaves in this way, cf.
(40).
(40)
a. Maten må/ skal/ kan/ bør bli servert snart.
 Maten må/skal/kan/bør serveres snart
 ' The food must/ will/ may/ should be served soon.' (i.e. epistemic/root = both OK)
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b. Det må/ skal/ kan/ bør komme noen.
   there must/ will/ may/ should come someone
   'Someone must/ will/ may/ should come.' (i.e. epistemic/root = both OK)
Note that these sentences are ambiguous  between an epistemic reading, which signals the
degree of likelihood of the embedded proposition, and a root reading, which signals the
necessity/intention/permission of the occurence of the event described by the embedded
proposition. Crucially, a root reading is indeed possible with inanimate and expletive subjects.
Thus, one very substatial part of Lødrup's argument for Norwegian root modals as
control verbs with independent subject positions is based on one, and one very untypical root
modal, the modal ville. As seen in (40) above, his very own tests applied to all other root
modals reveal that root modals must be raising verbs, too.
However, this does not diminish the importance of some of his other observations, e.g.
that behøve/trenge 'need' seem to pattern with epistemic modals w.r.t. topicalization and
pronominalization of their VP complements, and that root modals may take definite VP pro-
forms (dette 'this'), unlike epistemic modals.
3.2.9 Dyvik (1999)
By the author's own statement (p.c), Dyvik (1999) is first and foremost an argument against
the analysis of auxiliaries presented in Butt, Niño and Segond (1996). The latter work
suggests that AUX categories should be analysed as functional categories just contributing
tense and aspect features to the sentence, whereas traditional analyses within HPSG and LFG
treat auxiliaries as elements similar to main verbs. Dyvik (1999) argues that the traditional
analysis fares better w.r.t. capturing the linguistic facts about Norwegian modals and perfect
auxiliaries, since Norwegian auxiliaries indeed seem to have the properties of complement-
taking verbs as suggested by traditional LFG/HPSG analyses on the subject. He motivates his
claim using a range of data, observations and generalizations concerning Norwegian modals
and (other) auxiliaries.
Dyvik starts out noticing that although the semantic range of Norwegian modals is
similar to those in English, French and German, there is a notable systematicity of alternatives
in Norwegian:
Every modal can be interpreted either as a one-place epistemic modal or as a two-
place root modal. Under the epistemic interpretations the subject referent is not an
argument of the modal, which only takes the entire proposition as an argument [...].
Under the root interpretation the subject referent is an argument of the modal.
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Under the epistemic interpretation the modals meet the universal criterion of an auxiliary in
that they impose no semantic restrictions on the subject; thus, if modals occur with formal
(i.e. expletive) subjects, only the epistemic reading is possible. Dyvik furthermore points out
that when a modal takes the perfect auxiliary as a complement, the reading of the modal is
always epistemic (Dyvik's (10)).
(41)
Han     vil/kan/må/skal                ha dreiet håndtaket.
'He      will/may/must/is said to  have turned the lever.'
Norwegain modals can also be complements of the perfect auxiliary, but never in the
epistemic sense:
(42)
Han har     villet/kunnet/måttet/skullet dreie håndtaket.
he has [want-to/can/must/shall]PERF turn the-lever
'He  has wanted/been able/ been obliged/had a duty to turn the lever.'
It seems possible to construct examples where epistemic modals are complements of other
epistemic modals, and most clearly before the perfect auxiliary ha:
(43)
Han vil kunne ha reist i morgen.
he    will  may have travelled  tomorrow
'Tomorrow it will be the case that he may have gone away.'
From these syntactic facts, Dyvik says, it follows that epistemic modals can only occur in
finite forms (present and past tense) and the infinitive, while the past participle is reserved for
the root modals.
Dyvik goes on to refer some main points from Lødrup (1996). Since Lødrup argues
that epistemic modals should be considered raising verbs and root modals control verbs, it
seems natural to assume that Lødrup also considers the epistemic and root varieties of
Norwegian modals distinct lexemes (although, as Dyvik points out, Lødrup (1996) is not
explicit on this point). This is an assumption that Dyvik is quite unwilling to adopt:
[...] the analysis of epistemic and root modals as distinct lexemes would give rise to a
puzzlingly systematic homonymy linking pairs of epistemic and root modals in
Norwegian, a systematicity which would then be unaccounted for. The formal identity
of all morphosyntactic forms which they both have, along with their obvious semantic
relatedness, would appear accidental.
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The solution that Dyvik suggests is to bring the epistemic and root meanings together by
deriving the epistemic varieties from the root varieties by lexical rules, operating on semantic
forms and XCOMP (complement-taking) constraints. For instance, one needs to state that the
complements of root modals and the perfect auxiliary ha can only be root modals or main
verbs and not epistemic modals or the auxiliary ha itself, while epistemic modals can take all
kinds of complements. Each modal verb would have pairs of entries where the epistemic entry
is derived or at least derivable from the entry of the corresponding root modal.
Since Dyvik's solution has XCOMP constraints as a crucial ingredient, it follows that
Dyvik is less eager to do away with XCOMP-properties as possible constraints on modals and
other auxiliaries, as proposed by Butt et al. (1996). Although, Dyvik says, it would no doubt
be technically possible to provide an alternative analysis of the Norwegian constructions
along the lines suggested by Butt et al.
On the positive side, this article contains observations and generalizations rarely found
in works on modals, and the arguments that Dyvik presents against a "two distinct lexemes"
hypothesis seem appealing. On the negative side, however, several of the generalizations
stated in this work simply do not hold up against closer scrutiny. Among these generalizations
is the claim that root modals are always two-place predicates (cf. quote above), a widespread
assumption that we have already addressed and rejected in section 2.2.2. Secondly, the claim
that only epistemic modals take expletive subjects is certainly not a sound generalization
either; cf. section 3.2.6 for counterevidence to this claim.
An interesting observation is that the reading of the modal is epistemic when
preceding a perfect auxiliary and root when following it. While the latter observation seems
to hold for standard the dialects Bokmål and Nynorsk (although not for non-standard dialects)
of Norwegian, the first observation is more problematic. It is true that the default reading of a
modal preceding a perfect auxiliary will be the epistemic reading, all things being equal.
However, it is relatively easy to force a root reading of any modal in such surroundings, if we
provide the sentence with an additional purpose-clause or a temporal-adverbial clause
denoting a point in the future, cf. (44).
(44)
a.  Pasienten skal ha blitt beviselig feilbehandlet for å ha krav på erstatning.
     ' The patient must provenly have been subject to malpractice in order to
be entitled to a compensation'
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b.  Du bør ha gjort ferdig leksene dine før du går på kino.
    ' You ought to have finished your homework before going to the movies'
c.   En student må ha ridd denne hesten for å bli opptatt i rideklubben.
      'A student must have ridden this horse in order to be admitted to the
  jockey club'
d.   Jeg må ha bestått denne prøven før neste semester.
    ' I  must have passed this test by next term.'
Still, the observation that Norwegian modals preceding a perfect auxiliary have epistemic as
their default reading, although this is not the only reading possible in these surrounding,s is
very interesting, and should be investigated further. Thus, we will pursue this question
thoroughly in chapter 5.
To sum up, although Dyvik (1999) presents a range of rarely stated generalizations in
this proposal, several of these generalizations turn out to be false. This means that although
his analysis may offer a better account for modals and other auxiliaries than the approach of
Butt, Niño and Segond (1996), the fact remains that Dyvik's analysis builds several dubious
premises.
3.2.10 Wurmbrand (1999)
Wurmbrand's main objective in this article is to challenge the wide-spread control vs. raising
analysis of Germanic modals, as it is exemplified e.g. in several of the works described above.
In this mission she concentrates primarily on arguments provided by three empirical domains;
a) evidence suggesting that the subject is selected solely by the lower (infinitival verb)
predicate; b) scopal relations between the subject and the modal; and c) evidence suggesting
that root modals do not assign theta-roles.
Wurmbrand's first piece of evidence comes from there-insertion contexts that allow
for root readings of the modal (Wurmbrand's (3) a-c):
(45)
a. There may be singing but no dancing on my premises.
b. There can be a party as long as it's not too loud.
c. There must be a solution to this problem on my desk, tomorrow morning!
These examples strongly favour a raising analysis over a control analysis for root modals (just
like for the epistemic ones), Wurmbrand claims. She goes on to provide examples from
quirky-case marked subjects in Icelandic. Wurmbrand's analysis at this point explicitly go
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against the generalizations made in Thrainnson and Vikner 1995 (cf. section 3.2.6 above) that
only epistemic modals, and not root modals allow for quirky subjects, as she provides
examples of root modals with quirky subjects (Wurmbrand's (7)):
(46)
a. Haraldi           / *Haraldur     verður að líka hamborgarar
    Harold-DAT /Harold-NOM must to like hamburgers
   'Harold must like hamburgers' (in order to be accepted by his new American in-laws)
b. Umsækjandann        verður að vanta peninga
    The-applicant-ACC must to lack money
The applicant must lack money' (in order to apply for this grant)
The verb líka assigns Dative case to its subject, whereas the verb vanta assigns Accusative
case to its subject, and this quirky case marking on the subject is retained when these verbs
are embedded under root modals, as shown in (46). As argued by Thrainnson and Vikner
(1995), only raising verbs and not control verbs allow for quirky case subjects in Icelandic41,
so constructions like these in fact provide another piece of evidence that root modals are
raising verbs, Wurmbrand says. So her arguments follow Thrainnson and Vikner's arguments,
only her conclusion is the exact opposite to the conclusion of Thrainnson and Vikner (1995).
The disagreement between Wurmbrand (1999) on one side and Thrainsson and Vikner (1995)
on the other of course stems from their explicitly stated view on the potential availability of
root readings in constructions like the ones in (46). Thrainnson and Vikner reject the
possiblity of root readings in these constructions (T&V pp. 59-60), whereas Wurmbrand's
Icelandic informants assure her that root readings are possible, and that quirky case is
essential for these cosntructions to be grammatical.
Wurmbrand then turns to passive in modal constructions. First, she notes that the
generalization about passive in German is that passive is possible only if the predicate has an
underlying external argument (since unaccusative predicates cannot be passivized). This
generalization extends to verbs that combine with infinitival complements; passive of control
verbs (like versuchen 'try', beschliessen 'decide') is possible, but passive of raising verbs is
ungrammatical. So if one assumes that all modals are raising verbs, the prohibition against
passivization of modals follow straightforwardly. The second lesson to be learned from
modals in passive constructions comes from modals with passive complements. Control
                                                
41 To be exact, what Thrainnson and Vikner claim is that verbs that take quirky subjects cannot very easily be
embedded under control verbs at all, but whenever that is possible,  the case of the subject of the control verb
must be nominative, as determined by the control verb itself, and not quirky (p. 60).
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contexts in general block passivization of the embedded infinitive, while raising verbs and,
essentially, epistemic and root modals allow an embedded passive42, cf. the data in (47)
(Wurmbrand's (11)).
(47)
a. The biscuits seem to have been finished by Paul
b. *The bisquits tried/decided to be finished by Paul
c. The biscuits may be finished by Paul.
The explanation for the ungrammaticality of (47) b is that control verbs like try and decide
require an agentive external argument with which they establish a thematic relation, and the
inanimate subject fails to meet this requirement. No such effect arises with raising verbs or,
crucially, with epistemic or root modals. The similarity between root modals and (other)
raising verbs in this respect once again suggests that root modals, like epistemic modals, are
raising verbs, not control verbs.
Invoking May (1977,1985), Wurmbrand states that control and raising verbs differ
with respect to scope properties vis-a-vis their syntactic subjects, in that raising constructions
but not control constructions allow an interpretation in which the subject takes narrow scope
with respect to the matrix verb, cf. the possible readings of the raising predicate construction
in (48) a vs. the single reading of the control predicate construction in (48) b (Wurmbrand's
(14)):
(48)
a. Someone from New York is likely to win in the lottery
   i) There is somebody from N.Y. and he is likely to win in the lottery
   ii) It is likely that somebody from N.Y. will win in the lottery
b. Someone from New York tried/promised to win in the lottery
   There is somebody from N.Y. and he tried/promised to win in the lottery
Now, if modals (crucially root modals) are raising predicates, one would expect modal
constructions to display the same scopal ambiguity as other raising predicates, where the
subject may have wide scope or narrow scope with respect to the modal. Wurmbrand provides
data which suggest that this is correct, cf. (49):
                                                
42 As pointed out to me by Lauri Carlson (p.c.), this could be seen as a consequence of the phenomenon
described as Visser's Generalization, that an object NP with a following complement can always and only be
passivized if that complement relates to the object; e.g  We persuaded Lisa to go/ Lisa was persuaded to go vs.
We promised Lisa to go/*Lisa was promised to go; Visser (1963 – 73, III:2.2118).
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(49)
a. Somebody from New York must have won in the lottery  (epistemic)
  i) There is somebody from N.Y. and he must have won in the lottery
  ii) It must be the case that somebody from N.Y. have won in the lottery
b. An Austrian must win the next race (in order for Austria to have the most gold
   medals; root reading)
 i) There is an Austrian for whom it is necessary to win the next race
  ii) It is necessary that an Austrian (whoever it is) win the next race
Many authors (cf. the references cited in Wurmbrand 1999) have argued that this scopal
ambiguity in raising constructions is due to the availability of two subject positions in these
constructions; the lower subject position of the embedded predicate (corresponding to the
narrow-scope reading) and the upper subject position of the matrix predicate (corresponding
to the wide-scope reading). In raising constructions the subject may be interpreted as
occupying either of these positions, unlike in control constructions, where only one subject
position is available.  Whatever the theoretical assumptions, the similarity between modals –
root as well as epistemic – and (other) raising predicates with respect to scopal ambiguity
suggests once again that modals are raising verbs and not control verbs.
Finally, Wurmbrand challenges the assumption that root modals are able to assign
theta roles in any construction, and suggests instead that the apparent thematic relation
between a root modal and the subject in certain contexts is "purely contextual". To support
this claim, she provides a range of data (where some are quoted from works by other authors)
that clearly do not involve a thematic relation between the subject and the root modal, cf.
(50):
(50)
a. There can be a party as long as it is not too loud
b. The biscuits may be finished by Paul (Warner 1993)
c. An opening hand must contain thirteen points (Newmeyer 1975)
d. Icicles may hang from the eavestroughs (McGinnis 1993)
e. The traitor must die
f. The old man must fall down the stairs and it must look like an accident
Wurmbrand concludes by stating the following:
All these properties are expected and straightforwardly accounted for if a subject in a
modal construction starts out as an argument of the lower predicate - i.e. if a modal
construction involve a raising structure rather than a control structure.
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I have little to add or object to Wurmbrand's article, which I find to be thorough and
convincing. However, not all of the arguments presented here extend to all Norwegian, other
Mainland Scandinavian or German modals, since there exist root modals that behave in
untypical ways. Specifically, many of the arguments presented here do not extend to the
Norwegian kunne 'can' in its ability-reading and ville 'want-to'; neither do they extend to the
German modals wollen 'want-to' and mögen 'would like' (cf. Öhlscläger 1989:129 ff., who
analyzes these two root modals as control verbs but all other modals as raising verbs).
3.2.11 Picallo (1990)
As the works mentioned in this survey of recent analyses of modals have all focussed (most of
them exclusively) on Germanic modals, I will include a work concentrating on Romance
modals as the final work in this survey.
Picallo's (1990) main purpose in this article is to argue against the traditional analysis
of modals as restructuring verbs (e.g. Rizzi 1978) where the structure Modal + VINF is seen as
a monosentential structure derived from an initial multiclausal structure (e.g. Burzio 1986).
Picallo argues for instead an anlysis of modals where the construction Modal + VINF is
monosentential on every level of representation. In Picallo's analysis, epistemic modals are
constituents of INFL, whereas root modals are VP adjuncts. He specifically argues against an
analysis of epistemic modals as raising verbs and root modals as control verbs, at least for
Catalan.
Picallo's point of departure is the ambiguity of a sentence like the following:
(51)
El lladre pogué entrar per la finestra.
 the thief could come in by the window
i) 'It is possible that the thief came in by the window.'
ii) 'The thief was able to come in by the window.'
This ambiguity, Picallo says, follows from the fact that this sentence may be assigned two
distinct D-structure configurations. The modal may be generated in INFL and recieve an
epistemic reading (51)i), in which it has scope over the entire clause, or it may be generated as
an adjunct to VP and recieve a root reading (51)ii), in which it is interpreted as a subject-
oriented secondary predicate. The two different structures are represented by (52)a and b
respectively.
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(52)
a: Epistemic reading b: Root reading
         IP IP
NP I' NP I'
  I0 VP I0 VP1
     _       _     _          _
       Modal (spec) V'        +Tns Modal VP2
       +Tns     _ +Agr _
                 _ +Agr _ V0 (spec) V'
           V0
Picallo goes on to present evidence from various constructions to support his claims. First, he
invokes the assumption that derived subjects in Romance cannot bind anaphoric clitics
(Kayne 1975, Rizzi 1986). This amounts to saying that raising predicates disallow clitic
climbing of anaphoric clitics. But sentences with epistemic modals and anaphoric clitics that
have undergone climbing are always fully grammatical in Catalan and in the Romance
languages in general, which makes Picallo conclude that epistemic modals cannot be raising
predicates. Instead, these facts provide evidence for Picallo's own structure for epistemic
modals (depicted in (52)a above), where the subject is base generated in <Spec,IP> as the
external argument of the infinitive predicate. I.e. the subject of a sentence containing an
epistemic modal is a non-derived subject, and thus able to bind an anaphoric clitic.
Picallo finds further evidence for this structure in the fact that epistemic modals cannot
be preceded by auxiliaries. On the assumption that auxiliaries are VP constituents, this fact
follows if epistemic modals are generated in INFL. On the other hand, root modals are VP
constituents themselves (cf. (52)b above); thus nothing prevents them from being preceded by
an auxiliary. Thus, in  (53)a the modal has only the epistemic reading, whereas in  (53)b, the
modal has only the root reading (Picallo's (23)):
 (53)
a. En Joan pot haver anat a Banyoles.
   Joan may have gone to Banyoles.
b. En Joan ha pogut anar a Banyoles.
             has  could  go
 'Joan has been allowed to go to Banyoles'
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Furthermore, whenever two modals occur in the same sentence, the first modal, but not both,
may be interpreted as epistemic. This follows if epistemic modals are constituents of INFL
(presumably because INFL has only one position, like in Roberts (1985) above). Thus the
second modal in a two-modal sequence receives a root interpretation. Picallo also derives
some temporal peculiarities of epistemic modals from their base position in INFL. Epistemic
modals are always finite because the modal in the head of an untensed INFL is in a position to
govern PRO, which must be ungoverned.
Although Picallo rejects the control vs. raising analysis for Catalan modals, he does
assume that root modals assign theta-roles. So the theta-difference between root and epistemic
modals amounts to the property of epistemic modals to projecting a subject position to which
they do not assign a theta-role; a property that make them unique among predicates (verbal or
adjectival). In contrast, root modals (and semi-modals) impose selectional requirements on
the subject of the complex in which they appear, and thus they are theta-role assigners. This
would be compatible with the hypothesis that root modals are obligatory-control predicates,
but this is not the option chosen by Picallo.  Obligatory control predicates constitute the main
predicate of their own sentence, with the infinitive as the main predicate of an embedded
sentence. But en/ne-cliticization (which reveals the thematic property of a predicate as
ergative or non-ergative; as e.g. en (partitive clitic) is impossible with non-ergative verbs)
depends on the properties of the infinitive verb, and is not influenced by the modal at all.
Thus, Picallo analyses MV+Infinitive complexes as complex VPs. Theta-roles assigned by
root modals are secondary theta-roles, only manifested by selectional restrictions. The
infinitive is the primary predicate and determines e.g. the possibility of en/ne-cliticization and
the availibility of an arbitrary interpretation of pro (p.302), and these phenomena are
unaffected by the modal.
However, Picallo also finds evidence that the (semi-)modal voler 'want-to' ("and a few
other verbs") may function as a control main predicate in some instances; i.e. they double as
primary predicates (in a structure of obligatory conrol) and as secondary predicates (as root
modals). Again, clitic climbing is used as an important diagnostic.
Picallo's article is interesting in that it attacks the control vs. raising analysis from a
different angle compared to the works we have examined so far. Likewise, it is intriguing that
he reaches the exact opposite conclusion of e.g. Wurmbrand (1999): Whereas Wurmbrand
concludes from her examination that all (Germanic) modals are raising verbs, Picallo
concludes from his investigation that all (Romance) modals are non-raising verbs. This would
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be really exciting generalizations if they hold up against observable facts, since modals seem
to perform the same semantic tasks in Germanic and Romance (e.g. in their epistemic v.s root
readings), and the inventory of modals is surprisingly similar as well (e.g. poder 'may/can',
deure 'must' , haver de 'have to', voler 'want-to', gosar 'dare'). So why should the syntactic
facts be so radically different?
Picallo states, for instance, that root modals obligatorily assign a theta-role and thus
cannot take non-argument NPs as subjects. As we have seen in section 3.2.6, this is not true
for Germanic modals. On the other hand, this has been frequently claimed for Germanic root
modals as well (Lødrup 1996, Dyvik 1999, Thrainsson and Vikner 1995). So perhaps one
should undertake a broader investigation of Romance modals before celebrating the exciting
differences.
3.3 Modals and theta-roles
In the last few decades, a significant part of the discussion sorrounding the syntactic
description of modals has revolved around the question of whether modals are theta-role
assigners or not. This is not surprising, as this question is important to shed light on the
structural properties of a modal as well – do modals pattern with raising verbs or with control
verbs? Furthermore, if the complement of a modal could be considered a clausal argument,
one might argue for a biclausal structure when modals are involved, whereas one otherwise
might be inclined to treat modals as some kind of auxiliary or functional operator.
The question of the complement's possible status as an argument seems to be explicitly
addressed much more rarely than the question of a modal's potential external theta-role, but it
may be implicitly present in a number of control vs. raising analyses, in part because of the
"PRO theorem" (Chomsky 1981, p. 191). The "PRO theorem" states that PRO must be
ungoverned, unlike a trace t, which, on the other hand, must be governed. This means that a
complement of a control verb, which does contain such a PRO subject, must contain a barrier
to government by the verb selecting this complement. A raising verb, on the other hand, must
crucially not contain such a barrier, to allow the trace of the moved subject to be governed by
the verb.
One common way of encoding this difference within the GB version of P&P, is to
assume that control verbs take CP complements whereas raising verbs take VP (or IP)
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complements. If an author takes the modal to be an auxiliary, he will typically represent the
modal as a raising verb taking a VP complement (cf. e.g. Roberts 1985, 1993) 43.
These differences normally correlate with the author's assumptions about the theta-
assigning properties of the modal, such that the modal-as-control-verb will be a main
predicate, assigning an external theta-role to its subject and an internal theta role to its CP
complement, whereas the modal-as-auxiliary is considered a clausal operator with no theta-
properties (cf. e.g. Roberts 1993; Picallo 1990).
As regards the possible external theta-role of a modal, there has been a general
consensus among authors that epistemic modals never assign such theta roles. But for the root
modals, the views expressed may be collected into three different groups. Firstly, there are
authors that advocate the straightforward version of the control-vs. raising-analysis of modals,
who implicitly or explicitly express the assumption that root modals assign an external theta-
role to their subjects (e.g. Lødrup 1996, Dyvik 1999, Thrainsson and Vikner 1995 for
Icelandic).  Secondly, there are those authors who, more or less independently of an analysis
of root modals as control or raising verbs, assume root modals to assign a particular type of
theta-role; one that is irrelevant or invisible to the theta-criterion. This role is dubbed an
adjunct theta role (Zubizarreta 1982; Roberts 1985,1993; Pollock 1989), an additional theta-
role (Vikner 1988, Thrainsson and Vikner 1995 for Danish) or a secondary theta-role (Picallo
1990). This adjuct/additional/secondary theta-role is often claimed to manifest itself in that
the root modal imposes selectional requirements on its subject, unlike (other) raising verbs.
The third group of authors reject the control vs. raising analysis and argue that modals,
crucially, even root modals, are raising verbs that assign no theta-roles (Pullum and Wilson
1977, Wurmbrand 1999). These authors ascribe the aforementioned "selectional
requirements" on the modal's subject not to the semantic or syntactic specification of the root
modal, but to pragmatics, such that these effects are purely contextually determined (e.g.
Wurmbrand 1999)44.
I will examine the argument structure of Norwegian modals in chapter 4. I argue that
all three of the views mentioned above are insufficient to account for the various argument
                                                
43 Raising verbs are apparently able to take a range of complements. In ECM  constructions they are in general
assumed to take IP complements. In Norwegian, there seem to exist raising verbs (i.e. passive verbs) that take
VP complements (complex passives) and some that take small clauses as complements as well, e.g.
(i) Jon framsto [tJon som idiot]. (ii) Jon ble betraktet [tJon som idiot].
     Jon appeared      as idiot       Jon  was considered     as idiot
     'Jon appeared to be an idiot'       ' Jon was considered an idiot'  (Cf. Eide 1998 for arguments).
44 Barbiers (1995, 1999) does not fit into any of these three frames, since although Barbiers considers all modals
to be raising verbs, his parameter [± Subject orientation] is in part syntactically encoded by the abstract head D.
Some recent proposals
107
structures of Norwegian modals. Hence, it will be argued that the inventory of Norwegian
modals include main verbs, which are ordinary transitive verbs, control-type verbs (e.g. the
dispositional modals), raising-type verbs (epistemic modals) and finally, raising verbs that are
optional theta-assigners (root modals).
3.4 Insertion point of root vs. epistemic modals
As seen in the survey above, various authors have proposed that root and epistemic modals
are inserted in different positions. This is particularly elaborated on in the proposal of Roberts
and Roussou (2000) and Cinque (1999), where the former authors build on the proposal of the
latter. Recall that Cinque's hierarchy ranges over as much as eight or possibly nine different
positions where a modal may be inserted (the exact number of possible insertion positions is
left undetermined in Cinque's proposal). It is the nature of the insertion slot of the modal (e.g.
as Modepistemic or Modvolitional) which determines the reading of the modal.
Picallo (1990) and Barbiers (1995) also address the possible insertion slots for root
and epistemic modals. Picallo argues that epistemic modals are inserted in INFL whereas root
modals are adjouned to VP. Barbiers, on the other hand, argues that epistemic modals are
inserted above whereas root modals are inserted below an abstract head D which is taken to
encode subject-orientedness. Both authors support their findings with the observation that a
modal (typically) gets an epistemic reading when preceding a perfect auxiliary and a root
reading when following a perfect auxiliary. The latter observation is also made in Dyvik
(1999).
The possible insertion slots of Norwegian modals is addressed in chapter 5, where I
investigate the interaction of modals with aspectuals, tense and negation. My findings suggest
that the only valid generalization is that epistemic modals always scope over root modals.
4 The argument structure of Norwegian modals
In this chapter, I will argue that most Norwegian modals are best described as raising verbs in
their epistemic as well as in their root reading. First, I round up various arguments taken to
support the control vs. raising analysis, i.e. the family of analyses where root modals are
analysed as control verbs and epistemic modals are analysed as raising verbs, and show how
these arguments fail to hold up against closer scrutiny (section 4.1). Instead, I show that
epistemic and root modals pattern with raising verbs in (nearly) all relevant respects. There
are two apparent exceptions to this generalization, notably the dispositional root modals
kunne 'can' and ville 'want-to'. These two modals have main verb versions in which they take
CP or DP complements, but even in their auxiliary versions they pattern with control verbs
rather than raising verbs w.r.t. a number of properties; most importantly, their selectional
requirements w.r.t. a potential subject and their lack of subject-predicate scope ambiguity.
However, in certain constructions, notably where these modals take a small clause
complement, these two verbs behave like raising verbs too1. On the other hand, all other root
modals, which indeed do pattern with raising verbs w.r.t. the aforementioned selectional and
scopal properties, display a control-verb-like behavior under certain circumstances.
Specifically, the possible interpretations of modals in pseudocleft constructions suggest that
even these modal raising verbs are construed as "control verbs" in these specific (i.e.
pseudocleft) environments. Thus, the behavior of modals with a pseudoclefted or a small
clause complement constitute an important part of this discussion (cf. section 4.2).
In section 4.3 we broaden our scope and look at 'reanalysis verbs' (Johnson 1985, Arad
1998); a group of verbs that seem to behave just like modals w.r.t. a range of properties.
Examples of such verbs are e.g. promise and threaten. Like modals, they have proposition-
scope readings as well as +θ readings and they behave like raising verbs on a certain reading.
Moreover, just like modals, they behave like control verbs in pseudoclefts constructions.
To solve the apparent contradiction that modals (and reanalysis verbs) simultaneously
show signs of being raising verbs as well as control verbs, I will exploit Hornstein (1998,
1999, 2000), who strives to reduce raising and control phenomena to the single phenomenon
of raising (cf. section 4.4). On this background, modals (and reanalysis verbs) are construed
                                                
1 Admittedly, the modal kunne does not seem to take a small clause complement in standard dialects of
Norwegian. However, in some non-standard dialects, like in German, kunne takes a directional small clause
complement.
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as optional θ-assigners; i.e. predicates that optionally assign a θ-role (section 4.5). Like
Hornstein, I assume that the assignment of an external θ-role takes place in a spec-head
configuration2. In a development of Hornstein's analysis, I suggest that this spec-head relation
is established in overt syntax or not at all. Evidence to this effect is shown to exist in
sentences containing modals with expletive subjects.
Furthermore, this spec-head relation is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition on
assignment of the external θ-role from a modal to the subject. This is shown by the fact that
proposition-scope (i.e. non-θ-) readings of the modal are possible even where a spec-head
predication relation holds between the subject and the modal in overt syntax. I will argue that
a proposition-scope reading of the modal involves interpreting a non-topmost link in a DP-
chain; i.e. a proposition-scope reading  (corresponding to "lowering" of the subject in May's
1985 terms) involves interpreting a DP-trace instead of the DP in the surface position:
[DP [modal [tDP [Main verb]]]]
Intriguingly, a lower subject position must be available for this "semantic lowering" of the
subject to take place. Thus, where the lower subject-position is elided (like for instance in
pseudocleft constructions), "lowering" is impossible, and the θ-reading of the modal is the
only possible reading. The outcome of this discussion is the generalization that θ- vs- non-θ-
readings of a modal are a result of overt access to subject positions; i.e. in overt syntax.
In section 4.6, I will suggest that we need a two-level semantics (in the spirit of
Bierwisch and Lang 1989) to account for important uses and readings of modals. Whereas
modals may be construed as one-place predicates on one semantic level (Semantic Form),
taking solely the embedded proposition (i.e. the sentence minus the modal) as their argument,
they are always two-place predicates on a second semantic level (Conceptual Structure). At
the latter level, the source of modality (what has sometimes been called the rule-giver)
constitutes the first argument and the embedded proposition constitutes the second argument.
Finally, I sum up the most important findings and an overview over the selectional
requirements of Norwegian modals (section 4.7) Norwegian modals always take at least one
argument; notably an internal propositional complement. In addition, they may assign a θ-role
to their subjects. This subject is always raised from the embedded clause, since modals do not
assign Case to an embedded subject (cf. also Nordgård and Åfarli 1990:101).
                                                
2 Hornstein assumes that theta-assignment takes place when the DP is merged with the theta-assigning predicate.
Thus, Theta-roles may be assigned in e.g. head-complement configurations as well, but the most important
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4.1 The "control versus raising" analysis
I will start out by rounding up some of the core arguments invoked by the advocates of the so-
called "control versus raising" (CvR) analysis, where epistemic modals are analyzed as raising
verbs, whereas root modals are analysed as control verbs. This is an anlysis whose tradition
dates back to Ross (1969), and it still has numerous advocates (cf. the previous chapter).
Although I have argued against some of the core arguments for this analysis in the previous
chapter, this discussion was directed at the specific arguments expressed in the proposal under
discussion; hence it may be difficult to construe the full picture. At this point, I will examine
the various arguments taken to support the control vs. raising analysis and show that they do
not hold up against a closer scrutiny of the empirical facts.
The crucial assumption of the control vs. raising analysis is that root modals are
transitive (i.e. two-place) predicates whereas epistemic modals are intransitive3 (i.e. one-
place) predicates. That is, epistemic modals and root modals give rise to two different
syntactic structures4:
 (1)
a. epistemic: b. root:
         ModP                  ModP
DPSUBJ Mod'            DPSUBJ             Mod'
          Mod0    θ        IP       θ    Mod0   θ         IP
           
tSUBJ I'        PROSUBJ                    I'
      
                 I0           VP                          I0          VP
          tPRO
                      tSUBJ          V'       V'
                      θ        V0                  θ        V0
        Epistemic modal:(__  ,θ <IP>)                                               Root modal: (θ <DP>, θ <IP>)
                                                                                                                                                        
thematic role in the following discussion is the external Theta-role, and this role is assigned in a spec-head
configuration.
3 In Ross (1969), the term intransitive did in fact mean that the modal took no object. Instead, the proposition
(which is treated as an embedded proposition here; i.e. IP) was taken to be the subject of the modal.
4 There are a number of open questions here, e.g. why PRO and the subject-trace occur in the same structural
position. At the moment, I want to gloss over these obvious questions, although I will mention that Stowell
(1982) proposes that the nature of the two I(NFL) heads are different. Tensed I(NFL) assigns null case, unlike
untensed I(NFL), hence, only tensed I(NFL) accepts a PRO subject. Furthermore, assume that I(INFL)[+ Tense]
is a barrier to government, whereas I(NFL) [-Tense] is no barrier. Obviously, this is simply restating the facts,
but still, this is one possible analysis that allows us to keep things simple for now.
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This alleged difference between root and epistemic modals leads to a range of predictions; in
particular predictions related to the putative selectional requirements on a potential subject
imposed by the root modal, but also predictions concerning subject-modal scope ambiguity5.
Some important predictions are as follows:
(2)
Epistemic modals Root modals
a. Allow expletive subjects yes no
b. Allow weather-det/Það 'it' subjects yes no
c. Allow idiom-chunk subjects yes no
d. Allow quirky subjects (Ic.) yes no
e. Allow passive compl. with inanimate subject yes no
f. Display subject-modal scope ambiguity yes no
g. Passivize no yes
h. Allow pseudoclefted complement no yes
Most of the predictions listed in  (2) follow straightforwardly from the assumption that root
modals are control verbs that assign an external (e.g. experiencer) θ-role; whereas epistemic
modals are raising verbs that assign no external θ-role. Admittedly, some of the predictions
listed rest on auxilary assumptions, but mostly of a kind that is in accordance with widespread
hypotheses within the P&P theory; e.g. Burzio's Generalization (Burzio 1986) and the
assumption that raising structures, as opposed to control structures, give rise to scopal
ambiguities (cf. May 1977, 1985). In what follows, we will go into each of these predictions,
consider what motivates them as predictions of the control vs. raising analysis, mention some
of their advocates and observe how they hold up against empirical facts.
(2)a is expected on the assumption that expletive subjects are semantically empty, thus
banned from θ postions. Since the subject position of a root modal is considered a θ− position
in the CvR analysis, i.e. since the root modal obligatorily assigns a θ role like other control
verbs, it follows that expletive subjects do not occur with root modals (cf. e.g. Vikner 19886,
Thráinsson  and Vikner 19957, Dyvik 1999).  However, this prediction is not fulfilled, as seen
by the data in (3). In all five cases, we have root readings of modals with expletive subjects.
                                                
5 The terms subject-predicate scope ambiguity and subject-modal scope ambiguity are employed as equal terms.
In both cases, the ambiguity concerns whether or not the modal/matrix predicate takes scope over the subject.
6 In fact, Vikner (1988:fn 6) claims that modals do not take expletive subjects at all.
7 Recall from section 3.2.6 that Vikner (1988) and Thráinsson and Vikner (1995) assume that Danish modals are
raising verbs. However, since (some) root modals are assumed to assign an 'additional theta-role' and this
additional theta-role assignment is taken to be subject to certain restrictions (cf. Thráinsson and Vikner 1995:64),
this analysis comes out with the same predictions as the mainstream control vs. raising analysis.
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(3)
a. Det skal bestandig være minst to voksne til stede.
  'There should always be at least two adults present.'
b. Det må komme minst femti personer for at festen skal lønne seg.
    there must come at least fifty people for the party to pay off
   'At least fifty people must show up for the party to pay off.'
c. Det bør bli forandringer m.h.t. denne praksisen.
   there should occur changes w.r.t. this (code of) practice
   'This code of practice ought to change.'
d. Det kan være opptil fire patroner i hylsa pr. ladning.
    'There may/can be up to four cartridges in the case in one load.'
e. Det behøver/trenger ikke være noen voksne til stede.
   'There need not be any adults present.'
There is in fact one modal that does fulfill the prediction; namely the modal ville 'want-to'.
This modal rejects expletive subjects on a root reading, cf. (4) a. Furthermore, the modal
kunne 'can' in its dispositional (i.e. 'ability') reading behaves the same way; cf. (4)b, although
the permissive reading of kunne 'may' patterns with all other modals in that it accepts
expletive subjects; cf.  (3)d.
(4)
a. *Det vil komme en mann hit i morgen.
'There wants to come a man here tomorrow (root reading).'
b. *Det kan komme ti gjester i fødselsdagen din.
 there can come ten guests to your birthday party
'There are able to come ten guests (dispositional reading).'
Expletives are non-arguments and thus expected to be banned from θ-positions. The same
applies to other non-arguments like 'weather-it' and idiom-chunk subjects8, according to
Thráinsson and Vikner (1995). Again, the expectation is borne out for ville 'want-to'; cf.(5),
but clearly not for deontic root modals in Norwegian , cf (6):
(5)
a. Det vil snø snart.
'It will/*wants to snow soon (i.e. epistemic = OK, root = *)'.
                                                
8 Note that on a metaphoric reading, where inanimate referents are ascribed a human-like quality, non-arguments
like the idiom subject nøden 'the need' may be acceptable on a root reading of ville 'want-to'. We will discard
such cases here. Thus, whenever I state e.g. that a modal takes animate/intentional subjects, I am abstracting
away from metaphoric uses of this kind (cf. also fn. 15).
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b. Nød vil lære naken kvinne å spinne (idiom: Nød lærer naken kvinne å spinne).
'Need will/*wants to teach naked woman to spin (epistemic = OK, root = *).'
(6)
a. Nå bør det snart regne; gresset er så tørt.
   now should it soon rain; the grass is so dry
  ' It ought to rain soon; the grass is so dry.'
b. Det kan ikke snø nå som vi er på landtur!
'It cannot snow now that we are on a picnic!(= negated permission)'
c. Det må blåse sterkere for at draken skal lette.
'it must blow harder for the kite to fly'
  'It must be windier for the kite to fly.'
d. M.h.t. Jon, så kan fanden ta ham (idiom: Fanden ta Jon!)
   'As for John, the devil may take him (= permission).'
The dispositional modal kunne 'be-able-to' constitutes a special case, since it does in some
instances accept idiom subjects (cf. (7)). In sentences with weather-it subjects, however, it is
questionable whether the reading of the modal is a dispositional reading; instead, we get a
reading that resembles the "quantificational" reading discussed in Carlson (1977) and Brennan
(1993, 1996, 1997)9. This reading may be paraphrased 'it (sometimes) happens that p'.
(7)
a. Nød kan lære naken kvinne å spinne (idiom: Nød lærer naken kvinne å spinne)
              'Need can teach naked woman to spin (= ability).'
b. Det kan snø mye mer enn dette.
'It can snow much more than this.'
Prediction d listed in (2) above states that only epistemic modals, not root modals, allow for
quirky (i.e non-nominative) subjects (Thráinsson 1986, Thráinsson and Vikner 1995). The
argument goes as follows: Root modals do not select for quirky subjects themselves. Like
other control predicates, they select for nominative subjects. Epistemic modals, on the other
hand, are raising predicates, and impose no selectional requirements onto their subjects. Thus,
if a predicate that requires a quirky subject is embedded under an epistemic modal, the quirky
subject may be raised to the subject position of the epistemic modal, retaining its quirky case.
                                                
9 The quantificational reading of modals has mostly been discussed in relation to generic statements, such as a
basketball player can be short, which could be paraphrased 'there exist short basketball players' (cf. e.g. Brennan
1993: 96 ff). Brennan also lists a range of related readings under the term "quantificational", e.g. Joan can be
silly, paraphrased 'Joan has a tendency to behave in a silly manner'.
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No such raising can take place with root modals, since root modals are control structures;
which implies that their subject position is occupied by a nominative subject10.
However, Wurmbrand (1999) provides some data where root readings are possible
although the subject is quirky:
(8)
a. Haraldi           / *Haraldur     verður að líka hamborgarar.
    Harold-DAT /Harold-NOM must to like hamburgers
  'Harold must like hamburgers (in order to be accepted by his new American in-laws).'
b. Umsækjandann        verður að vanta peninga
    The-applicant-ACC must to lack money
    'The applicant must lack money (in order to apply for this grant).'
Since root readings are indeed acceptable in these sentences, as claimed by Wurmbrand's
Icelandic informants (and these judgements are confirmed by my own Icelandic informants),
we have counterevidence to the prediction that quirky subjects are incompatible with root
readings of modals. Thus, if quirky subjects are indeed ungrammatical in control structures, as
claimed by e.g. Thráinsson and Vikner (1995)11, this is yet another indication that at least
some root modals are not control verbs, and that once again, some root modals pattern with
raising verbs. Interestingly, according to my own Icelandic informants, the Icelandic
counterparts to the Norwegian dispositional root modals kunne 'can' and ville 'want-to', i.e.
kunna and vilja, reject a root reading when the subject is quirky, thus these two modals
pattern once again with control verbs, not raising verbs12:
                                                
10 It is somewhat curious and a matter of theoretical development that Roberts (1985:38, 1993: 314) takes
exactly the existence of 'quirky subject + modal' data as evidence (or rather an indication) that modals were
control structures in middle English. That is: exactly the same type of data that Wurmbrand (1999) uses to argue
that modals are raising verbs in modern Icelandic is used by Roberts to support the hypothesis that they are
control verbs in Middle English. Roberts' (1985) argument goes as follows: Quirky subjects posess inherent
Case. If so, there is no need and in fact no way for this subject to raise, as there is nothing to drive this
movement. Thus, since the subject does indeed precede the modal, the explanation must be that the subject is
base-generated as the subject of a modal, i.e. the modal must be a control verb. At this point in time, it was a
widespread assumption within the P&P Theory that the subject's need (and later: Greed; Chomsky 1993) for
Case was the only driving force behind DP movement. Later, this assumption was modified, as the Extended
Projection Principle (the EPP) was introduced as another possible driving force for DP movement (cf. Chomsky
1993, Lasnik 1995). Roberts' (1993) argument for considering these data to instantiate control-structures is that
they "could not be treated in terms of raising, since raising cannot place an NP in indirect object position (on the
assumption that no operation of 'quirky raising' creating dative subjects exists; we assume that it does not since
this would allow dative expletives, something we do not find)."
11 It has been pointed out to me by Norbert Hornstein that Boškovic (1994) provides examples from Spanish
where quirky subjects are possible in control (-like) structures with the cognate of want. Hornstein suggests that
this variation may be due to a parametric difference between Spanish and Icelandic, since Spanish evidently
allows for quirky subjects in control-type structures whereas Icelandic does not.
12 I am indebted to Jóhannes Gísli Jónsson for providing me with these data, and to Jóhanna Barðdal for
confirming the judgements.
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(9)
a.  Haraldi /*Haraldur vill leiðast.
     HaraldDAT/HaraldNOM will borePASS
    'Harold has a tendency to be bored (epistemic reading only).'
b.  Haraldi /*Haraldur kann að leiðast.
     HaraldDAT/HaraldNOM may to borePASS
                'Harold may be bored (epistemic reading only).'
These two Icelandic modals take nominative subjects on a root reading, cf. (10). Note that a
predicate which requires a quirky subject cannot be directly embedded under these root
modals;  we need to add the causative láta sér to the construction:
 (10)
a.   Haraldur vill ekki láta sér leiðast
      HaraldNOM wants not let self bore-PASSIVE
      'Harald won't let himself be bored.'
b.   Haraldur kann ekki að láta sér leiðast
                  HaraldNOM can not to let self bore-PASSIVE
       'Harald does not know how to be bored.'
This means that although (at least some) deontic root modals pattern with raising verbs w.r.t.
quirky subjects in Icelandic, the Icelandic counterparts to the dispositional root modals
pattern with control structures in not accepting quirky subjects.
Prediction (2)e states that only epistemic modals are compatible with passive
complements with inanimate subjects (see e.g. Lødrup 1996). Again, this claim stems from
the alleged selectional requirements imposed onto the subject of a root modal. If root modals
are control structures, they are expected to select for intentional subjects. This intentional
subject would have to control the reference of the PRO subject of the embedded passive.
Thus, if this embedded subject (PRO) is inanimate, there will be a semantic mismatch
between the controller and the controllee13. On the other hand, if we evade the mismatch by
providing the root modal with an inanimate subject, there ought to be a mismatch between
this subject and the root modal, which, allegedly being a control verb, selects for intentional
subjects. This mismatch is indeed manifested in various control structures, cf. (11)a. Notice,
however, that no such anomaly arises with raising structures, examplified by (11) b.
Crucially, no such anomaly or mismatch arises with modals either, cf. (11)c, which allows for
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a root reading as well as an epistemic reading; data from Wurmbrand (1999)14. Notice in
particular that even a root reading does not give rise to this mismatch effect, although such an
effect would be expected  if all root modals were control verbs.
(11)
a. *The bisquits tried/decided to be finished by Paul
b. The biscuits seem to have been finished by Paul
c. The biscuits may be finished by Paul.
Most Norwegian root modals behave like the English may in this respect. They behave like
raising structures, exhibiting no selectional requirements ruling out an inanimate subject.
(12)
a. Maten må/ skal/ kan/ bør/behøver ikke/trenger ikke bli servert snart.
b. Maten må/skal/kan/bør/behøver ikke/trenger ikke serveres snart (s-passive).
    'The food must/ will/ may/ should/need not be served soon (epistemic/root = OK).'
However, the root modal ville 'want-to' does not follow this pattern. Again, ville, 'want-to',
patterns with control structures and not with raising structures in that it does display this
mismatch between an inanimate subject and the root modal; likewise, kunne 'can' in its
dispositional reading is marginal and perhaps dubious in this construction, see  (13).
 (13)
a. Maten vil bli servert snart15.
   'The food will/*wants to be served soon (epistemic OK; root=*).'
b. Maten kan bli servert snart.
   '*/??The food is able to be served soon.'
Prediction (2)f states that on the CvR analysis, subject-modal scope ambiguity is to be
expected with epistemic modals but not with root modals (cf. also Wurmbrand 1999). This
prediction rests on the observation (May 1977, 1985) that control structures and raising
structures differ w.r.t. their respective scope properties vis-à-vis their syntactic subjects.
Raising constructions but not control constructions allow for an interpretation in which the
                                                                                                                                                        
13 An appropriate question would be how such a sentence could be expressed at all, since a PRO subject of a
predicate embedded under a control predicate obligatorily gets its reference from the matrix subject if we have
an instance of subject control; from the matrix object if we have object control.
14 Wurmbrand states that these data are from Warner (1993) originally.
15 Notice that it is always possible to get a non-anomalous reading of such sentences if we allow for 'animation'
of inanimate referents, or metaphorical uses. Thus, if we apply the human property of wanting to something
inanimate like 'the food',  we may have a root reading of the modal  here. However, these phenomena are
discarded in discussions of selectional requirements involving semantic properties like [± human] or [± animate].
                                                              The Argument Structure of Norwegian modals
117
subject takes narrow scope with respect to the matrix verb, cf. the two readings of the raising
structure in (14)a vs. the single reading of the control structure in (14)b (data from
Wurmbrand 1999).
(14)
a. Someone from New York is likely to win in the lottery.
   i) There is somebody from N.Y. and he is likely to win in the lottery.
   ii) It is likely that somebody from N.Y. will win in the lottery.
b. Someone from New York tried/promised to win in the lottery.
   There is somebody from N.Y. and he tried/promised to win in the lottery.
Unfortunately for the advocates of the CvR analysis, most root modals pattern once again
with raising structures and not with control structures as they allow for both readings; see the
data in (15).
(15)
a. Noen søkere bør/kan/må/skal søke igjen.
   'Some applicants should/may/must/will apply again.'
   i) There are some applicants and they should/may/must/will apply again.
   ii) It is preferred/allowed/necessary/intended that some applicants apply again.
b. Noen søkere behøver ikke/trenger ikke søke igjen.
   'Some applicants need not apply again.'
     i) There are some applicants and they need not apply again.
     ii) There is no need for some applicants to apply again.
But even here, the root reading of ville, 'want-to', sticks out and behaves like a control
structure. The root modal ville is incompatible with a narrow scope reading of the modal, cf.
(16). The same applies to the dispositional reading of kunne 'can'; cf  (16)b:
(16)
a. Noen søkere vil søke igjen.
    'Some applicants want to apply again.'
b. Noen søkere kan også søke til neste år.
    'Some applicants are also able to apply next year.'
As noted e.g. by Lødrup (1996), if root modals are control structures, one might expect them
to passivize, given that control verbs typically do. But Norwegian root modals do not
passivize, as duely noted by Lødrup. The exception is once again constituted by the main verb
version of the modal ville 'want-to', which marginally passivizes when it takes a CP
complement, and the main verb version of kunne 'can', which may marginally passivize in
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those instances where it takes a DP complement16 (cf. also Öhlschläger 1989: 59-60 and fn 12
for German17). In addition, the main verb versions of the two new members of the class of
modals, notably trenger ikke/behøver ikke, 'need not', are able to passivize. Let me emphasize
that the passives in (17) are not the passive versions of the modal auxiliaries kunne, ville and
trenger ikke/behøver ikke. Firstly, since there is no verbal or small clause complement18, and
secondly, because all four verbs accept do-replacement in their active version. This latter
property applies to lexical, non-auxiliary verbs only (see section 2.3.2). Thus, the input to
these passives is the main verb version of kunne, ville and trenger/behøver ikke 'need not'. The
data (17) a and b are from Lødrup (1996), (17) c is my own19.
(17)
a. Leksen må kunnes i morgen.
   The lesson must can-PASSIVE tomorrow
   'You should know your lesson by tomorrow.'
b. Dette må ikke bare ønskes, det må villes.
   This must not only wish-PASSIVE, it must will-PASSIVE
   'You must not only wish this, you must want it.'
c. Medisinen trengs/behøves ikke lenger.
    medicine-DEF need-PASSIVE no longer
    'The medicine is no longer needed.'
The modal auxiliaries, then, do not passivize, unlike control verbs. Barbiers (1995:157 ff),
claims that modals are statives, and that this is the explanation for their lack of passive
versions:
                                                
16 Recall from section 2.3.2 that neither ville nor kunne may passivize when it takes a verbal complement:
 i) * (??Å) lese leksen må kunnes i morgen.
      to read the homework must can-PASSIVE tomorrow
       'One must be able to read one's homework tomorrow'
ii) *(??Å) lære seg matematikk må ikke bare ønskes, det må villes.
       to teach oneself mathematics must not only wish-PASSIVE, it must want-PASSIVE
      'One must not only wish to learn mathematics, one must want it'
17 The German cognates of kunne and ville, i.e. können and wollen marginally passivize. In addition, a third
modal may passivize in German; i..e. mögen 'like'. Öhlschläger mentions that these modals passivize only when
their complements are non-infinitives (f.n. 12 p. 59).
18 Recall that a modal taking an AdvP/PP complement belongs to the category of auxiliaries, as shown by the
fact that they resist gjøre 'do'-replacement in tags, see section 2.3.2.
19 Even ordinary control structures are in some cases much more comfortable with a non-verbal complement in
their passive versions. Alternatively, the so-called complex passive substitutes for the construction [control verb-
PASSIVE + Embedded infinitive].
i) ?Det ble forsøkt å åpne døren -> Døren ble forsøkt åpnet
ii) *Det håpes å gjenoppta forhandlingene -> Forhandlingene håpes gjenopptatt.
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 [M]odal verbs behave identically to other stative transitive verbs with respect to
standard transitivity tests[...]. As has long been known, [...] transitivity is not a
sufficient condition for felicitious passivization of a verb. The verb must have a
dynamic aspect. [...] Since modals and transitives select the auxiliary HAVE in the
perfect, [...] there does not appear to be any reason to assign the modals [...] a syntactic
status different from stative transitive verbs.
On the other hand, the fact that modals require have as their governor in the perfect does not
automatically grant them membership in the class of transitive verbs. There exists, for
instance in Norwegian, a range of predicates which, by relative consensus, are considered
raising (i.e. unaccusative) verbs, among others se ut til å 'seem to', framstå som 'appear as',
vise seg 'turn out',  forekomme meg 'appear to-me'; verbs that nevertheless require ha 'have' as
their governing auxiliary in the perfect20. In fact, even the passive, which on earlier stages of
Norwegian used to require the auxiliary være 'be' in the perfect, accepts and by younger users,
even prefers, ha 'have' as the auxiliary in modern Norwegian21. So there is in fact no reason to
count modals among ordinary transitive verbs just because they select for have as their
governor in the perfect; unaccusative raising verbs do the same. The raising constructions
mentioned here also have in common with modal auxiliaries that they do not passivize.
At this point, let us summarize how the eight predictions of the CvR analysis (listed in
(2) and repeated here for convenience) fares in this investigation..
 (18)
Epistemic modals Root modals
a. Allow expletive subjects yes no
b. Allow weather-det/Það 'it' subjects yes no
c. Allow idiom-chunk subjects yes no
d. Allow quirky subjects (Ic only) yes no
e. Allow passive compl. with inanimate subject yes no
f. Display subject-modal scope ambiguity yes no
g. Passivize no yes
h. Allow pseudoclefted complement no yes
                                                
20 As for the latter verb, Vikner (1995:260) states that it selects for være 'be' rather then ha 'have' as an auxiliary
in Danish. This seems to be one reason why Vikner assumes that this verb is 'ergative with two internal objects',
whereas he believes vise sig to be transitive, with the "embedded CP" as one argument and sig as the other. Now,
in Norwegian forekomme meg with være 'be' as an auxiliary sounds very archaic or straightforwardly
ungrammatical. Furthermore, it is often assumed that in verbal constructions like vise seg  'turn out', the reflexive
does not have the status of an argument, since it is not exchangable for any other DP, cf. e.g. Nordgård and
Åfarli (1990:167-168).
21 Also, in English the passive construction requires have to govern it in the perfect.
Chapter 4
120
The last prediction, concerning pseudocleft constructions, needs some more space and will be
treated separately in the next subsection. Before looking at pseudoclefts, however, let us sum
up the results we have achieved so far.
Predictions a, b, and c are all predictions concerning the possibility to take non-
argument subjects. The predictions of the CvR analysis is that epistemic modals do, whereas
root modals do not take such non-argument subjects. However, we have seen that this is
prediction is not borne out. Norwegian modals, epistemic and root, take non-argument
subjects. The exception is the dispositional root modal ville 'want-to' and the dispositional
version of kunne 'can/know'22. Wurmbrand (1999) presents counterevidence to the prediction
listed as d; i.e. she presents data provided by Icelandic informants to show that root modals
may occur with quirky subjects (the data are quoted here as (8)). But again, the dispositional
modals constitute an exception. According to my own Icelandic informants, the Icelandic
counterparts of the Norwegian dispositional modals behave like control verbs in not allowing
for quirky subjects (cf. the data in (9)); the reading of these two modals is always epistemic
when the subject is quirky. Prediction e is not fulfilled either; as we have seen, only the root
modal ville 'want-to' and to a certain extent kunne 'be-able-to'23 behave as expected by the
CvR analysis, whereas all other root modals accept passive complements with inanimate
subjects. Furthermore, all root modals except ville 'want-to' and the dispositional reading of
kunne 'be-able-to' display the same subject-modal ambiguity that we find with epistemic
modals and other raising predicates; and finally, no root modal auxiliary may passivize,
unlike control verbs. We do find passives of verbs that look like modal auxiliaries, but recall
that it is always the transitive, main verb version of the modal that is able to undergo
passivization, with a DP or a CP complement functioning as an object. Furthermore, this is
once again only relevant for the main verb version of ville 'want-to', dispositional kunne
'know' and trenger/behøver ikke 'need not'. This means that from the eight predictions of the
CvR analysis listed in (2), we have at this point found compelling counterevidence to seven of
them. The evidence points instead to an analysis of both epistemic and deontic root modals as
raising predicates.
The obvious troublemakers for an 'all modals are raising verbs' analysis are the
dispositional root modals ville 'want-to' and kunne 'be-able-to'. These two modals behave
                                                
22 Although kunne does sometimes accept idiom subjects; cf. the discussion of kunne above.
23 The lexical verb version of kunne 'know' does not accept inanimate subjects either, although the question of a
passive complement does not come into play here. The lexical verb kunne is a transitive verb denoting mental
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more like control verbs w.r.t. the features we have investigated so far. Thus, so far, there is
nothing to prevent us from analyzing the dispositional modals kunne and ville as control
verbs. Notice, however, that their epistemic counterparts show every sign of being raising
verbs. Thus, the control versus raising analysis seemingly fits the dispositonal modals like a
glove; for these two modals, the control versus raising analysis yields all the right
predictions24. This seems like a good reason to go ahead and adopt the basic assumptions of
the control versus raising analysis for the dispositional root modals kunne and ville. However,
there exist certain loose ends, which I will discuss in section 4.5. Let me also remind the
reader once again that in addition to the epistemic raising versions and the root 'control-like'
versions of these two verbs, there also exist non-auxiliary main verb versions of kunne, 'know
(by heart)' ville 'want'25. The behavior of these main verbs has sometimes been utilized to
support the control versus raising analysis, e.g. to illustrate that modals passivize, like other
control verbs. This is clearly unfortunate, as the "modal main verbs" exhibit a range of non-
auxiliary features and should be treated separately (cf. section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). With this note
of caution, the dispositional modals kunne and ville still fit nicely into the pattern expected by
the control versus raising analysis.
For deontic root modals, however, the control versus raising anlysis cannot account for
the empirical facts. The reason for this is that deontic root modals, like their epistemic
counterparts, pattern with raising structures w.r.t. the properties listed in (2), not with control
structures. The obvious conclusion to draw is that both epistemic and deontic root modals are
in fact raising verbs; which amounts to saying that there is no control vs. raising opposition in
the case of deontic modals and their epistemic counterparts. Finally, let us repeat the list of
properties in (2), this time as a list of actual findings, not a list of predictions. For now, I leave
out the latter prediction (prediction h) concerning pseudoclefted compelements of modals,
since this issue will be investigated more thoroughly in the next subsection. We also include
other raising verbs and control verbs in the table, to get the whole picture.
                                                                                                                                                        
ability, knowing (by heart). Thus it displays selectional requirements to its subject; as it demands animate
subjects. Furthermore, it takes a DP complements or a bare infinitive as a direct object.
24 Although there is one type of complements we have not mentioned in this discussion,  notably small clause
complements of modals. Barbiers (1995, 1999) provides evidence that these constructions are indeed raising
structures, not control structures (cf. section xx.xx). The dispositional modal ville 'want-to' takes small clause
directional complements; e.g. Ola vil hjem 'Ola wants (to go) home' whereas the dispositional modal kunne 'can'
does not in standard dialects of Norwegian. However, in my own dialect, kunne takes small clause complements,
e.g. Du kan ikke på skolen når du er syk 'You cannot (go) to school when you are ill', and the same is the case for
German, e.g. Können Sie selber ins Auto? 'Can you by-yourself (get) into the car?; i.e. Are you able to get into
the car by yourself?'. Thanks to Herbert Pütz for providing me with this latter example.
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 (19)
Raising verbs, Control verbs &
epistemic modals        dispositional root
& deontic root modals:
modals:
a. Allow expletive subjects yes no
b. Allow weather-det 'it' subjects yes no
c. Allow idiom-chunk subjects yes no26
d. Allow quirky subjects (Ic.) yes no
e. Allow passive compl. with inanimate subject yes no
f. Display subject-modal scope ambiguity yes no
g. Passivize no yes/no27
The table shows that deontic root modals pattern with epistemic modals and other raising
verbs w.r.t. the properties under discussion, whereas dispositional root modals pattern with
control verbs, except that dispositional modals do not passivize, unlike control verbs. This
means that the control vs. raising analysis gives the right result for the dispositional modals.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, advocates of this analysis typically illustrate their
analysis with exactly the two modals kunne and ville, with the implicit or explicit assumption
that the analysis carries over to all other root modals. But the control versus raising analysis
does not fit the deontic root modals in Norwegian, and obviously, neither their counterparts in
English (cf. Wurmbrand 1999), German (Öhlscläger 1986) or Icelandic (Wurmbrand 1999,
the discussion above). Deontic root modals in Norwegian show every sign of being raising
verbs, just like their epistemic counterparts; in all relevant respects they exhibit raising verb
behavior. That is, up to the point where we start looking at modals in pseudocleft
constructions.
4.2 Modals in pseudoclefts
First, let us repeat the latter of the predictions listed in (2). This prediction states that only root
modals and not epistemic modals accept a pseudoclefted complement; cf. the difference
between the epistemic modal in (20)a, which rejects a pseudoclefted complement, and the
                                                                                                                                                        
25Trenger/behøver ikke 'need not' also have main verb versions. For these two, their auxiliary counterparts
belong to the group of deontic, thus raising modals.
26 Recall that kunne does sometimes accept an idiom-chunk subject.
27 It is the main verb version of the dispositional root modals that passivizes. The auxiliary version, with a verbal
complement, does not. Also, the main verbs trenger ikke/behøver ikke passivize. These two have deontic root
counterparts, not dispositional root counterparts.
                                                              The Argument Structure of Norwegian modals
123
root modal in (20)b,  which accepts a pseudoclefted complement. Both sentences are taken
from Thráinsson and Vikner (1995: 61).
(20)
a. *Det hun kan er at have sovet over sig. (Danish)
      it    she can is to have slept over self
     (Intended meaning: 'What is possible is that she has overslept.')
b. En av de ting han ikke kan er at svømme. (Danish)
    one of the things he not can is to swim
    'One of the things he cannot (do) is to swim.'
Thráinsson and Vikner (1995) suggest that this difference is expected on the control vs.
raising analysis if it is augmented with the auxiliary assumption that the trace of a moved
constituent within the relative clause needs Case. According to the authors, this is a wh-trace,
and by "standard assumption (op.cit. p.62)", wh-traces need Case. The structure proposed for
the relative clause is as follows (Thráinsson and Vikner 1995:62):
(21)
Xi [CP (opi)  (that) ... ti ...] was Y
For the sake of clarity, let us translate the relative clause part of this structure into a tree-
structure, which comes out as follows:
 (22)
     DP
                    DPI             CP
                    Det
                  C0        C'
(opi)
 C     Modp
                     (som)
DP           Mod'
                      hun
     Mod0            ti
       kan
   it                           (that)   she     may
         'What         she      may                (do/have done)...'
It is the trace ti within the relative clause CP that needs to be assigned Case by a governing
verb, according to this proposal. The authors go on to account for the generalization that only
root modals accept a pseudoclefted complement by invoking Burzio's Generalization, which
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states that only verbs which assign an external θ-role to a subject assign Case to their
complements. Root modals allegedly do assign an external θ-role to a subject and thus do
assign case to their complement; here, to the (wh-)trace of the the moved constituent (i.e. the
operator "op"). In contrast, epistemic modals are raising verbs, hence they pattern with
unaccusatives. That is, these verbs do not assign an external θ-role to a subject and thus do
not assign case to their complements; hence the (wh-) trace in the complement position of an
epistemic modal within the relative clause could not be licenced, and the structure is
illformed. Thráinsson and Vikner's (1995) account of modals in pseudoclefts hence rests on
four basic assumptions. The first crucial assumption is the validity of Burzio's Generalization,
that the Case-assigning properties of the modal is dependent on its θ-assigning properties. The
second crucial assumption is that only a root modal, not an epistemic modal, assigns an
external θ-role and hence Case to its complement. The third assumption is that the movement
inside the relative clause is a subtype of wh-movement, and the fourth assumption is that wh-
traces need case.
We need to dwell for a moment on the latter assumption. It is indeed a "standard
assumption" within Government and Binding Theory that wh-traces need Case (cf. e.g.
Jaeggli 198028, Chomsky 1981:175). But it is an often ignored restriction on this assumption
that it does not apply to all types of wh-traces. Wh-traces in Case positions, i.e. argument
positions, are admittedly assumed to be assigned Case. But wh-traces, by assumption, are
found in non-argument positions as well, e.g. adjunct positions or A-bar positions. So when
the questioned constituent is e.g. an adverbial in an adjunct position, the Case requirement
does not apply to the wh-trace, since the case requirement applies to DP-type (i.e. argument-
type) Wh-traces only.
Now, the question is whether or not the trace within the relative clause could be
construed as an argument-type wh-trace. In those instances where the operator 'op' pertains to
the complement of a control verb, this seems defendable. Control verbs are taken to assign
two θ-roles, one external and one internal, the latter of some clausal category like IP or CP.
The argument receiving the internal θ-role may be questioned (i.e. undergo wh-movement),
and the resulting wh-trace presumably does need (or at least, is assigned) Case, sitting in the
position of an internal argument of a governing verb. Root modals, as opposed to epistemic
                                                
28 Jaeggli proposed that Case-marked (wh-) traces block wanna-contraction
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modals, seemingly behave on a par with control verbs in wh-constructions; their complement
may undergo wh-movement, cf. (23).
(23)
a. Hvai prøvdej Jon tj  ti ?
   what tried Jon
   'What did John try?'
b. Hvai måtte/skulle/villej Jon tj  ti ?
   what  [must/should/want]+past  Jon
  'What did John have to/intend to/want to (do)?'
Notice that an epistemic reading is unavailable of the modals in (23) b. This fact at first
glance lends support to Thráinsson and Vikner's story that Burzio's generalization is the
relevant factor in accounting for modals in pseudoclefts, and that the difference between root
modals and epistemic modals in pseudoclefts is due to the wh-trace's need for Case. However,
if it were true that even a wh-trace in the complement position of a raising verb needs Case,
one would expect that e.g. perfect auxiliaries and other raising verbs would behave differently
from control verbs w.r.t. wh-movement in general. By assumption, perfect auxiliaries and
other raising verbs do not assign an external θ-role to their subjects and thus do not assign
Case to their complement. Thus, if wh-traces need Case irrespective of the nature of the
governing verb, the complement of an auxiliary or a raising verb should be unable to undergo
wh-movement in any type of sentence. But in fact, given a context, the complement of perfect
auxiliaries and certain other raising verbs are not excluded from undegoing wh-movement.
This type of movement is marginal, but not ungrammatical, cf. (24):
(24)
a. A: Jon har faktisk solgt bilen hennes uten hennes samtykke.
        Jon has actually sold car-DEF her   without her consent
        'John has actually sold her car without her consent'
   B : ?HVA har han, sa du?!29 30
                    what has he said you
        'What did you say he has (done)?'
                                                
29 Note that although it is marginally possible for the complement of the perfect auxiliary to undergo wh-
movement, it cannot undergo pseudocleft, as will be discussed below.
30 An appropriate question here is whether the representation of the wh-movement corresponds to e.g. i) or ii):
i)  HvaI harK hanJ tK [ tJ [ tI ]]   (leaving the subject trace behind)
ii) HvaI harK hanJ tK  [ tI ]        (subject trace part of wh-constiutent)
If i) were the right representation, it would be incorrect to say that it is the complement of the perfect aspectual
which undergoes wh-moverment. However, I want to argue below for a structure which is even simpler than i).
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b. A: Bilen ser ut til å være en eneste rusthaug.
        car-DEF seems  to be one single pile-of-rust
         'The car seems to be one big pile of rust'.'
   B : ?HVA ser den ut til , sa du?!
                    what seems it out to said you
        'What did you say it seems?'
Since the wh-trace is licenced in these constructions, there are two possibilities. Either the wh-
trace of the questioned constituent in (24) is of the non-argument type; i.e. the type that does
not need Case, since the verb governing the trace does not assign Case. Or one might imagine
that the governing verb exhibits extraordinary Case-assigning properties in wh-constructions
only. The point is that this wh-movement is possible, whether or not the wh-trace needs and/or
receives Case. Thus, wh-movement of the complement of certain raising verbs is possible in
matrix clauses. And since wh-movement of the complement of a perfect auxiliary or a raising
verb is possible in matrix clauses, why should it be illicit in relative clauses? The conclusion
is that it cannot be correct that the Case requirement of the wh-trace is what restricts the
behavior of modals in pseudoclefts.
One might of course invoke special properties of the operator "op" in relative clauses31
and claim that the trace of this operator must receive Case. That would amount to saying that
wh-movement within a relative clause is subject to different restrictions than wh-movement in
matrix clauses. But this would be an entirely different question. The conclusion must be that
the Case requirements of wh-traces in and by itself is not enough to account for the patterns
observed with modals and their pseudoclefted complements. These patterns are quite
complex; in fact, much more complex than the dichothomy presented in Thráinsson and
Vikner (1995). In order to reach an explanation for the behavior of modals in pseudoclefts,
we need to look at these patterns in more detail.
Although Thráinsson and Vikner do not investigate other raising or control structures
in pseudoclefts, it seems to be a sound generalization that raising verbs are typically
ungrammatical in the constructions discussed here, whereas control verbs in contrast accept a
                                                
31 In fact, there seems to exist something like a definitness-effect in Norwegian relative clauses; as far as I know,
this is a novel observation. For instance, unaccusative verbs with expletive subjects are illicit in relative clauses,
e.g. *Jeg traff en mann som det kom forbi på veien her; lit.'I met a man who there came passing on this road'.
Note also that the corresponding main non-relative is fine: Det kom en mann forbi på veien her 'There passed a
man on this road'. In relative clauses one must employ the structure without the expletive; Jeg traff en mann som
kom forbi på veien her 'I met a man who passed on this road'  However, this effect seems to exist in other types
of wh-movement as well, e.g. * Hva skjedde det? 'What happened-there?' but Det skjedde en ulykke. 'There
happened an accident'.
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pseudoclefted complement, cf. the raising structures in (25)a and b versus the control
structures in  (25) c and d:
(25)
a. *Det Jon viste seg, var å være inkompetent.
              it     Jon  showed self, was to be incompetent
  (Intended: 'What John turned out to be, was incompetent.')
b. * Det Marit antas, er å være uærlig.
   it     Marit suppose-PASS, is to be dishonest
   (Intended: 'What Marit is supposed to be, is dishonest.')
c. Det Jon prøvde, var å være ærlig.
it     Jon tried, was to be honest
'What John tried, was to be honest.'
d. Det Marit håpet, var å få snakke med ham.
it     Marit hoped, was to get talk to him
'What Marit hoped (for), was to get to talk to him.'
For now, let us assume that the generalization holds, that raising verbs are illicit in these
constructions whereas control verbs are OK. Since Thráinsson and Vikner analyze root
modals on a par with control structures, whereas epistemic modals are analysed as raising
verbs, the prediction of their analysis would be that root modals accept, whereas epistemic
modals reject a pseudoclefted complement.
The predictions on the present approach are somewhat different. I do agree that
epistemic modals are best analyzed as raising verbs. Thus, if raising verbs are always illicit in
these constructions, epistemic modals ought to reject a pseudoclefted complement (which
they do). However, in contrast to the approach in Thráinsson and Vikner (1995), the picture
emerging in the present work points to a radical split within the group of root modals, with
dispositional modal on one side and deontic modals on the other. This picture affects the
predictions concerning root modals in pseudoclefts. In the picture outlined in the present
investigation, the expectation would be that only dispositional root modals ought to accept a
pseudoclefted complement, since they are the only root modals that pattern with control verbs
(in most relevant respects). This means that the data in (20), where the dispositional modal
kunne 'be-able-to' is licit in this construction whereas its epistemic reading is impossible, is
just what we would expect even on the present approach. We would also expect the other
dispositional modal, ville 'want-to', to accept a pseudoclefted complement. This expectation is
fulfilled; cf. (26).
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(26)
 Det Jon vil, er å kjøpe bilen.
  it  Jon wants, is to buy car-DEF
   'What John wants, is to buy the car.'
An epistemic reading is unavailable for (26), just as an epistemic reading is always
unavailable for a modal with a pseudoclefted complement (as duely noted by Thráinsson and
Vikner 1995). Epistemic modals pattern with raising verbs, and if raising verbs are (typically)
ungrammatical in these constructions, this is just what we would expect. Dispositional modals
pattern with control verbs, hence, ought to accept a pseudoclefted complement.
However, the predictions concerning deontic modals are quite another matter.  From
what we have seen so far, we would expect that deontic root modals are just as reluctant to
accept a pseudoclefted complement as epistemic modals are. Deontic root modals pattern with
raising verbs (in most relevant respects; cf. above), just like epistemic modals, and if raising
verbs are indeed ungrammatical in these constructions, then deontic root modals ought to
reject a pseudoclefted complement as well. But this prediction is not borne out, cf. the data in
(27):
(27)
a. Det Marit må, er å snakke med ham.
    it Marit must is to talk to him
    'What Marit must (do), is to talk to him.'
b. Det du skal, er å pusse tennene.
        it you shall is to brush teeth-DEF
   'What you will (do), is to brush your teeth.'
c. Det vi alle bør, er å tenke gode tanker.
    it we all should, is to think good thoughts
   'What we all should (do), is to think good thoughts.'
d. Det vi ikke trenger, er å kjøpe flere bøker.
    it   we not need, is to buy more books
    'What we don't need, is to buy more books.'
The modals in (27) are all deontic modals. Thus, although deontic modals pattern with rasing
verbs w.r.t. all properties listed in  (19); they differ from (most) raising verbs in this respect.
They accept a pseudoclefted complement, like control verbs, unlike raising verbs. The
intriguing question is why this should be so. In our quest for an answer, we will examine one
very interesting restriction on deontic modals in these pseudocleft constructions.
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As already mentioned in section 3.2.6, Thráinsson and Vikner (1995) fail to notice the
existence of root modals with proposition-scope readings. Recall that in these constructions
the root modal obligatorily takes scope over the subject, and there is no intuition of anything
resembling a θ-relation between the root modal and the subject. Since the existence of such
constructions is not acknowledged by Thráinsson and Vikner, it is not very surprising that
they would ignore the fact that root modals with proposition-scope readings are illicit in these
pseudocleft constructions as well, i.e. with a pseudoclefted complement of the modal; cf.
(28).
 (28)
a. *Det en kvinne bør, er å bli vår neste statsminister.
    it   a woman should, is to be our next prime minister.
    (Intended: 'What should happen is that a woman becomes our next prime minister.')
b. *Det apene ikke må, er å mates av besøkende.
    it    the monkeys not must, is to feed-PASSIVE by visitors
               (Intended: 'What must not take place is that the monkeys are fed by visitors.')
When we include the "proposition-scope root" data in our investigation, we discover that the
generalization that some modals do and other modals do not accept a pseudoclefted
complement does not follow the root-epistemic distinction, as claimed by Thráinsson and
Vikner (1995). To make matters worse, it does not even follow the dispositional vs. deontic
distinction, as expected on the outline in the present work. Instead, what we find is that
deontic root modals are fine in these pseudocleft constructions, provided the modal has a
subject-oriented reading (i.e. a two-place reading), like in the sentences in (27). In sentences
where the modal requires a proposition-scope reading, deontic root modals reject a
pseudoclefted complement. In the ungrammatical sentences in  (28)a and b (as well as their
grammatical unclefted counterparts) our intuition is that there is no semantic relation ('θ−
relation') between the modal and the subject; neither en kvinne 'a woman' nor apene 'the
monkeys' are perceived as having any kind of obligation. That is, what truly separates the
ungrammatical structures in   (28) from their acceptable counterparts in (27) is their lack of
subject-orientedness. The relevant generalization, then, is that proposition scope modals (root
as well as epistemic) reject, whereas subject-oriented modals accept a pseudoclefted
complement. To illustrate this generalization we exploit once again the table of possible
readings of Norwegian modals, repeated here as (29). Note that the term two-place refers
strictly to a +θ−reading here; no claims about a specific argument structure are implied.
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 (29)
Readings available for Norwegian modals:
          Dispositional: Two-place = subject-oriented ¤
      Root reading           Two-place = subject-oriented ¤
Modals            Deontic
             One-place = proposition-scope *
     Epistemic reading:           One-place = proposition-scope *
¤: Accepts a pseudoclefted complement; *: rejects a pseudoclefted complement.
So, we have isolated the relevant generalization, that subject-orientedness is the prerequisite
for modals to accept a pseudoclefted complement.  However, we still lack an explanation for
this generalization. This is what we will pursue in what follows.
4.2.1 Subject-orientedness and Theta roles
The phenomenon referred to as subject-orientedness in the discussion and table above (cf.also
Barbiers 1995, 1999) is exactly what numerous authors, e.g. advocates of the CvR analysis,
refer to as a θ-relation, or a two-place reading. Thus the notion of subject-orientedness is just
another term for a two-place reading or a +θ-reading. The advantage of the term subject-
orientedness is that it does not carry any of the connotations or associations to an external θ-
role or a specific argument structure that encumbers the two other terms, so this is the term we
will adopt in what follows32.
As discussed above, Thráinsson and Vikner (1995) try to relate the modal's accepting
or rejecting a pseudoclefted complement to the assumption that root modals do, whereas
epistemic modals do not assign an external θ-role. However, the problem with this analysis is
that it does not account for the fact that certain deontic root modals, notably the deontic
                                                
32 Within the functionalist literature on modals, the term agent-oriented is much preferred (cf. Bybee et al. 1994;
Bybee and Fleischman 1995). The problem with this term is that it is sometimes used to refer to an agent that is
not syntactically present; e.g. Das Bier sollte kallt sein 'The beer should be cold' has an agent-oriented reading,
according to Heine (1995:26), where "agent" is used to designate the person who acts on this sentence; e.g. the
one who puts the beer in the fridge. Thus this term sometimes incorporates information that is of no relevance to
us here in describing the behavior of modals in pseuodclefts.
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proposition scope modals, reject a pseudoclefted complement as well. But there is one
seemingly straightforward way out of this problem.
Let us assume that a subject-oriented reading involves the assignment of an actual θ-
role, as proposed by authors within the CvR analysis. In contrast, assume that a proposition-
scope reading (root or epistemic) arises when no such θ-role is assigned. Then this θ-role
assigned by the root modal to the subject is a prerequisite for a pseudoclefted complement. In
those instances where no semantic role is assigned, like in the root or epistemic proposition-
scope root modal constructions, the complement of the modal cannot undergo pseudocleft.
If we were to follow this line of thought, there is another pressing question we would
have to address, namely the possible θ-properties of deontic modals. On the one hand, we
have strong indications that deontic root modals are raising predicates in Norwegian. That is,
we have evidence that Norwegian deontic modals pattern with raising verbs w.r.t. a range of
properties, such as subject selection, scope ambiguity and passivization. (cf.  (19)). But if
deontic modals are raising verbs, they ought to reject a pseudoclefted complement, since
raising verbs typically do (unlike control verbs; cf. the contrast in (25)). However, pseudocleft
constructions seemingly recognize the presence versus absence of a "θ-role" assigned by the
deontic root modal to the subject, in that only subject-oriented readings of deontic modals
allow for a pseudoclefted complement. To account for this fact, it seems that we may want to
allow deontic modals to assign a θ-role under certain circumstances; e.g. in pseudoclefts.
Note that this problem concerns the deontic modals only, since the dispositional root
modals pattern with control structures anyway, w.r.t. all properties listed in  (19).
Dispositional root modals therefore seemingly do assign a θ-role to their subject, they have no
proposition scope readings, whereas their epistemic counterparts behave like raising verbs.
This means that the behavior of modals in pseudoclefts just described is as expected with
dispositional modals. However, Norwegian deontic modals exhibit the syntactic behavior of
raising verbs, and by assumption, no θ-role is assigned by raising verbs to their syntactic
subject. If deontic root modals are raising verbs, why is it that they are licit in this
construction at all? And why should only subject-oriented deontic root modals (i.e. directed
deontic root modals) accept a pseudoclefted complement? One course to follow would be to
assume that deontic modals do assign a θ-role on the subject-oriented reading.
This would amount to saying that deontic modals both do and do not assign a θ role,
which is somewhat troublesome. Put simply, a deontic root modal may be considered a verb
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that optionally assigns a θ-role to its subject. However, there are problems with a solution
involving a notion of optional θ-assignment within a Principles & Parameters Theory33. The
reason for this is that the principles governing θ-structure, the Projection principle and the θ-
criterion, are designated so as to evade a notion of optionality.
The fastest route out of this problem would be to propose, like Brennan (1997) does,
that each deontic modal actually corresponds to two different modals34 (op.cit. 226):
I propose that each modal auxiliary is actually two modal auxiliaries: mayS is
translated as an operator which combines with a (poposition-level) conversational
background and a proposition to form a modal proposition; mayVP is translated as an
operator which combines with a (property-level) conversational background and a
property expression to form a modal property expression. I make parallel claims for
the other modal auxiliaries. I do not identify the interpretive class of mayS as epistemic
or of mayVP as root.
In syntactic terms, Brennan's proposal amounts to a picture where there exist epistemic
modals, which are all raising verbs, root modals, which come in to varieties, one raising
variety that does not assign a θ-role to its subject (a variety that is lacking with Norwegian
dispositional root modals), and another varitety that does assign a θ-role to its subject. The
latter may be considered a control verb, like proposed for all root modals by e.g. Lødrup
(1996) and Dyvik (1999)35. We would then be assuming, in addition to one separate entry for
the epistemic version of the modal, two lexical entries for each deontic modal; one control
version and one raising version (a solution which is implicit in Brennan's 1997 suggestion). In
deciding which version we are dealing with in a sentence, i.e. whether or not a given modal in
a given sentence does assign a θ-role, the natural thing to do is to look to the table of readings
available for Norwegian modals (repeated here as (30)).
                                                
33 Although one might add that the problems are by no means easier to deal with in the various proposals where
the +theta reading is accounted for by assuming an "adjunct", "additional", or "secondary" theta-role. Even in
these cases, one needs to come up with some additional machinery which makes these "adjunct/additional
/secondary" theta-roles "invisible to theTheta-criterion" or in some other way agreeable to the Theta-criterion.
34 Her analysis at this point builds on the analysis of Perlmutter (1970), who identifies two verbs begin. As noted
by Perlmutter as well as Brennan, many of Perlmutter's arguments carry over to modals.
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(30)
Readings available for Norwegian modals:
          Dispositional: Two-place (subject-oriented)
      Root reading           Two-place (subject-oriented)
Modals            Deontic
             One-place (proposition-scope)
     Epistemic reading:           One-place (proposition-scope)
Translating these readings into argument structure, we assume that two-place or subject-
oriented readings occur whenever the root modal assigns a θ-role, whereas the absence of a
subject θ-role yields the one-place proposition scope reading. Indeed, we would say that a
two-place reading arises exactly because the modal in these cases are two-place predicates
syntactically; i.e. the modals assigns both a subject role and an object-role. We would thus
come up with a picture that displays a homomorphic relation between the syntactic properties
of a modal and the readings available for the same modal, compare (31) below to (30) above.
(31)
Hypothesis:  Deontic root modals come in two varieties; ± an external θ-role:
          Dispositional: Assigns θ-role to subject
      Root reading           Assigns θ-role to subject
Modals            Deontic
             Assigns no θ-role to subject
     Epistemic reading:           Assigns no θ-role to subject
At first sight, this analysis seems to have several advantages. Firstly, it is able to reconcile the
two main families of analyses within the P&P framework, notably the "control vs. raising"
analysis and the "all modals are raising verbs" analysis. Thus, it pays tribute to analyses and
insights within both camps. For instance, works within the control vs. raising camp have often
ignored proposition-scope readings of root modals; an error that of course yields a skewed
                                                                                                                                                        
35 The +theta deontic modal could also be considered a raising verb that assigns an adjunct theta-role, like
proposed for certain root modals by Vikner (1988), Thráinsson and Vikner (1995) for Danish root modals, and
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picture of the relevant data. The "optional θ-role" analysis, understood as the hypothesis that
there exist two versions or lexical entries for each deontic root modal, would offer a way to
maintain many of the hypotheses within the control vs. raising analysis and simultaneously
account for proposition-scope readings of root modals. The hypothesis of a raising root modal
in addition to the control version would simply function as an extension of the theory by
means of an additional lexical entry for each deontic modal. On the other hand, advocates of
the "all modals are raising verbs" hypothesis have to take seriously and offer some kind of
explanation for the intuition that root modals do seem to assign something like a θ-role to
their syntactic subject under certain circumstances. One very clear case where this question is
especially pressing is the constructions under discussion here, where the complement of the
modal undergoes pseudocleft.
Within the "all modals are raising verbs" camp, various solutions have been suggested
to account for the subject-orientedness effect, i.e. the fact that modals seem to assign
something like a Theta-role on certain radings. Wurmbrand (1999) suggests that what in these
cases appears to be a θ-role assigned by the root modal is in fact something else, like a role or
function assigned contextually, not syntactically. Modals do not assign an external θ-role, but
certain apparent thematic relations result from a "rich contextual component" (p. 13) of modal
statements. Thus, what Wurmbrand claims is that these apparent thematic relations are not
syntactically encoded, as can be shown, she says, by the fact that non-directed interpretations
(i.e. proposition-scope readings) are available in most modal constructions (p.13):
The availability of non-directed 'interpretations' shows that roles/functions like
'obligee' or 'permissee' etc. do not have to coincide with a specific syntactic argument
in the sentence. In other words, the determination of these roles cannot be seen as a
mapping between θ-roles and syntactic arguments.
Whereas this claim is correct for modals in other constructions and sentence types, the
problem with pseudoclefts is that this is a construction where the non-directed reading is
never available. The subject-oriented reading is the only possible interpretation. An approach
that invokes contextually determined "θ"- assignment would have to explain why this is so. In
which way are the contextual properties of the pseudocleft able to prevent the non-directed
reading from arising36 37?
                                                                                                                                                        
Roberts (1985, 1993).
36 Two comments are in order: Firstly, Wurmband never discusses modals and pseudoclefts in the short article
referred to here. Secondly, she states explicitly that the section containing the proposal of contextually assigned
roles is "somewhat preliminary" and that a more elaborate discussion is to be found in Wurmbrand (2001).
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In contrast to Wurmbrand's proposal, Barbiers (1995, 1999) proposes that subject-
orientedness is syntactically encoded, not in the shape of lexically encoded argument
structure, but in the shape of an abstract head D heading a designated projection in the
sentence phrase marker. This head D establishes the semantic relation between the subject and
the verb, and "it depends entirely on the base position of the modal" relative to this D head
whether the semantic relation will be established or not; cf (32) (see section 3.2.7 for a more
detailed account).
(32)
a. root b. epistemic
DP ModP
Subject DP Mod DP
     D ModP Subject DP
Mod IndP        D IndP
    Ind    VP      Ind VP
If the modal is generated below D, the subject-oriented reading is the result ((32)a), but if the
modal is generated above D, the structure yields the epistemic reading ((32)b). The
"proposition-scope root" reading of the modal arises either because the head D is entirely
absent from the structure, or because the subject reconstructs at LF into a position within the
scope of the modal (Barbiers 1999:20). If the latter course is chosen, Barbiers would have to
modify the statement that subject-orientedness rests "entirely" on the base position of the
modal, because in that case, LF-reconstruction would play a part as well. For the sake of
argument, let us say we adopt Barbiers' D-projection to account for the subject-orientedness
of modals and claim that only the structure in (32) a accepts a pseudoclefted complement. We
would still need some auxiliary hypotheses to explain why this should be the case. Another
pressing question is why some modals, like the dispositional modals, always require the
                                                                                                                                                        
37 Note that it is not unheard of to claim that contextual information and world knowledge affects syntactic
operations. I will mention only one such case here. Erteschik-Shir (1981) notes that wh-extraction from an NP
depends on contextual differeces. This is shown e.g. by the following minimal pair:
i) : Which car did you like the gears in?
ii) #Which car did you like the the girl in?
Bouchard (1995) advocates the idea that there is a transparent relation between gears and cars, whereas there is a
non-transparent relationship between girls and cars. This (non-) transparency affects the extraction possibilities.
Alec Marantz (p.c.) suggests that the relationship between gears and cars, unlike the relation between girls and
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presence of this head D. Given that this head is a(n optional) part of sentence structure, why
would certain modals, like the deontic ones, allow for the presence as well as the absence of
this head, whereas dispositional modals never allow this head to be omitted; alternatively,
why dispositional modals are not allowed to be generated above D (depending on the
explanation chosen)38.
A third and seemingly straightforward way of accounting for this (additional) θ-role/
subject-orientedness effect would be to allow for the "optional" assignment of a θ role by
some root modals; i.e. to assume that deontic root modals come in two varieties, one that does
assign a(n adjunct) θ role to its subject and one that does not.
However, there are several problems with the assumption that all and only deontic
modals come in two varieties. One is the conceptual problem of the existence of, presumably
in addition to one lexical entry for each epistemic modal, homonym pairs for all deontic root
modals, where each pair are identical semantically; except for their θ-properties, or in
Barbiers' terms, their "subject-orientedness". Assume that we implement this idea by
assigning a control structure to the +θ version of the deontic modal; the directed deontic
reading. The non-directed deontic reading is construed as a raising verb. This would mean
that in any sentence containing the modal, there would be a structural ambiguity. The problem
with this massive doubling of possible representations is that in any non-cleft sentence this
structural ambiguity would have no observable syntactic consequences. It would be a
different situation if the subject-oriented deontic modal took on a number of syntactic
properties that are not found with the non-directed counterpart; let us say that subject-oriented
deontic modals could suddenly passivize, unlike the non-directed ones. Or, we might expect
that with at least one of these homonymous pairs (six pairs, twelwe entries in all) the
complement-taking properties of one member of the pair should differ from the complement-
taking properties of the other member of the pair. This is not what we find.
So what we would be doing is to invoke the notion of homonym pairs for two reasons
only: Firstly, to solve the pseudocleft problem (in one rather ad hoc manner); and secondly, to
account for the availability of both subject-oriented and non-directed readings for deontic
modals. The only purely syntactic consequence accounted for would be the pseudocleft
problem, whereas our lexical inventory of root modals would be nearly doubled. This addition
                                                                                                                                                        
cars, amounts to a head-complement relation which is encoded in (covert) syntax, as shown by the fact that the
gears of the car is a felicitous construction whereas the girl of the car is not.
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of lexical entries is theoretically unattractive (cf. also Barbiers 1995:156), and one should
strive to find a better solution. On the other hand, if this addition of lexical entries did indeed
account for the behavior of modals in pseudoclefts, one might consider this solution anyway.
However, as pointed out in the discussion of Thráinsson and Vikner's (1995) analysis above,
the mere assumption of a(n additional) θ-role assigned by subject-oriented modals does not do
the trick. Burzio's Generalization is inadequate in accounting for the difference observed
between subject-oriented modals and proposition scope modals in pseudoclefts, since it seems
not to be the case that raising verbs reject a wh-trace as its complement (cf. the data in (24)).
We need to find a better explanation in any case. In an effort to do so, we need to look more
closely on modals in the pseudocleft construction from a slightly more semantic perspective.
First of all, let us examine some general properties of pseudoclefts.
4.2.2 The pseudocleft construction
Heycock and Kroch (1999) propose an account of pseudoclefts where these constructions are
analysed as equative structures. Furthermore, as noted by Prince (1978), pseudoclefts have a
fixed information structure in which the relative clause denotes the ground (known
information/topic) and the other argument of the copula denotes the focus (new
information/comment) of the sentence. The restrictions imposed by the semantics of equation
dictate that only those expressions can appear as the foci of pseudoclefts whose semantic type
matches the type of the (free) relative with which they are equated. This Topic-comment
structure could be depicted in an X-bar schema like the one in (33); adopted from den Dikken,
Meinunger and Wilder (2000)39 40, where the copula is assumed to be the lexical expression of
a pivotal Topic-head.
                                                                                                                                                        
38 Presumably, this difference could be described as selectional requirements of the modal at hand, depending on
the matrix of selectional requirements ascribed to the modal in the lexicon.
39 This structure is adopted from den Dikken, Meinunger and Wilder (2000:62). However, in invoking this
structure I do not signal that I will follow their analysis of pseudoclefts rather than Heycock and Kroch's (1999);
this structure is merely employed as an expository device.
40 Notice that neither Heycock and Kroch (1999) nor den Dikken et al. (2000) discuss modals with a
pseudoclefted complement. Heycock (p.c.) informed me that modals never accept a pseudoclefted complement
in English; the modal needs a do complement within the relative clause.
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(33)
 TopP
Spec: Ground Top'
                Det Jon liker Top0    XP: Focus
'What Jon likes'     er
  'is' å være på kontoret
                                 '(to) stay in his office'
In investigating the internal structure of the (free41) relative, we adopt Thráinsson and
Vikner's (1995; evidently following Chomsky's 1986: 84-85) analysis of the relative clause,
repeated here as (34).
(34)
Xi [CP (opi)  (that) ... ti ...] was Y
Combining these two pieces of structure, we depict the structure of modals with a
pseudoclefted complement as follows (postponing the question of the internal structure of the
Focus-consituent XP):
(35)
 TopP
Spec: Ground Top'
     Deti [CP (opi) Jon må ti ]   Top0    XP: Focus
     'What Jon must (do)    er
å være på kontoret
'(to) stay in his office'
A much debated fact about pseudoclefts is that these constructions display a range of so-
called connectedness or connectivity effects, in that they exhibit the same patterns w.r.t.
various syntactic constraints as the simple sentences that paraphrase them. This is the case for
e.g. Condition A, B, and C (data from Heycock and Kroch 1999):
                                                
41 Note that whereas the relative in English pseudocleft construction may be described as a free relative, headed
by a wh-constituent, the relative of Norwegian pseudocleft is headed by a non-wh-constituent.
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(36)
a. What Maryi was was proud of herselfi/*j.
b. Maryi was proud of herselfi/*j.
c. What Maryi was was proud of her*i/j .
d. Maryi was proud of her*i/j .
e. What shei was was proud of Mary*i/j.
f.  Shei was proud of Mary*i/j.
In the literature, three types of approaches are found to account for these connectedness
effects; den Dikken et al. pp 42-4342:
The semantic approach [...] treats connectivity in [pseudoclefts] as a purely
interpretive phenomenon, arising without syntactic c-command. Binding dependecies
etc. are viewed as side effects of semantic composition, in which semantic properties
of what and be play a key role. The syntactic reconstruction approach [...] claims that
connectivity effects displayed by [pseudoclefts] reflect syntactic c-command (simple
sentence consistency), not obtaining at S-structure but established at LF via covert
movement of the [Focus Constituent] into the wh-clause. The ellipsis approach [...]
assumes that the [Focus Constituent] is a full IP which is (usually) reduced by PF
ellipsis. The IP-[Focus Constituent] is identical to the corresponding simple clause [...]
both before and after S-structure [...], so that connectivity actually reflects regular c-
command relations within the [Focus constituent] at all levels of syntactic
representation.
Furthermore, we will briefly consider another peculiarity of pseudoclefts. Williams (1994:60)
observes that the scope behavior of quantifiers in pseudoclefts is different than the behavior of
the same quantifiers in corresponding non-cleft sentences. For instance, a universal quantifier
in the Focus Constituent XP cannot take wide scope over an existensial quantifier inside the
relative, unlike the interpretations available in the corresponding non-cleft sentence, cf. (37) a
vs. (37) b, and (37) c vs (37)d (data quoted from Heycock and Kroch 1999) :
(37)
a. What bothered a friend of mine was every article that appeared.
b. Every article that appeared bothered a friend of mine.
c. ?What someone is prepared to read is every article on linguistics.
d. Someone is prepared to read every article on linguistics.
                                                
42 Den Dikken et al. list  Jacobson (1995) and Sharvit (1997) as advocates for the semantic approach; Heycock
and Kroch (1999) and Boškovic (1997) as advocates for the syntactic reconstruction approach and Ross (1997)
and Schlenker (1998) as advocates of the ellipsis approach. Den Dikken et al. argue for a more fine-grained
account. They claim that the ellipsis approach is the correct approach, but only for a well-delineated subset of
pseudoclefts, namely those with the following order: Wh-clause < counterweight (i.e. FocusXP). For the other
type, with the reverse order (i.e. FocusXP < wh-clause), they propose that connectivity (i.e. connectedness)
effects arises in another way, possibly along the lines of the semantic approach.
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Williams concludes that there is no reconstruction into the relative. This is potentially an
important observation to our investigation.
Finally, we need to know the basic syntactic properties of the Focus Constituent XP.
Den Dikken et al. analyze this constituent (which they dub the counterweight) as a full IP,
where material already expressed in the "Ground" XP may be repeated, or – as frequently
happens –  (phonetically) elided. At this point, we will not decide for or against the elipisis
analysis. However, it is worth mentioning that in the constructions examined here, where the
pseudoclefted constituent is the complement of a modal, the correlate of the relative clause det
'it', although it refers to the VP complement of the modal, is equated with a Focus Constituent
that is syntactically more than a VP, specifically, a constituent headed by the infinitival
marker å 'to'. Norwegian modals in unclefted sentences take bare infinitives; the infinitival
marker shows up in these pseudocleft constructions only43 (cf. also Thráinsson and Vikner
1995:fn 16) for the same observation). Thus, in the modal constructions examined here, the
Focus Constituent (or counterweight) is always an infinitive headed by the infinitival marker
å, 'to'.
This particle has sometimes been considered a complementizer, hence situated in C0
(cf. e.g. Nordgård and Åfarli 1990:117); whereas others have suggested that this particle is the
head of IP (Christensen 1983, Platzack 1986:123).
Bech (1998), who investigates Norwegian psych verbs with clausal complements,
concludes that Norwegian infinitival constructions headed by å 'to' come in two different
varieties. There is a control variety, with a PRO subject in <Spec, IP>, protected from
government by a C-projection on top of IP. The other type is the raising variety, with a trace
of a raised subject in <Spec, IP>. This latter type of å-headed infintive constructions are bare
IPs, allowing the NP-trace in <Spec, IP> to be properly governed by a lexical head, namely
the raising verb selecting the IP; cf. Bech (1998:62). In both cases å heads IP, but the control
infinitival construction consists of a projection (CP) on top of IP, whereas the raising
infinitive is a bare IP.
Stowell (1982) represents another approach to infinitives. Stowell too emphasizes that
there are structural differences between control infinitives and raising infinitives. Control
infinitives have tensed I(nfl)s, according to this proposal, as opposed to raising infinitives.
                                                
43 But cf. section 2.3.1, fn 29: In non-standard dialects we find certain constructions where the infinitival marker
is present in the complement of the modal. In those cases, the presence vs. absence of the infinitival marker has
interpretive effects. No such interpretive effect is present here.
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Infinitive tense checks null Case, and the only empty category that requires null Case is PRO.
Hence, only PRO can appear in <Spec,IP> of tensed infinitives.
It is not important here to decide which of these approaches to adopt, or which
proposal is superior to the other. The important thing to notice, however, is that numerous
authors have proposed and investigated structural differences between control and raising
infinitives. This is another important matter to our investigation of modals in pseudoclefts.
Specifically, the structural difference between a control infinitive and a raising infinitive may
be crucial when this infinitive functions as the Focus constituent (or the counterweight) of  a
pseudocleft; in this case, the pseudoclefted complement of a modal.
4.2.3 Modals and subject scope
At this point, we need to reexamine the scope properties of the subject in raising structures.
As discussed in section 4.1, it is a widely acknowledged property of raising predicates that
they allow the subject of the construction to take both wide and narrow scope w.r.t. the matrix
predicate (cf. e.g. May 1977, 1985). Recall also that this is not so for control structures, in
which the subject invariably takes wide scope. Deontic modals pattern with raising predicates
in that they allow for a narrow-scope as well as a wide-scope reading of the subject w.r..t. the
modal, compare to the deontic modal must to the raising verb seem and the control verb hope:
(38)
a. John must stay in his office
i.         It is considered necessary (e.g. by speaker)that [John stays in his office].
ii. John has an obligation to [stay in his office].
b. John seems to be happy.
i. It seems (e.g. to the speaker) that [John is happy].
ii. John [is showing signs of being happy].
c. John hopes to talk to her.
         # i. It is hoped (e.g. by the speaker) that [John talks to her].
ii. John [has a hope to talk to her].
The generalization that the subject scope of raising predicates differs from the subject scope
of control structures has been accounted for and implemented in a number of ways (cf.
Wurmbrand 199944). A widespread assumption is that this contrast between raising structures
                                                
44 Wurmbrand lists, in addition to May (1977, 1985) , Bobaljik (1998),  Lebeaux (1994), Fox (1998, 1999) and
Sauerland (1998) as various approaces proposing mechanisms to account for the "narrow scope reading" of the
subject.
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and control structures is due to the availability of a lower subject position for the structure
(e.g. at LF) in raising structures but not in control structures. This effect is often explained as
a consequence of the raising operation itself. The raising of the subject from the (+θ) subject
position of the embedded predicate to the (-θ) subject position of the raising predicate yields a
structure where the subject may be interpreted in the upper subject position – which gives the
subject a wide scope reading – or the subject may be interpreted in the lower subject position;
i.e. the subject position of the embedded predicate, in which case the trace of the subject is
interpreted. This latter option gives the subject the narrow-scope reading w.r.t. the raising
predicate. Interpretation of the subject in this lower position depends on the possibility to
"lower" the subject back into its trace position (i.e. "reconstruction"), alternatively; the
possibility to interpret the trace of the subject DP instead of the raised subject DP. On both
types of accounts, the point is to semantically "undo" the overt raising of the subject. The
difference between control and raising predicates in this respect can be depicted as in (39),
adopted from Wurmbrand (1999).
(39)
a. Control b. Raising
      IP      IP
     Subject       VP    Subject  VP
        VCONTR        INF     VRAISING INF
          PRO         VP         tSUBJ VP
               V      ...         V            ...
SCOPE:    SUBJ  > VERB SUBJ   >  VERB  >  SUBJ
Deontic modals behave like other raising verbs in allowing for narrow-scope as well as wide-
scope readings of the subject. However, there is still one very important difference between
deontic modals and (most) other raising verbs. This is the fact that whereas the perceived θ-
properties of ordinary raising verbs (like e.g. antas in (40)a below) remain uninfluenced by
the interpretation of subject scope, a wide scope reading of the subject w.r.t. a deontic modal
simoultaneously facilitates a subject-oriented, thus, +θ reading of the modal; cf. (40)bii). And
vice versa, the availability of a subject-oriented (+θ) reading is dependent on a wide-scope
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reading of the subject45 in the case of deontic modals, since a narrow scope subject cannot be
construed as having any obligation or permission.
(40)
a. Jon antas å være morderen.
   'Jon is presumed to be the killer.'
              i) It is presumed that (Jon is the killer).
  ii) Jon (has the property: presumed to be the killer).
a. Jon må passe hunden.
   'Jon must watch the dog.'
              i) It is necessary that (Jon watches the dog). # Jon has an obligation.
  ii) Jon (has the obligation to watch the dog).
A proposition-scope modal obligatorily scopes over the entire proposition of the sentence in
which it is contained, including the subject, with no intuition of a θ-relation between the
subject and the modal. This amounts to saying that in the case of modals, the wide-scope
reading of the subject is a prerequisite for a subject-oriented and thus, a +θ reading, since a
subject-oriented reading is unavailable with a narrow-scope subject. Another way of
formulating this generalization is that a proposition scope (root or epistemic) reading always
and only occurs when the subject is "lowered"; i.e. the trace of the subject is interpreted;
recall that this trace sits in the lower subject position.
Interpreting the trace instead of the visible subject is a prerequisite for a proposition
scope reading of a modal; indeed, one might quite rightfully claim that this reconstruction
procedure is what constitutes a proposition-scope reading of a modal. On the other hand,
interpreting the subject in the upper subject position gives the subject wide scope over the
modal. In the case of modals, as opposed to (most) other raising verbs, a wide scope reading
of the subject is semingly linked to a +θ reading of the matrix predicate; i.e. the modal.
Likewise, a +θ reading of the modal hinges on the subject being interpreted in its surface
position – the upper position. On the other hand, if the subject is interpreted in its trace
position, i.e. the lower subject position, what we have is a proposition scope reading of the
modal – either a proposition scope root modal or an epistemic modal. This generalization is
illustrated in (41):
                                                
45 I will go into the terms wide-scope and narrow-scope reading of e.g. a subject much more thorougly below. I
am aware that there exist various proposals where proper names, e.g. Jon, are construed as always having wide
scope. If we accepted this as a premise, then proposition-scope readings of modals would never be possible with
proper names, because the subject would always scope over the modal. However, this does not seem to capture
the intuitions about these constructions.  I will suggest an answer to the puzzle below.
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 (41)
Modal raising structures
     IP
Subject  ModP
          Modal   INF
      tSUBJ      VP
           V            ...
SUBJ   >  MODAL  >  SUBJ
READING: SUBJECT-ORIENTED      PROPOSITION SCOPE (ROOT OR EPISTEMIC)
" +θ"                      " – θ"
As illustrated by the figure, the "lowering" procedure, consisting in interpreting the subject in
the lower (i.e. trace) position gives the proposition-scope reading of a modal, hence the –θ
reading of the modal. The wide scope reading of the subject is linked to the +θ reading of the
modal; i.e. for a +θ−reading to arise, the subject needs wide scope.
Now, if we rely on these assumptions about the relation between θ-readings and
subject scope (assumptions that will be made subject to scrutiny below), there is a seemingly
straightforward way of accounting for the observed generalizations concerning modals with a
pseudoclefted complement. Recall that modals accept a pseudoclefted complement provided
the modal has a subject-oriented ("+θ") reading. Whenever the natural interpretation of the
sentence requires that the modal is given a proposition-scope (root or epistemic) reading (like
e.g. in  (28), repeated here as (42), the modal rejects a pseudoclefted complement.
(42)
a. *Det en kvinne bør, er å bli vår neste statsminister.
    it   a woman should, is to be our next prime minister.
  (Intended: 'What should happen is that a woman becomes our next prime minister.')
b. *Det apene ikke må, er å mates av besøkende'
    it    the monkeys not must, is to feed-PASSIVE by visitors
               (Intended: 'What must not take place is that the monkeys are fed by visitors.')
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Let us start by examining why proposition-scope readings are unavailable in these pseudocleft
constructions. First, we need to reinvoke the internal structure of the relative in <Spec,TopP>.
Cf. the illustration in (35), repeated here as (43):
(43)
 TopP
Spec: Ground Top'
Deti [CP (opi) (som) Jon må ti]    Top0      XP: Focus
'What         (that)  Jon must (do)    er
        is å være på kontoret
'(to) stay in his office'
The complement of the modal, dubbed "op" here, is raised to <Spec,CP>. By assumption, this
operator gets its reference from the correlate Det 'it' outside of CP46. This element, det, has a
variety of functions and (in part unrelated) meanings in Norwegian. In this case, however, it
seems legitimate to argue that det is a (surface) proform, cf. Lødrup (1994); pertaining to the
VP complement of the modal47. A mainstream way of getting the semantics right for such a
proform would be to assume that the structure of the phonetically deleted VP is syntactically,
although not phonetically, present in the phrase marker, at least at LF (cf. also Lødrup
1994:30848). I want to assume instead that this proform det is a simplex structure, something
like a pronoun49. There is no syntactic reconstruction of this proform into a fullfledged VP at
                                                
46 Chomsky (1986b), Negård (2001:121). The latter claims that the reference and function of a wh-operator is
determined by the strucural environments of the wh-operator; e.g. by whether or not there exists a correlate for
the wh- operator. When there exists a correlate for this operator, as is the case in relative clauses, the operator
refers to the correlate.
47 In fact, Lødrup seems to reserve this term for the det complement of epistemic modals and certain other
constructions. Root  modals are analyzed as control verbs, and control verbs "always allow an NP object as an
alternative to a verbal complement". Hence, det might be analyzed as a pronoun object when it is the
complement of a root modal in Lødrup's proposal. I confess that I have glossed over the syntactic differences
between det as a complement of a subject-oriented root modal and det as a complement of a proposition scope
(root or epistemic) modal that Lødrup observes; e.g. that det as the complement of a subject-oriented root modal
is able to take part in "object-shift", as opposed to det as a complement of a proposition-scope modal. There are
several reasons for making this simplification; firstly, the judgements are subtle for the variations observed, and
secondly, Lødrup's examples consists almost entirely of sentences containing the modals kunne and ville, i.e.
dispositional modals. Thirdly, like Thráinsson and Vikner (1995), Lødrup (1994, 1996) ignores the proposition
scope root readings of deontic modals.
48 Lødrups framework is LFG, and this semantic reconstruction, where the antecedent of det is copied in and
replaces det in functional structure.
49 Lødrup suggests (p. 309) that this proform det also has certain properties that makes it legitimate to treat it as a
direct object and to assume that its replacement in functional structure is also an object.
Chapter 4
146
any syntactic level50. Hence, the structure of the relative clause sitting in <Spec,TopP> could
be depicted as the structure in (44); irrelevant details ommitted:
(44)
     DP
                    DP             CP
                    Det
                  C0        C'
(opi)
 C     Modp
                     (som)
Jon         Mod'
                      
     Mod0            ti
       må
Assuming this structure for the relative clause allows us to account for the lack of quantifier
scope reconstruction into the (free) relative in a pseudocleft, observed and pointed out by
Williams (1994), mentioned in section 4.2.2 and repeated here as (45). We assume the
structure in  (46) for e.g. the relative clause in (45)a (note that the IP-level is omitted for
simplicity; this has no theoretical implications).
(45)
a. What bothered a friend of mine was every article that appeared.
b. Every article that appeared bothered a friend of mine.
c. ?What someone is prepared to read is every article on linguistics.
d. Someone is prepared to read every article on linguistics.
 (46)
     DP
                    DP             CP
                  What
                  C0        C'
           (opi)
 C      VP
                     
 ti                     V'
                      
            I0            DP
       bothered  a friend of mine
                                                
50 Although I do not rule out the possibility that there exists a reconstruction at a level "more abstract than LF
under most current assumptions" along the lines proposed for reconstruction of pseudoclefts in Heycock and
Kroch (1999:365).
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There is no reconstruction of the What-phrase into the quantified phrase every article that
appeared within the relative clause, hence one would not expect scope-variability any more
than one would expect scopal ambigutiy of two quantifiers in two different clauses, e.g. as in
the follwing discourse:
(47)
Soneone is prepared to read something. It is every book on linguistics.
Note, however, that connectedness effects, e.g. binding of anaphors, is possible between two
different sentences in a discourse.
(48)
John suddenly saw something. It was himself in the mirror.
Thus, the structure we will be assuming for a relative in <Spec, TopP> where the
pseudoclefted constituent is the complement of the modal is the one depicted in (44), repeated
here for convenience as (49):
(49)
     DP
                    DP             CP
                    Det
                  C0        C'
(opi)
 C     Modp
                     (som)
Jon         Mod'
                      
     Mod0            ti
Now, for the modal to get the proposition scope (and minus-θ) reading, we have assumed that
it is essential that the subject trace is interpreted instead of the surface subject DP; i.e,
corresponding to the "lowering" procedure of May (1977, 1985). This means that we need
access to a spec-position below the modal, because this is where we find the trace of the
subject. But in this structure, there exists no spec-position below the modal. The "pre-
movement subject position" is simply elided and deleted and thus not available for
interpretation.
The only specifier position available is the position scoping over the modal, which
gives the subject wide scope and the modal a +θ reading. If this is on the right track, a
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pseudocleft structure where this lower subject position is retained inside the relative clause
should give rise to proposition scope readings. This is borne out, cf. (50)a. Compare (50)a,
where proposition-scope readings are possible, to (50)b, where proposition-scope readings are
unavailable:
(50)
a. Det Jon må være, er arkitekt.
   it Jon must be, is architect
  'What John must be, is an architect.'
b. Det Jon må, er å være arkitekt.
   it Jon must, is to be an architect
  'What John must do, is to be an architect.' 
(50)a is three-ways ambiguous. It does have a subject oriented (+θ) reading, but crucially, the
proposition-scope root and epistemic readings are also both available. The two root readings
both need a context, e.g. they are easier to get if (50) is uttered by a director of a play. But the
important point here is that both root and epistemic proposition scope readings are possible
only if the lower subject position (the specifier position of være 'be') is syntactically present.
The structure of the relative clause in (50)a may be depicted as in (51) below.
 (51)
     DP
                    DP             CP
                    Det
                  C0     C'
(opi)
 C     Modp
                     (som)
Jonk         Mod'
                      
     Mod0            VP
       må
          tk   V'
        V             ti
      være
Notice that the presence of være 'be' provides a specifier position, but presumably not a θ-
role, given that the copula (in an by itself) is not a θ-assigner, by standard assumptions. Thus,
let us assume that the main contribution of the copula w.r.t. allowing for a proposition-scope
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(non-θ) reading of the modal is to supply the structure with a lower subject position51. Only
when this position is syntactically present are the proposition-scope readings of the modal
available. When this position is elided, as in (44) above, the proposition scope readings are
impossible, and the wide-scope subject/ +θ reading of the construction is the only reading.
However, there is a potential snag here. Consider what happens when the
pseudoclefted XP is the complement of a perfective verb.
(52)
a. * Det Jon må ha, er solgt bilen hennes.
       it John must have, is sold her car
      (Intended: What John must have done, is to have sold her car)
Here the aspectual ha provides a lower subject position, but the structure is nevertheless ill-
formed. However, the ungrammaticality of (52) is straightforwardly explained when we
consider the overall structure of pseudoclefts. There are strong restrictions on the possible
syntactic realization of the Focus constituent XP. The generalization could be expressed as
follows: The pseudocleft structure is an equative structure (cf. Heycock and Kroch 1999 and
section 4.2.2 above) where two (referential) entities are equated. Since the head of the relative
clause is a pronoun (cf. above), and there exists the restriction on equatives that the two
arguments equated must be of the same semantic type, the focus constituent XP must be, in
some sense, nominal. Hence, the relevant structure reads something like " XPN = XPN"; which
entails that only argument-type clauses (headed by at 'that' or the infinitival marker å 'to'),
DPs or adjectives are allowed to appear here. Bare VPs (cf. (52)), adverb phrases and PPs are
thus banned from constituting the Focus constituent XP; cf. the data in ( 53):
( 53)
a. *Det Jon må, er hjem/til flyplassen.
     it Jon must  is home/ to airport-DEF
    'What Jon must do, is to go home/to the airport'
Være 'be' accepts a pseudoclefted complement because it takes adjectival and (other) nominal
categories as complements. This is not so for the aspectual ha 'have'. This auxiliary requires
its complement to be a perfect participle; hence a bare VP. But verbal (i.e. [+V])categories
cannot head the Focus constituent XP. Thus, the structure is ill-formed. As stated and
discussed above, though, være is quite willing to accept a pseudoclefted complement, and
serves to illustrate that our prediction is borne out: the lower subject-position is crucial to the
                                                
51 I need to modify this claim below, but I will allow this assumption here for the sake of exposition.
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proposition-scope reading of modals. Only when this position is syntactically present is the
proposition-scope reading of the modal possible.
Now, this explains the fact that proposition-scope (epistemic and root) modals reject,
whereas subject-oriented modals accept a pseudoclefted complement. The proposition scope
reading of a modal consists in interpreting a subject-trace in a subject position within the
syntactic scope of the modal. But when the complement of a modal is pseudoclefted, this
complement is replaced with the proform det, which has no internal structure; or at least, no
subject position of a relevant kind. This means that the lower subject position, which gives
rise to the proposition scope reading of the modal and, correspondingly, to the narrow scope
reading of the subject, is simply not present in the syntactic structure. Stipulating a one-to-one
correspondence between a wide scope subject and a +θ reading on the one hand, and a narrow
scope subject and a -θ reading on the other hence gives the right result. Norwegian deontic
modals are allowed in this structure because they allow for a wide-scope, +θ reading, as
opposed to most other raising verbs (cf. the tables in (30) and (31)).
However, there is one severe problem with this proposal. It remains to explain why
other raising verbs are illformed in this construction. If the wide scope vs. narrow scope
reading of the subject were the only relevant distinction, other raising verbs ought to be
allowed in this construction as well. As we have seen (cf. above), raising verbs allow for a
wide scope reading of the subject; hence, all raising verbs should accept a pseudoclefted
complement, if the wide-scope reading of the subject is all it takes to rescue the structure. I
will examine one potential, GB-style explanation here.
Assume for a moment that the explanation resides in the properties of the Focus
Constituent XP. Let us consider the proposed structure again:
(54)
 TopP
Spec: Ground Top'
Deti [CP (opi) (som) Jon må ti]    Top0      XP: Focus
'What         (that)  Jon must (do)    er
        is å være på kontoret
'(to) stay in his office'
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As mentioned in section 4.2.2, several authors have proposed that there exist structural
differences between the complement of a raising verb and the complement of a control verb.
For instance, Bech (1998) suggests that infinitival phrases headed by the infinitive marker å
come in two different varieties. An å-headed infinitive functioning as the complement of a
raising verb is a bare IP with a subject trace in <Spec, IP>, allowing this trace to be properly
governed by the selecting matrix verb, i.e. the verb selecting the complement. On the other
hand, an å-headed infinitive functioning as the complement of a control verb has a CP on top
of IP, protecting the PRO subject in <Spec, IP> from being governed by the matrix control
verb selecting the complement; cf. the difference between (55) a (control) and (55)b (raising),
from Bech (1998: 62-63):
(55)
a. Ola liker [CP [IP PROx å [VP tx spise bananer]]].
    'Ola likes    to        eat bananas.'
b. Huni forekommer meg [IP ti å [VP ti analysere setningen]].
    'She    seems  (to)  me      to          analyze the-sentence.'
We insert these sentences into the TopP structure.  (56) is a control structure and a fully
grammatical pseudocleft. (57) is a raising structure and an illformed pseudocleft.
 (56)
 OK: TopP
Spec: Ground Top'
DP    
      Top0                                     CP: Focus
  DP             CP        er
 Det       C'
             (opi)            C'
                C             IP
          C        IP
     (som)       PROx           I'
        Jon                IP'
                               I           VP
           I0               ti        å
      liker                         tx        V'
          spise bananer
           'What   Jon        likes                     is                             to               eat bananas'
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 (57)
 * TopP
Spec: Ground Top'
DP
      Top0       IP: Focus
  DP             CP        er
 Det            tx          I'
             (opi)            C'
                        I           VP
          C        IP       å
     (som)        tx           V'
        Jonx               IP' spise bananer
                      
           I0               ti
      antas                   
'What   Jon               is-presumed                   is               to               eat bananas'
Now, let us assume that the subject trace in <Spec, IP> of the Focus constituent is the
offending element of the structure in (57). We may invoke a number of reasons why this
should be the case. Most importantly, the trace does not have an antecedent in a c-
commanding position. In fact, this trace does not have an antecedent at all, thus it must be
base-generated as a trace, not the silent copy of a moved constituent. Secondly, let us assume
that the copula lexicalizing the Top head is unable to properly govern this trace; e.g. because
it is not a proper lexical verb with any lexical content. Thirdly, given the assumption that å-
headed infinitives come in one CP variety and one IP variety, we may want to claim that only
the CP variety is a true "nominal" category, capable of being equated with a pronoun such as
Det. We might argue that a bare IP is a non-nominal category, unable of being equated with
the pronoun Det. Any of these assumptions would allow us to explain why raising structures
are illformed in these constructions52.
On the other hand, it would not explain why deontic modals, as the only types of
raising verbs, accept a pseudoclefted complement. One way out would be to propose that
deontic modals, although they are defined as raising verbs in the lexicon, are able to be
redefined as control verbs is these structures only. This is not completely unheard of; it is
possible for certain verbs with one specific type of argument structure to be forced into a
different frame and thus give rise to new meanings, cf. e.g. the following examples:
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(58)
A: Fjernkontrollen har forsvunnet.
'The remote control has disappeared.'
B: Jaså, og hvem har forsvunnet den, da?
'Really, and who has disappeared it, then?'
Forsvinne 'disappear' is clearly defined as an ergative (unaccusative) verb in Norwegian, and
it does not take an agentive subject. Nevertheless, it is marginally possible – in jocular and
poetic contexts – to force an agent into this construction53. The resulting construction has a
causative reading; 'who made the remote control disappear'.
However, allowing deontic modals to be redefined in this way is still an unsatisfactory
solution for a number of reasons. Firstly, because forcing a verb with a given argument
structure into a different verb frame seems to give rise to deviating, highly marked or
methaphorical readings. No such effect is observed with modals in pseudoclefts. Secondly, if
we allow for deontic modals to be control verbs in certain constructions, we might as well
allow for two different entries of each modal in the lexicon, the very thing we set out to avoid.
Thirdly, the question still remains how we could restrict this kind of redefinition of raising
verbs to allow deontic modals, and at the same time disallow other raising verbs, to partake in
this kind of "redefinition of argument structure".
But even if we could solve all these problems, one much more fundamental problem
for our approach, where ± θ-reading is seen as a side effect of the scope of the subject, resides
in the fact that the stipulated correspondence of subject scope and ± θ-reading does not hold
up against closer scrutiny. Admittedly, it does seem to be a sound generalization that +θ
readings demand, or at least strongly prefer, a wide scope subject. But non-θ readings of
deontic modals allow for wide-scope subjects as well, just like other raising verbs with non-θ
readings, cf. (59)a. But even when the reading of the subject is a wide-scope reading,
proposition-scope modals, just like other non-thematic raising verbs, reject a pseudoclefted
complement, cf. (59)b:
                                                                                                                                                        
52 This type of approach would favour an analysis where the connectedness effects observed in pseudoclefts are a
result of interpretive mechanisms and not the result of actual syntactic C-command between the antecedent and
the anaphor.
53 Interestingly, it is a prerequisite that the additional argument forced into this construction needs to be a
prototypical agent. If we replace hvem 'who' with hva 'what',  the construction is (according to my informants)
close to nonintelligible, , cf. (i):
 ??/* (i) Hva har forsvunnet fjernkontrollen? ' What has disappeared the remote control?'
Chapter 4
154
(59)
a. En pasient må opereres.
  ' A patient must be operated on,  ∃x & (is operated on x).'54
b. ??/*Det en pasient må, er å opereres55.
    'What a patient must, is to be operated on.'
What we have learned so far is that the availibility of the wide-scope reading of the subject
cannot be what allows deontic modals to partake in the construction under scrutiny here.
Intuitively, what does separate most other raising verbs from root modals as regards a
pseudoclefted complement is perfectly clear. Modals are able to survive in this construction
because they may assign what has become known as the additional/adjunct/secondary θ-role
(the phenomenon referred to as subject-orientedness above). This is also the intuition
expressed by my (non-linguist) informants. The construction Det Marit antas, er å være
uærlig 'what Marit is presumed, is to be dishonest' is illformed because there is no semantic
relation between Marit and antas 'is-presumed'. Now, one might imagine that this is the
layman way of expressing the intuition of wide-scope vs. narrow-scope reading of the subject.
But as we have seen, the wide-scope/narrow-scope reading of the subject does not give us the
solution in any case, since wide-scope readings alone are in fact not enough to permit a
raising verb in this construction. In fact, the wide-scope/narrow-scope subject distinction is
useful to us only as far as it correspond to the ± θ reading, and this correspondence is in fact
not one-to-one. Thus, there are important reasons to believe that θ-relations and not subject
scope is the primary feature in distinguishing between deontic modals and other raising verbs
when it comes to accepting vs. rejecting a pseudoclefted complement. On the other hand, the
pseudocleft data point to a solution where the syntactic presence of the lower subject position
is crucial to get a non-θ/proposition scope reading of the modal. Hence, if we had a way of
relating ± θ-readings instead of ± wide scope subject readings to upper and lower subject
positions, we would have a much better chance of solving the problem before us, i.e. to
explain why proposition scope modals reject, whereas subject-oriented modals accept a
pseudoclefted complement.
Now, as discussed a number of times, these subject positions have been taken by
numerous authors to encode wide vs. narrow subject scope and not θ-relations. And it is true
                                                
54 The "box"  encodes necessity, whereas the "diamond" ◊ encodes possibility. See Brennan (1997:16 ff) for
the history of  definitions of these signs in western philosophy.
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that there exists a certain correspondence between subject scope and +θ-readings; cf. the
discussion above. But the problem is that there exists a discrepancy in certain cases;
specifically, that wide-scope subjects do not guarantee a +θ reading. So if we want to make a
case of the hypothesis that ± θ-reading, not subject scope, is the primary function of access to
the upper and lower subject positions, we need to discredit the hypothesis that subject scope is
what is encoded by these positions. This is what we turn to next.
4.2.4 Competing for subject positions: Theta−relations vs. subject scope
In the literature, various arguments have been offered to support the assumption (attributed to
May 1977) that raising predicates give rise to a wide scope reading as well as a narrow scope
reading of the subject, whereas control predicates do not allow for a narrow scope, only a
wide scope reading of the subject. I will examine three types of argument here.
4.2.4.1 The argument from nobody/somebody
Firstly, Zubizarreta (1982: 54, following May 1977) points out that the interplay of the
quantifiers nobody and somebody are different when they occur in the subject positions of
raising verbs as compared to control verbs. Her data are as follows (her 16 –20).
 (60)
a. Nobody tried to leave.
b. Nobody seemed to have left.
c. Nobody tried to leave but somebody tried to leave (contradictory).
d. Nobody seems to have left but somebody seems to have left (non-contradictory).
e. (∀x (x does not seem to have left)) but (seems (∃x (x have left)))
The explanation given by Zubixzarreta for the lack of contradiction in  (60)d is that in the first
part of this clause, seem is predicated of x, but not in the second part; cf.  (60)e. Control
predicates are not able to scope over their subjects like raising verbs; hence a narrow scope
reading of the subject is not available, and so  (60)c is contradictory. However, one problem
with these data and the lesson to be learned from them is that authors typically use the raising
verb seem as an example. The picture gets more nuanced when we include other raising verbs.
                                                                                                                                                        
55 This sentence is well-formed given a generic reading of the subject, but not on the wide-scope (nor the
narrow-scope/ non-theta) existential reading intended here.
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Thus, replacing seem with be likely to or epistemic must (which we have established is a
fullfledged raising verb) result in different judgements from my informants:
(61)
a. Nobody is likely to have left but somebody is likely to have left.
b. Nobody must have left but somebody must have left.
My informants (native speakers of English) initially judged both sentences to be
contradictory. However, when I paraphrased the sentences so as to avoid contradiction, the
judgements were that the non-contradictory reading of (62)a is "extremely hard to get"
whereas the paraphrase in (62)b was judged to be "still contradictory".
(62)
Paraphrases of (61) a and b:
a. There is no person such that he is likely to have left;
    yet it is likely that somebody left.
b. There is no person such that he must have left;
    yet it must be the case that somebody left.
Notice that the same informants accepted the comparable paraphrase of seem without (much)
persuation. Now, English seem56, like its Norwegian counterpart ser ut til å, has what seems
to be a +θ-assigning counterpart. This version of seem takes adjectival complements in
addition to clausal complements. There is a slight difference in meaning between the two
versions of seem. The "+θ-assigning counterpart" denotes 'direct visual access to x' and differs
from the "-θ-assigning version" in that the former evidently does not accept a proposition
scope reading. I.e. it does not accept as a complement a proposition p where it is implied that
the speaker does not have direct visual access to the emebedded subject, cf. (63):
(63)
a. John seems sick/*gone.
  # It seems that John is sick/*gone
b. Everyone seems to be sick.
c. Everyone seems sick.
Note that whereas (63) b could be uttered by a teacher as an explanation of an empty class
room, (63) c could not. Hence, there exist two different verbs seem in English. My suggestion
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is that this property of seem might have an influence on the informant's judgements in readily
accepting  (60)d as non-contradictory. The Norwegian counterpart of seem is in fact
marginally permitted in the pseudocleft constructions discussed above, given that the focus
XP contains a subject-oriented predicate allowing for a 'direct visual access' reading; as
opposed to a predicate that favours a proposition scope reading of the matrix verb, where a
'direct visual access' reading is unavailable:
(64)
a. ?Det Jon ser ut til, er å være irritert.
  'What Jon seems (to be), is annoyed'
b. *Det Jon ser ut til, er å være borte.
    'What Jon seems (to be), is gone'
I should mention that not all of my informants accepted the sentence in (64)a as grammatical,
but crucially, every single informant judged (64)b to be dramatically worse than (64)a.
Raising verbs such as epistemic must have no θ-assigning (epistemic) version, and this
may be what influences on the informants rejecting of a non-contradictory reading of (61) b;
Nobody must have left but somebody must have left. For likely,one may assume that certain
speakers have a marginal possibility of a θ-assigning version in addition to the proposition-
scope version in their lexicon. Recall that the non-contradictory reading of (61)a (nobody is
likely to have left but somebody is likely to have left) was judged "extremely hard to get".
4.2.4.2 The argument from some/every
The second family of data taken to confirm the alleged subject-scope differences between
control predicates and rasing predicates stems once again from May (1977). The data here are
taken from Zubizarreta (1982:55); cf also Hornstein (1998:109), who attributes these
observations to Burzio (1986)57. What these data are supposed to show is that "a quantifier in
the embedded clause of a raising construction may have scope over the matrix surface
subject" whereas "in a control structure the matrix quantifier is always construed as having
scope wider than the quantifier in the complement clause".
                                                                                                                                                        
56 I want to thank Greg Carlson for discussing with me these properties of seem.
57 According to Zubizarreta (1982), the type of wide-scope/narrow-scope data observed by Burzio (and she
refers to Burzio 1981) are data like the following, One interpreter each seems to have been assigned to the
visiting diplomats but One interpreter each tried to be assigned to the visiting diplomats. The distribution of
distributive each is discussed by Beghelli and Stowell (1999).
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 (65)
a. Some politician is likely to address every rally in John's district.
    Some > every; every > some
b. Some politician decided to address every rally in John's district.
    Some > every; # every > some
 Hornstein (1998) adheres to these judgments and assumptions, although his data are slightly
different. However, acoording to my investigations these conjectures are simply not correct.
My informants assure me that both scope possibilities are available in the following control
structures.
(66)
a. Someone tried to read every book.
    Some > every; every > some (for every book, someone tried to read it)
b. Someone decided to read every report.
    Some > every; every > some (for every report, someone decided to read it)
The latter reading of (66)b is perhaps a little harder to get and needs some context. Let us say
I am a lecturer and that I encourage my students to read each other's reports, whereas I myself
promise to read those reports which will otherwise not be read by anyone. Then, I might utter,
Luckily, someone decided to read every report, where every scopes over someone.
4.2.4.3 The argument from the ambiguity of indefinites
The third set of data often invoked to illustrate scopal differences between control predicates
and raising predicates concerns the possible readings of indefinites. In certain contexts,
indefinites may be ambiguous between what linguists refer to as a specific w.i.z. a non-
specific reading. For instance,  (67) is ambiguous between these two readings:
 (67)
John is seeking a unicorn.
On the specific reading of the indefinite, there exists a particular unicorn of which it is true
that John is seeking it. On the other reading, John does not seek a particular individual, he is
simply looking for anything that would fit the description of a unicorn. In fact, there may not
exist a single individual in the real world which fits the description of a unicorn, but the
sentence may nevertheless be true in the real world; e.g. John might not know or believe that
unicorns do not exist. Frege (1892) noted that modal operators (e.g. necessarily, possibly) are
                                                              The Argument Structure of Norwegian modals
159
among the elements which give rise to contexts where we find this type of ambiguity58. Other
elements that create such referentially opaque or intensional contexts where we find this
particular ambiguity of indefinites are verbs denoting utterance events (e.g. tell, report)
propositional attitudes (e.g. believe59,think) or intentions (want, seek). For short, we refer to
all those elements who create the aforementioned ambiguity-promoting contexts as
intensional predicates.
Now, a much preferred way of representing these different readings of indefinites
within formal semantics is to give the indefinite wide scope over the intensional predicate on
the specific reading, whereas the non-specific reading has narrow scope w.r.t. the intensional
predicate.
(68)
a. ∃x (x: a unicorn) & John seeks x (= specific reading)
b. John seeks ∃x (x: a unicorn) (= non-specific reading).
That is, the terms wide-scope subject vs. narrow-scope subject originally refers to the way
these two readings are represented within formal semantics. But wouldn't it be nice if these
semantic representations corresponded to syntactic representations in a homomorphic
fashion? May (1977, 1985) thought so. He set out to show that wide-scope vs. narrow-scope
readings of subjects are in fact syntactically encoded. I will examine the main points of his
analysis and the most fundamental arguments.
Firstly, May observes a difference between raising structures and control structures
w.r.t. their ability to give rise to the specific-nonspecific/existing-nonexisting ambiguity for
indefinites. Cf. (69):
(69)
a. A hippogryph is likely to be apprehended.
b. A hippogryph is anxious to be apprehended.
Acoording to May, (69)a does not necessarily entail the supposition that hippogryphs exist,
unlike (69)b, which can only be truthfully uttered if hippogryphs exist. May links this
difference between raising structures and control structures to the thematic properties of the
                                                
58 In fact, this is part of a bigger problem which concerns definite descriptions (e.g. The Morning Star) in
addition to indefinites. This ambiguity with definite descriptions is often referred to as the de dicto vs. the de re,
i.e. roughly, the description vs. the individual fitting the description. But the phenomenon in both cases concerns
the intension vs. the extension of a DP.
59 It is a prerequisite for the intensional reading of believe that its complement denotes a proposition. E.g. John
believes me does not qualify as an intensional context.
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matrix verb. Raising predicates have non-thematic subject positions, as opposed to control
predicates, which are thematic. The ability to take expletive subjects are taken as a diagnostics
for this non-thematic property of the matrix subject position, cf. (70).
(70)
a. It is likely that a hippogryph will be apprehended.
b. *It is anxious that a hippogryph will be apprehended.
The non-thematic property of the matrix subject position in a raising structure has two major
consequences. Firstly, this property entails that raising predicates allow for movement to the
matrix subject position from the subject position of the complement. Secondly, this property
allows the matrix subject position of a raising predicate to host an empty expletive. Empty
expletives are ruled out in the subject position of a control predicate since this is a thematic
position. On the other hand, (70)b above is a finite clause, hence the subject position of the
control predicate cannot host PRO either. The subject position of a finite clause is always
governed, and PRO must be ungoverned. Thus, there is no empty category that would be
allowed to fill the subject position of a control predicate in finite clauses. Therfore, this type
of structure is ruled out as ill-formed at LF. But for the non-specific, narrow scope reading of
an indefinite subject to arise, it is crucial that an empty expletive fills the upper subject
position at LF. It follows that control predicates do not allow for a narrow-scope construal of
the subject. Their having a thematic subject position assures that their subjects never get a
narrow-scope reading.
May briefly discusses the possibility that "a semantic generalization might be offered,
for instance, that all the predicates concerned are, in some sense, modal". But he rejects this
possibilty, on grounds that will be discussed below. Thus, he upholds his hypothesis that the
thematic properties of the subject position of raising vs. control predicates is what gives the
right result.
However, there exist some severe difficulties for this account, in my view. Firstly,
tying the specific-nonspecific distinction to the thematic properties of subject positions gives
predictions that are simply not borne out (cf. below). Secondly, May equals the specific-
nonspecific distinction with ± supposition of existence; one quite common move among
authors discussing these phenomena within a syntactic framework, one which probably stems
from the formal semantics way of representing this distinction. Nevertheless, this is a mistake,
because the " no supposition of existence" effect is not unrelated to the modal nature of the
matrix predicate, as we will see shortly. Nor is this effect determined by the syntactic position
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or syntactic function of the indefinite, and it is not uniquely related to (non-)thematic
properties of subject positions. As for the latter claim, cf. e.g. the difference between (71)a
and (71)b:
(71)
a. It is likely that a unicorn ate all your flowers.
b. It is regrettable that a unicorn ate all your flowers.
According to May, a sentence like (71)a "can be truthfully uttered without any supposition
regarding the existence of [unicorns]" (May 1985: 97). However, this does not seem to be the
case when we look at (71)b. Uttering (71)b (truthfully) entails that the speaker believes in the
existence of unicorns. On the other hand, observe that it still allows for a specific/non-specific
distinction: I regret either that a particular unicorn (e.g. Petunia) ate your flowers, or I might
not know which unicorn ate your flowers, but still I may regret the fact that a unicorn ate all
your flowers60. What this sentence shows, then, is that the specific-nonspecific distinction is
independent of the "no supposition of existence" effect, since this effect in fact runs across the
specific-nonspecific distinction. The sentence also shows that the nonthematic properties of
the matrix subject position is not enough to ensure the "no supposition of existence" effect61.
The claim that the "no supposition of existence" effect is unrelated to syntactic
position or function of the indefinite is supported by data like the following:
(72)
A martian is supposed to have taken a unicorn captive in a UFO.
Uttering this sentence truthfully does not entail the speaker's commitement to believing in
neither martians, unicorns or UFO's. Furthermore, although the raising predicate is supposed
is what creates the effect in this particular sentence, any element expressing someone's
                                                
60 What would seem like an obvious thing to do is to try to derive the properties of the adjective regrettable from
the natural assumption that this adjective is derived from a factive verb regret. Factive verbs (or bridge verbs)
have distinct syntactic behaviour in many languages, as opposed to other verbs taking propositions as a
complement.
61 Koster (1978; in Zubizarreta 1982) suggested that there are no sentential subjects. Those that appear to be
cases of sentential subjects are in fact topicalization. The contrast between *That John left seems and That John
left is obvious follows from Koster's assumption that seem selects a proposition as an internal argument while
obvious selects a proposition as an external argument. But even such an approach would not get us very far in
relating supposition of existence to the thematic properties of the subject position, because likely and regrettable
evidently belongs to the same type in this respect; cf. That a unicorn ate all your flowers is likely; That a unicorn
ate all your flowers is regrettable. These data serve to show two things; one, the ability to raise/topicalize the
sentential complement (or subject, depending on your theory) is at least in principle independent of the
possiblility to raise the embedded subject to the matrix subject position (cf. the example in (74)). And two,  the
ability to raise/topicalize the sentential complement/subject is not related to the "no supposition of existence"
effect.
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propositional attitude towards the proposition will do, cf. (73), where the element creating the
'lack of supposition of existence' effect is an adverbial:
(73)
Allegedly, a martian has taken a unicorn captive in a UFO.
When the adverbial allegedly is left out, the speaker is commited to believing in martians,
unicorns and UFOs alike. That is, the reading "no supposition of the existence of an x" on
behalf of the speaker arises as a result of employing an intensional predicate, whatever it
might be. In my opinion, the property of raising verbs which gives rise to this effect is the
semantic property of modality, shared by all intensional predicates. An intensional predicate
relieves the speaker from the commitment that the proposition embedded under this predicate
should describe a state-of-affairs belonging to the speaker's model of the actual world.
Instead, the intensional predicate signals that the embedded proposition describes a state-of-
affairs in someone else's model of the actual world, which may of course differ from the
speaker's model.
Now, a possible objection to the discussion of the data in (71) is that the structure in
(71) b is not a raising type adjective. Compare (74) a to (74)b:
(74)
a. A unicorn is likely to have eaten all your flowers.
b. *A unicorn is regrettable to have eaten all your flowers.
Thus, one might argue that the "no supposition of existence" effect is in some way related to
the predicate's ability to host the embedded subject in its subject position. This line of thought
does not take us very far either. There are a number of predicates in Norwegian, e.g. those
known as unaccusatives, which are assumed to have a non-thematic subject position, since
this position may host expletives. On the other hand, this subject position may also host the
raised postverbal DP. This DP could also be argued to be a raised subject, notably a subject
raised from an embedded small clause (cf. Stowell 1981,1983).
(75)
a. There appeared a policeman on the scene.
b. A policeman appeared on the scene.
However, this type of structure does not give rise to the "no supposition of existence" effect,
irrespective of their non-thematic subject positions and their ability to host a raised subject or
an expletive in this subject position. The reason, I claim, is that they are not intensional
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predicates62. They do, however, give rise to the specific-nonspecific ambiguity, which,
evidently, is an inherent property of indefinites unrelated to the syntactic position which they
happen to occupy (cf. also Enς 1991 for a similar view ). Notably, a policeman above may be
a particular individual who we know is a policeman (e.g. John) or, alternatively, someone
who happens to fit the description of a policeman (e.g. someone wearing a policeman's
uniform).
Thus, we conclude that it is the semantic properties of raising verbs that give rise to
the described ambiguity, not their argument structure. And yet, there is one sense in which
May is right in claiming that the supposition effect of indefinites in the subject position of
raising structures is related both to the matrix subject position as well as the nonthematic
property of this position; in short, to the raising construction itself. Raising constructions
allow for the raising of a subject contained in the embedded proposition into the matrix
subject position. This embedded proposition is semantically (and via the subject's trace,
syntactically) within the scope of the intensional predicate, e.g. is believed, and all elements
semantically belonging to this proposition are under the modal influence of the intensional
predicate. This is why May's argument against a semantic explanation fails; cf. May
(1985:105):
[A semantic approach] would fail to distinguish active and passive occurences of
believe; even if there were some generalization linking believe with predicates like
appear and likely, we would have to ask why we find an ambiguity in No agent is
believed by Philby to be a spy for the other side but none in No agent believed Philby
to be a spy for the other side. Presumably both occurences of believe mean the same
thing [...]. Further, why wouldn't other matrix constituents interact scopally with the
predicate? As pointed out, we only find ambiguities with respect to the subject NP;
witness the nonambiguity of Philby is believed by no agent to be a spy for the other
side.
To stay with readings of indefinites here, we replace May's examples with sentences
containing indefinites. But notice that the phenomenon is the same.
(76)
a. A unicorn is believed by Philby to be a hippogryph.
b. A unicorn believed Philby to be a hippogryph.
c. Philby is believed by a unicorn to be a hippogryph.
                                                
62 Observe that appear has many of the properties attributed to seem in section 4.2.4.1 above. These verbs may
both function as intensional predicates, provided they have a verbal complement (I believe this is the right
generalization). Note the difference between (i) and (ii) and (iii) and (iv) respectively:
(i) A unicorn appeared in the garden. (ii) A unicorn appeared to be in the garden.
(iii) A unicorn seems very annoyed. (iv) A unicorn seems to be very annoyed.
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In (76)a, a unicorn belongs to the proposition believed by Philby to describe an actual state-
of-affairs, notably the proposition [A unicorn is a hippogryph]. Hence, a unicorn is under the
modal influence of the intensional predicate is believed, which means that the speaker is
entitled to being agnostic w.r.t. to the existence of unicorns, whereas Philby is not (given that
Philby is a rational person). The same goes for the supposed existence of hippogryphs; the
speaker is not committed to believing that hippogryphs exist, whereas Philby must believe in
them. This is because the speaker reports both unicorns and hippogryphs as something
belonging to Philby's system of beliefs, while remaining silent about whether or not these
creatures belong to his or her own belief-system. Furthermore, given that Philby is convinced
that unicorns and hippogryphs exist, there is still the specific-nonspecific ambiguity. Philby
may have suspicions concerning one specific unicorn (e.g. Petunia) to be a disguised
hippogryph, or he may not know which of the unicorns is a disguised hippogryph.
Furthermore, he may suspect that one particular hippogryph (e.g. Baltus) has disguised
himself as a unicorn, or he may not know which of the hippogryphs to suspect.
In (76)b and (76)c, a unicorn does not belong to the proposition reported as what is
believed, since in both sentences, the unicorn is the entity holding the belief reported. Instead,
a unicorn belongs to the matrix proposition denoted by the sentence uttered by the speaker.
Hence, the speaker is commited to the assumption that unicorns exist. However, the specific-
nonspecific ambiguity is still present, since the speaker may or may not know which unicorn
holds the reported belief. And furthermore, as far as the speaker is concerned, hippogryphs
may or may not exist – since a hippogryph is contained in the proposition reported as
belonging to the belief-system of a unicorn.
Now, the discussion so far has been an informal and intuitive discription of the "no
supposition of existence" effect in propositions embedded under intensional predicates. But
there exist far more formalized ways of expressing these intuitions. A recent formal semantic
approach to intensional predicates is found in Quer (1998). Quer sets out to explain the
distribution and semantics of the subjunctive mood; particularly within Catalan and other
Romance languages. In doing so, he relies heavily on recent work of Giannakidou (e.g.
1994,1995). Here, one fundamental assumption is that the subjunctive has to be
(syntactically) licenced by occurring within the scope of a "non-veridical" operator. In
Giannaikidou (1994, 1995) the property of (non-)veridicality is defined as follows (quoted
from Quer 1998:18):
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 (77)
An operator Op is non-veridical iff Op p does not imply p; Op is veridical iff Op p
implies p (where p is an arbitrary proposition). Schematically:
a. Op p -/-> p Non-veridicality
b. Op p -> p Veridicality
The categories that obey non-veridicality are e.g. "desideratives, directives, modals and
predicates of fear" (Quer 1998:18); sometimes referred to simply as intensional predicates
(op.cit.:19).
Now, the next building-block of Quer's analysis is the idea proposed by Farkas (1992)
that for the interpretation of argument clauses, truth has to be relativized to worlds and
individuals. An epistemic predicate like believe, for instance, introduces those worlds that
accord with what is believed by the referent denoted by its subject. Thus, propositions
denoted by complement clauses must be "individually anchored", i.e. true as far as as the
individual referred to by the matrix subject is concerned. Let us look at one example.
(78)
[P2 Philby believes that [P1 a unicorn is sleeping in the garden]].
In this sentence, there are two propositions; one denoted by the embedded sentence, and
another denoted by the whole sentence, the latter incorporating the embedded proposition as a
subpart. In order to interpret the embedded propostion we have to relativize its truth to the
individual denoted by the main subject in the following fashion:
P1 = T in wR (Philby); i.e. P1 is true in a world w that models reality R according to Philby.
As regards the unembedded proposition, the individual anchor in the default case is the
speaker; i.e. unless another anchor is implied by context, e.g. when the unembedded
proposition occurs in a sentence part of a larger discourse, like a speech, a report or a text
where the individual anchor remains constant throughout the discourse and is indicated to be
someone else than the speaker. In the default case, however, the truth of the unembedded
proposition in (78) is evaluated w.r.t. the world according to the speaker S as follows:
P2 = T in wR (S); i.e. P2 is true in a world w that models reality R according to the Speaker.
The "no supposition of existence" effect could easily be modelled in this system by means of
individual anchoring. Intensional predicates allow the speaker to be agnostic w.r.t. the factual
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existence of entities described in the proposition embedded under these predicates because
intensional predicates allow for a second individual anchor, i.e. an individual anchor in
addition to the speaker, notably the individual holding the reported belief or assumption
described by the embedded sentence. Thus, the embedded proposition may refer to entities
that exist merely in the subject's (e.g. Philby's) model of the actual world; these entities need
not exist in the speaker's model of the actual world. The "no supposition of existence" effect
boils down to the two (possibly different) models allowed in intensional contexts. Again, this
is a semantic property of intensional predicates (subsuming raising predicates), unrelated to
argument structure.
To sum up, the outcome of this discussion is that the wide-scope/narrow-scope effect
described by May in fact amounts to two different and in part unrelated phenomena. One is
the "no supposition of existence" effect which arises in intensional contexs. Propositions
embedded under modal predicates such as raising verbs allow the speaker to be agnostic w.r.t.
the factual existence of the entities described in this proposition. We have seen that this effect
is unrelated to syntactic position or function, as it concerns all indefinites contained in a
proposition embedded under a intensional predicate, irrespective of their status as a subject,
an object, or the complement of a proposition (cf. (72) and (73)). Since this is an effect which
in and by itself is unrelated to syntactic positions, it follows that it should not be linked to the
upper vs. lower subject position. Moreover, the other observed effect, the specific-nonspecific
distinction, is present in all indefinites irrespective of the semantic nature of the matrix
predicate. Hence, it should be considered an inherent property of indefinites that cannot be
linked to upper vs. lower subject positions (cf. also Enς 1991). My conclusion, then, is that
both phenomena known as the wide-scope vs. narrow-scope readings of indefinites within
formal semantics is unrelated to syntactic subject positions.
Summing up our findings of syntactically encoded scope relations between quantified
DPs, we have found that the three families of arguments invoked do not hold up against closer
scrutiny. The first argument, from the interplay of nobody-somebody in rasing and control
structures, turned out to be less trustworthy than often assumed. It is not the case that all
raising structures result in the lack of contradiction predicted. In fact, at least some raising
structures are judged to be just as contradictory in this respect as any control structure. Hence,
this argument fails to distinguish all raising structures from all control structures.
The second argument comes from the possible scopes of some/every, where some is
the matrix subject whereas every is contained within the embedded clause. Numerous authors
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have claimed that raising structures allow, whereas control structures reject the embedded
quantified phrase to take scope over the matrix quantified phrase. We have seen that my
informants strongly disagree with this generalization. In fact, control structures allow for both
scope possibilities just like raising structures.
The third argument comes from the alleged ambiguity of indefinites in raising
structures as opposed to control structures. We have seen that indefinites are ambiguous
between a specific and a nonspecific reading in any position, and (following Enς 1991) we
conclude that this ambiguity should be treated as an inherent property of indefinites. The
other type of ambiguity concerns the "no supposition of existence" effect, i.e. a lacking
supposition of the factual existence of the entity described by the indefinite, and this was
argued above to be a result of the indefinite belonging to the proposition embedded under an
intentional predicate. This effects also concerns all indefinites belonging to this proposition,
not only the subject. Hence, this is an effect arising from the semantics of intensional
predicates which is not exclusive to the subject position of raising constructions. It follows
that this effect should not be ascribed to this subject position.
4.2.5 Are Theta-relations encoded in syntactic positions?
This being the case, these subject positions are free to encode the establishing of θ-relations.
We have assumed so far that there is a certain correspondence between subject scope and θ
relations; specifically, that directed deontic readings of modals demand a wide-scope subject.
Let us look at some data again; cf. (79)63. We concentrate on the root reading of the modal
only, and WsS = Wide scope subject; NsS = Narrow scope subject; GenS = Generic subject.
(79)
A student must ride this horse.
i) A specific student, e.g. Mary, has an obligation to ride this horse (WsS; +θ).
ii) Some student or other has an obligation to ride this horse. (NsS; +θ).
iii) It is necessary that a student (specifically: Mary) rides this horse. (WsS; -θ).
iv) It is necessary that some student (or other) rides this horse (NsS; -θ).
v) For all x, ((x: a student) -> x has an obligation to ride this horse) (GenS; +θ).
vi) For all x, ((x: a student) -> it is necessary that x rides this horse) (GenS; -θ).
                                                
63 The sentence is taken from Brennan (1993), though the readings are mine.
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In my opinion, there is no "no supposition of existence" effect in this sentence on its natural
or default reading64. Thus, if the only wide-scope subject/narrow scope subject distinction
present is the specific-nonspecific distinction, it seems that both readings should be possible
regardless of the modal's reading as +θ-assigning or –θ assigning. And this seems indeed to
be the case in (79) above. However, the directed deontic (+θ) reading does seem hard to get
with a non-specific indefinite subject in a number of other cases. Instead, if we force a
directed deontic reading onto the modal in such cases, the generic reading is the one that
seems more natural; cf. (80):
 (80)
a. En student bør lese mye før eksamen
    'A student should read a lot before the exam'
i) A specific student, e.g. Mary, has a weak obligation to read a lot... (WsS; +θ )
ii) ??Some student or other has a weak obligation to read a lot... (NsS; +θ )65
iii) It is preferred that a student (specifically: Mary) reads a lot... (WsS; -θ)
iv) It is preferred that some student (or other) reads a lot... (NsS; -θ)66
v) For all x, ((x: a student) -> x has a weak obligation to read a lot...) (GenS; +θ)
vi) For all x, ((x: a student) -> it is preferred that x reads a lot) (GenS; -θ)
It seems very likely that the observed differences between (79) and (80) are rooted in
conceptual preferences; since it varies between different sentences and contexts. If we
conceive an obligation or a permission as directed, it does appear to be somewhat
counterintuitive to direct it towards an arbitrary individual. Instead, the generic reading pops
up in these cases: For any individual fitting the discription of a student, this individual has an
obligation to read a lot.
We have also seen examples where any directed deontic reading seems very unnatural;
recall some of the pseudocleft data repeated here as (81):
                                                
64 Although I am aware that someone might disagree. Frege's original observations of the aforementioned
ambiguity effects between intention and extension (Sinn und Bedeutung) concerned e.g. the effects of modal
operators like must. But these effects in this sentence is maintained as the specific-nonspecific distinction. My
point is that a speaker would have to be irrational to utter this sentence if he or she did not believe that there
existed students, since the necessity expressed by the modal must is perceived by the speaker himself (by
default), unless the speaker reports this as a rule laid down by someone else (e.g. the regulations of the jockey
club). The hearer, on the other hand, would be quite free to remain agnostic as to the existence of students.
65 This reading is not quite impossible, e.g. in contexts where the utterance is reported speech; " Sally told me
about a student who ought to study hard before this exam, but I do not know which student".
66 This is also a reading which seems hard to get in this particular sentence, but I believe, not impossible. Say the
context is as follows: The future of the linguistics department is dependent on at least one student passing this
exam. Then this reading would be possible.
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(81)
a. *Det en kvinne bør, er å bli vår neste statsminister.
      it   a woman should, is to become our next prime minister.
    (Intended: 'What should happen is that a woman becomes our next prime minister.')
 b. *Det apene ikke må, er å mates av besøkende'
    it    the monkeys not must, is to feed-PASSIVE by visitors
               (Intended: 'What must not take place is that the monkeys are fed by visitors.')
In the case of (81)a, the natural reading would be the one that is intended in the gloss. The
generic reading of the indefinite is barred because it would not be possible that all (or most)
women could become our next prime minister. The specific reading of the indefinite seems
very unlikely, but maybe not totally impossible with a strong emphasis on the indefinite. In
(81)b, the directed reading is unnatural because nobody in his right mind would direct an
obligation towards a group of animals. The concept of a directed obligation or permission
requires a rational mind as the entity towards which the obligation/permission is directed. In
this particular case, apene 'the monkeys' would even be required to control what may happen
to them; specifically, that they are not fed by visitors.
This brings us to the subject of control over a potential situation. Even if we have an
intentional subject of the modal present, the directed deontic reading is sometimes extremely
unnatural, if this subject is perceived as a raised object of a passive. Cf. (82):
(82)
*/??Det Jon absolutt ikke må, er å bli operert av doktor Kevorkian.
 it Jon absolutely not must, is to be operated  by doctor Kevorkian
'What Jon absolutely shouldn't be, is operated on by doctor Kevorkian.'
But again, this is a tendency that may be overridden. In some cases, it is possible to force a
quasi-agentive reading of the passive, where "quasi-agentive" denotes 'to put oneself in a
position to be v-ed'. In these cases, a directed deontic (+θ) reading of the modal is possible;
hence, the modal may accept a pseudoclefted complement, albeit marginally:
(83)
?Det Jon må, er å bli oppdaget av et plateselskap.
 it Jon must, is to be discovered by a record company
'What Jon must do, is to (let himself) be discovered by a record company.'
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The directed deontic reading of (83) conveys that Jon has the capacity of creating the situation
where he is dicovered by a record company; i.e. a quasi-agentive reading67. No such effect is
present in (81)b above.
In short, what all these data show is that what is conceived as the more natural reading
of the indefinite as specific/nonspecific/generic is influenced by a number of (contextual and
pragmatic) factors, whereas the reading of the modal as directed deontic (+θ) or non-directed
(proposition scope) seems to be syntactically encoded. We have seen that access to a subject
position below the modal is crucial to a proposition-scope reading of the modal. This is shown
by the pseudocleft data. In all instances where the lower subject position is elided, the
proposition scope reading of the modal becomes impossible; cf. (81) through (83) above and
(84)b. In those instances where this position is retained in the pseudocleft, the proposition
scope reading of the modal is allowed, cf. (50), repeated here as (84)a (structures below).
(84)
a. Det Jon må være, er arkitekt.
   it Jon must be, is architect
  'What John must be, is an architect'
b. Det Jon må, er å være arkitekt.
   it Jon must, is to be an architect
  'What John must do, is to be an architect' 
(85)
     DP
                    DP             CP
                    Det
                  C0     C'
(opi)
 C     Modp
                     (som)
Jonk         Mod'
                      
     Mod0            VP
       må
          tk   V'
          V           ti
                  være
                                                
67 Hornstein (1998:120) discusses examples where arbitrary PRO has a 'quasi'agentive' reading: PRO to appear
to be intelligent is harder than one might think. According to Hornstein, Chomsky (1995b) assumes that this
reading is a by-product of raising. "In other words, this is the sort of interpretation one gets in the raised subject
position."  Hornstein continues (fn. 30): "it is plausible that these effects are quasi-thematic properties of IP."
                                                              The Argument Structure of Norwegian modals
171
(86)
     DP
                    DP             CP
                    Det
                  C0        C'
(opi)
 C     Modp
                     (som)
Jon         Mod'
                      
     Mod0            ti
       må
So far, we have seen that syntactic access to the lower subject position is a prerequisite to a
proposition scope (non-θ) reading of the modal. What we have not investigated, however, is
whether or not access the upper subject position has any consequences for the possible
readings of a modal as proposition-scope (-θ) or subject oriented (+θ). Let us examine this
issue as well; starting out by looking at some data, given here as (87):
(87)
a. Det skal bestandig være minst to voksne til stede.
  'There should always be at least two adults present'
b. Det må komme minst femti personer for at festen skal lønne seg.
    there must come at least fifty people for the party to pay off
   'At least fifty people must show up for the party to pay off'
c. Det bør bli forandringer m.h.t. denne praksisen.
   there should occur changes w.r.t. this (code of) practice
   'This code of practice ought to change'
d. Det kan være opptil fire patroner i hylsa pr. ladning
    'There may/can be up to four cartridges in the case in one load'
e. Det behøver/trenger ikke være noen voksne til stede.
   'There need not be any adults present'
For all sentences in (87) , where an expletive blocks the upper subject postion, the subject-
oriented (+θ) reading is impossible. All of these sentences have proposition scope readings
only. One might imagine that this is a consequence of the nature of the postverbal DPs
involved, since all DPs have a nonspecific-type reading. Recall that it is conceptually difficult
to combine a directed deontic or subject-oriented reading of the modal with a non-specific
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reading of the subject; cf. the discussion above. So let us construct some sentences where a
specific reading of the indefinite is possible:
(88)
a. Det skal alltid være en voksen til stede, nemlig Jon.
    'There should always be an adult present, specifically, Jon.'
b. Det kan komme en venn i selskapet ditt; jeg tenkte på Marit.
    ' There may come a friend to your party, I am thinking, Marit.'
Thus, it is possible to construe these indefinites as specific; however, this does not give us the
subject-oriented reading. (88)a does not mean that Jon has a personal obligation, instead, the
natural reading is that someone else (e.g. the addressee) is responsible for making sure that
Jon is present. Likewise, (88)b does not mean that Marit is the one who is given a personal
permission to come to the party. Instead, the natural reading of (88)b is that the speaker grants
someone else; i.e. the addressee, the permission to invite a friend, e.g. Marit, to the party.
Building on Chomsky's (1986, 1991, 1993) idea that the expletive there is replaced by
its (postverbal) associate at LF68, Lasnik (1999) assumes that the expletive there is an "LF-
affix". Lasnik (1981) suggested that there exists "a general "stranded affix" constraint
demanding that underlyingly freestanding affixes ultimately be attached to an appropriate
host.[...]". That is, if the associate of there does not adjoin to there, the LF will crash" (p. 34).
Lasnik suggests (in chapters 4 and 6),  that there lacks agreement features with the result that
the agreement features of AgrS would not be checked unless some movement takes place. The
main objective for Lasnik (as for Chomsky before him) in this approach is to explain the
agreement facts of English existential constructions, where the verb agrees morphologically
with the postverbal DP.
One might imagine that authors who adhere to the hypothesis that specifity (e.g. wide-
scope vs. narrow-scope readings) of indefinites is syntactically encoded by the upper vs.
lower subject position would seize the opportunity to exploit Lasnik's ideas to account for the
fact that we may get a specific reading of the indefinite in (88)a and b. However, the question
remains – and this is a forceful objection, in my view – why the putative adjunction of the
postverbal DP to the expletive at LF does not result in a subject-oriented reading of the
modal, given that the configuration between the initially postverbal DP and the modal ought
                                                
68 This is inaccurate. Chomsky (1986a) introduces the "replacement" idea; in Chomsky (1991, 1993)
"replacement" is itself replaced by "adjunction"; i.e. the associate of there adjoins to there at LF to check its
Case.
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to be just right – at LF – for the association between the modal and the DP. Apart from the
fact that Lasnik's account rests on a number of stipulations already (e.g. that there is an LF-
affix, a notion otherwise unheard of, to my knowledge), he would have to come up with an
explantion why modals reject the subject-oriented reading unless a thematic subject (of the
right kind; i.e. denoting a rational, responsible individual) fills the upper subject position in
overt syntax69.
In my view, the data in (87) and (88) show that overt access to the upper subject
position, i.e. access to this position in overt syntax, is crucial to the subject-oriented reading.
When this subject position is blocked by an expletive, the subject-oriented (+θ, directed
deontic) reading simply cannot arise. On the other hand, the pseudocleft data show that the
lower subject position is crucial to the proposition scope reading of the modal. Thus, subject-
orientedness – understood as the ± θ reading – seems to be syntactically encoded after all.
Unlike Barbiers (1995, 1999), I have found no evidence that this semantic relation is
encoded by a designated syntactic head (Barbiers' "D"). Instead, the data examined suggest
that a subject-oriented reading arises when the subject is interpreted in the upper subject
position; by the spec-head relation between the subject and the modal. The proposition-scope
reading arises when the subject is interpreted in the lower subject position, i.e. when the
subject's trace is interpreted instead of the subject in its surface position. The position of the
subject trace must be a subject position within the modal's syntactic scope; i.e. lower in the
phrase marker than the modal.
In short, the subject-oriented reading arises when the spec-head relation between a
modal and the subject holds at LF. Otherwise, the reading of the modal will be the proposition
scope reading. The answer to the question posed in the headline of this subsection thus has to
be: YES. Yes, θ-relations are indeed encoded in syntactic positions.
                                                
69 Another forceful objection to the idea that the associate of the expletive is raised and adjoined to the expletive
at LF is the observation (cf. e.g. Lasnik 1999: 136) that this putative raising of the associate is unable to create
new scope relations e.g. between negation and the associate. Cf. for instance the following sentence:
i) There aren't many linguists here.
Many linguists necessarily has narrow scope w.r.t. negation, although if this constituent is raised and adjoined to
the expletive at LF, one might expect this construction to exhibit the same scopal relations between Many
linguists and negation as the ones found in ii):
ii) Many linguists aren't here.
However, this is not what we find. To account for this fact, Chomsky (1991, 1993) stipulates that the operation
of adjunction,as opposed to the operation of replacement, does not create new scope relations. However, Lasnik
(1999:137) points out that on the theory of adjunction, developed in May (1985) and "assumed in all of
Chomsky's writings ever since" (Lasnik 1999:137), the adjunction procedure does create a relevant c-command
relation and should be expected to give rise to new scopal relations.
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4.2.6 Raising verbs in pseudoclefts
However, there is still the matter of explaining why other raising verbs do not allow for a
pseudoclefted complement like modals do. I suggest that the answer lies within the thematic
plasticity of modals. Modals are able to function as θ-assigners just in case they have a
subject-oriented reading. Most other raising verbs do not have this possibility, irrespective of
their subject-orientation. Following Zubizarreta (1982:97), I want to propose that there exists
a constraint that DPs are "thematically identified", where this notion is defined as follows:
[...] every A-position must be thematically identified. A position is thematically
identified if it is a semantic position or if it is linked to a semantic position.
If we assume that it is a restriction on any type of A-movement that the moved DP is
identified w.r.t. theta-role, we are in a position to account for the unacceptability of raising
verbs with a pseudoclefted complement. Most raising verbs cannot be construed as θ-
assigners, thus the subject within the relative clause will not be thematically identified in
sentences like (89) below.
(89)
a. *Det Jon viste seg, var å være inkompetent.
              it     Jon  showed self, was to be incompetent
  (Intended: 'What John turned out to be, was incompetent')
b. * Det Marit antas, er å være uærlig.
   it     Marit suppose-PASS, is to be dishonest
   (Intended: 'What Marit is supposed to be, is dishonest')
In these sentences, Jon and Marit do not receive a θ-role within the relative clause, since
raising verbs do not assign θ-roles. Thus, these DPs are not identified as to argument-status or
θ-properties. That is, these sentences violate the first half of the theta-criterion, which states
that each argument (DP) must be assigned a theta-role. One might say that these sentences are
ungrammatical for the same reason as (90) is ungrammatical:
(90)
*Det Jon, var at han ble overkjørt av toget.
  it John, was that he was run over by the train
'What Jon, was that he was run over by a train'
The reason modals accept a pseudoclefted complement is that modals, as opposed to raising
verbs, may assign a θ-role under certain circumstances; specifically, when the main predicate
is agentive and the raised subject is an intentional subject. Indeed, in pseudoclefts of the
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relevant kind, they must assign a θ-role, for the structure to be well-formed. In fact, this may
be the other side of the coin w.r.t. the phenomenon that modals always get a subject-oriented
reading in these structures. Not only is the lower subject position syntactically suppressed; the
subject DP must be thematically identified as well. The only option is to construe the modal
as a θ-assigner. As opposed to most other raising verbs, this is possible in the case of
modals70.
However, recall that not all verbs typically construed as raising verbs reject a
pseudoclefted complement. For instance, the Norwegian raising construction ser ut til å  is
accepted in these constructions, provided the main predicate is a subject-oriented predicate,
and the reading of ser ut til å is the 'direct visual access' reading, cf. (91):
(91)
a. ?Det Jon ser ut til, er å være irritert.
  'What Jon seems (to be), is annoyed'
b. *Det Jon ser ut til, er å være borte.
    'What Jon seems (to be), is gone'
These facts suggest that the line between raising verbs and control verbs is less rigid and fixed
than assumed in the literature. We return to this question in section 4.4 and 4.5.
Finally, note that by assuming that theta-assignment or theta-identification is the
relevant property allowing subject-oriented root modals (as opposed to proposition-scope root
and epistemic modals and most other raising verbs) to take a pseudoclefted complement, the
present analysis is at last reconciled with one fundamental assumption of Thráinsson and
Vikner (1995). Recall that these two authors propose that root modals accept and epistemic
modals reject a pseudoclefted complement because root modals assign theta-roles, whereas
epistemic modals do not. We have seen that the although their analysis rested on some invalid
                                                
70 Observe that this explanation forces us to assume that the copula may function as a theta-assigner as well. In a
sentence like Det Jon er, er intelligent 'What Jon is, is intelligent' there is no other verb within the relative to
thematically identify the argument Jon. This is not too troublesome, however, if we allow for compositional
theta-roles in the spirit of e.g. Marantz (1984). Although the copula in and by itself may not be considered the
main element assigning the theta-role to Jon, it would nevertheless be the head of the compositional predicate
assigning a theta-role to Jon. This evidently suffices to thematically identify the argument. If we make the
natural assumption that the requirement of thematic identification applies to all types of wh-movement, we
would have to assume that even the perfect aspectual ha 'have' possesses some thematic substance, cf. ii):
i) Jon har solgt bilen hennes. 'Jon has sold her car.'
ii) ?HVA har han?      'WHAT has he (done)?'
Assume, for instance, that ha signals agentivity in ii). This seems to be on the right track, since my informants
find iv), where the wh-constituent equals a passive, to be worse than ii):
iii) Jon har blitt overkjørt av toget. 'Jon has been run over by the train.'
iv) ??HVA har han? 'WHAT has he (done)?
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premises (e.g. that root modals always assign theta-roles), their conclusion that theta-
assignment from the modal to the raised subject is a crucial factor in determining the
acceptability of modals in pseudocleft constructions was eventually reached also by the
present proposal.
However, I would like to point out that the property of "thematic substance" ascribed
to a predicate in a theory of thematic identification seems more easily gradable than the
property of assigning Case to a complement, which is the crucial distinguishing property
between root and epistemic modals in Thráinsson and Vikner's (1995) account. A scale of
"thematic substance" could range from certain verbs possessing no thematic substance w.r.t.
an external theta-role (e.g. antas 'be supposed to'), via some thematic substance w.r.t. an
external theta-role (e.g. aspectuals and the copula) to substantive thematic substance w.r.t. an
external theta-role (e.g. control-type verbs). The property of assigning Case to a complement
seems less gradable; intuitively, either a verb assigns a case feature or it does not. Thus, a
notion of "thematic identification" seems to be more suitable to capture the fact that
grammaticality judgments concerning raising verbs and wh-movement (including pseudocleft
data) are slippery, vague and to a great extent depend on whether or not the examples in
question are provided with a context.
4.3 Reanalysis verbs
It is quite intriguing that modals are sensitive to overt syntactic access to the upper and lower
subject positions for their subject oriented (+θ) vs. proposition scope readings respectively.
But surely, it would strengthen our case if there existed other verbs, apart from modals, that
behave in the same manner. This is why we will broaden our scope so as to include the type
of verbs dubbed the threaten class (Johnson 1985, Zubizarreta 1982, Arad 1998). I will refer
to these verbs simply as reanalysis verbs, since they are said to undergo reanalysis (cf. e.g
Johnson 1985, Arad 1998). Examples of these verbs include e.g. promise and threaten, as
well as their counterparts in various languages; cf. e.g. German Es versprach zu regnen71 'it
promised to rain' (see Arad (1998) for examples in French; she also refers to Italian and
Hebrew counterparts).
 What has been known as the primary reading of these verbs is the agentive reading. In
addition, they have another interpretation, which Johnson describes as "events are in motion,
such that x is imminent"; Johnson (1985: 25-26, quoted here from Arad 1998:115). Note that
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these verbs may take a DP complement, as in (92)a, in which case the verb has only the
agentive reading72. In fact, whenever the DP encoding the recipient of the threat or a promise
is present, the non-agentive reading is blocked, cf. (92)c. On the other hand, a non-agentive
subject gives rise to the non-agentive reading only, cf. (92)d, whereas an agentive subject
gives rise to both readings, provided the main predicate allows for a causer or an agent
(according to Arad 1998), cf. (92)b.
(92)
a. John threatened Mary. (Agentive reading only)
b. John threatened to destroy the party. (Agentive/non-agentive)
c. John threatened his mother to marry Mary. (Agentive reading only)
d. The ice-cream threatens to melt. (Non-agentive reading only)
(92)b is ambiguous between a reading where John states his intention to destroy the party (the
agentive reading), and a reading where his presence or behavior suffices to ensure that the
party is destroyed (the non-agentive reading). In the latter case, John might not even be aware
that his behavior is destroying the party for everyone else; he might simply be causing this
result by his mere presence.
Zubuzarreta (1982), Johnson (1985) and Ruwet (1991) observe a range of similarities
between the reanalysis (non-agentive) reading of these verbs and raising verbs (the list is
adopted from Arad 1998/ Zubizarreta 1982):
(93)
I. In both, the subject role is defined by the lower predicate.
II. Both can host in their subject position an idiom which is associated with the
lower predicate (e.g. The shit threatens to hit the fan).
III. Both allow en-cliticization in French (which indicates a connection with a
lower position in the structure).
However, the reanalysis reading of these verbs are also found to differ from raising verbs in a
number of ways:
(94)
I. Reanalysis verbs do not allow expletive it as a subject, or French il.
II. Reanalysis verbs do not allow narrow scope to the subject.
III. Reanalysis verbs do not allow any object to intervene between the matrix verb
and its complement (compare threatens #me to... vs. It seems to me that...).
                                                                                                                                                        
71 I am indebted to Philippa Cook for bringing this example to my attention.
72 This is comparable to the fact that the verb believe may take a DP complement, John believes Mary, in which
case it does not give rise to an intensional context; compare to John believes Mary to be a thief.   
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The set of Norwegian reanlysis verbs seems to consist solely of the compound verb
corresponding to threaten (true med).  However, this verb does allow for expletive subjects, at
least marginally, cf. (95):
(95)
a. Det truer med å bli en fryktelig oppstandelse på jobben i morgen.
   it theratens with to become a terrible commotion at work tomorrow
   ' A terrible commotion threatens to take place at work tomorrow'
For the second alleged difference between raising verbs and reanalysis verbs, typically
illustrated by means of the quantified phrases some and every, this generalization is  simply
not correct, according to my English-speaking informants. Cf. the scope ambiguity in (96):
(96)
Some tornado threatened to destroy every city.
It is possible to interpret this sentence as 'For every x, x a city, some tornado threatened to
destroy x'. Moreover, the subject some tornado may be interpreted as one specific tornado
(e.g. "Diana"), or a non-specific tornado. Thus, this sentence allows for all readings typically
associated with raising verbs (except the "no supposition of existence" effect, which arises
with intensional predicates only).
The generalization that adding the recipient of a threat (or a promise) blocks the
reanalysis reading holds in Norwegian as well. One may speculate that adding the recipient of
a threat gives the construction a directed reading which is incompatible with the reanalysis
reading "events are in motion, such that x is imminent". Apart from that, I can offer no
explanation for this restriction.
For our discussion, these verb are interesting because they reject a reanalysis reading
in exactly the same environment as modals reject the propostion scope reading, specifically,
when their complement is pseudoclefted; cf  (97):
 (97)
a. Det Jon truer med, er å ødelegge selskapet.
   it Jon  threatens with is to destroy the party
   'What John threatens to do, is to destroy the party'
b. ??/*Det iskremen truer med, er å smelte.
     it ice-cream-DEF threatens with, is to melt.
     'What the ice-cream threatens to do, is to melt'
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That is, in these environments, the matrix verb has only the agentive reading and requires an
agentive subject; thus,  (97)b is ill-formed, unless we assign a human-like property to the ice-
cream.
Now, the other two tests possible with modals to indicate that θ-assignment takes
place in the spec-head relation consisting of the modal and its specifier position are less useful
to us here. Reanalysis verbs take true expletives only marginally (as opposed to modals, but
cf. (95)above); cf. (98)73:
(98)
      ?? Det truer med å komme to inspektører hit i morgen74.
         it threatens to arrive two inspectors here tomorrow
         'Two inspectors threaten to arrive here tomorrow'
However, to the extent that (98) is possible, it can only have the non-agentive interpretation.
On the other hand, pseudoclefts where the lower subject position is retained within the
relative, are also very hard to construct, but cf.  (99):
 (99)
?Det denne gutten truer med å bli, er virkelig tjukk.
it this boy threatens to become, is really fat
'What this boy threatens to become, is really fat'
Again, to the extent that this construction is possible, it is ambiguous between the agentive
and the non-agentive reading, as expected if reanalysis verbs are anything like deontic
modals.
So far, we have found that there is good evidence to support our hypothesis that when
the subject θ-role of a modal is assigned, it is assigned in a spec-head relation. When the
subject postion of the modal is filled by an expletive, the +θ reading is unavailable. On the
other hand, this spec-head relation, even if it does apply in overt syntax, may be "semantically
undone", provided a lower subject position is available for interpretation. Thus, the spec-head
relation in overt syntax is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the +θ reading of a
modal to arise. An overt spec-head relation between the subject and the modal typically
renders the modal ambiguous between a subject-oriented (+θ) reading and a proposition-
scope (-θ) reading. However, eliding the lower subject position in overt syntax (e.g. by
                                                
73 They also take weather-arguments, as in i):
i) Det truer med å regne/snø i morgen.
'It threatens to rain/snow tomorrow'
74 Note that the judgements concerning the acceptability of this sentence vary from 'exellent' to 'unacceptable'.
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substituting the proform det 'it' for the complement VP, as this happens when this VP
undergoes pseudocleft), forces the +θ reading and makes the proposition-scope reading
unavailable. Thus, we have concluded that syntactic access to the lower subject position is a
prerequisite for the proposition-scope reading of the modal to arise. Hence, we have found
evidence for the generalization with which we started out as a working hypothesis, cf. (100):
(100)
Modal raising structures
     IP
Subject  ModP
          Modal   INF
      tSUBJ      VP
           V            ...
SUBJ   >  MODAL  >  SUBJ
READING: SUBJECT-ORIENTED      PROPOSITION SCOPE (ROOT OR EPISTEMIC)
" +θ"       " – θ"
I will assume this to be the right analysis for reanalysis verbs as well. As opposed to other
authors who have examined these verbs, I assume that on the reanalysis reading, there is no
more a semantic threaten-relation between the subject of these verbs and their complement
than there is a must-relation between the subject of the modal måtte 'must' and its complement
on a proposition scope reading. Hence, I claim that the proposition scope reading of modals
and the reanalysis reading of threaten-class verbs arises exactly when the subject of these
verbs, via its trace, is interpreted in the lower subject position; i.e. the position within the
syntactic scope of the matrix verb. In these cases, the matrix verb is not construed as
assigning an external θ-role. However, when the subject is interpreted in the upper subject
position, the matrix verb is construed as assigning an external θ-role. This holds for modals
and reanalysis verbs alike75.
                                                
75 It is interesting that reanalysis verbs typically denote agent-oriented, mental, socially determined actions and
states, such as promise or threaten. Modern Norwegian modals developed from verbs typically denoting such
agent-oriented, socially determined mental actions. Thus, burde 'should' developed from old-Norse byrja 'belong
to'  regarding rights and duties; ville from vilja 'want, choose, prefer'; kunne from kunna 'learn to know, know';
skulle from skulu 'owe', måtte from mâ 'manage, have access to', trenger (ikke) from 'long for (German)', behøver
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But then, it seems that we are back where we started. We wanted to avoid the
stipulation of two different entries in the lexicon for each deontic modal, and it seems no
more appealing by now. But how else could we explain the fact that deontic modals take
expletives in their proposition scope (root and epistmeic) readings, whereas they obviously
assign θ-roles in the pseudocleft structures, given the explanation above? And how else could
we explain the regular semantics of modals with expletives (they all have a proposition scope
reading) vs. modals with a pseudoclefted complement (they all have a +θ reading)? Certainly,
a "double entry" approach to deontic modals would explain these facts, as well as explaining
the difference between modals and (other) raising verbs.
However, the theoretical objections to this solution still stand. This would lead to a
doubling of entries in the lexicon; a structural ambiguity in all sentences containing a modal
(except for the relevant pseudocleft structures and those containing an expletive subject), and
all syntactic and semantic properites of each modal pair would be identical, ecxept for the
feature ± external theta-role. Let us postpone the question of possible double entries for a
moment, and approach the question from a different angle.
4.4 Hornstein (1998, 1999, 2000)
Norbert Hornstein has recently published a series of articles addressing the possibility of
reducing the notions of raising and obligatory control (as opposed to arbitrary control) to one
notion only. He suggests that both phenomena should be reduced to raising. Hornstein
presents a range of arguments to support his analysis; I will go into a few important ones here
and refer the reader to Hornstein's articles for the whole story.
To begin with, Hornstein observes that the interpretational properties as well as the
distribution of Obligatory Control PRO (henceforth, OCP) differs from Non-obligatory
Control PRO (NOCP) in important respects. Confer the following paradigms; illustrating the
properties of OCP in (101) and the properties of NOCP in (102) 76:
                                                                                                                                                        
(ikke) from 'being appropriate'. One may assume that the reanalysis verbs do not have all properties associated
with raising verbs because they are less 'grammaticalized'; i.e. they have not completed their transformation to
raising verbs. There are indications that  not all modals went through all changes at the same time either. For
instance, the modals kunne and ville and their cognates in various languages survive as lexical verbs, and
Thráinsson and Vikner (1995) provide data from the Icelandic Sagas to indicate that the modals skulu 'should'
and munu 'may' took on an epistemic reading earlier than any of the other modals.
76 Hornstein states that this paradigm derives from Williams (1980), Lebeaux (1985), Higginbotham (1992) and
Fodor (1975). Hornstein's paradigms are reduced by a few points here.
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(101)
a. * It was expected PRO to shave himself.
b. *John thinks that it was expected PRO to shave himself
c. *John's campaign expects PRO to shave himself.
d. The unfortunate expects PRO to get a medal
(102)
a. It was believed that PRO shaving was important.
b. Johni thinks that it is believed that PROi shaving himself is important
c. Clinton'si campaign believes that PROi keeping his sex life under control is
    necessary for electoral success.
d. The unfortunate believes that PRO getting a medal would be boring.
(101)a vs. (102)a indicates that OCP must have an antecedent whereas NOCP does not
require an antecedent. (101)b vs. (102)b indicates that the antecedent of OCP must be local,
whereas if NOCP does have an antecedent it need not be local. (101)c vs. (102)c shows that
the antecedent of OCP must c-command PRO, whereas the antecedent of NOCP need not c-
command PRO. In (101)d vs. (102)d the issue at stake is whether PRO must have a "de se"
(reflexive) reading. We see that for OCP only the "de se" reading is possible, in that the
unfortunate expects himself  to get a medal, whereas in the NOCP construction, a non-"de se"
interpretation is possible, e.g. (102)d could mean 'for anyone to get a medal would be boring'.
Hornstein goes on to notice that the difference between OCP structures and NOCP structures
is that OCPs behave like anaphors whereas NOCPs behave like pronouns. In short, the
interpretive data point to the conclusion that PRO is ambiguous.
However, a "PRO theorem" approach to PRO's distribution cannot accept an
ambiguity thesis. The "PRO theorem" relies on the assumption that every PRO is
simultaneously [+pronominal, +anaphor]. Apart from this snag, Hornstein (quoting Bouchard
1984) mentions that the "PRO theorem" relies on the notion on government; a notion that is
unnecessary within binding theory except for deriving the distribution of PRO (cf. Hornstein
2000:31 ff.).
Accounting for the distribution of PRO within the Minimalist Program, Chomsky and
Lasnik (1993) suggest that PRO has a "null Case" feature, that can only be checked off by the
Infl of non-finite control clauses. Thus, PRO, and PRO alone is assigned "null Case".
Although Hornstein admits that this type of approach would be able to account for the
interpretive data in (101) and (102), since it is no longer required that PRO be simultaneously
[+pronominal, +anaphor] (on the contrary, PRO is allowed to be ambiguous), he states that "It
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is fair to say that null Case accounts for the distribution of PRO largely by stipulation"
(Hornstein 1999: 71).
Instead, Hornstein proposes an account of PRO where NOCP is assumed to equal
(small) pro, the null counterpart of the pronoun one. Firstly, the arbitrary reading
characteristic to non-obligatory control PRO can be accommodated on this assumption.
Secondly, NOCP readings are largely restriced to positions from which movement is not
allowed (e.g. complex subjects or wh-islands, cf. also Manzini 1983). On the other hand,
obligatory control PRO (OCP) is reduced to A-movement in Hornstein's analysis, where this
empty category is simply an intermediate NP-trace.
The theoretical hindrance for this move is obviously the θ-criterion, which is retained
in the Minimalist Program. Chomsky (1995a) restricts θ-assignment to the merger of trivial
(i.e. one-membered) chains, which assures 1) that θ-assignment is prior to any A-movement;
and 2) that movement from one θ-positon to another is strictly forbidden77. Hornstein
suggests that we submit these assumptions to scrutiny; (Hornstein 1999: 71).
How well motivated are they? Why assume that chains are biuniquely related to θ-
roles? What goes wrong if movement takes place from one θ-position to another? Why
distinguish trace from PRO? As is generally the case with minimalist meditations, I
assume that the burden of proof is on those who wish to promote these assumptions
and invoke these distinctions. What is not at issue is that control and raising sentences
manifest different properties. The minimalist question is whether these differences
require the technical apparatus standardly invoked to distinguish them.
Of course, Hornstein acknowledges the set of data which constitutes the empirical basis for
prohibiting movement from one θ-position to another.
(103)
a. *JohnI saw tI. (meaning: John saw himself)
b. * JohnI believes tI to be a fool. (meaning: John believes himself to be a fool).
Hornstein suggests (in "an inadequate sketch") that the sentences may violate Case theory.
Say the verbs in (103) have an accusative Case feature which must be checked by an overt
DP. In these cases, what we find instead of a phonetically null DP-trace is a reflexive. In other
words, reflexives are also the residue of movement; they are spelled-out DP-traces (Kayne
1996 proposes something similar for reflexive se in French). When the verb in question does
                                                
77 Brody (1995: 12) also includes as a fundamental constraint the theta-criterion; in this approach dubbed the
Main Thematic Condition: "All non-root positions of chains are nonthematic (where the root of the chain is its
most deeply embedded position)". And p. 77: "Only the root position(s) of a chain can be theta-related (i.e.,
assigning or receiving a theta role)."
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not require its accusative Case feature to be expressed, however, the reflexive is no longer
obligatory; cf. e.g. (104):
(104)
a. Mary washed (herself) thoroughly.
b. John shaved (himself) carefully.
Although there are many remaining questions for such an approach to control vs. raising
phenomena, let us proceed as if these problems are non-existent. In order to utilize Hornstein's
ideas, we need to state the basic properties of his theory. Firstly, Hornstein assumes that links,
not chains, are the actual entities of interpretation.
(105)
a. At the CI Interface (LF) an A-chain has one and only one visible link.
b. DPs begin in VP internal positions – their θ-domains- and move to VP external
    spec positions to check morphological features such as Case.
c. Movement is actually copy plus deletion.
d. Grammatical conditions apply exclusively at LF.
(105)a implies that "lowering" is possible in A-chains. "Lowevring" is effected when higher
links of a chain are deleted and a lower link is retained. (105)a requires that all but one link of
a chain delete, but it does not specify which one is retained nor does it favor the deletion of
lower links over higher ones. This treats chain links rather than chains as responsible for
determining relative scope, by means of the interpretive rule:
α scopes over β just in case α c-commands β. 
Secondly, Hornstein has specific assumptions concerning the nature of θ-assignment.
Importantly, θ-roles are conceived as semantic features on verbs and predicates; thus, they
may be checked by DPs, just like e.g. the EPP feature. Specifically (Hornstein 2000:38):
(106)
a. θ−roles are features on verbs
b. A DP "receives" a θ-role by checking a θ feature of a verbal/predicative
    phrase that it merges with.
c. There is no upper bound on the number of θ-roles a DP can have.
I would like to mention that Manzini and Roussou (1997) proposes an analysis of control that
shares many of these assumptions. The main difference is that Manzini and Roussou suggest
that DPs are base generated in their Case position, hence, that A-movement does not exist.
The θ-features of the embedded predicate(s) raise to adjoin to the head Infl of the matrix
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sentence, thus aquiring the right spec-head relation to the matrix subject DP. PRO positions
are phonetically null because there is nothing there at all, according to this proposal.
For our purposes, Hornstein's approach is better suited, since it also addresses scope
issues and allows for "lowering" of a DP into an embedded subject position. Recall that
although all but one link of the A-chain must be deleted by LF, there is nothing to prevent the
upper link from being deleted and the lower (or an intermediate) link to be retained. That is,
there is nothing in the fundamentals of this proposal that prevents the upper link from being
deleted. However, certain properties of a sentence may force the upper link to be retained for
the sentence to converge. One such property may be e.g. the requirements of the binding
theory. Consider (107), for instance.
(107)
a. A studenti seemed to hisi supervisor [ti to read every article ].
b. A studenti seemed to himselfi [ti to read every article].
In these phrase markers the lower copies must delete, otherwise binding of the
pronoun/reflexive is not possible, and the sentence will be ill-formed. Another property that
would force the upper link of the A-chain to be retained is the expression of θ-roles. Cf. (108).
(108)
a. *The shit expects [t to hit the fan].
b. * There expects [t to be a man in the garden].
These sentences are ill-formed because idoms (The shit) and expletives (There) are unable to
check θ-roles (although they are able to check the EPP-feature). Thus, verbs that assign an
external θ-role need a thematic DP of a right kind in their subject-position. Provided this spec-
head relation must hold at LF, which seems reasonable, given that thematic roles are
important to the overall interpretation of a sentence, a matrix verb assigning an external θ-role
would always force the upper link of an A-chain to be retained, whereas all other links are
deleted. Deleting the upper A-link would leave the θ-feature of the verb unchecked, hence,
the sentence would not converge at LF.
Hornstein mentions (1998, fn 10) that a weak-strong distinction might be relevant to
the checking of θ-roles.
θ-roles are presumably interpretable. As such, they need not be checked [...]. One
could argue that θ-theory requires these roles to be expressed and nominals to bear
them [...]. One might further ask why θ-roles must meet this requirement [...]. An
answer consistent with the spirit of MP is that θ-roles are bound affixes. If so, they
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would need nominal support. If these affixes are strong, then they would have to be
supported in overt syntax. If weak, a θ-feature could be checked at LF.
I want to reject this latter assumption here. We have seen that for modals, it is a prerequisite
for a +θ reading that the modal's subject position is not filled by an expletive. If the modal has
an expletive subject, the +θ reading cannot arise. On the other hand, if any verb has a 'weak' θ
feature, this must be the case for deontic modals, since deontic modals allow for a θ-reading –
given that they have a thematic subject – but they also allow for their θ-feature to be
unexpressed (even at LF). However, if the right spec-head relation between the modal and the
subject is not established at some point in overt syntax, the θ-reading will not arise at all; it
cannot arise at LF unless established in overt syntax.
Hence, it would make sense to ascribe a weak θ-feature to modals if and only if the
weak-strong distinction is taken to mean non-obligatory vs. obligatory assignment of a(n
external) θ-role, where this relation holds in overt syntax as well as at LF. However, since the
terms strong-weak are theoretically encumbered, I will exploit instead the terms obligatory vs.
non-obligatory. It is not unheard of to ascribe an optional θ-role to modals. E.g. Zubizarreta
(1982: 84) refers to the subject position of modals as receiving a "non-obligatory adjunct
external θ-role". Armed with Hornstein's theory, where the θ-criterion is modified to allow for
movement into a θ−position, there is no need to distinguish between adjunct and argument θ-
roles78. The version of the theta-criterion adopted in what follows is stated in (109) . Compare
this to the original theta-criterion from Chomsky (1981:36) quoted in (110).
(109)
The Modified Theta-criterion:
Each argument bears at least one θ−role, and each obligatory θ−role is assigned to one
and only one argument.
(110)
The Theta-criterion:
Each argument bears one and only one θ−role, and each θ−role is assigned to one and
only one argument.
                                                
78 This is a simplification. Zubizarreta also refers to adverbs as adjunct theta-role assigners. Thus, one might
want to keep the term "adjunct theta-role" for the type of theta-role assigned by subject-oriented adverbs such as
intentionally, unwillingly etc. Muysken (1981) paints a picture where adverbs are important to interpretation, but
rather unimportant as regards the structure of a clause, cf. section 5.1.
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On this background, I want to classify Norwegian deontic modals as raising verbs that
optionally assign an external θ-role to their subjects. Norwegian epistemic modals are raising
verbs that never assign an external θ-role to their subjects, and Norwegian dispositional
modals are raising verbs that always assign an external θ-role to their subjects.
4.5 Optional and obligatory Theta-assigners
Ascribing to deontic modals the property of being optional θ-assigners allows us to account
for their syntactic behavior without stipulating two different entries in the lexicon for each
deontic modal. That is, instead of the two-entries listing in (111)a, I will propose the single-
entry listing in (111)b:
(111)
a. I.  må, deontic modal: < θ, VP> b. må, deontic modal: <(θ), VP>
 II. må, deontic modal: < e, VP>
In what follows, we will assume that Norwegian deontic modals (and presumably, Norwegian
reanalysis verbs) are described in the lexicon as raising verbs with an optional external θ-
role79. This θ-feature is optionally checked or discharged by an agentive DP entering into a
spec-head relation with the modal at some point before the string is spelled out; that is, during
the part of the derivation belonging to overt syntax. Discharging this θ-feature forces a +θ
reading of the modal and simultaneously prevents the DP from being interpreted in the lower
subject position; hence, the proposition-scope reading of the modal is unavailable. However,
it is also possible for the agentive DP to enter into a spec-head relation with the modal in
overt syntax without discharging the θ-feature80; e.g. solely to fullfill the EPP or subject-
requirement of a clause. In this case, "lowering" (i.e. interpretation of the lower DP-link) is
                                                
79 This is parallel to verbs like e.g. spise 'eat', which are typically taken to amount to two different entries in the
lexicon. The reason for this is that spise may take an internal argument, e.g. bananer 'bananas', but this argument
is not obligatory. Thus, this verb could be described as assigning an optional internal theta-role; Spise: <θ,(θ) >.
80 This is semingly what distinguishes modals from verbs like e.g. rope 'i.e. call'. In Norwegian, it is possible to
make impersonal constructions with these highly agentive verbs; e.g. i):
   i) Det roper i skogen.
   (lit.) There calls in the woods
Thus, these verbs could easily be argued to assign an optional external theta-role, like modals. However, these
verbs do not allow for non-thematic (i.e. proposition-scope) readings when they have an intentional subject,
unlike deontic modals:
i) Jon roper i skogen
I. 'Jon calls in the woods'
II. '#Something calls Jon in the woods.
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allowed, and the proposition-scope reading of the modal is the result. Let us see how this
works.
(112)
a. b.
ModP ModP
   DP [θ+θ]      Mod'                                    DP[θ]       Mod'
           Marit                                                                       Marit 
                  Mod0       VP                Mod0        VP
    √ (θ)                                                   (θ)
     må       ti          V'                           må  ti      V'
                      
          V0                                         V0
                                                        √ θ                                                                         √θ
                 smile                                                 smile
'Marit     must                smile'                               'Marit     must                 smile'
In (112), the DP Marit checks the theta-feature of smile by merging with smile, resulting in a
spec-head configuration. Thus, the theta-feature of smile is checked (represented by √). This
is an obligatory operation, since smile obligatorily assigns a theta-role. Next, the VP [Marit
[smile]] merges with the modal. This operation is once again obligatory given the relevant
string. The third merger is also obligatory, presumably because of the EPP: The Mod' merges
with the raised subject. However, at this point there is an optional operation. Either the subject
DP checks (represented as √ ) the theta-feature of the modal må, or it does not. If it checks
this feature, the resulting representation is (112)a, where the subject DP ends up bearing two
theta-roles. On the other hand, if the subject DP does not check the theta-feature of the modal,
the resulting structure is (112)b, where the subject DP has only one theta-role; i.e. the theta-
role assigned by the embedded predicate smile.   
Now, if we look at the possible interpretations of these phrase markers, we find that
when the subject DP checks the theta-feature of the modal, as in (112)a, the subject must be
interpreted in this position; i.e. the topmost link of the DP-chain is the link retained and
interpreted; cf. (113)a.  However, if the theta-feature of the modal is left unchecked, as in
(112)b, the lower link of the DP-chain (i.e. the subject trace) is the link retained and
interpreted; cf. (113)b.
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(113)
a. b.
ModP ModP
   DP [θ+θ]      Mod'                                                       Mod'
           Marit
                  Mod0       VP                Mod0        VP
    √ (θ)                                                   (θ)
     må              V'                           må DP[θ]      V'
                                                                                Marit
          V0                                         V0
                                                        √ θ                                                                         √θ
                 smile                                                 smile
'Marit     must                escape'                                            'must   Marit      escape'
An appropriate question at this point is the following. What prevents the modal from
assigning a theta-role to some argument other than the raised subject? That is, what excludes a
string like (114)a or b?
(114)
a. * Marit må Jon rømme.
     'Marit must Jon escape'
b. *Det må Marit rømme.
     'There must Marit escape'
After all, if the modal optionally assigns a theta-role and the embedded predicate assigns
another theta-role, how come the structures in (114) are unacceptable?
To account for this fact, I will invoke the assumption from Nordgård and Åfarli
(1990:100) that modal auxiliaries do not assign Case. Consider the structures in (115):
(115)
a. * b.        *
ModP ModP
   DP[θ]           Mod'                                  DP               Mod'
             Marit         Det
                  Mod0       VP                Mod0        VP
    √ (θ)                                                   (θ)
     må        DP[θ]    V'                           må DP[θ]      V'
     Jon                                                              Marit
          V0                                         V0
                                                        √ θ                                                                         √θ
                 smile                                                 smile
'Marit     must      Jon     smile'                                'There  must   Marit      smile'
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In (115)a, Marit will be assigned Case by whichever head assigns Case to the subject of finite
clauses, e.g. C[+finite]. However, Jon will not be assigned Case, because the modal is not a
Case assigner. Likewise, in (115)b, the expletive will be assigned Case (e.g. by C[+finite]),
but Marit will not be assigned Case; once again because the modal does not assign Case to a
DP which it C-commands81.
Now, blocking the matrix subject position with an expletive excludes the +θ reading
of the modal. For the θ-feature to be discharged, an DP denoting an agentive entity must enter
into a spec-head relation with the modal in overt syntax (i.e. during the derivation of the overt
syntactic structure). An expletive subject prevents this move from taking place by occupying
the subject position of the modal. Hence, the proposition-scope reading of the modal is the
only possibility.
One might picture a scenario where a DP-chain acquires a θ-feature from the modal
(by means of the overt subject) before being interpreted in the lower subject-position (by
means of the subject's trace). The question is, why should this move not be possible? The
resulting reading ought to be a reading which is simoultaneously a +θ reading (acquired in the
spec-head configuration [subject [modal]]) and a proposition scope reading (stemming from
the relative scope of the modal and the subject's trace; i.e. the lower link in the DP-chain)
where the modal has scope over the entire proposition, including the subject (by means of the
subject's trace). But this is a much more general question that does not pertain solely to
modals. One might just as well ask, why is it that "control verbs" in general do not allow for
proposition scope readings? The generalization within a Hornstein-type approach could be
expressed as follows:
(116)
a. Delete all links in the A-chain except one. BUT:
b. The retained link must be at least as high in the structure as the topmost θ-position.
Thus, to explain why deontic modals do not simultaneously express a +θ and a proposition-
scope reading, we would first have to explain why control verbs in general do not allow for
proposition-scope readings. They just don't. A legitimate interpretation of a control verb – or
any verb obligatorily assigning an external θ role – requires that the DP expressing or bearing
this external θ-role is interpreted either in the spec-position of this verb or, alternatively, in a
                                                
81 This structure would presumably be ruled out anyway, on account of the definiteness-effect.
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position c-commanding this spec-position. In the latter case, the relevant DP is interpreted in a
position higher in the structure than the spec-position of the θ-assigning verb. In either case,
the subject is not allowed to scope under the θ-assigning verb. Control verbs; i.e. in this
picture, raising verbs that obligatorily assign an external theta-role, simply do not allow their
subjects to scope under them, and neither do θ-assigning modals. Recall that Hornstein
suggests that deleting the upper A-link would leave the θ-feature of the verb unchecked,
hence, the sentence would not converge at LF.
In the case of deontic modals, then, either the θ-feature is discharged, which prevents
interpretation of the lower link of the DP-chain. Or, alternatively, the θ-feature is not
discharged, and interpreting the lower link in the DP-chain is allowed.
This approach to deontic modals allows us to explain a range of otherwise troubling
data. The assumption that deontic modals optionally assign an external θ-role accounts for the
fact that they have +θ as well as proposition-scope (non-θ) readings. It explains why they
licence expletives in their subject positions, because their assigning an external θ-role is
optional. The auxiliary assumption that θ-assignment takes place in a spec-head configuration
allows us to explain why expletives block a +θ reading from arising, and relating the
proposition-scope reading to the interpretation of the lower link in the DP-chain allows us to
account for the fact that a proposition-scope reading never arises when the complement of the
modal is pseudoclefted, since in these cases, the lower subject position is elided. Hence, in
these cases, there exists no "lower link" in the DP-chain. Moreover, the only way a DP could
be thematically identified in these pseusocleft structures is by checking the optional theta-role
of the modal, since there is no other potential theta-assigner to perform this task.
This approach also allows us to solve another puzzle, regarding modals taking small
clause complements. Consider the following data.
(117)
a. Jon må hjem.
   'Jon must (go) home.'
b. Vi skal på kino.
   'We are-going to the movies.'
c. Marit vil til flyplassen straks.
   Marit wants to the airport immidiately
   'Marit wants to go to the airport immidiately'.
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You may recall from chapter 3 that Barbiers (1995, 1999) uses these non-verbal complements
as an argument against the control vs. raising analysis. The argument goes as follows.
Using as an "uncontroversial diagnostic" that small clause complements cannot be
extraposed, Barbiers establishes that the non-verbal predicative complements of modals are
indeed small clauses, cf. (118) (Barbiers' 1999: (14)).
(118)
a. dat Jan morgen <naar Amsterdam> moet <*naar Amsterdam>
  'that John tomorrow to Amsterdam must to Amsterdam'
b. dat de brief morgen <in de prullenbak> mag <*in de prullenbak>
   'that the letter tomorrow into the trashcan may into the trashcan'
If the bracketed constituents are small clauses complements, then the DPs Jan and de brief
must be their subjects. Their subjects cannot be PRO, since a small clause complement (of a
selecting verb) cannot have PRO as its subject82 (cf. (119)a; Barbiers' 1999: 15a), so the
subject must have raised from a position inside the small clause; cf. (119)b (op.cit. 15b).
(119)
a. Jan drinkt [SC  zich /*PRO ziek].
  'John drinks   SE    sick.'
b. Jani moet [PP ti naar Amsterdam].
   'John must to Amsterdam.'
The assumption that these constructions are raising constructions fits nicely with the overall
behavior of Norwegian deontic modals like måtte 'must' and skulle 'should' (cf. (117) a and b),
since deontic modals pattern with raising verbs in most respects anyway. On the other hand,
ville, 'want-to', is a dispositional modal, and dispositional modals pattern with control verbs in
important respects. Thus, if these modals with small clause complements are raising
structures, ville should not be able to occur in these structures, if it is a control verb. It seems
that without a Hornstein-type reduction of obligatory control to a subtype of raising, we
would have to allow for a redefintition of ville in such cases; that is, ville behaves as a control
                                                
82 Small clauses may appear in adjunct positions where the PRO subject will not be governed by a selecting verb.
This is the case e.g. for small clauses headed by som (Mainland Scandinavian), as (English) and als (German).
Cf. e.g. Eide (1997, 2000a, 2000b), Flaate (1998), Flaate and Eide (1998), Eide and Flaate (1999). One might
think that these constructions would pose a serious problem for a Hornstein-type analysis, since in these cases,
A-movement would be to a non-c-commanding position. But Hornstein takes care of this by an additional
stipulation; e.g. Hornstein (1998:107): "Sidewards movement is permitted", and Hornstein (1999:79): "What is
important here is that c-command is not part of the definition  of movement. Thus, the computational system
does not prohibit the copying of an expression to a position that does not c-command the "movement" site.
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verb in all other constructions, but as a raising verb in exactly these small-clause
constructions. Interestingly, typical control verbs are rarely found in these constructions, but
there exist certain verbs which are semantically similar to certain modals, e.g. ønske 'wish
(for)' or tro 'believe' that take small clause complements similar to those found with modals.
Note, however, that these control verbs are ungrammatical if the small clause subject is
phonetically empty, cf (120):
(120)
a. Marit ønsket *(seg) langt vekk.
   Marit wished herself far away
  'Marit wished she was far away'
b. Flyktningene trodde *(seg) trygge.
    refugees-def believed themselves safe
   'The refugees beieved themselves to be safe'
One way of accounting for these facts within a Hornstein-based analysis would be to assume,
in radical opposition to Burzio's generalization, that in the case of raising verbs (including
control verbs), there is no absolute correspondence between the verb's assigning an
(obligatory) external θ-role and its case-assigning properties83. Instead, these properties are
idiosyncratic properties of raising (subsuming control) verbs, where Case- and theta-
properties are defined for each verb. Thus, for the matrix verbs in (121), the property of
assigning an external θ-role (represented here as ± θ) and the property of assigning Case to a
complement DP or an embedded subject ( represented here as ± Case) vary independently:
(121)
a. Jon virket (*seg) trygg. (virke: -θ, -Case)
    Jon seemed himself safe
    'Jon seemed (to be) safe.'
b. Flyktningene trodde *(seg) trygge. (tro: +θ, +Case)
    refugees-DEF believed themselves safe
   'The refugees believed themselves to be safe.'
                                                
83 For Norwegian, this assumption is problematic for a range of other (i.e. 'more lexical') verbs as well. For
instance, many so-called unaccusative verbs like smelte 'melt' , brenne 'burn',  kjøre 'drive' have transitive as well
as ergative versions. In their transitive version they take an agentive subject, whereas in their ergative version,
the post-verbal patient may be promoted to subject. However, for the ergative versions, there exists another
possibility as well, notably to fill the subject position with an expletive and let the post-verbal DP remain in situ.
Thus, in these cases, the verb does not assign an external theta-role, but it obviously assigns (some kind of ) Case
to the complement DP nevertheless.
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c. Marit ønsket *(seg) langt vekk. (ønske: +θ, + Case)
    Marit wished herself far away
   'Marit wished she was far away.'
d. Vi skal (*oss) på kino. (skulle: ± θ, -Case)
    we will ourselves to movies
   'We are going to the movies.'
e. Marit vil (*seg) til flyplassen straks. (ville: +θ, -Case)
   Marit wants-to (herself) to the airport immidiately
   'Marit wants to go to the airport immidiately.'
That Norwegian modals do not assign Case to a DP which it governs is, as mentioned above,
not a new assumption; cf. e.g. Nordgård and Åfarli (1990:101). On the other hand, verbs like
tro 'believe' or ønske 'wish' are able to assign Case e.g. to a complement DP; cf. (122):
(122)
a. Jon trodde Marit.
   'Jon believed Marit'
b. Alle ønsket en løsning84.
   'Everyone wished (for) a solution'
Raising verbs like virke 'seem' are like modals in not assigning Case, however. What
separates most raising verbs from deontic modals is that raising verbs do not normally assign
a θ-role to a subject, whereas deontic modals optionally assign such a θ role, and dispositional
modals obligatorily assign an external θ-role, like control verbs. The property "+obligatory
external θ-role" of the modal ville simultaneously rules out the possibility of expletive or
idiom-chunk subjects and proposition scope readings; in short, makes dispositional modals
pattern with typical "control verbs" in most respects85.
In Hornstein's approach the difference between control and raising reduces to the
assumption that in control structures, the DP aquires two θ-features during the derivation,
since the DP moves from one θ-position into another θ-position. In raising structures, the DP
                                                
84 It is also possible to add another argument here, one reminicent of the "free dative" argument in German. That
is, a benefactive (resembling an indirect object) may be added in a number of constructions where the verb
otherwise assigns only one internal theta-role, e.g. Alle ønsket Marit en fin dag  'everyone wished Marit a nice
day'.
85 The other dispositional modal kunne 'can =ability' never occurs in these constructions in Norwegian. However,
its German cognate können does in fact take small clauses like the ones discussed here, e.g. Können Sie selber
ins Auto, oder brauchen Sie vielleicht hilfe? Lit. 'Can You by-yourself into the car, or do You perhaps need
help?' Thanks to Herbert Pütz for this information.
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moves from a θ-position into a non-thematic subject position; hence, the DP aquires only one
θ-feature during the derivation.
There seems to be a general consesus on the assumption that raising verbs differ from
control verbs in that "in raising verbs, the subject role is defined by the lower predicate". This
is true, but to some extent, inaccurate. Even control verbs need their subject to be compatible
not only with the matrix (control) verb, but with the lower predicate as well. This fact seems
so obvious that it is sometimes ignored, but in fact, this is exactly the kind of thing obligatory
control is all about. Thus, whereas it has been noted numerous times that a sentence like
(123)a is ill-formed because control verbs obligatorily assign an external θ-role, data like
(123)b, which serves to show that even the subject of control verbs are defined, not solely by
the θ-role assigned by the control verb, but by the embedded predicate as well, are remarkably
absent in this discussion:
(123)
a. *The shit expects to hit the fan.
b. *John tried to rain.
Thus, in control structures, the subject first receives a θ-role from the embedded predicate(s),
and must meet the selectional requirements of this predicate(s) before it moves to the subject
position of the control predicate, where it has to meet another set of semantic requirements,
i.e. those of the control predicate, which assigns to the subject another θ-role. Raising verbs
impose few or simply no selectional requirements onto their subjects; thus, the subject is
required to meet the selectional requirements of the embedded predicate(s) only, since raising
verbs have few or no selectional requirements for the subject to meet86.
At this point, let us consider once again the table of observed differences between
proposition-scope (root and epistemic) modals and raising verbs on one side and control verbs
and dispositional modals on the other, repeated here as (124).
                                                
86 Bouchard (1995) argues against the concept of theta-roles altogether and claims that the term theta-role has no
identifiable content across verb classes (p. 59): If verbs can vary so much in restrictiveness, a given thematic role
could be associated with no selectional restrictions. For example, seem could assign a "Seemer" role, with no
selectional restrictions – anything can seem."
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(124)
Raising verbs, Control verbs,
epistemic modals        dispositional root
& proposition-scope modals & subject-
deontic root modals: oriented deontic
root modals:
a. Allow expletive subjects yes no
b. Allow weather-det 'it' subjects yes no
c. Allow idiom-chunk subjects yes no87
d. Allow quirky subjects (Ic.) yes no
e. Allow passive compl. with inanimate subject yes no
f. Display subject-modal scope ambiguity yes no
g. Passivize no yes/no 88
h. Accept pseudoclefted complement no yes
(124) a, b and c are all explained on the different selectional requirements of "raising" verbs
and "control" verbs. Control verbs are simply raising verbs with an attitude; i.e. they have a
number of selectional requirements for their subjects to meet. They demand their subjects to
be intentional and agentive, and their subject DPs must carry a nominative case marking. This
latter requirement accounts for the fact that at least some Icelandic root and epistemic modals
accept, whereas dispositional modals (kunna 'can' and vilja 'want-to') reject quirky subjects;
cf. (124)d. The strict selectional requirements of dispositional modals and "control" verbs also
prevent them from taking  passive complements with inanimate subjects (124)e.
Since all but one link of any DP-chain must be deleted by LF, and furthermore, since
the retained link must be at least as high in the structure as the topmost θ-position, this gives
rise to the interpretational differences observed between "control" verbs and "raising" verbs.
Control verbs assign an external θ-role, and this forces their subject to be interpreted at least
as high as the spec-position of the control verb. Raising verbs do not assign an external θ-role,
thus their subject may be interpreted in a non-topmost position (by means of its trace), unless
the upper DP-link is required for other reasons (e.g. binding). The different θ-assigning
properties also account for the different scope-possibilities of subject-oriented and
proposition-scope modals; cf. (124)f.
It is expected that control-type verbs should passivize, on the account that they assign
an external theta-role. However, Norwegian modal auxiliaries do not passivize, unlike control
                                                
87 Recall that kunne does sometimes accept an idiom-chunk subject.
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verbs. Their main verb versions, which take a proper argument as an object, may passivize;
i.e. modals passivize only when they function as ordinary transitive verbs. We do not have
any explanation for the fact that dispositional modals do not passivize in their auxiliary
version. It is true that a number of other control verbs do not passivize very easily either, i.e.
in those instances when they take an infinitival complement:
(125)
a. *Det håpes/blir håpet å kunne åpne døra.
      there hopePASS     to canINF open the door
    'One hopes to open the door'
b.  Det *prøves/?blir prøvd å åpne døra.
     there tryPASS to open the door
    'One tries to open the door'
However, we do not have an explanation for the lack of passive with modal auxiliaries, other
than suggesting that this is related to their taking infinitival complements instead of DP/CP
complements.
As regards the ability to take a pseudoclefted complement (124)h, we have seen that
this can be accounted for within the approach advocated here. "Raising" verbs like non-
thematic modals have proposition-scope readings, hence the lower link in the subject's DP-
chain is retained, not their topmost link. However, the lower subject-position is unavailable
when the complement is pseduoclefted, and the proposition-scope reading cannot arise.
Furthermore, the requirement that argument DPs must be thematically identfied rules out the
possibility for proposition-scope modals and other "raising" verbs in this construction.
Modals hence constitute a mixed category w.r.t. thematic properties. Epistemic modals
are raising verbs that do not assign an external θ-role under any circumstances and they have
no selectional requirements w.r.t. a possible subject. Dispositional modals are raising verbs
that obligatorily assign an external θ-role to their subjects; hence they demand intentional
subjects. And finally, deontic modals optionally assign an external θ-role, and
correspondingly, they may have either proposition scope (-θ) readings or subject-oriented
(+θ) readings. Their external θ-role being optional, they accept non-argument subjects on a
proposition-scope reading and reject such subjects otherwise. None of these modal auxilaries,
                                                                                                                                                        
88 It is the main verb version of the dispositional root modals that passivizes. The auxiliary version, with a verbal
complement, does not. Also, the main verbs trenger ikke/behøver ikke passivize. These two have deontic root
counterparts, not dispositional root counterparts.
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neither root nor epistemic, neither  dispositional nor deontic, assign Case to the subject of a
clausal complement89.
In addition, we know that four of the modals have main verb versions (shown by the
fact that they accept do-replacement in tags, they may passivize, and they take DP/CP
complements). These four, notably kunne 'can', ville 'want-to', behøve 'need' and trenge 'need'
behave like ordinary transitive verbs in that they obligatorily assign an external θ-role to their
subjects as well as (accusative) Case to a complement. A note of caution is in order; ville
takes CP, not DP complements, thus one might want to make an exception w.r.t Case-
assigning properties for this verb, unless one adheres to the assumption that CP argument
clauses need Case as well.  I will leave this question open here.
4.6 The Source of modality: Conceptual Structure vs. Semantic Form
I argued in section 4.2.4.3 that modals are intensional predicates. It was suggested (following
Quer 1998) that intensional predicates are indexical in that the truth of their embedded
propositions must be relativized to worlds and individuals, i.e. provided with an individual
anchor; cf. for instance (126), which could be represented as (127):
(126)
[P2 Philby believes that [P1 a unicorn is sleeping in the garden]].
(127)
P1 = T in wR (Philby); i.e. P1 is true in a world w that models reality R according to Philby.
Now, in (127) (and (126)) Philby is the individual anchor for the intensional predicate believe.
The question we will pursue in what follows is: What may constitute the individual anchor for
a modal? Rephrased in a manner more in line with the functional literature on modals, who or
what constitutes the source of modality?
                                                
89 It is true however that modals accept pro-predicates like det as a complement, e.g. as in ii):
i) Kan bussen ha kommet?  'Could the bus have arrived?'
ii) Den kan (nok) det.   Lit. 'It could possibly that'.
However, since det in these cases should be considered a pro-predicate and not a pronoun, we assume that it does
not need case in these instances. A slightly bigger problem is the fact that root modals accept definite pro-
predicates like dette 'this', e.g. Jeg vil ikke dette 'I do not want this (to happen)', as noted by Lødrup (1994).
Although this element could also be described as a pro-predicate which does not need case, it does seem more
pronoun-like than det. The fact that root modals accept, whereas epistemic modals reject dette as a complement
could be accounted for by invoking the fact that root modals may be construed as two-place predicates, whereas
epistemic modals cannot. Thus, dette  denotes a VP complement which functions almost like a direct object, and
should perhaps be expected to be assigned Case. I have no solution to this problem at present.
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Within the functionalist literature, this question is an important one, since e.g. the
source of an obligation or permission to a great extent determines the overall intepretation of
an utterance containing a modal in a specific context; cf. e.g Heine (1995:29 ff). But not only
functionalists are concerned with this issue; we find attempts of formalizing the source of an
obligation or permission within logic (e.g. the dyadic deontic logic of Hansson 1970) early
Transformational Grammar (e.g. Newmeyer 1969) and Government and Binding approaches;
e.g. Öhlschläger (1989).
To clarify, so far we have been exclusively concerned with what has been known as
the goal of modality, i.e. the individual towards which the obligation or permission is directed
on a directed deontic or subject-oriented reading (and correspondingly, towards which no
obligation or permission is directed on a non-directed reading) . At this point, we want to look
into the source (German: Quelle) of modality. Here, Calbert (1975:24):
 [...] each modality can be expressed from the point of view of the Source (X in [a
below]) or from the point of the Goal (Y in [b below]). These alternatives may be
called Source-oriented and Goal-oriented modalities respectively [...]:
a. X wants Y to...
b. Y has to...
In Heine (1995:29 ff), this source is dubbed Force and is explicated in the following manner:
There is some force F that is characterized by an "element of will" (Jespersen
1924:320-1), i.e. that has an interest in an event either occurring or not occurring.
Newmeyer (1969) proposed that deontic root modals are ditransitive semantically, where e.g.
must in the sentence John must eat soup has a semantic structure like require in the sentence
Something requires of John that he eats soup. In this early Transformational Grammar
literature, the source is sometimes referred to as the rule-giver argument (term quoted from
Brennan, 1997:38).
These few references already serve to show that the interpretive importance of the
source of modality has been acknowledged by a variety of linguistic frameworks. Now, one
might want to argue, and quite rightfully, that the rule-giver or source of modality belongs to
the pragmatic information provided by a context, thus it is not obvious that this is a matter
which need to be examined in a semantico-syntactic investigation. However, in my opinion,
adressing the question of the source of modality helps us to sort out certain quasi-conceptual
influences which direct the readings of modals in specific ways; readings that have been taken
to be syntactically encoded (e.g. Barbiers 1999).  Furthermore, this is a subdomain of a much
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larger field consisting of the semantics of intensional predicates in general, and we have
already seen that intensional predicates impose specific semantic effects onto e.g. indefinite
DPs within their semantic scope (cf. the dicussion in 4.2.4.3  above).
The puzzle concerning the Source of modality expressed by modals thus consists in
the fact that there is a tacit, mostly contextually determined presence of a rule-giver which
may or may not be explicitly expressed. However, even if this rule-giver is overtly expressed,
this entity does not occupy an argument position of the modal; at least not an argument
position on any current understanding of the term. (128) exemplifies sentences where the rule-
giver or source of modality is explicitly expressed:
(128)
a. According to your mother, you ought to become a doctor.
b. The doctor said that I may stop taking this medicine.
c. In my view, you should'nt do that.
d. Regulations indicate that all of our students must take this exam.
e. Thanks to his exceptional physical shape, John can cross the river.
Öhlschläger (1989) represents a G&B approach which tries to incorporate the source of the
modality expressed by the modal. Although he ascribes the "rule-giver" argument to the
semantics of the modal, and semantics alone, he recognizes that this gives rise to a
discrepancy between his syntactic description of modals as raising verbs and the semantic
discription, which contains an argument that is not expressed in syntax (op.cit. 246; my
translation):
 [...] There exists a discrepancy, an opposition, between my syntactic and my semantic
description, which is rooted in the fact that I invoke a θ-role "Source" in my semantic
description, that does not correspond to an argument position in the D-structure of
raising verbs, which leads to a violition of the θ-criterion. In my opinion though, the
syntactic arguments supports an analysis of the modals as raising verbs just as
unequivocally as the semantic arguments support a semantic explication of the kind
that I have proposed. One possibility to solve this opposition would be to add an
argument position in D-structure.
The author is reluctant to make this move, though, since this would amount to proposing an
argument position which is not occupied in overt syntax; thus, he leaves this question open.
The core problem here is as stated by the quote from Öhlscläger above: The semantics
of modals seemingly encode some kind of argument, 'the Source', which does not correspond
to a syntactic argument position, and the way 'D-structure' is employed within G&B, this is a
serious problem. There is something about (especially epistemic and deontic) modals that
emphasize the presence of an intentional, rational mind, an authority or a narrator, and it is
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not obvious that this is all pragmatics. Modals demand a 'Source argument' much in the way
speaker-oriented adverbs like luckily, obviously, unfortunately, evidently are associated with
the speaker: These adverbs can only be interpreted as evalutations expressed by the speaker
(cf. Jackendoff 1972 for similarities and differences between modals and speaker-oriented
adverbs90). One could quite rightfully claim that this type of information needs to be
expressed in the semantic representation of an entry in the lexicon, instead of assuming that
this is contextually inferred. Since D-structure argument-positions cannot do the job (and
since D-structure has seized to exist within the Minimalist Program version of P&P anyway),
one might imagine that Source interpretations could be encoded by LF-relations, as implied
by the approach of Barbiers (1995). Recall that Barbiers proposes a syntactic projection DP
headed by an invisible determiner D to account for subject-orientedness. This subject-
orientedness of e.g. kunnen 'can', may be interpreted either as ability or as permission.
According to Barbiers, this is due to the ambiguity or abstractness of the head D:
The relations established by D are the other building blocks: the possibility of the [...]
event is determined and the subject is the determiner. Since the notion of determiner is
taken to subsume notions such as source, possessor, origin and so on, the subject [...]
can be interpreted as the source of the possibility [my emphasis], which yields the
ability interpretation, or as the possessor of the possibility, which yields the permission
reading. The ambiguity between a dispositional and a directed deontic interpretation is
thus ascribed to the ambiguity of, or rather the abstractness of D, just as in the case of
John's portrait, where the semantic relations between John and portrait established by
D can be interpreted as posessor, artist, source and so on.
Some readers may find it strange that the subject itself could be considered a source of
modality, as long as we have equated Source with "Rule-giver". However, within the German
tradition at least, it is common to recognize two major types of Source, dubbed "subject-
external" and "subject-internal" modality respectively. Only in the former case does it make
sense to equal Source with Rule-giver; typical examples are deontic modals. In the latter case,
the Source of modality resides within the entity described by the subject DP; for instance the
subject-internal 'intention' of wollen (Germ.) /ville (Norw.) /willen (Dutch) 'want-to' or the
subject-internal 'enabling properties' of können (Germ.) /kunne (Norw.) /kunnen (Dutch).
Instead of invoking semantics, D-structure or LF/abstract heads, or writing this subject
off as 'pragmatic/contextual/world-knowledge', the present proposal situates the Source of
modality on the borderline between semantics and pragmatics. In an effort to describe the
                                                
90 Op.cit.p 104: The claim, then, is that speaker-oriented adverbs and epistemic modals, which are syntactically
totally dissimilar excpt that they are daughters of S, are treated identically by the semantic component, which
only makes use of the single syntactic property they have in common.
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Source of modality, I will exploit the idea of a two-level semantics of the kind advocated by
Bierwish and Lang (1989) and Bouchard (1995). Although I have no need for the elaborated
notation and machinery of Bierwisch and Lang here, I want to utilize their idea of separating a
level of Semantic Form (SF) from a level of Conceptual Structure (CS), much like Bouchard
distinguishes Grammar Semantics from Situational Semantics91. These two semantic levels
allow us to describe any linguistic object by two different semantic representations; cf.
Bierwisch and Lang (1989: 474 ff:):
[C]ertain properties of the lexical items which determine their syntactic behavior are
established in their internal SF structure. This applies in particular to the syntactic
argument structure of lexical items, determined by the θ−grid, a structure which has
crucial bearing on the syntactic functions of lexical items [...] 
[...]since[...] the conceptual interpretation of the D[imensional] A[djectives] [i.e. the
linguistic objects] must be distinguished from their SF structure, there can be no
general identity between SF and CS.
This gives us a system that allows for one semantic level that operates close to syntax, and
another semantic level that operates close to conceptual organization, and the important
assumption that there is no general identity between them.
So I will pursue the following idea: At the close-to-syntax SF-level, epistemic modals
are one-place predicates that take the embedded proposition as their argument. Dispositional
modals are two-place predicates that take the subject and the embedded proposition as
arguments, whereas deontic modals are either one-place predicates or two-place predicates;
they optionally assign an external θ-role to a subject while obligatorily taking the embedded
proposition as an internal argument. However, at the close-to-conceptual-organisation CS-
level, I assume that all modals are two-place predicates, where the second argument is the
proposition described by the sentence (minus the modal), and the first argument, i.e. the
Source, may be instantiated by one out of three options: Speaker, Subject or External92.
                                                
91 Bouchard separates between Grammar Semantics and Situational Semantics. However, Bouchard's levels does
not correspond to Bierwisch and Lang's levels in all respects. Bierwisch and Lang describe the assigning of
theta-roles as an important aspect of Semantic Form (i.e. syntax-relevant Semantics). Bouchard rejects the idea
that theta-roles are important to Syntax (p.45): "Theta-roles are [...] not approporiate primitives to use in
constructing Semantic Representations. They are unsuitable to represent meaning because any slight change in
the context can bring about a change in roles." And p. 51: "[A] thematic representation is, in a sense, analogous
to the situation it describes; it corresponds to the situation itself." P. 41: " The claim is that the very notions on
which theta roles are based are external to Grammar."
92 Antoher way of implementing these ideas would be to exploit the notion of individual anchoring  referred to
above, where the individual anchor is equated with the first argument.
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Semantic Form:  Epistemic modals: Modal (p)
Dispositional modals: Modal (subject, p)
Deontic modals: Modal (p)  v  Modal (subject, p)
Conceptual Structure: All modals: Modal (x,p), &  x = Speaker, or
   x = Subject, or
   x = External
I consider the term "Speaker" to be self-explanatory93; "Subject" refers to the syntactic subject
of the modal, whereas the latter term "External" deserves some explanation. First of all,
"External" refers to an entity different from the Speaker and the Subject. Secondly, it does not
refer to an entity necessarily external to the discourse; on the contrary, the "External Source"
entity is in general easily recoverable from the overall context. Moreover, "External" does not
always refer to an entity external to the sentence either; we have seen that the Source of
modality may be specified and explicitly expressed in a sentence albeit not as a syntactic
argument of the modal (cf. (128) above). In general, the external Source of modality does not
need to be explicitly expressed. Thus, the term external is chosen for two reasons; firstly
because the Source is in general sentence-external, secondly because the term external
modality is a familiar term, within the German literature on modals at least. Admittedly, this
term traditionally incorporates "Speaker as Source" readings; moreover, external modality is
sometimes treated as an inherent property of deontic modals; cf. e.g. Heine (1995: 30):
 [...] Force [i.e. Source] is different from C [the agent] in the case of modals such as
müssen 'must', sollen 'shall, should' or können 'can' [...].
This is not completely accurate, however. Although it is true that deontic modals allow for an
external Source of modality, they by no means rule out the possibility of the subject being the
Source of modality in some cases. This is particularly obvious in (129) below:
(129)
a. Jon skal på kino.
    Jon will to movies
   'Jon is-going to the movies'
b. Marit må kaste opp.
   'Marit must throw up'
                                                
93 Like a temporal point of reference can be shifted, or the reference of the first person pronoun I  can be shifted
from the speaker to some other referent given that the sentence is embedded within e.g. a discourse of reported
speech, a letter etc., "Speaker" as a first CS-argument is able to be shifted in the same manner.
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The more natural reading of both these sentences requires the subject to be the Source of
modality, although one might object to this claim in the latter case. Marit does not "require of
herself" that she throws up, instead her physical condition requires that she throws up. On the
other hand, "the physical condition of x" is traditionally considered sufficiently "subjective"
in the case of kunne 'can' in that this is dubbed "internal modality" on this paraphrase. Thus,
this ought to suffice in the case of måtte 'must' as well.
Another pressing question in describing the argument structure of modals on two
semantic levels is whether it is possible to find paraphrases or semantic descriptions that are
sufficiantly abstract to allow for a "conceptual argument" which is not expressed in overt
syntax, while simultaneously being substantial enough for a close-to-syntax semantic level.
Preferably, this core meaning should cover both root and epistemic meanings as well, since I
agree with the observation made in Dyvik (1999) that
[...] the analysis of epistemic and root modals as distinct lexemes would give rise to a
puzzlingly systematic homonymy linking pairs of epistemic and root modals in
Norwegian, a systematicity which would then be unaccounted for. The formal identity
of all morphosyntactic forms which they both have, along with their obvious semantic
relatedness, would appear accidental.
This quote places Dyvik (1999) in the "Unifiers" camp, whereas some of my descriptions
signal an affinity to the "Dividers" camp; the terms are due to Brennan (1993), who invokes
these terms to describe the two major approaches to the dual reading of root vs. epistemic
modals. Unifiers argue that there is only one lexical entry with two different uses, an
epistemic use and a root use respectively. The context, alternatively, the syntactic
surroundings are responsible for the felt difference in mening. Dividers argue that modals are
lexically ambiguous; i.e. there are (at least) two different lexical entries for each modal. In
principle, I cheer wholeheartedly for the Unifiers, thus I set out to find semantic descriptions
that would cover both epistemic and root readings; descriptions that would function
simultaneously on a Conceptual Structure level as well as on the level of Semantic Form.
This turned out to be quite a challenge, and the suggestions I have made should be
considered tentative descriptions that hopefully will make way for better suited replacements.
For some of the modals, then, I decided to go for two different descriptions of root vs.
epistemic readings, although I believe it is possible in principle to find more abstract notions
that could encode both root and epistemic versions. For instance, I have described the core
semantic content of skulle 'shall' as "intention" on the root reading, but "opinion" on the
epistemic reading. However, there ought to exist a slightly more abstract concept that could
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cover both, and there probably does exist such a concept. Take an example like the following
minimal pair94.
 (130)
a. He insists that I leave him.
b. He insists that I left him.
In  (130)a, insists means roughly 'forcefully expressing an intention that p' whereas in  (130)b,
insists means 'expressing a convinced belief that p'. Although it is possible to account for this
fact by assuming two different lexical entries for insist, it is tempting to conclude that at least
at some point in time, insist denoted a concept that covered both "intention" and "opinion".
The same can be observed with e.g. be supposed to:
(131)
a. John is supposed to become an architect.
b. John is supposed to be an architect.
Again, 'intention' vs. 'opinion' are the relevant readings. To find these two readings as a
possibility with one and the same linguistic form in one case after another ought to indicate
that these two concepts are closely related, perhaps that they are different aspects of one and
the same concept on a more abstract level. However, since I have found no word in my
vocabulary corresponding to this more abstract concept, I have resorted to two different
descriptions for root and epistemic skulle. Thus, I have chosen to give skulle 'shall' the
following semantic description:
Skulle: 
Conceptual Structure: Root: Intention of (x) that p is made true
x = Speaker, or
x = Subject, or
x = External
Epistemic: Opinion of (x) that p is true
x = External
Semantic Form: Root: There exists an intention that p is made true
+ external θ-role: The subject has the
responsibility of acting on this intention.
- external θ-role: The intention is not
addressed to any particular individual.
Epistemic: There exists an opinion that p is true
                                                
94 Cf. Quer (1998:54) for a discussion of the importance of the subjunctive/indicative distinction in such cases.
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The choice between Speaker, Subject or External as the first CS-argument gives us three
different nuances of meaning. If Speaker instantiates this first argument, the reading of the
modal is typically performative, since the Speaker reports his or her intention that p is made
true. This does not necessarily mean that the utterance is conceived as an order or a command;
this depends on whether the subject is 2nd or 3rd person (a 2nd person subject favours a
'command' reading) but the utterance may just as well be conceived as a promise (cf. Dyvik
1999 for the 'promise' reading of skulle),  or a threat, and depending on whether the state-of-
affairs described by the embedded proposition is conceived as positive or negative for the
hearer; cf. e.g. (132):
(132)
a. Du skal ikke på kino i kveld.
    You will not to movies-DEF tonight
    'It is my intention that you do not go to the movies tonight'
The perlocutionary (cf. Austin 1962) aspects of the utterance; i.e. exactly how an utterance is
conceived by a hearer, belongs to the pragmatics component, in my view, and I have no
intention or ambition to be able to formalize these aspects of modals here. Thus, whether the
utterance is conceived as a command, a promise or a threat depends on the context. However,
the Source of modality in a modal is another matter; I believe that this property of modals can
and should be systematized and formalized in order to shed some light on the complex
semantics of modals.
The sentence in (132) has another reading where the subject is the Source of modality;
i.e. it is the subject itself that has the intention and constitutes the first CS-argument. This
reading is more visible if we make the sentence denote a question, cf. (133):
(133)
a. Du skal ikke på kino i kveld?
    You will not to movies-DEF tonight
    'Is it your intention not to go the movies tonight?'
The third possibility is that the source of modality is neither Speaker or Subject, but some
other entity, typically an authority of some kind. Say John's baby sister Mary delivers the
following message from their parents:
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(134)
a. Du skal ikke på kino i kveld.
    You will not to movies-DEF tonight
    'It is their intention that you do not go to the movies tonight'
Here, the Source is external; i.e. neither Speaker nor Subject, but the parents. It is the parents'
intention that is expressed by skulle in this context.
In a number of sentences the Source of modality, i.e. here, the entity whose intention
is expressed by skulle, must be external because the syntactic subject does not denote an
entity which is a rational being. This is the case in (135) below. Note that, as indicated by the
gloss, the 'intention' reading is particularly clear in this sentence:
(135)
a. Maskinen virker ikke slik den skal.
   machineDEF does not work like it should
   'The machine does not work the way it is intended'
Another intriguing fact about the Source of modality, in this case, the entity which has the
intention, is that it need not be constant throughout a context or even throughout a sentence.
Look at the following authentic example (a response from an official to a curious journalist
asking questions about a suspicious deal; roughly, Why weren't the proper authorities
informed about this deal?).
 (136)
Det var aldri noen annen intensjon enn [S1 at [S2 de som skulle kjenne til avtalen,
skulle kjenne til avtalen]].
'There was never any other intention; [S1 [S2 those who were supposed to know about
the deal], were supposed to know about the deal].'
One might have expected this sentence to be a tautology, but it is not. The reason this is not a
tautology is that there are different Sources of modality in the two instances of skulle. In S2
the Source is external authorities, say, laws and regulations; in S1, the Source argument is
instantiated by the parties involved in the deal (including the Speaker). The sentence means
that the intention of the parties involved in the deal (including the speaker) were the same as
the law's intentions as regards informing the proper authorities about the deal.
In describing the semantic content of deontic skulle as 'intention of (x) that p is made
true', I simultaneously reject the more wide-spread assumption that skulle 'shall', måtte 'must'
and burde 'should' denote 'obligation' in and by themselves (as implied by e.g. Sørensen
Chapter 4
208
2000). Instead, 'obligation' is an implication, a derived meaning, stemming from one specific
set of possible CS-argument/ ± θ combinations. Specifically, this reading arises when we have
a +θ reading on Semantic Form, and a Source argument on Conceptual Structure which is
different from the Subject. That is, this reading arises when, for instance, the intention
expressed by skulle is the intention of some entity different from the Subject, and the Subject
has the responsibility of making the embedded proposition true (+θ-role). This pertains to
måtte and burde as well; what is perceived as an obligation is in fact just one possible
combination of CS-arguments and SF θ-relations. Note, for instance, that no 'obligation'
reading arises if the subject itself constitutes the first CS argument, cf. (137):
(137)
Skal du kjøpe den boken?
will you buy that book
'Is it your intention to by that book?' -/-> obligation
'Is it the intention of someone else that you buy that book?' -> obligation
On the epistemic reading, the Source of modality is always External in the case of skulle,
which means that the opinion expressed is always the opinion of some entity different form
the Speaker or the Subject (cf.(138). This being a idiosyncratic property of skulle, it seems
likely that this information belongs to the lexical description of this modal.
(138)
Hovmesteren skal være morderen.
'The butler is supposed to be the killer.'
Continuing with the description of deontic modals, I propose that 'necessity' is an inherent
part of måtte 'must'. In this I adhere to a long tradition of proposals within numerous linguistic
frameworks. My proposal differs, however, from those of many other authors (especially
within logic) in assuming that this necessity is always perceived by some entity; i.e. the
difference amounts to assuming a Source of modality even for this modal. In this respect, I
follow Öhlscläger (1989), and on a more general level, functionalist authors such as Palmer
(1986:16), who suggests that
Modality in language is, then, concerned with subjective characteristics of an
utterance, and it could even be further argued that subjectivity is an essential criterion
for modality. Modality could, that is to say, be defined as the grammaticalization of
speaker's (subjective) attitudes and opinions.
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At the same time, I reject the distinction drawn by numerous authors between subjective and
objective95 readings of måtte 'must' (and other modals); cf. e.g. Lyons (1977), Öhlscläger
(1989) where objective readings equal logically necessary. In my view, the way måtte is
employed and used in natural language, the necessity expressed by måtte is always perceived
by some entity; i.e. only the subjective reading is viable in natural language. The description
of måtte 'must' is hence as follows:
Måtte: 
Conceptual Structure: Root: Necessity perceived by (x) that p is made true
x = Speaker, or
x = Subject, or
x = External
Epistemic: Necessity perceived by (x) that p is true
x = Speaker
Semantic Form: Root: There exists a necessity that p is made true
+ external θ-role: The subject has the
responsibility of acting on this necessity.
- external θ-role: The necessity is not
addressed to any particular individual.
Epistemic: There exists a necessity that p is true
The following non-tautological sentence serves to ilustrate that even måtte allows for different
entities to instatiate the first CS-argument:
(139)
Du må gjøre det du må gjøre.
'You must do what you must do.'
One possible reading of this sentence is the following paraphrase: The speaker perceives it as
necessary that the subject performs the acts which are perceived as necessary by the speaker.
The description of trenger ikke/behøver ikke 'need not' takes the description of måtte
'must' as its point of departure and amounts to the negated version of måtte; i.e. ¬, no
necessity. Note also that I have one description pertaining to both ikke trenge/ikke behøve,
                                                
95 Be aware that there are at least two important uses of this pair of terms. In the German literature, subjective
and objective mostly denotes epistemic vs. deontic/dynamic. The other important use is the one aimed at here,
where subjective denotes some entity performing some kind of evaluation, and objective denotes logically
necessary/possible, where the necessity/possibility is independent of any entity perceiveing this necessity.
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since I have found no relevant semantic differences between them. Stylistically, though,
behøve sounds slightly more archaic than trenge. I have chosen not to represent this fact here.
Ikke trenge/behøve: 
Conceptual Structure: Root: No necessity perceived by (x) that p is made true
x = Speaker, or
x = Subject, or
x = External
Epistemic: No necessity perceived by (x) that p is true
x = Speaker
Semantic Form: Root: There exists no necessity that p is made true
+ external θ-role: The subject would have had the
responsibility of acting on this necessity.
- external θ-role: The necessity would not have
been addressed to any particular individual.
Epistemic: There exists no necessity that p is true
Burde 'should' is often described as 'weak obligation'. As argued above, the 'obligation'
reading arises when we have a situation where the first CS-argument is not the Subject, and
the Subject is assigned a θ-role from the modal. Moreover, that this reading is paraphrased as
'weak obligation' and not simply 'obligation' seemingly  signals a certain optionality, instead
of the absolute necessity represented in the description of måtte. I have chosen to represent
this optionality as 'preference', as follows:
Burde:
Conceptual Structure: Root: From a set of propositions <p1....pn>,
(x) prefers that p is made true
x = Speaker, or
x = Subject, or
x = External
Epistemic:  From a set of propositions <p1....pn>,
      (x) prefers p as the one most likely to be true
x = Speaker
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Semantic Form: Root: There exists a preference that p is made true
+external θ-role:The subject has a
responsibility of acting on this preference.
- external θ-role: The preference is not
addressed to any particular individual.
Epistemic: There exists a preference for p as the propostion
most likely to be true
The deontic modals described so far are all often ascribed an 'obligation' (wiz. lack of
obligation) reading by numerous authors. Kunne is different in that it is said to denote
'permission'. Again, I suggest that the 'personal permission' reading stems from the same
combination of CS-arguments and θ-assignment as mentioned above with 'obligation'. This
assumption allows us to give kunne 'can' a slightly more abstract representation than simply
'permission'. Note also that kunne has two different entries; one among the deontic modals
and another among the dispositional modals. This move is justified on a number of grounds.
We know that dispositional modals display a syntactic behavior which is different from
deontic modals in a number of respects (cf. the previous section). Moreover, although the
'ability' dispositional reading of kunne 'can' is sometimes claimed to be subsumed by the more
general deontic reading (cf. e.g. Papafragou 1998), it is a fact that it is the 'ability' reading
which survives as a lexical main verb in various English dialects and other languages, among
those Norwegian. This points to a situation where there exist two homonym modals kunne
'can', one deontic and one dispositional. Moreover, I will assume here that it is the deontic
kunne which gives rise to the epistemic reading, not the dispositional one. As a matter of fact,
numerous authors count the English cognate of ville 'will' in its epistemic reading as a tense
morphem instead of a modal (cf. the discussion in Dyvik 1999, Julien 2000a and McCawley
197196). This assumption would allow us to draw the generalization that the dispositional
modals do not have epistemic counterparts. However, as pointed out by Dyvik (1999)
The epistemic meaning of ville comes close to 'future tense', but considering the
systematic relationship between ville and the other modals, Norwegian grammar
seems to classify this meaning as the epistemic counterpart of volition, i.e. as a modal
rather than as a temporal kind of meaning.   
                                                
96 Pullum and Wilson (1977:775) quote the following claim from McCawley (1971:112): "The future tense in
English differs mainly morphologically from the present and past; its marker is morphologically a modal verb
rather than an affix."
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Thus, what I want to suggest here is that only kunne in its dispositional sense lacks an
epistemic counterpart.  This assumption is not without problems, though. Recall from chapter
2.4.2 that få 'get' was excluded from the group of modals exactly because it lacks an epistemic
counterpart. Consistency ought to require that dispositional kunne should be excluded from
the group of modals on the same grounds. One way to circumvent this problem would be to
say that dispositional kunne has an epistemic counterpart which is semantically so close to the
epistemic counterpart of deontic kunne that they are in principle indistiguishable. This
assumption is counterintuitive, in my view, and I will not argue further for this solution here.
Instead, I will make an exception for dispositional kunne and count it among the proper
modals although it seemingly lacks an epistemic counterpart. I readily admit that this choice
is inconsistent with the discussion in section 2.4.2 where få was excluded on the same
grounds. However, as already mentioned, it is possible in principle to argue for an epistemic
counterpart of dispositional kunne, hence it seems slightly more legitimate to consider it a
proper modal. No such solution would be possible in the case of få 'get'.  
Deontic kunne 'may' thus receives the following description:
Kunne: 
Conceptual Structure: Root: (x) allows that p is made true
x = Speaker, or
x = Subject, or
x = External
Epistemic: (x) allows that p is true
x = External
Semantic Form: Root: There exists a permission that p is made true
+ external θ-role: The subject has the
personal opportunity to act on this permission.
- external θ-role: The permission is not
addressed to any particular individual.
Epistemic: There exists an possibilty that p is true
The two dispositional modals in Norwegian differ from the deontic modals in that they only
allow for the Subject as the first CS-argument (corresponding to the notion of subject-internal
modality mentioned above). Hence, one could argue that this level is less important in the
case of dispositional modals. However, as regards the first CS-argument of epistemic ville
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'will', this is instantiated by the speaker (with the exceptions pertaining to all epistemic
modals, as mentioned in footnote 93 above). Interestingly, the German cognate of ville
demands the subject as the first CS-argument, not the speaker, and the meaning is reminicent
of epistemic skulle, i.e. 'opinion', cf. (140):
(140)
a. Johann will reich sein.
    Johann will rich be
   'Johann claims to be rich'
b. Maria will Schauspielerin gewesen sein.
    Maria will actress            been         be
   'Maria claims to have been an actress'
However, the Norwegian epistemic counterpart of ville has 'prediction' as its core semantics
rather than 'opinion'. This assumption is supported by the observation in Bybee et al.
(1994:244) that 'future' is equivalent to 'prediction' in many languages, and the Norwegian
ville in its epistemic sense is typically used as a future marker.
We regard the focal use of future as equivalent to a prediction on the part of the
speaker that the situation in the proposition, which refers to an event taking place after
the moment of speech, will hold.
Thus, I propose the following descriptions for the two dispositional modals in Norwegian;
kunne and ville respectively:
Kunne: 
Conceptual Structure: Root: Ability of (x) to make p true
x = Subject
Semantic Form: Root: The subject has the ability to make p true
+ external θ-role only
Ville: 
Conceptual Structure: Root: Intention of (x) that p is made true
x = Subject
Epistemic: Prediction of (x) that p will be true
x = Speaker
Semantic Form: Root: The subject has an intention that p is made true
+ external θ-role only
Epistemic: There exists a prediction that p will be true
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For the lexical/main verb modals, the main verb version of ville may be given the same
description as modal auxiliary ville, since main verb ville takes CP complements, which also
denote a proposition p. For main verb kunne 'can' and trenge/behøve, the meaning resembles
the auxiliary versions, although main verb kunne typically denotes mental, not physical ability
('know' as opposed to 'know how to'), and main verb trenge/behøve denotes that the subject
needs whatever is denoted by the DP/CP complement. This could nevertheless be described as
'necessity perceived by (x)' , where x is always the subject. Thus, there is no doubt that the
main verb modals semantically resemble their auxiliary counterparts to a great extent.
I want to emphasize once again that the descriptions given here should be considered a
first approximation to the core semantics of Norwegian modals. Firstly, because I hope to
come up with paraphrases that would allow for the same meaning to cover both epistemic and
root senses. Secondly, because this is an experiment aiming at including a representation of
the 'rule-giver' or Source of modality which may not, in the long run, turn out to belong to the
semantic representation at all. However, there exist certain indications that the assumption
that the Source is important semantic property of modals is indeed justified, cf. e.g. the non-
tautological sentences (136) and (139) above. This sentence shows that although the relevant
"Rule-giver" has to be recovered from context, the ability to take on such a Rule-giver
argument is a property of modals that separates them from other verbs and auxiliaries; cf. e.g.
the difference between (141) with the modal skulle 'intention of (x)' and  (142) containing the
verb mene 'think, believe' below:
 (141)
Det var aldri noen annen intensjon enn at de som skulle kjenne til avtalen,
skulle kjenne til avtalen.
'There was never any other intention; those who were supposed to know about the
deal, were supposed to know about the deal'
 (142)
Det var aldri noen annen mening enn at de som mente å kjenne til avtalen,
mente å kjenne til avtalen.
'There was never any other opinion; those who believed to know about the deal,
believed to know about the deal'
It is striking that whereas  (142) is a tautology, (141) is not. This, I claim, is because modals
imply a rule-giver CS-argument, as opposed to verbs like mene. Hence, to incorporate this
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information in the argument-structure of modals, albeit on a Conceptual Structure level of
little importance to syntactic behavior, seems justified.
4.7 Summing up
We have seen in this chapter that Norwegian modals constitute a mixed group as regards
theta-assignment. Firstly, there exist main verb modals that behave like ordinary transitive
verbs (trenger(ikke), behøver (ikke), kunne, ville),assigning one external and one internal
theta-role. Secondly, there exist two dispositional modals that group with control verbs in
(nearly) all relevant respects, they take an external DP argument and an internal infinitival
complement. Thirdly, there exist epistemic modals that group with raising verbs and never
assingn an external argument but take infinitival complements; and fourthly, there exist
deontic modals that are best described as optional theta-assigners in that they optionally
assingn an external theta-role; these modals too take infinitival complements.
I have argued that theta-assignment is what is encoded by access to upper and lower
subject-positions, not wide vs. narrow subject scope. In this discussion, I argued for a point of
view which is in strong opposition to e.g. May (1977, 1985). Modals with a pseudoclefted
complement and modals with expletive subjects constituted an important part of this
discussion.
Furthermore, I have presented recent proposals from Hornstein (i.e. 1998, 1999,
2000), where it is argued that control should be reduced to raising. I argued that making this
assumption would allow us to account for otherwise problematic constructions, such as
dispositional modals with a small clause complement.
Finally, I have proposed that what is known in the literature as the source of modality
constitute an important part of the semantics of modal auxiliaries. Since the source of
modality seems to be of little or no importance to the syntactic behavior of Norwegian
modals, I invoked a two-level semantics in the sprit of Bierwisch and Lang (1989) to account
for the various readings of modals as e.g. obligation vs. intention. I argued that the obligation
or permission reading of deontic modals stems from a certain combination of entities
instantiating the arguments of these modals at Conceptual Structure and Semantic Form.
5 How modals interact with other categories
In this chapter, I want to explore how modals interact with other catgories and semantico-
syntactic markers in a given sentence. These questions have been subject to scrutiny for many
decades, within the functionalist as well as the formalist camp, and within the generative
syntax branch of the latter, the relevant data have been considered important indicators of the
possible insertion positions of a root vs. epistemic modal in a sentence structure (cf. e.g.
Picallo 1990, Dyvik 1999, Barbiers 1998).
Section 5.1 is devoted to The Bioprogram Hypothesis of Bickerton (1981), (1984) and
other Universalist approaches to tense/modality/aspect, like Bybee (1985) and Muysken
(1981). These approaches suggest that Tense-Modal-Aspect markers typically obey a strict
hierarchy in a syntactic structure, to the extent that these markers constitute important clues to
a "default sentence structure", and thereby to important aspects of Universal Grammar. The
assumption that TMA markers are subject to a universal constraint on relative scope, is
largely supported by the empirical findings of Bybee (1985), although her typological study
suggests a relative ordering of TMA markers as MTA rather than TMA. Bybee investigates a
sample of fifty languages throughout the world (op.cit. p. 5), and her investigation of TMA
markers focusses on TMA type inflections rather than TMA type syntethic, free-standing
particles; importantly, the latter have been the focus of attention in Bickerton's and Muysken's
work. Thus, Bybee's findings suggest that the universal ordering of TMA markers is Modal-
Tense-Aspect, whereas Bickerton's and Muysken's proposal imply the order Tense-Modal-
Aspect. We will discuss whether and how this can be solved within a more fine-grained
approach to TMA markers.
Our reason for dwelling on these issues is the hypothesis, represented by the proposal
of Åfarli (1995), that Germanic modal and aspectual auxiliaries may and should be analysed
on a par with the type of TMA markers that we find in creole languages. We investigate
whether this type of approach is adequate to account for epistemic and root readings of
modals in Norwegian (and other Germanic languages) relative to the aspectual auxiliary ha
'have'. Our findings, however, point to a solution where many important generalizations
assumed to be syntactic constraints on the behaviour of modals are in fact semantic in their
nature. Thus, semantics seems to be a far more important submodule than syntax when it
comes to restricting root versus epistemic readings and possible insertion sites of Norwegian
modals. Admittedly, this is a different matter in a language like English, where modals are
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subject to restrictions of a stricter and more syntactic kind than their cognates in other
Germanic languages.
In order to determine certain important aspects of the behaviour of Norwegian modals
as semantically or syntactically motivated, I have conducted an investigation of the
interaction of modals with some major semantico-syntactic categories. I take "major
semantico-syntactic category" to refer to a category which has a substantial semantic impact
on a given proposition, a formally recognizable mode of expression, preferably, of cross-
linguistic relevance. Thus, I have concentrated on the three categories aspect, tense and
negation.
I will discuss the interaction of modals and aspectuals in 5.2. Section 5.3 deals with the
aspectual and temporal properties of a modal's complement more generally. The temporal
properties of modals is the subject of section 5.4, whereas modals and negation is the subject
of section 5.5. Finally, in section 5.6, I sum up some important findings.
5.1 The Language Bioprogram and Other Universalist Hypotheses
Whether one accepts or rejects the actual hypothesis, the Language Biopogram Hypothesis
(LBH) of Bickerton (1981, 1984) constitutes a watershed within the literature on pidgin and
creole languages. Our discussion here will concentrate on one important fragment of this
literature, concerning the expression of Tense, Mood and Aspect (TMA-markers) in creoles1.
The empirical findings giving rise to this hypothesis are in fact 'old news'; the surprisingly
similar properties of TMA markers in creoles with radically different lexical bases were noted
by various authors as early as the nineteenth century; Singler (1990: vii ff.) mentions  Van
Name (1869-70) and Schuchardt (1882) as early works commenting on this similarity. Later,
in the mid-twentieth century, Thompson (1961) and Taylor (1971) drew attention to the TMA
systems of creoles. Specifically, these authors make the following observations about the
preverbal TMA particles found in creoles (as summarized by Muysken 1981:183):
(1)
(a)  each Creole language tends to have three of them; a past tense marker; a potential
mood marker; and a durative aspect marker.
                                                
1 There exist of course other categories whose realization in Creoles are taken to constitute "unmarked settings"
and "default settings" of language parameters. Bickerton (1999:59) lists the following set of semantic
oppositions: anterior/non-anterior, realis/irrealis, punctual/non-punctual in TMA systems; specific/non-specific,
accomplished/unaccomplished, and stative/nonstative elsewhere. He goes on to suggest that these oppositions
could be regarded as "the default settings of semantic parameters".
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(b) when we find more than one particle accompanying a verb, the particles always
occupy a fixed order; tense, mood, aspect, main verb. The combinations of the particles
are interpreted in fixed, and rather complex ways.
Bickerton interprets these observations in a specific way. He argues that creoles provide a
window to Universal Grammar; i.e. to our innate linguistic capacity. The syntactic systems
common to and characteristic of creoles may be taken to display the default settings of
possible semantic and/or syntactic parameters; hence, the inventory and relative ordering of
creole syntactic markers could be seen as pointing to the default syntactic structure of human
language. The fundamentals of the hypothesis are outlined as follows in Muysken and Smith
(1995:11); cf. also Muysken and Veenstra (1995: 129 ff):
The bioprogram theory claims that creoles are inventions of the children growing up on
the newly founded plantations. Around them they only heard pidgins spoken, without
enough structure to function as natural languages, and they used their own innate
linguistic capacities to transform the pidgin input from their parents into a full-fledged
language. Creole languages are similar because the innate linguistic capacity utilized is
universal, and they are simple because they reflect the most basic language structures.
One feature shared by all creoles that would derive from the innate capacity is the
system of pre-verbal tense/mood/aspect particles. Not only do they seem limited in the
creole languages to a particular set of meanings, but they also seem always to occur in a
particular order. The system of tense/mood/aspect particles, its interpretation and its
ordering would directly reflect universal aspects of the human language capacity.
Muysken (1981) proposes that TMA particles, unlike categories like e.g. adverbs, are
constrained by principles of core grammar. Invoking this notion might be seen as an early
attempt of specifying a universal ordering of functional heads or functional categories, and in
doing so, separating a set of functional categories from lexical categories (like e.g. adverbs2),
where the latter are not subject to the constraints of core grammar. Thus, Muysken (1981:187)
proposes the following:
Semantic interpretation involves two components [...]: SI-1, constrained by principles
of core grammar, and SI-2, determined by the interaction of pragmatic, lexical,
cognitive, and other considerations. The elements in the auxiliary, which may include
tense, mood, and aspect, are interpreted by component SI-1. The interpretation rule
can be roughly formulated as follows:
[S ... [AUX  Ti , MJ, AK, ...] ...] is interpreted as: Ti MJ AK (P), where P corresponds to the
propositional content of S.
                                                
2 Thus, Muysken's proposal differs from Cinque's (1999) more recent theory where adverbs are associated with
specific functional projections; i.e. as specifiers of these projections.
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Now, there exist (at least) two wide-spread and partially related views as to why the default
order of TMA particles should be the one observed. One camp ascribes the observed order to
universal syntactic ordering principles (cf. e.g. Woisetschlaeger 1977), whereas the other
camp claims that the structure of creole languages directly reflects universal semantic
structures ("The Hypothesis of Semantic Transparency)". The latter view takes Creole TMA
particles to reflect separate logical operators, fairly directly mapped onto surface structures;
thus, the syntactic ordering between them reflects the universal relative semantic scope of
these semantic operators (cf. Muysken and Smith 1995:11). A third quite influencal view
(especially within functionalist frameworks) is the one developed by Bybee (1985), where the
constraint responsible for restricting the relative order of TMA markers or morphemes (in this
case, TMA type inflections) is a principle of relevance; defined as follows (Bybee 1985:13):
A meaning element is relevant to another meaning element if the semantic content of
the first directly affects or modifies the semantic content of the second.
Bybee continues on p. 15 (op. cit):
Among inflectional categories, we can distinguish degrees of relevance of the concept
expressed inflectionally to the concept expressed by [...] a verb stem. A category is
relevant to the verb to the extent that the meaning of the category directly affects the
lexical content of the verb stem.
The workings of this principle of relevance thus restricts the relative ordering of TMA
markers or morphemes in a rigid manner, here described in Hopper and Traugott (1993:143):
Given the hypothesis of relevance, aspect is most relevant to the verb, tense less so,
since it relates the time of the situation to some other time, and mood least so since it
expresses speaker point of view on the situation. If that which is most relevant is that
which is most likely to be close to the verb, then we would expect aspect to be most
likely of the three categories to be ordered next to the stem (or even be part of it, as a
derivational form), tense next, and mood last [...]. [T]he natural order is mood-tense-
aspect-V (or, in OV languages, V-aspect-tense-mood).
Now, note that the notion "relative closeness to the verb stem" comes out as the common
principle in the two aforementioned approaches to TMA markers, represented by Bickerton
on one side and Bybee on the other. In the case of free-standing TMA particles, "relative
closeness to the verb stem" is signalled by the overt sequence of pre-verbal markers, where
the marker closest to the verb occurs in the rightmost position in the TMA cluster. In the case
of TMA type inflections, "relative closeness to the verb stem" refers to the position of an
inflectional morpheme, e.g. an affix, encoding Tense, Mood or Aspect, relative to the verb
stem and relative to the other TMA affixes.
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Interestingly and perhaps unexpectedly, the findings of Bybee (1985) suggest that the
relative ordering of TMA markers or morphemes is Mood-Tense-Aspect rather than Tense-
Mood-Aspect. That is, she objects to the relative ordering of TMA markers proposed by
Bickerton and his advocates to be universal, since her own sample of 50 languages contains
only one language (notably Ojibwa) where the mood marker occurs closer to the stem than
the tense marker (op. cit. p. 35). Now, one might want to propose that this difference could be
explained by the hypothesis that TMA morphemes display a different relative ordering when
expressed by inflectional morphemes as compared to free-standing, syntethic particles (a line
of thought which is pursued and ultimately rejected by Bybee herself3).
However, if one adopts the Mirror Principle of Baker (1985), along with the auxiliary
assumption that functional elements such as TMA markers head their own syntactic
projection in a sentence structure (regardless of their status as affixes or free-standing
particles), the relative ordering of TMA markers – understood as relative closeness to the verb
stem – ought to come out as identical, independently of their status as bound or free
morphemes. That is, on this specific understanding (elaborated on below) of how "identical
ordering" is syntactically expressed, notably as relative closeness to a verb stem, there ought
to be no divergence between free-standing particles and inflectional morphemes as regards
relative ordering.
 Baker's Mirror Principle states that "morphological derivations directly reflect
syntactic derivations and vice versa". A slightly modified version of the Mirror Principle,
dubbed the Lexicalist Mirror Principle, is proposed in Thráinsson (1996:258). This version (or
some similar version) of the Mirror Principle has numerous advocates within the Principles
and Parameters framework:
Let us make the natural assumption that morphological features are not associated with
each lexical element as a set (i.e. in an unordered fashion) but rather with the relevant
overt morphemes (when such morphemes are available). Thus the morphological
feature of tense is associated with the tense morpheme of a verb, and morphological
features of person and number (e.g. subject agreement features) of a finite verb are
associated with the agreemenet morpheme of the verb in question. These
morphological features are then checked off in a cyclic fashion as the verb form is
adjoined to the relevant functional head, beginning with the features associated with
the morphemes closest to the stem of the verb since features associated with "outer"
morphemes are not visible until features associated with morphemes closer to the stem
                                                
3 Instead, Bybee (1985:197 ff) proposes that the "Mood" particles employed in the Creole systems investigated
in Bickerton's work are examples of "agent-oriented modality" markers rather than Mood markers per se. As
these agent-oriented modalities develop (over time) into mood-markers, they can no longer be modified by tense;
thus the order Tense-Modality-Verb changes into Mood-Tense-Verb.
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have been checked off. In a language where a tense morpheme is closer to the stem of
a finite verb than a subject agreement morpheme for instance, this would mean that the
functional head T (i.e. the head against which the morphological feature of tense is
checked) would have to be lower in the syntactic structure than AgrS (the head against
which the subject agreement feature is checked). I will refer to this version of the
Mirror Principle as the Lexicalist Mirror Principle.
Assuming we adopt the (Lexicalist) Mirror Principle, one would expect the affix closest to the
stem to be lower in a syntactic structure and to have a narrower scope than an affix less close
to the stem. Applying this principle to TMA markers, the ordering of bound TMA morphemes
(i.e. inflections) should come out as a relative closeness to the verb stem, where the outmost
affix would have semantic (and again, given the (Lexicalist) Mirror Principle, syntactic) scope
over a more deeply embedded affix, i.e. an affix closer to the verb stem. On a Universalist
approach, the relative ordering of TMA morphemes ought to come out as identical on this
level of abstraction, regardless of their status as inflections or free-standing particles. Thus,
the difference between different sets of TMA morphemes (apart from lexical content) should,
ideally, reduce to a question of one property only; namely, the property of being expressed by
a bound or free morpheme, the relevant feature being [± affix].
Imagine two languages that employ the same number of TMA morphemes. The only
(presently relevant) difference between these two languages is that the language depicted in
(2)a has affixal TMA morphemes, whereas the language in  (2)b has free-standing preverbal
TMA particles. Abstracting away from all kinds of potential snags (e.g. portmanteau-/zero
morphemes; head-complement direction, possible mixes of prefixes, infixes and suffixes,
possible combinations of pre- and postverbal markers), the two structures in question would
come out as follows:
 (2)
a. Bound TMA affixes b. Free-standing TMA particles
T+Aff T-Aff
       M+Aff       M -Aff
   A+Aff   A -Aff
    V   V
      [ AffTense[AffMood [AffAspect [V-stem]]]]        Tense  Mood  Aspect  Verb
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Although this is an idealized case, where this minimal pair of languages does not correspond
to two empirically attested languages4, it still seems possible to align inflectional and free-
standing TMA morphemes w.r.t. relative ordering and semantic and syntactic scope, and the
study of one set of markers should ideally be able to shed some light on the other.
We will return to the discussion on relative ordering of Tense and Mood morphemes
below (cf. section 5.4.1). At present, let us note the fact that although Bickerton's and Bybee's
proposals differ in their view on the universal relative ordering of Tense and Mood markers,
they evidently agree on the relative ordering of Mood and Aspect, in that Aspect morphemes
surface in a position closer to the verb or verbstem than do Mood morphemes.
Now, why should this discussion have any bearing on Norwegian modals? After all, it
is an observable fact that Norwegian and other Germanic languages do not employ the kind of
preverbal Tense-Mood-Aspect particles that we find in e.g. Creole languages, neither does
Norwegian or any other Mainland Scandinavian employ inflectional Mood or Aspect
morphemes (except for relicts of Mood, such as the Optative). In fact, it is a quite wide-spread
opinion that Mood and Aspect do not amount to functional categories at all in Germanic
languages. Here, in the words of Thráinsson (1996: 262):
Interestingly, most syntacticians working on Germanic languages, for instance, seem
to assume that Mood and Aspect do not play any role as F[unctional] C[ategories] in
these languages. I have seen no syntactic evidence that they do and the approach
advocated in the present paper would predict that they do not since Mood and Aspect
are not marked separately in the overt morphology of these languages.
But there exists one proposal which is at odds with this more wide-spread view. This is the
proposal of Åfarli (1995).
5.1.1 Åfarli (1995) – modal and aspectual auxiliaries and TMA markers
The line of thought pursued in Åfarli (1995) is to try aligning modal and aspectual auxiliaries
found in Germanic languages with the type of TMA particles found in creoles. The author
first proposes that any functional projection must consist of some substance, phonetic and/or
semantic. This leaves exactly four conceivable possibilities, where ±p refers to phonetic
substance and ±s refers to semantic substance:
                                                
4 Although it is possible to claim that  (2) b is exemplified by the Creole languages studied in Bickerton's and
Muysken's work. However, the validity of this claim depends on whether or not one accepts or rejects Bybee's
objections to this relative ordering, since Bybee claims that the "Mood" particles invoked by Bickerton and his
advocates are in fact "Agent-oriented modality" markers, and not mood markers at all (cf. footnote 3).
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( 3)
a. [-p, -s]  b. [+p, +s] c. [-p, +s] d. [+p, -s].
The first of these matrices denotes no substance at all and cannot trigger the construction of a
projection. The other three matrices correspond to various types of "functional seeds"; i.e.
feature combinations which are able to trigger and head their own projections. Type b is an
overt seed, since it has both semantic substance (i.e. content) and phonetic substace (i.e.
form). Type c is a covert seed, since it has content but no form, and finally, type d is a dummy
seed; it has only phonetic substance and no content5. These functional seeds, if they have
semantic content, are to be considered operators that takes the proposition as argument, and
the author mentions as plausible candidates for such functional operators Tense, Mood and
Aspect. Thus, the semantic representation of a Tense, Mood or Aspect operator can be
described as in the left column of (4) below, whereas the corresponding syntactic structure
could be represented as in the right column:
(4)
a. T  [prop P(a)] b. [TP ...  [T  [clause NP [ V...
c. M [prop P(a)] d. [MP ... [M [clause NP [ V...
e. A  [prop P(a)] f. [AP ...  [A  [clause NP [ V...
The author goes on to argue that whereas Tense should be considered a covert seed in
Norwegian and English, Tense-Mood-Aspect particles in Creole languages as well as modal
and aspectual auxiliary verbs in Norwegian and English are overt functional seeds. To classify
a functional seed as covert in a given language does not mean e.g. that this seed has no visible
morphosyntactic consequences in this language. If that were the case, this proposal would be
reminicent of Cinque (1999), who claims that all sentences in all languages employ a
universal set of functional categories, where each category heads its own projection; i.e. in
this respect, there is no parametrization, no variation. Where languages vary, Cinque claims,
is whether or not a given functional category is overtly realized in this language6; cf. also
Roberts and Roussou (2000). This is not what is meant by "covert seeds" in Åfarli's proposal,
                                                
5 We will not dwell on the subject of dummy seeds here, since this is less relevant to our investigation. As
examples of dummy seeds, Åfarli proposes the copula and the version of do found in do-support.
6 One relevant paragraph bearing on this issue goes as follows (Cinque 1999:52): "If we ignore agreement and
negation, the partial relative orders of functional heads for which there is overt evidence[...] in different
languages appear to be compatible with a single overall order. Thus, putting the partial relative orders of
functional heads found into a single, more comprehensive, order seems to provide no contradiction, at least in a
more careful examination. I take this to be significant, that is, nonaccidental. In the interpretation I suggest, this
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on the contrary, the author explicitly rejects the view that all clause types in all languages
employ one universal set of functional categories, and Åfarli adheres to Iatridou's (1990a)
view that evidence for a proposed functional category must be found in each specific
language and for each specific clause type. Instead, what is meant by "a covert seed" in
Åfarli's proposal is a functional category sited in the head position of a functional projection
where the observable morphosyntactic consequences are of a more indirect kind. An overt
functional seed hosts a designated element which is base generated in the head of the
corresponding projection. A covert functional seed, on the other hand, does not host such a
base generated designated element, but solely the abstract features corresponding to the
functional category. Let us consider one example. Say tense is spelled out as an affix in a
language L. Then there are two possibilites. Either this affix is basegenerated in a designated
projection, in which case it constitutes an overt seed, or, alternatively, the tense operator is a
covert abstract seed, in which case the affix is not base generated in T0, but is merely spelled
out as a reflex on the verb governed by the tense operator. Look at (5).
(5)
a. [TP ... [ AffTense [VP [ V...
b. [TP ... [ OpTense [VP [ V...
In (5)a, the tense affix heads the TP, and in order for the affix to be associated with the verb,
the  verb must move and adjoin to the tense affix. In (5)b, the tense operator assigns the tense
feature to V by an inflectional rule (Tense Assignment) and the tense affix is the spell-out of
the assigned tense features. In the former case, the tense operator amounts to an overt seed. In
the latter case, the tense operator amounts to a covert seed.
Now, of particular interest to us here is that Åfarli proposes that Creole TMA particles
also constitute overt functional seeds, designated heads of their own functional projections.
Furthermore, he argues that Norwegian modal and aspectual auxiliaries are overt functional
seeds as well. Thus, Norwegian modals and aspectual auxiliaries are treated on a par with
TMA particles in Creole languages in that they are all analyzed as overt mood and aspectual
operators heading their own functional projections7.
                                                                                                                                                        
is so because the partial orders found overtly in different languages are subsequences of a single universal
sequence of functional heads, present in all languages."
7 One major difference between Norwegian and the Creole languages under discussion is that in Norwegian,
Tense is a covert, abstract functional operator which can assign a Tense feature to a mood operator or an
Aspectual operator in its domain. That is, Tense in Norwegian is assigned to the topmost verbal category,
whether this is a main verb, a modal auxiliary (i.e. a Mood operator) or an aspectual auxilary (i.e. an Aspectual
operator), and the Tense feature is spelled out as an affix on this topmost verbal category, whether it is a main
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As regards the relative ordering of tense-mood-aspect markers, Åfarli's proposal is not
strongly committed to the Universalist rigid relative ordering hypothesis8. However, the
author does mention (footnote 5, p. 146) that
[T]he order of functional projections is such that the covert tense seed c-commands the
overt auxiliary verb seed. This is necessary if tense is to be assigned to the overt seed.
Laka (1990) independently argues that tense is the highest functional projection. This
is compatible with the observation made in Muysken (1981) that the normal order of
functional particles in Creole languages is tense, mood, and aspect.
Now, if the normal order of functional particles in Creole languages reflects the normal order
of functional projections, and furthermore, if modal and aspectual auxiliaries in Norwegian
are indeed Mood and Aspectual operators heading such projections, then one would expect
Norwegian modal and aspectual auxiliaries to obey the same rigid relative ordering w.r.t. one
another as TMA particles in Creoles. That is, one would expect that in a sequence consisting
of one aspectual and one modal auxiliary, the modal would precede the aspectual and the
aspectual ought to occur closer to the verb than the modal. We would not however expect
occurrences of the sequence [aspectual-modal], since this would go against the strict relative
ordering of Mood and Aspect operators found in creoles.
Now, to some potentially serious objections to Åfarli's proposal. Recall that Åfarli
(seemingly) identifies a modal auxiliary with the mood operator (p. 146):
If we assume that tense can in fact be assigned to the overt mood operator, we get an
overt mood operator with a tense affix. In other words, we get what is usually called a
modal auxiliary verb.
Admittedly, it is not unheard of to consider e.g. epistemic modals to express some mood-like
content. Bybee (1985:28), for instance, defines mood as follows:
Mood refers to the way the speaker presents the truth of the proposition, whether as
probable, possible, or certain[...].
Employing Bybee's definition, it seems legitimate (and customary) to ascribe to epistemic
modals a mood-like status. Moreover, Palmer (2001) suggests that epistemic modals express
                                                                                                                                                        
verb, a modal or an aspectual auxiliary. In Creole languages, Mood and Aspect particles do not carry a visible
tense feature in the shape of an affix; instead tense is expressed by a designated free-standing particle which
takes scope over the entire proposition, (presumably) including the Mood and Aspect markers.
8 A note of caution is in order. The analysis of modals constitutes a small and subordinate part of Åfarli's article,
and many of the questions pursued in the present work are not addressed in his proposal. Furthermore, there is
nothing in Åfarli's proposal that explicitly excludes the existence of different types of modals, e.g. epistemic
modals and root modals, or the co-existence of affixal mood and modal particles in one and the same language.
By the author's own statement (p.c.), the aim of this article is to propose an overarching system in which to
analyze these types of linguistic markers, not to conduct a thorough, cross-linguistic investigation of modals and
TMA markers in various languages.
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exactly the speaker's attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition, and
Huddleston (1984:164) proposes that auxiliaries may constitute "an analytic mood system".
These assumptions put together could give us a point of departure for arguing that epistemic
modals could and should be considered mood operators, like Åfarli proposes. Whether or not
root modals could be considered mood operators is an entirely different question. Root
modals do not express the speaker's attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the
proposition; thus, their semantic content does not resemble what is typically understood by
"mood". So the important question is, should all modals be considered mood operators, or
solely epistemic modals? Åfarli does not address this question in this article.
Moreover, Åfarli seemingly adheres to a view reminicent of Huddleston's proposal of
auxiliaries as 'analytic mood' mentioned above. In fact, Åfarli mentions (p.146) that
[I]t is perhaps suggestive that we find modal and aspectual auxiliary verbs in
languages like Norwegian or English, i.e. languages that lack mood and aspect affixes
on verbs.
This suggestion might be taken to imply that modal auxiliary verbs are less likely to be found
in languages with inflectional mood or designated preverbal mood markers. However, a
language like German readily contradicts this tentative expectation, since German employs
inflectional mood and modal auxiliaries; moreover, these modal auxiliaries express both
epistemic and root modality, just as in Norwegian and English. To pursue Åfarli's line of
thought, one might be inclined to think that in a language like German, which employs
inflectional mood in addition to modal auxiliaries, inflectional mood would render epistemic
readings of modal auxiliaries superfluous, such that root readings would be the only readings
of modal auxiliaries. This is not at all what we find9.
Furthermore, although Åfarli quotes Muysken (1981), he seems to have missed out on
the fact that Muysken himself mentions as a possible snag to his own proposal the existence
of modal verbs in Creole languages, crucially, in addition to preverbal TMA particles
(Muysken 1981:199):
A second, quite major, problem concerns the interaction between the preverbal
particles and the modal verbs, which have not been mentioned so far, but which occur
in most Creole languages as well.
Finally, the relative ordering of modals and aspectual auxiliaries actually observed in
Norwegian constitutes a potentially serious problem to Åfarli's proposal. Recall that the
                                                
9 Note also that Icelandic employs both inflectional Mood and modal auxiliaries, where these modal auxiliaries
have both root and epistemic readings.
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author implies that he takes the order Tense-Mood-Aspect to be the "natural order" (although,
admittedly, nothing in this proposal hinges on this assumption). However, if all modals are
taken to signal an underlying mood operator, one fact that remains to be explained is that
Norwegian sentences employ the pattern Aspectual-Modal in addition to the expected Modal-
Aspectual order. Indeed, we also find examples of Modal-Aspectual-Modal and, more
marginally, Modal-Aspectual-Modal-Aspectual within (what appears to be) the the same
sentence; cf. (6) a – d:
(6)
a. Marit kan ha kommet.
    'Marit may have come.'
b. Han hadde ikke kunnet komme før.
    he    had     not  canPERF come earlier
    'He hadn't been able to come earlier.'
c. De kan ha måttet stoppe på veien hit.
    they may have mustPERF stop on wayDEF here
   'They may have had to stop on their way here.'
d. ?Jeg skulle gjerne ha kunnet ha kommet før lunsj10.
    I should gladly have canPERF have come before lunch
   'I should gladly have been able to have arrived before lunch.'
What is the status of the different modals in these patterns? Are they all mood operators? Or
should modal auxiliaries be considered multifunctional items, i.e. lexical items which are
capable of taking on various syntactic functions?11
The latter path seems the more promising. But suppose for a moment that modal
auxiliaries are not multifunctional. Suppose instead that they always signal an underlying
Mood operator. In this case, we could reject the Universalist rigid relative ordering hypothesis
and adopt instead an hypothesis which allows for the pattern [Aspect operator-Mood operator]
in some languages and the pattern [Mood operator-Aspect operator] in other languages; along
the lines of Thráinsson's (1996:257) Limited Diversity Hypothesis:
                                                
10 This pattern, with several perfect auxiliaries in the same sentence, seems to be less marginal in Swedish; cf.
Wiklund (1998:18). In Norwegian this sentence sounds somewhat marginal, as indicated.
11 Cf. also Baptista (1997: 106) where the TMA particle ta in Capverdean Creole is analysed as a multifunctional
item which takes on a number of different meanings and functions:" [T]here are several morphemes realized
phonetically as ta in the Capverdean language. Ta1 conveys futurity whereas ta2 expresses purpose and
continuation and ta3 may be closer to an infinitive marker like English to."
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(7)
The Limited Diversity Hypothesis (LDH)
Clausal Architecture  is detemined by UG in the sense that UG defines the set of
functional categories, {F1, F2..., Fn}, that languages "select" from. Cross-linguistic and
intra-linguistic variations are limited to the following:
a. It is not the case that all FCs are instatiated in all languages.
b. The FCs selected by a given language may not be present in all clause types of
that language.
c. The sequence (c-command relations) of those functional categories (dominance
relations between the functional projections) that are directly related to
morphological distinctions may vary from language to language, consistent
with the Mirror Principle.
Adopting such a perspective will help us solve the disagreement between Bickerton's proposal
that Creoles display a rigid Tense-Mood-Aspect order and Bybee's claims that her sample of
languages display the relative ordering Mood-Tense-Aspect. Different languages would be
allowed to display different orders of TMA-markers, because these markers are directly
related to morphosyntactic distinctions. However, on the face of it, the LDH will not help us
in the question of different orderings of TMA markers within the same language.
Thráinsson's emphasizes that
it follows from [(7)], i.e. the Mirror Principle, that the sequence of any two functional
categories that are directly related to morphological distinctions is uniform for all clause
types within each language, as long as the order of morphological markers [...] does not
vary in the language in question.
Thráinsson continues (in a footnote) that he does not know of any languages where the order
of morphological markers varies in this sense.
To maintain the hypothesis that modal auxiliaries in Norwegian always instantiate
Mood operators whereas aspectual auxiliaries always instantiate Aspect operators, we would
have to assume that Norwegian with its various possibilities of relative ordering between
modals and aspectuals does constitute a language where the dominance relations between
various functional projection may vary from one sentence to another. That is, to account for
the fact that we find in Norwegian the sequence [aspectual-modal] in addition to [modal-
aspectual] as well as even more complex combinations, we would have to say that Norwegian
allows for several different relative orderings of Mood and Aspect operators; which would
amount to rejecting the requirement that the dominance relations of functional projections
should be consistent within one and the same language. Alternatively, we could claim that
there exists some kind of 'restructuring principle' which rearranges the functional categories at
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LF and align them with the universal relative ordering (a similar type of approach is pursued
by e.g. Bartos (2000) for Hungarian12). In both cases, we would have to address the question
why Norwegian allows various ordering patterns in overt syntax, when creole languages
evidently allow for one pattern only; notably the Mood-Aspect order.
This is not a theory that we will pursue here, though. Instead, we will study in more
detail the various readings of Norwegian modals when they precede and when they follow an
aspectual auxiliary respectively. The immediate purpose of this investigation is to determine
whether or not it would be possible to argue that root and epistemic modals belong to two
different syntactic catgories, where only epistemic modals instantiate a Mood operator in
Åfarli's sense. If we could find evidence that the reading of a modal in the sequence [modal-
aspectual] is consistently different from the reading we find in the sequence [aspectual-
modal], this would support a division between the two categories in syntax. Specifically, the
hypothesis we are pursuing is that the former sequence always gives rise to an epistemic
reading, whereas the latter always gives rise to a root reading. If this is correct, then the rigid
relative ordering of Mood and Aspect could be argued to hold even in Norwegian, since only
epistemic modals instantiate Mood operators, whereas root modals do not. First of all, let us
look at some earlier proposals regarding this specific subject.
5.2 Modals and aspectuals: readings and scope
In Dyvik (1999) we find two claims that regard the possible readings of modals preceding and
following the prefect auxiliary ha. That is, the author claims that
(a) Norwegian modals get an epistemic reading whenever they precede a perfect
auxiliary, and
(b) Norwegian modals get a root reading whenever they follow a perfect auxiliary.
Dyvik illustrates this generalization with the following data, where the (a) sentence gets an
epistemic reading, and the (b) sentence gets a root reading:
(8)
a. Han     vil/kan/må/skal                ha dreiet håndtaket
   'He      will/may/must/is said to  have turned the lever.'
                                                
12 Specifically, Bartos proposes that this restructuring takes place by means of a "proxy" head; i.e. the empty
head of a functional projection which is available as an adjuction-site for tense and modality affixes base-
generated in a lower position.  This adjuction to a proxy head allows a category to scope over another category at
LF, i.e.  the scope relations in overt syntax may be inverted by means of this proxy head.
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b. Han har     villet/kunnet/måttet/skullet dreie håndtaket
    he has [want-to/can/must/shall]PERF turn the-lever
    'He  has wanted/been able/ been obliged/had a duty to turn the lever'
Likewise, Picallo (1991:293) observes the same phenomenon for Catalan, notably, that the
modal gets an epistemic reading when it precedes the perfect auxiliary, and a root reading
when it follows the perfect auxiliary. He uses these data to support his analysis that epistemic
modals are constituents of INFL, whereas root modals are adjuncts of VP:
(9)
a. En Joan pot haver anat a Banyoles.
   Joan may have gone to Banyoles.
b. En Joan ha pogut anar a Banyoles.
        has  could  go
 'Joan has been allowed to go to Banyoles.'
Finally, Barbiers (1995: 197) makes the same generalization for Dutch, expressed as follows:
(10)
a. Mod HAVE [...] probability [i.e. epistemic; my comment]
b. HAVE  Mod [...] polarity [i.e. root; my comment]
In the discussion surrounding this generalization, Barbiers claims that "the order HAVE MOD
forces a polarity (i.e. a root) interpretation [whereas] the order MOD HAVE is compatible
with the probability interpretation"13.
That is, what we have so far is the same observation made for three different
languages; Picallo observes for Catalan what Barbiers observes for Dutch and Dyvik for
Norwegian, notably that a modal preceding a perfect auxiliary gets an epistemic reading,
whereas a modal following a perfect auxiliary gets a root reading. Assuming these
observations to be correct (an assumption that we will modify below), there is a seemingly
straightforward way of accounting for these facts and simultaneously maintaining the major
assumptions of Åfarli (1995) outlined above. Assume that we follow Bybee (1985) in
distinguishing a functional category Mood from a semi-lexical category (agent-oriented)
Modality. Then we could count epistemic modals as Mood markers and root modals as
Modality markers, where these two categories have designated positions in a syntactic
                                                
13 Barbiers' reason for using "is compatible with" instead of "forces" in this latter quote is his observation,
mentioned in his footnote 41 (p.197) that "The correspondence between modal interpretation and the relative
order of modal and auxiliary is not perfect: The order MOD AUX can also have a polarity (i.e. root)
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structure, heading their own designated projections. The dominance relations of these
projections become clear when we observe their respective orders relative to the perfect
aspectual have. Thus, from what we know so far, the dominance relations between epistemic
modals, perfect aspectuals and root modals are as follows:
(11)
  MoodP 
         AspP
Epistemic     
modal                ModalP .....
                V
    Root modal
   
a.    må ha   kunnet     spille  piano
     must           have    canPERF                play    piano
     'must           have                 been able to                    play the piano'
b. har   måttet  (kunne)   spille  piano
            has   mustPERF      (can)       play the piano
                       'has     been obligated to  (be able to) play the piano'
In this picture, Norwegian Mood and Aspect markers obey the rigid ordering pictured by
Universalist approaches to TMA markers, since only epistemic modals are Mood markers.
Root modals are not Mood markers, but modality markers; hence they are not among the
elements partaking in TMA patterns. This way we could salvage Åfarli's hypothesis in  that
some Norwegian auxiliaries are functional elements of the same type as creole TMA markers,
and furthermore, we could account for root vs. epistemic readings of modals as a result of the
same visible element – a modal – being inserted in different positions in a syntactic structure;
in the head position of ModalP and MoodP respectively. Moreover, if root modals belong to a
functional category different from Mood, it comes as no surprise that Creole languages
                                                                                                                                                        
interpretation[...]. The analysis of the order MOD AUX must therefore be more complex than [MOD BE D Ind
R]. I leave this for further research."
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employ preverbal Mood markers as well as modal verbs, where these modal verbs would be
expected to have root readings14.
Another prediction of this hypothesis would be that in a sentence where a modal is
embedded under another modal, the outmost modal would get an epistemic reading whereas
the embedded modal would get a root reading. This prediction is by and large borne out, but
there are exceptions. In certain sequences of two modals, both of them may get an epistemic
reading; especially if the second modal is kunne 'can, may' (cf. Vikner 1988: 9-10 and
Thráinsson and Vikner 1995:76), and most clearly before the perfect auxiliary ha (data from
Dyvik 1999):
(12)
Han vil kunne ha reist i morgen.
he    will  may have travelled  tomorrow
'Tomorrow it will be the case that he may have gone away.'
Likewise, it is possible to get a root reading of both modals in a modal-modal sequence:
(13)
Det er absurd at vi skal måtte gå til domstolen med disse spørsmålene.'
It is absurd that we shall must go to the court with these questions
'It is absurd that we are supposed to have to go to court with these questions.'
We could account for these observations by allowing the catgory MoodP to be recursive
above AspP and likewise, to allow the category ModalP to be recursive below the AspP. On
that assumption, it is more adequate to describe Mood versus Modality as two structural
domains rather than unique projections, in that the Mood domain may contain more than one
functional Mood head each hosting an epistemic modal, as long as they are all situated above
AspectP. Likewise, the Modal domain may contain pairs or sequences of root modals, each
heading its own functional or semi-lexical projection, but confined to the structural domain
below the AspectP and above the main predicate projection (e.g. VP). What should be
impossible, however, is a sequence of two modals where the first gets a root reading and the
second gets an epistemic reading. This prediction is borne out without exception. In fact, I
                                                
14 Another piece of empirical evidence that could be accounted for within this type of approach is the
observation in Palmer (1986:19) that "There is, similarly, a distinction in Modern greek. Here, the same verb
(BORO) is used in both senses, but in the epistemic sense the 'impersonal' (3rd person singular) form is found,
with no agreement with the subject, while in the deontic and dynamic senses fully inflected forms, with
agreement, are used [...]."  We could ascribe this variation to the different properties of the two functional
projections MoodP and ModalP; MoodP does not interact with AGR, but ModalP does.
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know of no VO language, nor have I seen any reference to a language where this
generalization does not hold. Thráinsson and Vikner (1995:78) ascribe this effect to the
different argument-taking properties of root modals and epistemic modals:
Since epistemic modals predicate of a whole proposition whereas root modals
predicate of one of the arguments (typically the subject) of a proposition, we would
not expect root modals to be able to take scope over epistemic modals.
Recall from section 3.2.6 that these two authors assume root modals to always assign a(n
additional) theta-role, whereas epistemic modals assign no theta-role. As discussed in section
xx, root modals may also have proposition scope readings where they do not assign a theta
role to the subject, just like epistemic modals. Thus, invoking argument-taking properties
does not explain the fact that an epistemic modal always scopes over a root modal. However,
it is tempting to ascribe this effect to a rigid ordering of functional projections, guided by a
Semantic Transparency principle; where this rigid ordering of syntactic heads reflects a
universal ordering of semantic operators. This does of course amount to a stipulation, but it
does at least capture the observed pattern.
Now, consider some potentially serious problems encountered by the analysis just
proposed. As mentioned in section 2.1, my own dialect of Norwegian displays a non-standard
pattern as regards the possible readings of the order [Aspectual-Modal]. According to the
generalizations proposed by Dyvik, Picallo and Barbiers presented above, a modal auxiliary
embedded under an aspectual auxiliary yields the root reading only15. While this
generalization does hold for the two Norwegian standard dialects (Bokmål and Nynorsk), it
does not hold for a number of non-standard dialects spoken in western and northern parts of
Norway16. In these dialects, the epistemic reading is available even for a modal embedded
under an aspectual, cf. (14):
(14)
a. Han har måtta arbeidd med det i heile natt.
   he has mustPERF workPERF on it in all  night
 ' He must have worked on it all night through.'
                                                
15 Note that although Barbiers notices that there are exceptions to the general rule that the sequence [Mod-Have]
gives rise to an epistemic reading (cf. footnote 13 above) he allows for no exceptions to the rule that [Have-Mod]
gives rise to a root reading of the modal.
16 According to Vikner (1988), it does not hold without exception for Danish either: Han har skullet bo i Århus
'he has should live in Århus; He is supposed to have lived in Århus'. Moreover, one of my informants assures me
that there are exceptions to this generalization even in dialects closer to Bokmål, particularly in colloquial
speech.
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b. Han har skulla vorre en sjarmør i sine yngre daga, har æ hørt.
              he has shallPERF  bePERF a charmer in his younger days have I heard
' He is supposed to have been a charmer in his younger days, so I've heard.'
c. Hu har kunna vorre her og forre igjen.
she has canPERF bePERF here and leavePERF again
'She may have been here and left again.'
Furthermore, the generalization that a modal always receives an epistemic reading when
preceding an aspectual auxiliary does not hold even in the standard varities of Norwegian, cf.
(15)a – c; in fact, neither does it hold for Dutch, cf. (15)d, nor English, cf. (15)e:
(15)
a. Pasienten skal ha blitt beviselig feilbehandlet for å ha krav på  erstatning.
    PatientDEF shall have been provenly wrong treated for to have claim on
     compensation
  ' The patient must provenly have been subject to malpractice in order to be entitled to
     a compensation.'
b. Du bør ha gjort ferdig leksene dine før du går på kino.
   you should have done finished homework yours before you go to movies
   ' You ought to have finished your homework before going to the movies.'
c. En student må ha ridd denne hesten for å bli opptatt i rideklubben.
    a student must have ridden this horse to to become admitted in jockeyclub-DEF
 'A student must have ridden this horse in order to be admitted to the jockey club.'
d. Jan moet morgen zijn kamer opgeruimd hebben17.
   John must tomorrow his room cleaned have
  'John must have cleaned his room (by) tomorrow.'
e. Students must have taken calculus by the start of their senior year18.
It is the addition of an adverbial (sentence), typically a purpose-clause or a temporal adverbial
(clause) denoting a point in the future, that facilitates a root reading of the modal in a [modal-
aspectual] sequence, as seen in examples (15) a- e.
Thus, we have provided examples where the sequence [Aspectual-Modal] gives rise to
the epistemic reading instead of the expected root reading in non-standard dialects of
Norwegian (as well as Danish; cf. fn. (14)) , and we have examples from Norwegian, English
and Dutch showing that the sequence [Modal-Aspectual] might give rise to the root reading in
addition to or instead of the expected epistemic reading. Our initial hypothesis was that the
                                                
17 The sentence is taken from Barbiers (1995:fn.41).
18 Sentence from Brennan (1997: 42).
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aspectual uniquely and unambiguously delimits two modal domains, where the upper domain
is a Mood19 domain, instantiated by epistemic modals, whereas the lower domain is a
Modality domain, instantiated by root modals. This hypothesis did not hold up against closer
scrutiny, however, since we have found that a modal following an aspectual may have an
epistemic reading; moreover, a modal preceding an aspectual may perfectly well have a root
reading in a range of Germanic languages. Thus, we need to modify our hypotheses.
5.2.1 A recursive category Aspect in Mainland Scandinavian?
It would be possible to account for the data and still maintain our hypothesis of designated
projections for root and epistemic modals in a syntactic representation of a clause if we allow
for the AspP category hosting the perfect auxiliary to be recursive. Evidence suggesting that
this is in fact an available strategy for Mainland Scandinavian languages is provided by
Wiklund (1998:18); quoted here as (16):
(16)
Jag skulle (ha) velat (ha) kunnat (ha) åkt skidor på fredag.
I shouldPAST have wantPERF have canPERF goPERF skiPLURAL on Friday
'I would have liked to be able to go skiing on Friday'
In this particular sentence, any of the three occurrences of ha may be ommitted, and still yield
a fully grammatical structure, but the important thing to notice here is that the structure is
fully grammatical also with the three instances of ha retained (according to Wiklund 1998).
Thus, examples such as (16) suggest that any verbal projection in a clause, including those
headed by modals, may project an AspP hosting a perfect aspectual on top of it, in contrast to
the hypothesis implicit in the discussion above that the perfect aspectual is sited in a non-
recursive, unique projection reminicent of the system we find in Creole languages. If we make
the assumption that in MSc, any verbal projection (including those headed by modals) may
project its own AspP, we are in a position to account for the relevant data from non-standard
dialects of Norwegian as well. Look at (17):
(17)
a. Han har måtta arbeidd med det i heile natt.
   he has mustPERF workPERF on it in all  night
 ' He must have worked on it all night through.'
                                                
19 I want to emphasize that the term Mood-domain should be taken to refer to a functional domain with specific
semantic traits, e.g. evidential or epistemic modality. However, in employing the term Mood-domain I am
absolutely not signalling that this functional domain corresponds exactly to the functional projection hosting
inflectional Mood.
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b. Han har skulla vorre en sjarmør i sine yngre daga, har æ hørt.
              he has shallPERF  bePERF a charmer in his younger days have I heard
' He is supposed to have been a charmer in his younger days, so I've heard.'
c. Hu har kunna vorre her og forre igjen.
she has canPERF bePERF here and leavePERF again
'She may have been here and left again.'
The verb embedded under the modal must be a perfect participle if the intended reading of the
modal is the epistemic reading. Note that (17)a-c is ambiguous between a root reading and an
epistemic reading, whereas an infinitival complement of the modal would force a root reading
of the same modal in these dialects20; compare (18) a to (18) b:
(18)
a. Han har måtta skrekke sæ te pænga te kinobillætta
  he has mustPERF cryPERF himself into money for movie-tickets
  'He must have whined himself into money for movie tickets (epistemic/root).'
b. Han har måtta skrik sæ te pænga te kinobillætta.
   he has mustPERF cryINF himself into money for movie-tickets
  'He has had to whine himself into money for movie tickets (root reading only).'
This effect may be explained by assuming the presence of a second aspectual in the sentence
structure in (17) a-c and (18) a. This aspectual is deleted before "Spell-Out", alternatively, a
phonetic form is never assigned to this second aspectual. However, the assumption that this
aspectual has some kind of syntactic presence is supported by the fact that something triggers
the perfect morphology on the embedded lexical verb, and a phonetically empty ha 'have'
seems a perfect candidate. Thus, the structure of these sentences is as depicted in (19):
                                                
20 Cf. also Vikner (1988:7) for a similar type of data in Danish: Han har skullet bo i Århus 'He has shouldPERF
liveINF in Århus'. Vikner explains these data as 'misplaced perfect'; i.e. the perfect of the modal belongs with the
main verb, from a semantic point of view. Note in particular that these data differ from the non-standard
Norwegian data in that the relevant Norwegian dialects require the main verb to be a perfect participle for the
epistemic reading to be allowed, whereas an infinitival main verb gives rise to a root reading of the modal; in
fact, certain informants judges the infinitival main verb to be ungrammatical. This is evidently not the case for
Danish. I have no explanation to offer why non-standard Norwegian should behave differently from Danish in
this respect.
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(19)
          Triggers perfect morphology
       AspP
            MoodP:
       Epistemic         AspP
    
               VP(lexical)
      har         måtta                   Ø         skrekke       sæ te...
     has          mustPERF        cryPERF
The root reading of the modal is also possible in this construction. To account for this fact, we
replace the MoodP in the figure above with a ModalP, hosting a root modal. In all other
respects, the two structures come out as identical.
Armed with the general assumption that any verbal category (including modals) in
MSc can project an AspP on top of it, we may claim that the difference between standard and
non-standard dialects of Norwegian w.r.t. ordering of aspectuals and modals is due to one
property only. Specifically, standard dialects of Norwegian allow any verbal category to
project an AspP on top, except for epistemic modals. Non-standard Norwegian dialects, on the
other hand, makes no distinction between epistemic modals and all other verbal categories as
regards the possibility of projecting an AspP on top of it.
The assumption that (virtually) any verbal category in a MSc sentence may project its
own AspP, and the observation that we may encounter several aspectuals within one and the
same sentence (cf. (16) above) implies that the relative ordering between a modal and an
aspectual like ha 'have' cannot be used as a unequivocal diagnostics for the modal's position in
a sentence structure and hence its status as epistemic or root. This is so because it is evidently
not the case that there exists a unique AspP projection in MSc sentence structure delimiting
an epistemic mood domain above AspP and a root modal domain below AspP. However, it
remains a sound generalization that the "epistemic domain" scopes over the "root domain" in
any of the languages we have considered, a fact that may be accounted for by assuming a
universal ordering principle between Mood(-like) and Modality semantic operators, where the
former may be instantiated by epistemic modals and the latter by root modals.
The lack of ambiguity in (18)b is still a puzzle in the picture painted here. However,
we may speculate that the presence of a single aspectual above the modal does function as a
delimiter in the sense that it delimits the ModalP below it, since it remains a sound
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generalization that the sequence [Aspectual-modal-infinitive] gives rise to a root reading of
the modal in any of the Norwegian dialects we have considered (although this does not hold
for Danish, cf. fn. 20).
Moreover, it is still the case that a modal preceding an aspectual tends to yield an
epistemic reading, by default, as it were, as long as nothing forces a root interpretation; cf.
(20). We observe that the epistemic reading is the natural reading in (20) a, whereas adding an
adverbial purpose clause to the same string favours a root reading of the modal, cf. (20)b:
(20)
a. Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet.
  patient-DEF must have been wrong treated
 'The patient must have been subject to malpractice.'
b. Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet for å få erstatning.
  patient-DEF must have been wrong treated for to get compensation
 'The patient must have been subject to malpractice in order to get a compensation.'
These facts seem to defy a solution based on a fixed ordering of the syntactic categories
MoodP/ModalP relative to a unique AspP. Instead,  the data in (20) point to a solution where
the resulting reading of a sequence Modal-Aspectual is determined by the overall semantic
construal of a sentence. Thus, instead of assuming that an aspectual defines a structural
domain for epistemic modals above it and root modals below it, I will propose that the
semantic contribution of an aspectual favours an epistemic reading of a modal scoping over
the aspectual, whereas the same semantic contribution favours a root reading of a modal in the
aspectual's scope. This "semantic contribution of an aspectual" must be allowed to posit a
certain plasticity, in order to account for the fact that aspectuals following a modal give rise to
a) an epistemic reading of the modal 'by default', as observed in (20)a , and b) a root reading
of the modal when combined with the semantic contribution of certain adverbials, as observed
in (20)b.
 In order to build a case for these claims, we will look into what might be the relevant
semantic contribution of an aspectual in a sentence structure. I will start out by examining the
semantic contribution of an aspectual when it functions as the complement of a modal, as in
(20). Specifically, we want to find out which semantic properties an aspectual must posit in
order to give rise to the alternation in (20) a vs. b.
Given the wide-spread assumption that aspectuals provide any construction with
specific aspectual properties, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that the core properties of an
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aspectual are aspectual properties. In fact, this might seem to be a self-evident statement, but
we will conclude that this is not so. However, we will take the time to investigate the
aspectual properties of aspectuals and how they affect the reading of the modal selecting it.
We start out by examining the alleged stative properties of aspectuals. The stative
property of an aspectual is likely to be important, since stative lexical verbs embedded under
modals display the same pattern as the aspectual in (20) above; namely an epistemic reading
of the modal "by default", cf (21)a, and a root reading of the modal in the presence of an
adverbial purpose clause; cf. (21)b:
(21)
a. Jon må virkelig like pannekaker.
  'Jon must really like pancakes.'
b. Jon må virkelig like pannekaker for at svigermora skal like ham.
  Jon must really like pancakes for that mother-in-lawDEF shall like him
  'Jon must really like pancakes in order to make his mother-in-law like him.'
If we compare (21)a and b to (20) a and b above, we find that the stative verb like is subject to
the same pattern as the aspectual ha; i.e. that when they function as the complement of a
modal, they favour an epistemic reading of the modal 'by default', but they allow for a root
reading of the same modal in the presence of an adverbial purpose cluause. Thus, it is
tempting to propose that aspectuals and stative verbs share some essential properties that
cause them to behave in the same manner when they are embedded under a modal, for
instance a [+stative] feature, which can be modified or overridden by a purpose clause.
Specifically, we will investigate whether or not root and epistemic modals have
different selectional requirements w.r.t. the aspectual properties of a potential complement. In
this quest, we will will broaden our scope and investigate the aspectual properties of any
possible complement of root modals and epistemic modals respectively.
5.3 The aspectual and temporal properties of the complement
Throughout the investigation of the aspectual properties of a modal's complement, it turns out
that these aspectual properties are intertwined with the temporal properties of the same
complements. Thus,  for the sake of efficiency as well as clarity, the following discussion will
revolve around aspectual and temporal properties of a modal's complement21.
                                                
21 Norwegian modals are still the focus of attention, although English modals are included to shed light on a
progressive complement of a modal.
Chapter 5
240
Numerous authors concerned with the aspectual properties of linguistic expressions
have found it useful to distinguish a notion Aktionsart from the notion Grammatical Aspect.
One quite wide-spread practice is to take the notion of Aktionsart to denote the inherent
properties of verbs in isolation22, as opposed to aspectual properties acquired by the verb in
specific syntactic environments23. Aspect is typically first taken to denote a grammatical
category, i.e. the "grammaticalization of the relevant semantic distinctions", to quote Comrie
(1976:7). In the present discussion, the perfect (John has read the book) and the progressive
(John is reading a book) will be the most relevant formal (i.e. grammaticalized, in Comrie's
terms) aspectual categories. In both these cases, there is an aspectual auxiliary which heads
the construction and, by assumption, provides it with specific aspectual properties, in a
manner to be discussed24. However, it is also customary to refer to another set of aspectual
properties as aspect, namely those aspectual semantic changes or influences that arise when
the Aktionsart of the verb interacts with other lexical items in the clause; adverbials being an
important case in point. For instance, when a verb with a dynamic, punctual Aktionsart (e.g.
flash) combines with a durative adverbial (e.g. until dawn) and as a result gives an iterative
reading (The light flashed until dawn25), it is customary to refer to this as iterative aspect26.
For our purposes, the distinction between Aktionsart and Aspect does not seem to be crucial,
which is why I will refer to the aspectual properties of the modal's complement simply as
encoding e.g. dynamic or stative aspect, although I am aware that the term Aktionsart would
be more appropriate in some cases.
                                                
22 The inherent properties of verbs (verb semantics) constitute a whole industry within linguistics, and I have no
ambition to do justice to the vast spectrum of attested and conceivable verb types represented in this industry.
However, I would like to mention Vendler (1967) and his four verb types states, activities, accomplishments and
achievements. Cf. also Pustejovsky (1995:16).
23 There exists another widespread use of the notion Aktionsart, namely to restrict this term to the aspectual
properties of morphological (derivational) affixes, particularly in the literature on Slavic languages; cf. e.g.
Comrie (1976:6, fn. 4).
24 Furthermore, in section 5.3.3.2 I will argue that these properties are not aspectual properties at all, but
temporal properties (cf. also Julien 2000a). But for now, we will refer to the perfect and the progressive as
aspectual categories, following the minstream way of referring to these categories.
25 The sentence is taken from Jackendoff (1997:51).
26 Jackendoff (1997:51) refers to this type of aspectual shifting as aspectual coercion, a topic which is also
addressed in e.g. Pustejovsky (1995:202 ff) within an elaborated formal apparatus. In this framwork, coercion is
in general defined as a 'type shifting';  (p.111) "a semantic operation that converts [e.g.] an argument to the type
which is expected by a function, where it would otherwise result in a type error". The definition of coercion is
later etended to deal with e.g. aspectual coercion.
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5.3.1 The event – state distinction
For our purposes, the most interesting aspectual division is that between state and change-of-
state. The difference between the two could be depicted as follows (Carlson 2000):
 (22)
a.  ______________________
  ------ S ---------  (e.g. sove 'sleep')
          ____________
b. _________|
  ----  ¬S  -->|<-----  S ----- (e.g. sovne 'fall asleep')
 (22) a represents a state, that is, a situation S which holds unchanged over time.  (22) b
represents a change from the absence of S to the presence of S. Predicates denoting the latter
type of situation are sometimes referred to as dynamic predicates, eventive predicates, or
simply as events27. A predicate which denotes the pattern in  (22) a is e.g. sove 'sleep',
whereas sovne 'fall asleep' has the pattern in  (22) b. That is, Jon sov 'Jon slept' encodes a
situation where Jon was in the state of sleeping, with no reference to the beginning or end of
this state. On the other hand, Jon sovnet 'Jon fell asleep' encodes a situation where John went
from a state of not-sleeping to a state of sleeping28.
In the literature on aspect, the distinction between states and changes-of-state; i.e.
between states and dynamic situations (or events), is often taken to be one fundamental
feature of conceptual and linguistic organization; cf. Michaelis (1998:1):
Those who explore tense and aspect seek to relate presumably universal features of
conceptual structure (e.g., the distinction between static and dynamic situations) to the
language-particular recources which are available for talking about situations.
                                                
27 Note that several authors maintain a further subdivision of dynamic situations into events and processes; e.g.
Comrie (1976). This division is not very important to our discussion here, but see the discussion of habitual and
iterative aspect below.
28 Another way of characterizing the difference between a stative and a dynamic situation is found in Comrie
(1976: 49): "With a state, unless something happens to change that state, then the state will continue [...]. With a
dynamic situation, on the other hand, the situation will only continue if it is continually subject to a new input of
energy [...]. To remain in a state requires no effort, whereas to remain in a dynamic situation does require effort,
whether from  inside [...] or from outside[...]."I will not adhere to this description of the state-event distinction.
Using this description as the relevant distinction between states and events would lead us to define the iterative
(or habitual) aspect as a dynamic situation in a number of cases (e.g. Mary climbed the fence for six years).
However, in aligning the iterative/habitual aspect with the perfect and the progressive, we need to define the
iterative/habitual aspect as stative; cf. the discussion below.
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She goes on (p. 16) to quote Langacker (1987:258), who claims that the distinction between
states and events (linguistically encoded e.g. as the imperfective/perfective contrast) has "a
primal character", because it is linked to a basic cognitive capacity: The ability to perceive
change (or the lack of change) over time. Michaelis thus decides to take states and events as
the "two primary situation classes"; two classes that are distinct in the following respects
(op.cit. p.4):
    [E]vents (e.g. falling asleep or peeling an apple) are situations which (a) have
salient boundaries (i.e., points of inception and/or termination) and (b) involve change
over time; states (like being green or looking happy) are situations which do not
involve change over time, and which do not have salient endpoints. I will maintain that
the event-state distinction, as outlined here, should form the basis of all explanation in
aspectology29.
In what follows, we will exploit this distinction between stative and non-stative (i.e. dynamic
or eventive) aspect. We will take this distinction to be the primitive aspectual distinction, and
investigate whether Norwegian root and epistemic modals select for different values of these
aspectual features for their complements. Specifically, our initial hypothesis is that the feature
[+stative] is selected by epistemic modals in Norwegian, required to apply to an epistemic
modal's complement. Likewise, we will assume that [-stative] is selected by Norwegian root
modals and required to apply to the complement of a root modal.
5.3.2 Selectional requirements of Norwegian modals
Early on in my investigation on Norwegian modals, I came to suspect that the event-state
distinction might be important to the specific reading of a given modal in a given sentence as
epistemic or root. Initially, I observed that a root reading of a modal is favoured when the
complement of the modal is construed as dynamic; i.e. involving a change of state, whereas
an epistemic reading prefers a stative complement.
                                                
29 Furthermore, the temporal boundaries of an event is reminicent of the spatial boundaries of individuals,
according to Michaelis. Thus, the state-event distinction bears a conceptual resemblance to the mass-count
distinction (op.cit. 6): "While an event qualifies as an individual, a state does not. Individuality is contingent
upon (a) the presence of boundaries and (b) indivisibility. An indivisible entity is one whose subparts do not
count as instances of the whole (e.g., the handle of a cup is not a cup). Since an event is wholly contained within
some relevant period – and is fully instantiated at no point within that period - it is both bounded in time and
indivisible. A state obtains at all points within the relevant interval, and possibly at times anterior and subsequent
to that interval; it is therefore neither bounded nor indivisible [...]. These two situation types are analogous to the
conceptual categories mass versus count, which concern the disposition of an entity through space [...]. While
spatially bounded entities (like cats or cups) qualify as individuals, unbounded entities (like water or mud) do
not."  
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Barbiers (1995) makes a similar observation for Dutch root and epistemic modals, an
observation which constitutes the basis for one fundamental notion in his analysis, the notion
of polarity transition (cf. section 3.2.7, Barbiers 1995: 149 ff. f). What gives the root reading
of a modal, according to Barbiers, is that the complement of the modal denotes a transition
from a negative stage ¬S (i.e. where S does not hold) at the speech time, to a positive stage S
(where S does hold) at some point in the future. An epistemic reading of the modal ensues
when the complement of the modal does not encode a transition from ¬S to S; i.e. when it
encodes a stative situation. Compare e.g. (23)a, where the modal has a dynamic complement
(i.e. in Barbiers' terminology, a complement which denotes a polarity transition), to (23)b,
where the complement of the modal is stative (and hence does not encode a polarity
transition):
(23)
a. Marit må klatre over gjerdet.
   'Marit must climb the fence.'
b. Jon må virkelig like pannekaker.
    'Jon must really like pancakes.'
Furthermore, and seemingly very promising for this line of thought, Bybee et al. (1994)
elaborate on the importance of the aspectual as well as the temporal propeties of the modal's
complement; specifically, the discussion referred here concerns the English must. On a root
reading, the modal must selects for a dynamic complement with a future reading; on an
epistemic reading, must selects for a stative complement with a contemporanous ('present')
reading (op.cit. 200 ff):
The contexts in which must has an obligation reading and the contexts in which it has
an epistemic reading are mutually exclusive. In the future, must has only an obligation
reading.
 (i) The letter must arrive some time next week.
In present and past sentences, however, must has only an inferred certainty reading.
 (ii) The letter must be in the mail.
(iii) The letter must have been in the mail.
In fact, in the past tense and in the present tense with a stative verb, must can ONLY
have an epistemic reading. Thus even with a dynamic verb in the past, must is
epistemic.
 (iv) He must have called three times while you were gone.
And in the non-past with a dynamic verb, must is epistemic with progressive
situations.
(v) He must be trying to call me right now.
In a restricted set of cases, the reading of must can be ambiguous between an epistemic
reading and an obligation reading. One such case is [(vi)].
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(vi) He must play tennis a lot (or he won't win the tournament).
(and that is why he is so good).
In this case the epistemic reading has the present habitual aspect, while the obligation
reading is future-projecting.
Note that by "present" and "future" Bybee et al. (1994) evidently refer to the temporal
readings of the infinitival complement of a modal, and the same goes for the present
discussion. It should be emphasized, however, that "future tense" and "present tense' does not
correspond to a formal difference; i.e. there is no morphological marking on the infinitive to
correspond to the "future" and "present" readings respectively. What we will claim is that the
infinitive is ambiguous between a "future" and a "present" reading; specifically, that the
infinitve may be interpreted as temporally subsequent to the modal ("future") or as temporally
contemporaneous to the modal ("present"). We will elaborate more thoroughly on these
questions in section 5.3.3.2.
The claims quoted from Bybbe et al. (1994) above suggest that the stative vs. dynamic
construal of the modal's complement is crucial to trigger the epistemic versus root reading
respectively. Moreover, the temporal reading of the infinitival complement seems to fall
nicely into place as well, such that the combinations [dynamic aspect + future tense] and
[stative aspect + present tense] in fact exhaust the aspectual and temporal readings of the
(infinitival) complement of the modal. This latter generalization can be made on the basis of
sentences like the following (Bybee et al, 1994:201):
(24)
a. He must understand what we want (or we'll never get it [root]).
  (we've told him so many times [epistemic]).
Bybee et al. observe that "the epistemic reading here calls for a stative interpretation of the
main verb, but the obligation reading requires a dynamic sense". We might add that the
epistemic reading requires the present (i.e. contemporaneous) reading of the (infinitival)
complement, whereas the root reading favours the infinitive to receive a future interpretation.
That is, we may paraphrase the two distinct readings as follows:
(25)
He must understand what we want.
 (i) It is required that there is a change of state
from the present state, where he does not understand what we want (¬S),
to a future state, we he does understand what we want (S).
(i)  It must be the case that he is presently in a state of understanding what we want.
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Assume for a moment that this is in fact the relevant generalization: The specific combination
of semantic features required of a complement to trigger a root reading is [dynamic
aspect+future tense] whereas the combination of features required for an epistemic reading is
[stative aspect+present tense]. Then epistemic and root readings of modals select for the exact
opposite feature combinations in their complements; i.e. [dynamic+future] for root modals
and [stative+present] for epistemic modals.  If this is a valid generalization, we need simply to
identify these two properties w.r.t. any potential complement, and then we would really have
an elegant generalization with very strong predictions. In fact, we would be in a position to
predict exactly where an epistemic reading would arise, and where a root reading is the only
possibility.
This is what we turn to next; we will investigate whether or not all types of
complements of epistemic modals encode [stative+present] and whether or not all types of
complements of root modals encode[dynamic+future]. First however, let us summarize the
relevant claims mentioned in the discussion above. Anticipating the discussion that follows,
we also include non-verbal directional small clause complements in our table, although these
constructions have not been mentioned above.
(26)
Complement  Reading of modal
[dynamic + future] root
[stative + present] epistemic
perfect epistemic
progressive epistemic
habitual/iterative epistemic
directional small clause root
Our next project then, is to find arguments to support the idea that the perfect, the progressive
and the iterative aspect all encode the properties [stative + present], since they give rise to the
epistemic reading of the modal selecting them. Moreover, we will search for arguments to
support the hypothesis that directional small clauses encode the properties [dynamic + future],
since these small clauses are embedded under root modals only; i.e. an epistemic reading of a
modal is disallowed with these types of complements.
This latter assumptions has not been mentioned in the discussion above. Thus, let us
investigate the aspectual properties of this construction first of all.
Chapter 5
246
5.3.2.1 Directional Small Clauses
As mentioned above, a modal with a directional small clause complement rejects an epistemic
reading; cf. section 3.2.7, Barbiers (1995, 1999)30 and (27):
(27)
a. Jon må hjem.
   Jon must home
   'Jon must go home.'
b. Vi skal på kino.
    We will in the movies
    'We are going to the movies.'
These small clauses have a dynamic as well as a future reading. The situation described by the
small clause does not hold at the moment of speech, in fact, it would be absurd to utter (27)a
in a situation where Jon is already home, or to utter (27)b if we are already in the movie
theatre. Instead, the situation described by the small clause is  required/intended/permitted to
hold at some point in the future; hence it fulfills the requirements of a 'polarity transition', in
Barbiers' terms. There is no way to construe the small clause complement of a Norwegian
modal as encoding a situation contemporaneous with the moment of speech; neither is it
possible to construe the small clause as a stative predicate. The stative counterpart of e.g.
(27)a, which would involve the non-directional or stative counterpart of hjem 'home
(directional)', i.e. hjemme 'home (stative)' is ungrammatical in these constructions, cf. (28)31:
(28)
a. Jon må *(være) hjemme.
    'Jon must (stay) home.'
The way to save this construction would be, as indicated, to supply the sentence with a
copula, which gives a grammatical construction. But in this case, the complement of the
modal is no longer a small clause complement. Hence, small clause complements of
Norwegian (and evidently, Dutch) modals do encode both properties required to encode a
polarity transition; i.e. [+dynamic, +future], but none of the properties required from a
complement of an epistemic modal; i.e. [+ stative, +present].
                                                
30 Barbiers takes these small clause complements as the basis for his analysis, which is extended to account for
verbal complements.
31 An appropriate question might be why the construction Jon må hjemme 'Jon must home-STATIVE' does not
give rise to an epistemic reading of the modal. I will suggest an answer to this question in section 5.4.3.
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5.3.2.2 The Perfect
It is commonly assumed that the perfect encodes some kind of past-time reference, or in the
words of Dyvik (1999), a non-referential relative past32. But does the past-time reference in
any way prevent the perfect from simultaneously encoding a state? Numerous authors have
suggested a negative answer to this question. On the contrary, it is by no means a rare
assumption that that the perfect encodes a state, cf. ter Meulen (1995:5):
The perfect Jane has sighed describes th[e] state caused by the end of [Jane's] sighing.
Such perfect states are atemporal in the sense that once they have begun, they never
end.
She continues (op. cit. p.6):
The difference between the simple past and the perfect is hence aspectual in nature:
The former describes events in a context-dependent way, whereas the latter gives only
stative information.
What this proposal suggests is that unlike most states, the perfect denotes not only a state, but
the event whose culmination caused the given state as well. The 'relative past' reading comes
from straightforward inference, since if there exists a state described as commencing at the
exact time of culimination of the very event that caused the state, and the culmination of this
event is an essential part of the description of the state, then it follows that this event must
                                                
32 In fact, Dyvik makes this claim for the Norwegian (and English) perfect only: "The Norwegian perfect is
semantically very close to the English perfect, and less close to the French and German perfects, which can be
used to refer to specific past times ("Ich habe ihn gestern gesehen" 'I saw him yesterday'). The meaning of
Norwegian (and English) perfect is neither deictic past tense nor perfective aspect, but rather non-referential
relative past - the category existentially quantifies over times preceding the time indicated by the tense of the
finite verb: "Jeg har sett ham" 'I have seen him' = There exists a time in the past such that I saw him then."
In my opinion, however, the difference between the Norwegian and the German perfect resides not in a
difference between a specific versus relative reading; they both denote relative past. However, languages differ
w.r.t. whether or not they employ two (or more) different formal markers to encode what Bybee et al. (1994:100)
refer to as the "immediate past" versus "remote past" distinction: "The exact time period covered by immediate
and remote may vary [...]". For instance, Comrie (1985b:85) claims that the Spanish Present Perfect (which
Bybee et al. characterize as an anterior) may be used as a simple past for situations taking place on the day of the
speech event. Dahl (1985:125) reports that the Romance languages Spanish, Catalan and Occitan use the Present
Perfect with 'this morning', but the simple past with 'yesterday'; I might add that this is the system found in
Norwegian as well. However, the "immediate" vs. "remote" system seems to be even more intricate than
observed by Bybee et al. Evidently, what counts in Norwegian as "immediate past", signalled by the perfect, are
the cycles 'today', 'this week' as well as 'this year': Jeg har ikke sett ham i dag/ denne uka/ i år  'I have not seen
him today/this week/this year' are all fine, and the perfect is possible with all these adverbials. However, for the
adverbials meaning 'yesterday', 'last week' or 'last year' to be licenced, the simple past must be employed and the
perfect is impossible: Jeg så ham ikke i går/ i forrige uke/ i fjor 'I did not see him yesterday/last week/last year';
*Jeg har ikke sett ham i går/i forrige uke/i fjor 'I have not seen him yesterday/last week/last year'. In any case,
Norwegian seems to encode the distinction "remote" versus "immediate" past syntactically, by two different
syntactic forms (the simple past versus the perfect), whereas German does not. However, I cannot see that this
effect is accounted for by invoking the terms "specific past" versus "relative past", as suggested in  Dyvik
(1999).
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already have taken place in order for the state to hold at the time of utterance. Therefore, what
is syntactically encoded is 'state', but since the event must have taken place in order for the
state to hold, the 'past event' reading is an inevitable inference.
Michaelis (1998:51), following Herweg (1991a, 1991b), refers to the perfect as a
stativizing operator,  an operator which maps an event predication true at one time (Madge
swallow-the fly) into a stative predication true at a later time. This state predication is
describable as the aftermath of the fly-swallowing event (just as in ter Meulen's proposal
referred to above). Hence, the perfect provides a stative construal of what would otherwise be
an event predication.
Thus, there exist several proposals suggesting that the perfect encodes a stative
situation. Moreover, it has been argued that the perfect is really some kind of 'present tense'.
Cf. e.g. Jespersen (1931:47):
The perfect [...] is itself a kind of present tense, and serves to connect the present time
with the past. This is done in two ways: first, the perfect is a retrospective present,
which looks upon the present state as a result of what has happened before in the past;
and second the perfect is an inclusive present, which speaks of a state that is continued
from the past into the present time.
 See also Michaelis (1998), who, by her own statement (p.10) refines and elaborates on the
analysis offered by Jespersen, and Comrie (1976:52), who claims that the perfect has "a
present relevance". Thus, there exist several proposals that lend support the assumption that
the perfect encodes [+stative] as well as [+present]; that is, both of the features that we have
assumed to be crucial for the complement of a modal on the epistemic reading.
5.3.2.3 The progressive
For the progressive, these assumptions seem to be less controversial. The progressive is
widely held to encode a stative aspect33 (cf. e.g. ter Meulen 1995:66, Michaelis 1998:52,
Herweg 1991a, 1991b, Langacker 1987, 1991). For instance, Michaelis (1998:52) follows
Herweg (1991a, 1991b) in referring to the progressive as a stativizing operator, i.e. an
operator which maps an event into a state. For a given event, there is a state that holds prior to
the time at which that event has reached its point of culmination. This state is the progressive
state. Thus, the event(-interval) "selected" by the progressive is inot a state in and by itself
(e.g. Madge swallow the fly), but the progressive denotes a state (Madge is swallowing a fly);
cf. Michaelis (1998:266).
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For the assumption that the progressive encodes 'present', cf. almost any proposal on
the subject, e.g. Kreidler (1998:222):
[The progressive] is also about the present moment but calls attention to the fact that
the activity is in process now [...].
Thus, we have at present no reason to doubt that the semantic properties required from a
potential complement assumed to trigger the epistemic reading of a modal ; i.e. [+stative,
+present], are both encoded by the progressive as well.
5.3.2.4 The iterative
Now, the matters are perhaps less evident when it comes to ascribing stative properties to  the
iterative. Thus, we must emphasize once again that the event–state distinction is primarily
concerned with change-of-state versus no change-of-state. In this perspective, the iterative
seems indeed to qualify as a state, since the iterative encodes no change; i.e. it encodes no
reference to the beginning or the end of the iterative situation, which is the defining property
of a state. Furthermore, those adverbials that are typically licenced in stative constructions are
licenced with the iterative construal of otherwise dynamic predicates; cf. the difference
between (29)a (single dynamic event) and (29)b (iterative construal):
(29)
a. Marit klatret   over gjerdet       [på seks sekunder].
    Marit climbed over fence-DEF in six seconds
    'Marit climbed the fence in six seconds.'
b. Marit klatret over gjerdet  [i seks år].
    Marit climbed over fence-DEF for six yers
    'Marit climbed the fence for six years.'
The natural reading of (29)b is that Marit was in the habit of climbing the fence on a regular
basis for a period of six years; i.e. an iterative reading (that is, unless Marit was a really slow
climber), and the adverbial 'for six years' is the kind that typically goes well with stative
predicates. Thus, we have indications that the iterative has stative features. Another way of
depicting the iterative within Carlson's (2000) system could be as a 'series':
                                                                                                                                                        
33 But cf. Comrie 1976:35 for the opposite view.
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(30)
        __     __     __      __      __ S
__|    |__|   |__|    |__|    |__|    |__ ¬S
                   
Here, we may represent the dynamic situation of climbing the fence as the change from ¬S to
S, whereas the iterative is represented as a state framing or encompassing the dynamic
situation, characterized by the repeated sequence of ¬S and S.
 We have seen evidence that the iterative may be construed as a stative. But does it
have a 'present' reading? Looking at iterative readings of predicates embedded under modals,
the answer is positive.  Cf. (31):
(31)
a. Marit må klatre over gjerdet.
   Marit must climb fenceDEF.
   'Marit must climb the fence.'
b. Tom Cruise skal spise i denne restauranten.
   Tom Cruise shall eat in this restaurant
  'Tom Cruise is supposed to dine in this restaurant.'
The sentences in  (31) have (at least) two readings, one where the modal gets a root reading
and the embedded predicate encodes a future event, and another where the modal receives an
epistemic reading and the embedded predicate is read as an iterative; i.e. as stative34.
Crucially, the reading of the embedded predicate in the latter case is one of contemporacy; i.e.
the predicate encodes a state which is characterized by the regular repetition of a certain
action, notably the action of Marit's climbing the fence or of Tom Cruise's dining in this
restaurant. This state has no beginning and no end (which defines it as a state), since there is
no reference to when Marit started or stopped climbing the fence or when Tom started or
stopped dining in this restaurant. It would not be felicitous to utter this sentence intending the
epistemic reading of the modal if the speaker did not believe that the situation characterized
by this repeated action still holds; i.e. that Marit still climbs the fence and that Tom still dines
in this restaurant on a regular basis.
                                                
34 Some of my informants have cartain difficulties in getting the epistemic reading of (31)a, but they are always
helped by the following context: You and I are coming to visit Marit in her new house. However, we can find no
gate in the garden fence. How does Marit manage to get into her own garden? In a moment of desperation, I
might utter (31)a, meaning 'it must be the case that she climbs the fence'.
                                                           How modals interact with other categories
251
5.3.2.5 Why selectional restrictions are insufficient
So far, we have found good reasons to assume that the perfect, the progressive and the
iterative all encode the semantic features [+stative] and [+present]. Thus, according to our
initial hypothsis, we would expect these constructions to occur with epistemic readings of
modals, which were assumed to select for [+stative,+present] complements. We would not
expect them to occur as complements of root modals, however, since we have assumed that
root modals select for [+dynamic,+future] complements.
We may state these selectional requirements in a slightly more formal manner. Let T1
be the evaluation time of the modal and T2 the evaluation time of the embedded proposition;
furthermore, let "=" encode the relation of simultaneity and "<" the relation of precedence:
(32)
a. Epistemic: Må T1 (STATE [Marit klatre over gjerdet]T2) & T1 = T2
b. Root: Må T1 (EVENT [Marit klatre over gjerdet]T2) & T1 < T2
                    must               (Marit  climb the fence)
The formula in  (32) a says that the modal må 'must' is true at a point in time T1 and the
propositional expression Marit klatre over gjerdet, 'Marit climb the fence', where this
propositional expression describes a state, is true at a point T2 and that T1 is identical to T2.
These are the temporal requirements of the epistemic modal. In (32)b, on the other hand, we
state the requirements of a root modal. The root modal må is true at a point in in time T1 and
the embedded proposition, i.e. the modal's eventive complement, is true at a point in time T2
and T1 is required to precede T2.  That is, epistemic modals are temporally contemporaneous
with their complements whereas root modals temporally precede theirs. Since we have found
support for the view that the perfect, the progressive and the iterative all have
contemporanous readings, we would expect these aspectual construals to be suitable
complements for epistemic modals only.
However, this is obviously not right. As the reader may recall, we have already seen
(section 5.2 above) that this expectation is not bone out, since a perfect embedded under a
modal may give rise to root readings of the modal in addition to the epistemic reading,
provided a purpose clause (or a temporal adverbial denoting future) is added:
(33)
a. Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet.
  patient-DEF must have been wrong treated
 'The patient must have been subject to malpractice.'
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b. Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet for å få erstatning.
  patient-DEF must have been wrong treated for to get compensation
 'The patient must have been subject to malpractice in order to get a compensation.'
Furthermore, the progressive behaves the same way. Embedded under a modal, a progressive
typically favours an epistemic reading of the modal, unless a temporal adverbial is added.
Norwegian does not employ a designated progressive, which is why I illustrate this
phenomenon with English data ((34) b is taken from Brennan 1997):
(34)
a. The water must be boiling.
b. The water must be boiling when you pour it over the tomatoes.
Likewise, admittedly, the iterative construal of the situation embedded under a modal
typically does give the expected epistemic reading as a (possible) result (cf. (35) a), but it is
equally possible to force an iterative construal of the complement and still get a root reading
of the modal. Again, this latter reading comes easier if we add an adverbial, cf. (35) b:
(35)
a. Marit må [klatre over gjerdet]ITERATIVE.
   Marit must climb fenceDEF
   'Marit must climb the fence'
b. Marit må [klatre over gjerdet] ITERATIVE resten av sitt liv.
   Marit must climb fenceDEF        restDEF of her life
   'Marit must climb the fence for the rest of her life'
And finally, recall that an inherently stative lexical verb like like 'like' is subject to the same
pattern as the perfect, the progressive and the iterative. Again, the stative verb gives rise to an
epistemic reading of the modal, and again, an adverbial facilitates the root reading.
(36)
a. Jon må virkelig like pannekaker.
  'Jon must really like pancakes'
b. Jon må virkelig like pannekaker for at svigermora skal like ham.
  Jon must really like pancakes for that mother-in-law shall like him
  'Jon must really like pancakes in order to make his mother-in-law like him'
Now, although we have found reasons to believe that the perfect, the progressive and the
iterative behave like stative verbs because they have stative properties, we are no closer to a
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solution to the problem we started out with, namely, why do certain adverbials give rise to
this "override" effect?
There is one potential path to follow. Assume that we hold on to our hypothesis that
epistemic modals typically select for [+stative, +present] complements whereas root modals
select for [+dynamic,+future] complements. However, let us add the modification that these
matrices constitute the proptotypical matrices of epistemic and root modals, respectively.
What if we assume that one of the features is more important than the other, e.g. that a
[+future] complement always gives rise to a root reading of the modal, whether the
complement is [+stative] or [+dynamic]? Then, we could claim that forcing a future reading
of the otherwise contemporaneous (i.e.[+present]) complement of a modal by means of a
temporal adverbial suffices to allow for a root reading of the modal. In short, assume that a
future reading of a stative complement suffices to give the modal a root reading.
One argument in favour of this line of thought is  that the adverbials giving rise to this
"override" effect are temporal adverbials denoting 'future' and purpose clauses. Moreover, we
could argue that the latter also denote some point in the future:
(37)
 Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet for å få erstatning.
 patient-DEF must have been wrong treated for to get compensation
 'The patient must have been subject to malpractice in order to get a compensation '
In this sentence, 'receiving a compensation' is temporally subsequent to the action described
as 'being subject to malpractice'; i.e. the reading is that 'being subject to malpractice' must
already have taken place by the point in time when a compensation is received. The purposes
described by the purpose clauses is seen as a (potential) consequence of the action encoded by
the complement of the modal, hence, the purpose must be subsequent in time to this action.
Knowing that causes must precede their consequences, this is an effect of our knowledge of
how the physical world actually works. Thus, it is possible to argue that purpose clauses
denote a point in the future.
Furthermore, assume that these types of adverbials are able to give the entire
complement of the modal a 'future' reading. After all, the reading of the a sentences in (33) -
(36) is that some action has taken place or is taking place now; whereas the reading of the b
senteces is that an action must have taken place or must be taking place by some future point
in time (specified by a temporal adverbial or a purpose clause). Thus, the adverbial turns the
'present' complement of a modal into a 'future' complement, and this seemingly suffices to
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turn the "epistemic modal complement" into a "root modal complement". Hence,  we may
formulate the 'override' rule as follows:
Epistemic modals select for [+stative, +present] complements.
Root modals select for [+dynamic, +future] and [+stative, +future] complements.
Certain adverbials turn a [+present] complement into a [+future] complement.
In this scenario, we could maintain the hypothesis that epistemic modals select for [+present]
complements, whereas root modals select for [+future] complements, as claimed above.
Furthermore, these temporal properties seemingly typically correlate with the aspectual
properties [+stative] vs. [+dynamic] of the complement, where [+stative] goes with [+present]
and  [+dynamic] goes with [+future]. However, as described above, we may get a 'future'
reading even of the [+stative] complement; which suffices to make it a suitable complement
of a root modal.
Now, unfortunately, the hypothesis of different selectional requirements does not hold
up against closer scrutiny. The reason for this is that our fundamental assumption, that
epistemic modals select for present complements only, whereas root modals select for future
complements only, turns out to be false. The first piece of evidence that our hypothesis is
insufficient comes from the fact that the modal ville 'will' in its epistemic reading has a
'prediction' reading. This entails that this epistemic modal at least selects for future-denoting
complements. Now, if this were an idiosyncracy of the modal ville, we might invoke an
explanation where this modal is exceptional and perhaps not a real epistemic modal in any
case, but rather some kind of future tense marker (as has been argued for e.g. English; cf.
Comrie 1976, Julien 2000, 2001). However, in a closer investigation of the other epistemic
modals, we find that epistemic modals in general accept future-denoting complements. Note
that the following sentences are ambiguous between root readings and epistemic readings, but
the important point to notice here is that they do in fact allow the epistemic interpretation,
even though the complement is future-denoting.
(38)
a. Det skal bli regn i morgen.
   'It is supposed to rain tomorrow.'
b. Da må bomben eksplodere om bare tre sekunder!35
   ' Then the bomb must explode in only three seconds!'
                                                
35 Thanks to Tor Åfarli for this example.
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c. Han behøver ikke komme på møtet, bare fordi han sa det.
   'He need not come to the meeting, just because he said so.'
d. I følge mine beregninger, bør møtet være i morgen.
  'According to my calculations, the meeting should take place tomorrow.'
Furthermore, the predicates embedded under the epistemic modal in (38) a – c are dynamic
predicates. This means that even epistemic modals allow for [+dynamic,+future]
complements; the combination of properties we have claimed to be selected by root modals
only.
To make our initial hypothesis look even worse, we observe that root modals accept
[+stative,+present] predicates, the combination of semantic features we have reserved for
epistemic modals. Look at (39), for instance:
(39)
Jon må være på kontoret.
'Jon must be/stay in his office.'
Contrary to the assumptions made above – confer especially Barbiers' polarity transition
requirement for the complement of root modals – this sentence, on a root reading of the
modal, may be uttered in a situation where Jon is already in his office. That is, the situation
required to hold may very well hold already at the moment of utterance. There is simply no
reference to whether or not the situation already holds36. Furthermore, the complement is
stative. Recall also that the perfect, the iterative and the progressive are assumed to be stative
and still give rise to root readings of the modal, but in the latter case, we could at least argue
that the [+future] feature of the complement is enough to trigger the "override" effect.
Example (39), however, shows that even a [+present] complement may give rise to a root
reading of the modal. This is certainly a blow to our hypothesis about the "override" effect;
i.e. that it could be explained by assuming that turning the [+present] complement into a
[+future] complement triggers the root reading of the modal. If root modals too accept
                                                
36 This is an important point, one which will be elaborated on below. It will be assumed that the present reading
of the complement of a root modal is irrelevant. The reason for this is conceptual. Root modals state that a
situation is required, allowed, intended or wanted to take place. Thus, they have a communicative function
resembling that of the imperative. For instance, this  makes modals suitable replacements for the imperative in
embedded clauses in Norwegian:
(i) Han sa: GÅ! ---> Han sa at vi skulle/måtte gå
'He said: Leave!' ---> He said that we should/had to leave'
However, it makes no sense to e.g. order a person to bed, if this person is already in bed. Thus, I believe that root
modals focus on the future i.e. 'from now on, this situation S must/should/may hold', and it follows that it is
irrelevant whether or not this situation already holds.
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[+present] complements, just like epistemic modals accept [+future] complements, there is no
reason to expect that turning a [+present] complement into a [+future] complement should
automatically lead to a shift in reading of the modal from an epistemic reading to a root
reading.
Thus, first of all, we need to modify our initial hypothesis that epistemic modals select
for [+stative, +present] complements only, whereas root modals select for [+dynamic,
+future] only. However, these properties are seemingly  prototypical properties of the
complement of epistemic and root modals, respectively. That is, based on what constitutes the
more natural reading of a modal as epistemic or root with various types of complements out
of context, we can state the following. Norwegian epistemic modals prefer [+stative,+present]
complements, although there are exceptions. Firstly, the epistemic modal ville encodes
'prediction' and selects for future-denoting complements, and these complements may very
well encode dynamic events. Secondly, other epistemic modals accept [+dynamic,+future]
complements as well (albeit more marginally). Furthermore, Norwegian root modals prefer
[+dynamic, +future] complements, but they also accept [+stative,+present] complements.
When the complement of a modal is the perfect or an iterative, progressive or an otherwise
stative construal of an infinitive (and in English, the progressive construction) this typically
yields an epistemic reading of the modal, unless an adverbial purpose clause or a temporal
adverbial denoting 'future' is added to the construction, in which case it may get a root
reading.
We still have no valid explanation for the latter fact; i.e. the"'override" effect. We have
seen that an account bulding on different selectional requirements of aspectual properties does
not get us very far. On the other hand, an analysis invoking a shift in temporal construal of the
complement did not give us the right answers either. And yet, the latter approach still seems
to capture something of what is going on in these cases; the shift in temporal construal does
seem to be important somehow.  This is seen perhaps most clearly in the perfect:
(40)
a. Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet.
  patient-DEF must have been wrong treated
 'The patient must have been subject to malpractice.'
b. Pasienten må ha blitt feilbehandlet for å få erstatning.
  patient-DEF must have been wrong treated for to get compensation
 'The patient must have been subject to malpractice in order to get a compensation.'
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The root reading is close to impossible in (40) a, unless something resembling an adverbial
(e.g. a purpose clause) can be drawn from context. Likewise, the epistemic reading seems
very unnatural in (40) b, although perhaps less so than the root reading in (40) a. I want to
pursue the idea that this effect is somehow related to temporal construal of the modal's
complement. In this quest, we need first of all to look more closely into some essential
properties of the Norwegian tense system. This is what we turn to next.
5.3.3 Some essential properties of the Norwegian tense system
In this section, I will take as my point of departure the recent publications of Julien (2000a,
2001). I present some of her fundamental assumptions and the basic workings of her model.
In the next subsection, I will argue against some of Julien's assumptions whereas I adopt those
claims that, in my opinion, present themselves as valuable insights. Building on and
developing Julien's ideas, I propose a system of Tense-chains, where each verb in a sentence
is temporally ordered w.r.t. the c-commanding verb or the speech event S. Within this model,
it is possible to account for the "override" effect we find with e.g. perfect constructions
discussed in the previous section.
I should emphasize that I have moulded my hypotheses on the Norwegian tense
system in tandem with my work on Norwegian modals; that is, the thoughts that I put forward
here are ideas that have presented themselves as useful first and foremost relative to the
temporal properties of the various complements of modals as well as the temporal properties
of modals. Thus my analysis of tense does not constitute a general theory encompassing all
facets of the Norwegian tense system. Nevertheless, I believe my ideas to have some merit,
and they represent a fresh look at the interaction of tense, aspect and conceptual knowledge in
temporal construal in natural  language.
5.3.3.1 Julien (2000a, 2001)
Julien (2000a, 2001) presents a tense theory for languages universally. One essential
assumption of her theory is that any clause contains exactly two temporal heads, past and
future. These two heads can each have a positive or a negative value, where the positive value
will be spelled out by a corresponding tense marker.
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(41)
TP(past)
TP(past)
            T (Past)          TP(Future)
           [± PAST]
         TP(Future)
    T(Future)     VP
     [± FUT]
A positive value for T(past) combined with a negative value for T(future) gives a simple past
as a result.  A positive value for T(Future) combined with a negative value for T(Past) yields a
simple future as a result. A negative value for both heads simultaneously gives a present
tense, and it is also possible for both heads to have a positive value simultaneously, which
gives 'a future viewed from the past', as in the following sentence (Julien 2000a:130):
(42)
She woul-d write.
         FUT-PAST
Now, another important idea elaborated on by Julien (2000a, 2001) is the assumption that
there exists a distinction in the universal tense system between finite and non-finite tenses (or
in the words of Comrie 1976, absolute and relative tenses). Julien's achievement is that she
manages to argue convincingly that the perfect, the progressive and the prospective should be
viewed as non-finite tenses instead of aspects, where the perfect is a relative past, the
progressive is a relative present, and the prospective is a relative future37. The difference
between finite/absolute tenses and non-finite/relative tenses is that the latter are unable to
relate to the moment of utterance (or the speech event S), whereas the former typically do
relate to the moment of utterance. Hence, non-finite tenses will always be embedded under
some other, finite verbal element, whereas finite tenses may function as the highest tense
element in a sentence functioning as a complete utterance.
A third important assumption in Julien (2000, 2001) is the hypothesis that tense
elements are dyadic predicates of temporal ordering. Tense elements are seen as abstract
                                                
37 Julien mentions Demirdache and Uribe-Extebarria (2000) as elaborating on a closely related idea.
Furthermore, I would like to mention Guéron and Hoekstra (1995), who defend a similar view for the perfect and
the progressive.
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entities, although they are phonlogically realized by appropriate tense markers38, e.g. affixes
or designated preverbal particles of the kind mentioned in section 5.1. The two arguments of a
tense element are both events39, and each tense element specifies a temporal relation between
these two events. To exemplify, let T be a tense element, hence a dyadic predicate, which
specifies a temporal relation between its two arguments e1 and e2. Moreover, let the tense
element in question encode the temporal relation 'precedence', such that e1 precedes e2. This
would be a description of a tense element encoding future, cf. (43), since e2 is 'future' w.r.t. e1:
(43)
T+FUT & -PAST (e1 < e2) 40  
In any tense construction, the highest tense element can have the speech event S as one of its
arguments. The lowest tense element must have the predicate event, E, as one of its
arguments. E is syntactically represented by VP. It follows that in simple tenses, where there
is only one active tense element (Julien suggests that the non-active tense-element may be
inert), this tense element must have both S (i.e. the speech event) and E (i.e. the predicate
event) as arguments, so that S is directly related to E; i.e. in this case, e1 and e2 in (43) would
correspond to S and E respectively. The two events, e.g. S and E, must be related in one out of
three ways, which exhaust the logical possibilities: precedence, subsequence or simultaneity.
Look at (44), for instance.
(44)
a. Mary loves John. S=E (S is contemporaneous with E);  T-FUT & -PAST  (e1 = e2)
b. Mary loved John.   S > E (S follows E); T-FUT & +PAST (e1 > e2)
c. Mary will love John. S < E (S precedes E) T+FUT & -PAST (e1 < e2)
                                                
38 It should be noted that "tense markers" may sometimes be phonologically zero; e.g. the present tense is often
phonologically zero, according to Julien (2001:129). In such cases, it is customary to assume that "zero
morphemes" still have a denotation because of their paradigmatic opposition to other, phonetically realized tense
markers.
39 Julien discusses and rejects various hypotheses on the arguments of tense elements. Reichenbach (1947),
Comrie (1985) assume that tense elements encode a relation between time points. Bennett and Partee (1978),
Demirdache and Uribe-Extebarria 2000 assume that tense elements relate time intervals. Both these views are
rejected by Julien. Instead, she adopts the assumption of Giorgi and Pianesi (1997) that tense elements relate not
time points or time intervals but events, where event is construed as a cover term for events in the narrow sense
(i.e. non-states/dynamic situations) and states; i.e. as synonymous with the eventuality of Bach (1981) or the
situation of Barwise and Perry (1983). Julien (2001:127): "On this approach, John ran  is true iff before the
speech event there was an event of John running, and similarly, John was sick is true iff before the speech event
there was an event that consisted in John being sick. It follows that the precise extension in time of the event or
state becomes irrelevant, and the problems associated with the time point or time interval approaches disappear."
40 I would like to emphasize that this amounts to my understanding of Julien's assumptions; this formula is not
taken from any of Julien's work quoted here. Thus, potential errors are mine.
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This exhausts the possible orderings of S and E. However, S and E do not suffice to account
for all types of temporal orderings in natural language, as is well known. Reichenbach (1947)
also introduced R, 'reference time', to account for the intricacy of natural tenses, and each
tense was seen as a global ordering of S, R and E. Vikner (1985) proposed that every tense
involves two Rs, i.e. two reference times. Julien rejects both these views and argues instead
that each tense element is taken to specify only one relation, between two events, where the
speech event may constitute one of these events. Furthermore, there is in principle no upper
limit to the number of such relations within one and the same construction. Instead, the
number of reference times R is a function of the number of tense elements that are present in
the construction. Since Tense elements are taken to be realized in Tense projections which
project on top of lexical VPs, it follows that the number of tensed verbs (finite or non-finite),
in a construction is what determines the number of reference times R41. However, there is a
requirement that every R introduced must serve a function to be licit at LF. This means that Rn
must not coincide with either S or E or Rn-1. To exemplify, Julien claims that this is the reason
why (45) is ungrammatical:
(45)
*She is being reading LGB.
Here, the finite auxiliary states that S is simultaneous with R1, which is the reference time
introduced by that auxiliary. Moreover, the progressive being adds another R, R2, which is
simultaneous with R1. Finally, the progressive reading states that R2  is simultaneous with E.
In other words, R1, R2 and E are all simultaneous. The two Rs cannot both have a function,
and the construction is ungrammatical.
Julien goes on to elaborate on the function and syntactic realization of R. She claims
that R is a perspective time, a time from which another event is viewed, and that it might
possibly be encoded by the syntactic head T(Future), at least in certain cases, or maybe R
does not have a syntactic representation at all.
For Julien, the difference between the (present42) perfect and the simple past (and
similarly, the difference between the progressive and the simple present) is that the simple,
                                                
41 This is inaccurate, since Julien proposes (see above) that both T(FUT) and T(PAST) may be active in one and
the same clause, cf. (42), where the verb would is taken to realize both T(FUT) and T(PAST). If both heads have
a positive value, there are two tense elements present in the same extended projection of one and the same verb,
which means that the number of reference times R are just in part determined by the number of tensed verb in a
sentence.
42 The present perfect is a perfect construction where the auxiliary is marked with present tense. Thus, I have
seeen him is the present perfect wheras I had seen him is the past perfect.
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finite tenses directly relate S to E, whereas the complex, non-finite tenses contain an R in
addition to S and E. It is the tense marking of the auxiliary which specifies the relation
between S and R, whereas the tense marking of the main verb -en (and presumably –ing in the
progressive) specifies the relation between R and E. To exemplify, in the present perfect R is
simultaneous with S, and focusses on the fact that E is viewed from S, cf. (46)b.
(46)
a. I bought that book. S > E
b. I have bought that book.  S=R & R > E
Since R=S, the only temporal adverbials that are compatible with these constructions are
adverbials denoting the moment of utterance. The focussing function of R in the present
perfect is said to prevent these adverbials from specifying E (i.e. the predicate event), which
means that they must specify R, which in the present perfect is contemporaneous with S43:
(47)
I have bought that book now/*yesterday.
On the other hand, in the past and future perfect, R does not coincide with S, which is why
temporal adverbials in these constructions need not specify R, they may also specify E,
according to Julien. This accounts for the ambiguity of the following sentences:
(48)
a. Mary had arrived at six o'clock.
b. When you arrive at seven, she will have arrived at six.
The ambiguity is seen by the two possible paraphrases of each of these sentences; either
Mary's arrival took  (or will take ) place at six o'clock, or she had (or will have) arrived by six
o'clock. In the former case, the adverbial specifies E, the predicate event time, in the latter
case, it specifies R, the reference time.
                                                
43 In fact, this turns out to be inaccurate, according to my own observations. First of all, it is perfectly possible in
Norwegian to add adverbials to this construction, adverbials that do not specify the moment of utterance, as long
as they belong to the same daily, weekly, monthly or yearly cycle (cf. footnote 32) e.g. Jeg har kjøpt mange
bøker i dag/denne uka/ denne måneden/ i år 'I have bought many books today/this week/this month/this year'.
Julien mentions (2001:143) that the speech event is not necessarily construed as intrinsically punctual, an
assumption that might account for this fact, although I am not sure how to incorporate this in the system outlined
here. Secondly, one possible piece of counterevidence to Julien's assumptions about the possible specification of
R vs. E  is a sentence like the following, where both E and R are specified at once, and the perfect in question is
the present perfect:
(i) Hver gang jeg ringer min mor, har hun sovet dårlig natten før.
    'Each time I call my mother, she has slept badly the night before'
Here, the adverbial clause Hver gang...'every time...' specifies R, whereas natten før 'the night before' specifies
E.
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5.3.3.2 A different approach
Firstly, I will raise a few objections to Julien's system. In her approach, complex tenses
typically imply the existence of several clauses, where one is embedded into the other. Each
verb in a construction projects the two temporal heads T(Past) and T(Future) on top of it, and
since, by Julien's assumption (cf. above), each clause can contain only two temporal heads as
a maximum, we need (in most cases) one clause, each containing these two heads, for each
lexical verb44. In addition, every extended projection of each verb in any clause must contain
a FinP, encoding ±finiteness. This yields, in my view, unneccessary complex structural
representations for each sentence. I see no a priori reason why finiteness and tense could not
be encoded by the same functional head, as long as they clearly do not correspond to two
different, separable affixes in Mainland Scandinavian45.
Secondly, although Julien assigns a temporal function to the perfect participle, notably
the function of bearing the 'non-finite past' marking, she assigns no such temporal function to
the infinitive, which has as its sole function to lexicalize the V head of the predicate VP. In
fact, Julien explicitly rejects that the infinitive has any temporal marking (cf. Julien 2001:126,
"the (infinitival) main verb is uninflected"). In my view, the infinitive does have a temporal
function on a par with the perfect participle and partakes in the temporal construal of
Norwegian sentences, thus I will ascribe temporal properties to the infinitive as well46. This
point will be elaborated on below.
Thirdly, though I strongly admire the effort to invent a theory that accounts for all
possible tense combinations in all possible languages, the extent and ambition of such an
endavour may in some cases jeopardize the accuracy and adequacy of the description of each
                                                
44 Again, the exception is when both T(FUT) and T(PAST) have a positive value, where e.g. the verb would
realizes both heads. Note also that the definition of 'clause' is fully dependent on the assumption that two T(ense)
heads are, universally, the maximal number of T(ense) heads in a single clause. Thus, if two 'past' relations are to
be licit in one and the same construction (e.g. She had [past] eaten [past]), it follows that we need two T(PAST)
heads to incommodate these relations. Since Julien assumes as a universal principle that only one single
T(PAST)  head is projected pr. clause (in addition to one single T(FUT)), it follows that such constructions must
be biclausal.
45 It seems that Julien's reason for assuming a separate Finiteness projection is the fact that subject agreement
always co-occurs with finiteness (Julien 2000a: 63): "Since subject agreement always co-occurs with finiteness,
one might reasonably guess that it is the Finite head which hosts subject agreement [...]."  While I agree that
assuming a separate projection FinP is one reasonable way of accounting for this fact, one might assume that this
could be accounted for by assuming that a feature [FIN] could be hosted by another projection, like e.g. a T-
projection. A T-projection carrying the feature [+FIN] would then be assumed to trigger subject agreement,
whereas a T-projection lacking this feature does not trigger subject agreement.
Another point is that MSc in general does not employ subject-verb agreement, except as relicts. Thus,
one might want to claim that a FINP could be parametrized as well, and possibley lacking in MSc.
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specific language. Specifically, I will claim below that Mainland Scandinavian languages do
not employ 'future' in their tense systems, since 'future' is not morphologically encoded47. One
way to implement this idea in Julien's system would be to allow the two different tense heads
to be parametrized, where languages may select T(Past) only, T(Future) only, both heads, or
none. Evidence to support this idea is found in Comrie (1985:48 ff), where the author
discusses languages where a) only a future/non-future distinction is made, b) languages where
only a past/non-past distinction is made, and c) "languages that lack tense altogether". Julien
herself provides data from languages where, evidently, both the past/non-past and the
future/non-future distinction are made. In my view, MSc belong to the languages in b); i.e.
languages that make the past/non-past distinction only. This does not mean, of course, that
Norwegian is unable to express 'future'. Just like languages that lack
morphologically/syntactically encoded tense features altogether may express temporal
relations by modal or lexical means, MSc employs e.g. modals to fill in the gaps in the tense
paradigm. Thus, contrary to Juliens assumptions, I do not take the modal ville 'will' to be a
marker for future tense, but a modal auxiliary denoting 'intention' in its root reading and
'prediction' in its epistemic reading. As such, it does give rise to a future reading of its
complement, but it does not belong to the inventory of markers in the Norwegian tense system
per se. Likewise, all the other root and epistemic modals may give rise to a future reading of
their complements without explicitly acting as tense markers. Instead, I will take the two-way
distinction mentioned in Comrie (1985:48ff) to be the fundamental split in the Norwegian
tense system, where 'past' is morphologically encoded as a preterite and the 'non-past' is
morphologically encoded as present.
While the general theory allows us a three-way distinction within absolute tense, many
languages in fact have a basic two-way split [...]. Past versus non-past is [...] the basic
tense-split in many European languages, with sub-divisions within non-past
(especially future as oppsed to the present) being at best secondary: thus the so-called
present tense in such languages is frequently used for future time-reference [...].
Adopting Julien's hypothesis of non-finite tense, I would like to propose that Norwegian
employs the following distinctions: finite versus non-finite and past versus non-past. Contrary
to Julien's assumptions, I claim that the infinitive functions as the non-finite non-past tense in
                                                                                                                                                        
46 Julien herself (p.c.) agrees that this might be a possibility, at least for Norwegian. She admits that she has not
focussed on the possible temporal contribution of the infinitive in her work.
47 Julien mentions that Solà (1994) expresses the view that the future in English is not a tense either, but a mood.
Like the view defended here, Solà assumes a [± PAST] tense distinction in English.
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Norwegian tense constructions. This yields the following paradigm (which will be modified
below).
(49)
          +Finite        -Finite
            +Past         preterite          perfect48
            -Past          present         infinitive
The main difference between Julien's model and the paradigm above is that I ascribe to the
infinitive a prominent place in the tense system, and that I do not assume 'future' to be
expressed by a designated tense element in Norwegian.
Furthermore, I will adopt Julien's account of the arguments of tense elements, namely,
that tense elements, in Norwegian expressed by tense affixes, establish a temporal ordering
between events, where the speech event may be one of these events49. I want to advocate
below the idea that each and every verbal predicate denotes an event (in the wide sense,
encompassing states; cf. fn. 39), and that this event takes part in temporal construal. This
means, for instance, that I take modal auxiliaries to denote their own separate events; they do
not express temporal facets of other events, as suggested by Julien's approach outlined above.
That is, on my approach, modals provide their own Es (i.e. predicate events)50.
In addition, I exploit Julien's idea that finite tenses relate to S whereas non-finite
tenses relate to R. However, I will claim that the R in question is provided by the c-
commanding verb; in fact, in my proposal, there are in a sense no R's, only E's, since each
verb provides an E which functions as an R  w.r.t. to the following verb.
Finally, I assume that any verbal predicate in Norwegian contains a tense-element, i.e.
there are no untensed verbs in Norwegian (this claim will be elaborated on in section 5.4.3).
The tense element of any given verb encodes a temporal relation between two events. If the
                                                
48 Note that this is the non-finite perfect; i.e. the perfect construction stripped of any finite marking. We return to
this point below.
49 It is possible to say that "event" here is short-hand for "event-argument" of the kind suggested by Davidson
(1967).
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tense element in question is a non-finite tense element, it encodes a relation between the event
denoted by the verb c-commanding the tense element and the event denoted by the verb
containing the tense element (i.e. the verb containing the affix denoting the tense element).
Alternatively, if the tense element in question is a finite tense element, it encodes a temporal
relation between S (the speech event) and the event denoted by the verb containing the tense-
element.
To exemplify, a sentence containing three verbal predicates contains three tense
elements, hence three temporal relations, and each relation specifies the temporal ordering of
two events – which means that there are four events in all, since S constitutes the topmost
event. Thus, these three verbal predicates constitute a Tense-chain with four links, with S as
the topmost or left-most link in the Tense-chain; cf. (50). Note that e.g. skulle is shorthand for
the tense-element [+PAST, +FINITE] expressed by the preterite form skulle:
(50)
              e1 e2 e3
Marit skulle prøve å komme.  --> skulle (S, e1), prøve (e1, e2), komme (e2, e3)
Marit should try to come
'Marit would try to come.'
This means that the Tense-chain in question consists of the four events (S, e1,e2 and e3), where
e1 is the event denoted by the modal skulle, e2 is the event denoted by the verb prøve and e3 is
the event denoted by komme. The verbal predicates involved are thus hooked up to one
another in a 'tongue and groove' fashion, where their respective tense elements anchor the
verb w.r.t. the previous event in the chain, whereas the event denoted by the verb itself
provides the anchor for the next tense element in the construction. Thus, the tense element of
skulle orders the event denoted by skulle w.r.t. S, the tense-element of prøve orders the event
denoted by prøve w.r.t. the event denoted by skulle and finally, the tense-element of komme
orders the event denoted by komme w.r.t. the event denoted by prøve.
Now, we have not addressed the nature of the temporal ordering imposed by the
specific tense elements. We have only stated that each tense-element encodes the relation
between two events, we have not specified what relation between these two events is encoded
by the various tense elements. However, since I am already committed to the assumption that
Norwegian employs a past/non-past distinction only, it follows that I believe these two
relations to be the only two relations that could possibly be encoded by Norwegian tense
                                                                                                                                                        
50 Below, I will argue that even aspectuals provide their own E's; i.e. they encode their own events. For
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elements. The"' past relation" is expressed by a) the perfect, which encodes the non-finite
"past relation" (we will return to the perfect below and specify this assumption) and by the
preterite, which is the finite "past relation". Now, recall that the difference between finite and
non-finite tense elements is that finite tense elements relate to S (which means that they take S
as their first argument), whereas non-finite tense-elements relate to the c-commanding verb.
Thus, the past-relation expressed by the preterite modal skulle in (50) takes S as its first
argument and the event denoted by skulle as its second argument, and orders S as 'after' the
event denoted by skulle:
(51)
         skulle [+PAST, +FIN] (S > eSKULLE)
This amounts to saying that the tense element of skulle has two features. Firstly, the "past
relation" encoded by the tense element signals that the event instantiating its first argument is
subsequent in time to the event instantiating its second argument. Secondly, [+FIN], i.e. the
finiteness feature, signals that the first argument of this specific tense element is S, the speech
event. In short, S is temporally subsequent to the event denoted by skulle, which means that
the event denoted by skulle is 'past relative to S'.
Now, the second temporal relation expressed by the Norwegian tense system is the
non-past. Recall the quote from Comrie (1985) above where it was stated that the non-past
form encompasses 'present' as well as 'future'. Thus, we have two ways of representing this
relation. One choice is to represent it as ((e1= e2) v (e1< e2)), which means that e1 is either
contemporaneous with e2 or e1 precedes e2. This means that e2 is either 'present' w.r.t e1 or e2
is 'future' w.r.t. e1; recall that the non-past forms are underspecified w.r.t. these two relations,
since it encodes both, simultaneously. Our other choice is to represent the non-past relation
simply as the "elsewhere" case, i.e. as the negated 'past' relation ¬ (e1  >e2), which means
'non-past'. This amounts to saying that the non-past form encodes 'everything but' the past-
relation; i.e. the present as well as the future. The latter representation is the one we will
employ in what follows, but keep in mind that it equals the representation ((e1= e2) v (e1< e2))
in all relevant respects.
Now, let us look at the finite non-past tense element. This amounts to the present. The
present is represented by the matrix [-PAST, +FIN], which means that it imposes a non-past
                                                                                                                                                        
expository purposes, however, I want to keep these assumptions in the background at present.
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relation on its two arguments, and because of the positive value of the finiteness feature, we
know that the first of these arguments is S:
 (52)
a. Marit kommer. kommer [-PAST,+FIN] ¬ (S > eKOMME )
   'Marit comesPRES.'
b. Marit liker Jon. liker [-PAST,+FIN] ¬ (S  > eLIKE)
    'Marit likesPRES John.'
The information encoded in this tense element, then, is that it imposes a non-past relation
between its two event arguments, a relation that encompasses the 'present' as well as the
'future'. Thus, the event denoted by the verbal predicate is anything from 'future' to
'contemporaneous' w.r.t. S, the speech event. We know from section 5.3.2 that dynamic
predicates tend to get a 'future' reading whereas stative predicates tend to get a 'present'
reading, at least this is the case for the infinitival complements of modals. We can observe the
same effect in the present; cf.  (52) a versus b. The dynamic predicate kommer 'comes' is
easily construed as 'future' w.r.t. S, whereasthe stative predicate liker 'likes' is hard to construe
as 'future'. The natural reading of this stative predicate is simultaneity, i.e. 'present'. However,
this is not information encoded in the tense element. The tense element encodes only two bits
of information; one, the relation imposed by the tense element on its two arguments is the
non-past relation; and two, the first of these arguments is S, because the tense element has a
positive value for the finiteness feature. The actual choice between a 'future' and 'present'
reading is thus not imposed by the tense element, this is an effect of the aspectual properties
of the predicates carrying the tense element as an affix.
Now, to the infinitive. Recall from the table in (49) that the infinitive is the non-finite
non-past. Hence, the infinitive is the non-finite tense element ranging from present to future,
and the relation this tense element imposes on its two event arguments is the relation of non-
past, just like the present. However, unlike the present, the infinitive does not take S as its
first argument; being non-finite, it takes as its first argument the event of the c-commanding
verb.
(53)
a. Jon skal arbeide. arbeide [-PAST,-FIN]  ¬ (eSKULLE   > eARBEIDE )
    Jon shall work
   'Jon is supposed to work.'
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b. Jon skulle arbeide. arbeide [-PAST,-FIN] ¬ (eSKULLE   > eARBEIDE )
    Jon should work
   'Jon was supposed to work.'
Now, notice that the representation of the infinitival tense element is identical in a and b.
However, we know that the event denoted by arbeide is 'future' or 'present' w.r.t S in (53) a,
whereas the same event might be in the past, relative to S, in (53) b. This is expected on the
theory outlined here. The tense element of arbeide, being non-finite, cannot relate directly to
S. It relates solely to the event denoted by the c-commanding verb, in this case skal/skulle.
Now, whereas skal in (53) a is present, hence encodes a [-PAST, +FIN] tense element, skulle
in (53) b is preterite and encodes a [+PAST,+FIN] tense element. Thus, skal is non-past w.r.t.
S, and skulle is past w.r.t. to S. The tense element of the matrix verb is what relates to S,
whereas the infinitive relates to the matrix verb. Thus, the event denoted by arbeide may be
construed as 'non-past relative to S' in (53) a because of its dependence on the c-commanding
verb, which is 'non-past relative to S'. On the other hand, the event denoted by arbeide in (53)
b may be construed as 'past relative to S' because its c-commanding verb is 'past relative to S'.
This effect might be called "temporal inheritance", since the temporal construal of arbeide
relative to S depends on the relation between the c-commanding verb (e.g. skal/skulle) and S.
Now, consider an apparent counter-example to these claims; cf. (54):
(54)
 Jon skulle arbeide i morgen, sa han.   arbeide [-PAST,-FIN]  ¬ (eSKULLE   > eARBEIDE )
  Jon should work tomorrow, said he
 'Jon was going to work tomorrow, he said.'
In this sentence, the event denoted by arbeide is construed as 'future relative to S', even
though skulle is still 'past relative to S'. Thus, this is an apparent counter-example to 'temporal
inheritance'. This is not so, however. Since arbeide in (54) is still non-past relative to skulle,
which is the information encoded by the tense element, it may be construed as 'future' relative
to skulle, and since the tense element does not encode any restriction on how far into the
future this event may be w.r.t. skulle, it follows that the event denoted by arbeide may even
be construed as 'future relative to S'. The tense system simply remains silent about this
relation; the only two relations encoded is the relation beween arbeide and skulle (encoded by
the infinitive) and the relation between skulle and S (encoded by the preterite). Note however,
that the temporal construal of arbeide relative to S must be compatible with the overall
temporal construal, which it is in (54), unlike in (55) below:
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(55)
*Jon skal arbeide i går, sa han.     arbeide [-PAST,-FIN]  ¬ (eSKULLE   > eARBEIDE )
Jon shall work yesterday said he
'Jon will work yesterday, he said.'
In this sentence, there is nothing to licence the adverbial i går 'yesterday', since the only two
temporal relations encoded is the non-past relation encoded by the infinitive arbeide, and the
non-past relation encoded by the present skal. Thus, neither of the events may be construed as
'past relative to S', and the adverbial i går is illicit.
Now, as regards the choice between 'future' and 'present', both being encompassed by
finite or non-finite non-past forms, we see once again that the aspectual properties of the verb
carrying the non-past tense element (i.e. the tense affix) are decisive, such that dynamic
predicates typically give rise to a 'future' construal, whereas stative predicates give rise to a
'present' construal. We have observed that the present (i.e. the finite non-past tense element) is
subject to this effect (cf.  (52)). Moreover, this effect was alluded to in section 5.3.2, where it
was observed w.r.t. to the infinitive as well. A similar observation is mentioned in Stowell
(2000), who attributes this observation to Zagona (1990):
When the complement of a modal is stative (including habitual and progressive
construals of eventive predicates), the eventuality-time (or the interval of habitual
quantification) may coincide with the modal's evaluation time, but when the
complement of a modal is eventive, it must be irrealis/forward-shifted.
A dynamic predicate, like komme 'come', typically gives rise to the 'future' construal, i.e. the
infinitive is construed as 'future' w.r.t. the c-commanding verb, whereas a stative verb like like
'like' typically gives rise to a temporal construal where the event denoted by like is 'present'
w.r.t. the c-commanding verb, cf. (56):
(56)
a. Marit må komme. komme [-PAST,-FIN]  ¬ (eMÅ   > eKOMME )
    'Marit must come.'
b. Marit må like pannekaker.  like [-PAST,-FIN]  ¬ (eMÅ   > eLIKE )
    'Marit must like pancakes.'
As represented in the formulas, though, the choice between 'future' and 'present' is not
encoded by the tense element of the infinitive. This tense element simply encodes that the
relation between its two arguments is the non-past relation, and that the first of these
arguments is the event denoted by the c-commandig verb. The choice between a 'future' or
'present' construal of the non-past relation is instead affected by the aspectual properties of the
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predicates involved, as parallelled by the finite non-past; i.e. the present, as described above
(cf.  (52)). However, as opposed to the finite non-past, which relates directly to S, the
aspectual properties of the c-commanding verb also are important to this choice in the case of
the non-finite non-past (i.e. the infinitive). That is, the aspectual properties of the verb
carrying the infintive tense element are important, but even the properties of the c-
commanding verb have influence on the choice between a 'future' and 'present' reading of the
complement. For instance, if we replace the modal må in (56) b with the modal ville, it is
easier to get a 'future' construal of the stative infinitive, simply because ville denotes intention
(root) or prediction (epistemic); both being "future-projecting" predicates in the sense that
their complements are construed as 'future' w.r.t. the modal.
Now, to the most complex tense element of all, the non-finite past construction which
is the non-finite perfect. First of all, note that Julien assumes the auxiliary ha 'have' to be an
integral part of the non-finite past construction, and I adhere to this assumption (a question
that will be specified below). The reason why we need to make this assumption is the fact that
deleting the aspectual ha (a phenomenon known as ha-deletion or ha-omission) deprives the
construction of some essential temporal properties, as described below in section 5.3.3.3.
Thus, we will regard the non-finite perfect as a compound, consisting of the non-finite
auxiliary ha and the perfect participle, and this complex construction is what gives us the
'non-finite past tense' construal.
Now, recall that non-finite tense elements relate to the event denoted by the c-
commanding verb. If we assume that the non-finite perfect is a compound which encodes the
non-finite past tense element, this ought to be the case for the perfect as well. That is, let us
assume for now that the non-finite perfect is a compound tense, where e.g. ha spist together
expresses the matrix [+PAST, -FIN](an assumption that I will modify below). Being non-
finite, this compound relates to the c-commanding verb, and expressing 'past', the compound
denotes a 'past' relation between its two arguments. On the face of it, these assumptions give
the right results, cf. (57):
(57)
a. Jon må ha spist. ha spist [+PAST,-FIN] (eMÅ  > eHA SPIST )
   Jon mustPRES have eaten
   'Jon must have eaten.' 
b. Jon måtte ha spist. ha spist [+PAST,-FIN] (eMÅTTE  > eHA SPIST )
    Jon mustPAST have eaten
   'Jon had to have eaten.'
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This would again constitute an example of "temporal inheritance" since the event denoted by
ha spist inherits its temporal construal w.r.t. S from the relation between the c-commanding
verb and S. Thus, whereas the present modal må is non-past w.r.t. S and the preterite modal
måtte is past relative to S, the event denoted by ha spist is 'past relative to må/måtte' in both
cases; compare the two time-lines depicted in (58):
(58)
a.  S
(eMÅ  > eHA SPIST )    ¬ (S  >  eMÅ )51
 
ha spist må
b.   S
          
(eMÅTTE  > eHA SPIST )       (S >  eMÅTTE)
        ha spist          måtte
However, these assumptions are clearly insufficient to account for the various temporal
construals possible with the non-finite perfect. To exemplify, let us look at (59) a below, and
compare this sentence to (57)a, repeated here as (59) b:
(59)
a. Jon må ha spist før han kommer
    Jon must have eaten before he arrives
   'John must have eaten before he arrives.'
b. Jon må ha spist. ha spist [+PAST,-FIN] (eMÅ  > eHA SPIST )
   Jon mustPRES have eaten
   'Jon must have eaten.' 
Whereas the representation of the temporal relations in (59)b gives the right result for this
sentence, it is obviously insufficient for the temporal relations in (59)a. In the latter case, the
natural reading is crucially not that ha spist is past relative to the event denoted by må.
Instead, the natural temporal construal of this sentence is that there exists a point in the future,
                                                
51 Note that the non-past relation encoded by the present does not force må to be simultaneous with S; it may
also be construed as 'future' w.r.t. S, since all that is encoded by the present is the non-past relation.
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specified by the adverbial før han kommer 'before he arrives', and the eating-event is required
to have taken place before this point in the future. The eating-event may very well take place
after the event denoted by må, i.e. the eating may be 'future' w.r.t. må. This is hard to account
for within the machinery invoked so far. Hence, we will modify, or rather specify our
machinery to account for these facts.
There is one important thing to notice in analyzing the non-finite perfect, and that is
the assumption that it is composed of an infinitive ha 'have' + the perfect participle. Now,
recall that we have assumed all other infinitives to express a non-past relation w.r.t. the c-
commanding verb. However, we have ascribed to the non-finite perfect, e.g. [haINF
spistPTCPL52], the matrix [+PAST, -FIN]. This leads to a contradiction, since the perfect
cannot simultaneously express both past and non-past. So thus far, we have suppressed the
fact that the non-finite perfect consists of an infinitival auxiliary in addition to the perfect
participle.
However, at this point, I want to propose that the perfect consist of not one, but two
temporal relations. Firstly, it consists of the temporal relation between the auxiliary ha and the
c-commanding verb. Secondly, it consists of the temporal relation between the auxiliary ha
and the perfect participle. Whereas the relation between ha and the c-commanding verb is a
non-past relation – since it is encoded by the infinitival form of the auxiliary – the relation
between the perfect participle and the auxiliary is the non-finite past relation. That is, the non-
finite perfect encodes two temporal relations at once, which is the reason for its double-faced
behaviour. Thus, let us replace the representation of the temporal relation of the perfect
invoked in  (57) above, repeated here as (60) a,  with the representation in (60)b:
(60)
a. Jon må ha spist. ha spist [+PAST,-FIN] (eMÅ  > eHA SPIST )
   Jon mustPRES have eaten
   'Jon must have eaten.' 
a. Jon må ha spist. ha [-PAST, -FIN]    ¬ (eMÅ   > eHA) &
   Jon mustPRES have eaten   spist [+PAST,-FIN]     (eHA  > eSPIST )
   'Jon must have eaten.' 
Now, let us see whether this move gives us the right results. Since ha is taken to encode a
non-past relation because of its infinitival form, it may in principle be construed as anything
from simultaneous to future w.r.t. its c-commanding verb. However, we know that there are
                                                
52 Meaning 'participle'.
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good reasons to describe the perfect as a state, and I want to propose that the auxiliary is what
encodes this state. Recall also that stative predicates with non-past tense elements tend to be
construed as contemporaneous with the c-commanding verb, if the non-past tense element in
question is a non-finite tense element, or contemporaneous with S, if it is a finite tense
element. In the case of (60), we have a non-finite non-past tense element, namely the
infinitive. Thus, since ha is assumed to be a stative predicate, the 'default' choice between
'future' and 'present' construal is the latter. Thus, we will modify our time-line in (58) a above
according to our new assumptions:
(61)
 S
                 ¬ (S  >  eMÅ )
           må
 (eHA  > eSPIST )         ¬ (eMÅ  > eHA )
spist ha
Now, we know that a stative predicate with a non-past tense element, which is typically
construed as 'present,' may be forced to encode 'future' by means of an adverbial denoting a
point in the future. This is the case, for instance, for (62) below:
(62)
a. Jon spiser.
   'Jon eatPRES'
  'Jon is eating.'
b. Jon spiser når han kommer.
   Jon eats when he arrives
   'Jon will eat when he arrives.'
We also know that this is the case for stative predicates in the non-finite non-past, i.e. the
infinitive; cf. e.g. (63), where it is easy to construe the infinitive as contemporaneous with må
in (63)a, although the natural construal of the infinitive is 'future' w.r.t. må in (63)b:
(63)
a. Marit må kunne denne boka utenat.  
    'Marit must know this book by heart.'
b. Marit må kunne denne boka utenat til i morgen.
   'Marit must know this book by heart by tomorrow.'
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Thus, since the aspectual ha is an infinitive, we would expect that it might be forced into a
'future' construal by means of a temporal adverbial denoting a point in the future, as well:
(64)
a. Jon må ha spist før han kommer
    Jon must have eaten before he arrives
   'John must have eaten before he arrives.'
Thus, it is the infinitival form of the aspectual that makes this construction licit. The non-past
relation between ha and the c-commanding verb må, which in its turn is 'non-past relative to
S', is compatible with a future-denoting adverbial because the non-past relation encoded by
the infintival auxiliary encompasses 'future' in addition to 'present'. Hence, the adverbial
simply specifies the non-past relation encoded by the non-finite non-past tense element. We
may depict the relations in (64) by the following time-line:
(65)
     S          Jon's arrival
     ¬ (S  >  eMÅ )
  må
 (eHA  > eSPIST ) ¬ (eMÅ  > eHA )
spist             ha
This time-line captures the intuitions about the temporal construal of (64), since a natural
paraphrase of this sentence is that 'by the time of Jon's arrival, a state must have commenced
consisting in the after-math of the event of Jon's eating'.
Now, there is an apparent snag to this solution. The non-finite perfect accepts not only
future-denoting adverbials, it even accepts past-denoting adverbials, cf. (66):
(66)
a. Jon må ha spist før han kom.53
    Jon must have eaten before he arrived
   'John must have eaten before he arrived.'
However, this is not necessarily as big a problem as it seems. Recall that the non-finite perfect
encodes two temporal relations, the non-past relation encoded by the infinitive and the past
relation encoded by the perfect participle.  I want to claim here that the adverbial før han kom
'before he arrived' specifies the past relation encoded by the perfect participle, not the non-
past relation encoded by the infinitive. This is reminicent of Julien's proposal above (cf.
                                                
53 Thanks to Helge Dyvik for making me aware of this type of data.
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section 5.3.3.1) that the perfect provides an R in addition to an E (where the latter is encoded
by the participle), and an adverbial may specify either R or E54. In my terminology, an
adverbial may specify the past-relation encoded by the participle or the non-past relation
encoded by the infinitival auxiliary. Hence,we may represent the temporal relations in (66) by
means of the following time-line:
(67)
                                          Jon's arrival       S
                                                                ¬ (S  >  eMÅ )
                                                                           må
(eHA  > eSPIST )                                        ¬ (eMÅ  > eHA )
        spist                                                            ha
Again, this time-line seems to capture the natural temporal construal of the sentence. The
natural paraphrase of (66) is that 'there must exist a state consisting in the aftermath of the
event of Jon's eating before he arrived'.
Now, we know that the perfect has finite versions in addition to its non-finite version.
Let us see how this theory fares w.r.t. the finite forms of the perfect.
(68)
a. Jon har spist.
    'Jon has eaten.'
b. Jon har spist når han kommer.
    Jon has eaten when he comes
   'Jon will have eaten when he arrives.'
In opposition to the non-finite non-past tense element, which signals that the event carrying
the tense element must take the c-commanding verb as its first argument, the finite non-past
tense element signals that the first argument of this tense element is S. Since the non-past
relation encodes 'future' as well as 'present' (although 'present' is the default with a stative
predicate), the stative auxiliary ha may be taken to encode simultaneity w.r.t. S (as in (68)a )
                                                
54 In some cases, both R and E may be specified in the same construction, cf. Julien (2000b:fn.5). Recall also that
Julien claims that the present perfect (i.e. where the auxiliary is 'finite present') does not allow for a specification
of R and E; only E  (the predicate time) may be specified in the present perfect. This does not seem to be correct,
however. Cf the following sentence:
 (i) Hver gang jeg snakker med min mor, har hun sovet dårlig natten før.
    'Each time I speak to my mother, she has slept badly the night before.'
Here the temporal adverbial clause hver gang jeg snakker med min mor specifies R/the non-past relation encoded
by har,whereas natten før specifies E/the past relation encoded by the participle.
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and 'future' w.r.t. S (as in (68)b), whereas the participle must be 'past relative to ha' in both
cases; i.e. (eHA  > eSPIST ).
Moreover, the perfect may be equipped with the finite past tense element encoded by
the preterite. In this case, both relations encoded are 'past' relations. Firstly, the preterite
auxiliary hadde, being finite, encodes 'past relative to S'; i.e. (S > eHA ).  Secondly, the perfect
participle is 'past relative to ha'; i.e. (eHA  > eSPIST ). Thus, we get two past relations,
represented by the following time-line:
(69)
            S
    (eHADDE  > eSPIST )               (S > eHADDE )
 spist hadde
Finally, let us test our assumptions on a somewhat longer Tense-chain, where the temporal
relations involved make up a quite complex temporal construal: 
 (70)
Han måtte ha villet prøve å svømme.
he mustPAST have wanted try to   swim
'He had to have wanted to try to swim'
måtte [+PAST,+FIN] (S > eMÅTTE)
ha  [-PAST,-FIN]         ¬ (eMÅTTE > eHA )
villet [+PAST, -FIN] (eHA > eVILLET )
prøve [-PAST,-FIN]         ¬ (eVILLET   > ePRØVE)
svømme [-PAST-FIN]       ¬ (ePRØVE > eSVØMME)
We may depict these relations on a time-line, like in (71). To simplify matters somewhat, we
take every non-past relation to encode 'simultaneity', but keep in mind that every non-past
relation may be construed as 'future' in addition to 'simultaneity'.
(71)
                              S
                      måtte (S > eMÅTTE)
            ha  ¬ (eMÅTTE > eHA )
          villet (eHA > eVILLET )
prøve ¬ (eVILLET   > ePRØVE)
svømme ¬ (ePRØVE  > eSVØMME)
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This tense-chain consists of six events, one encoded by each verb plus S, the speech event.
These events are ordered by five tense elements; each encoded by a tense-affix on a verb.
Only the top-most tense element is finte, since this is the only tense element which takes S as
an argument. All other tense elements in this chain are non-finite, since each of them takes the
event denoted by the c-commanding verb as their first argument. Now, some of the relations
in this chain are past relations, whereas other are non-past relations. Non-past relations may
be contrued as 'future' or 'present', depending in part on the aspectual properties of the
predicates involved and in part on the presence of specific temporal adverbials.
In this picture, it is not completely accurate to describe the perfect as a non-finite past,
since the perfect consists of two relations; the past relation encoded by the participle and the
non-past relation encoded by the non-finite auxiliary. However, since the perfect is, in
Hofmann's (1976: 94) words, " of course the only way to represent past time with an
epistemic modal", it does take on the function of a non-finite past. To illustrate this point, the
answer in B must employ the non-finite perfect under the modal, whether or not the question
in A employs the perfect, as in (72) a, or the preterite, as in (72)b:
(72)
a. A: Tror du Marit har drept ham? B: Hun må ha drept ham.
     believe you  M. has killed him      she must have killed him
     'Do you believe that Marit has killed him?' 'She must have killled him.'
b. A:  Tror du Marit drepte ham? B: Hun må ha drept ham.
       believe you  Marit killed him she must have killed him
                  'Do you believe that Marit killed him?'        'She must have killled him.'
However, our table of tense-forms in (49) should be replaced with the following:
(73)
          +Finite        -Finite
            +Past         preterite         participle
            -Past          present         infinitive
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Now, we are in a position to seek an aswer for the "override" rule alluded to in section 5.3.2
above. Recall that the "override" effect arises e.g. with the non-finite perfect embedded under
a modal, where the perfect gives rise to an epistemic reading of the modal as a 'default' (as in
(74)a). However, when we add an adverbial, like a temporal adverbial denoting 'future', or a
purpose clause, the natural reading of the modal is the root reading, cf. (74) b. On the other
hand, adding an adverbial denoting a point in the past once again gives rise to the epistemic
reading of the modal.
(74)
a. Jon må ha spist.            ha [-PAST, -FIN] ¬ (eMÅ   > eHA) &
   Jon mustPRES have eaten           spist [+PAST,-FIN]     (eHA  > eSPIST )
   'Jon must have eaten.' 
b. Jon må ha spist før han kommer                 ha[-PAST, -FIN]  ¬ (eMÅ   > eHA) &
    Jon must have eaten before he arrives       spist  [+PAST,-FIN] (eHA  > eSPIST )
   'John must have eaten before he arrives.'
a. Jon må ha spist før han kom.                           ha [-PAST, -FIN] ¬ (eMÅ   > eHA) &
    Jon must have eaten before he arrived           spist [+PAST,-FIN] (eHA  > eSPIST )
   'John must have eaten before he arrived.'
At this point, we need to address the different functions of root and epistemic modals. We
know that root modals are employed to state what is required, needed, allowed or intended to
hold at some point in time. However, the situation required embedded under the modal; i.e.
the situation which is required/intended/needed/allowed to hold cannot denote a point in time
preceding the evaluation time of the modal, because this will lead to a conceptual crash. It
does not make sense to require/intend/want/need/permit a situation to take place in the past.
This is why root modals are 'future-projecting', their complements describe a situation that is
temporally subsequent to the eventuality-time of the modal for conceptual reasons. When we
require/intend/want/need/permit a situation to hold, this requirement/intention/will/need or
permission cannot possibly influence on things that have already occurred. I.e. although I
might have wanted my requiring John to have eaten before S to be able to alter the actual
events taking place, this is not possible in reality. In the word of Lyons (1977: 843):
John may have come yesterday construed as a permission-granting utterance is
semantically anomalous for the same reason that Come yesterday, John! is anomalous.
This means that when an event embedded under a modal is construed as temporally preceding
the eventuality-time of the modal, the reading of the modal will always be epistemic. When
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the complement of the modal is construed as future w.r.t. to the eventuality-time of the modal,
however, the root reading becomes possible.
Recall from section 5.3.2.5 that it was claimed that root modals take stative
complements which are construed as contemporaneous with the root modal. The example is
repeated here for convenience (please ignore for the moment that an epistemic reading is also
possible):
(75)
Jon må være på kontoret.
'Jon must be/stay in his office.'
It is true that the situation embedded under the root modal, i.e. Jon's being in the office, may
very well already hold at the time of utterance. However, this is not the construal implied by
the communicative function of the root modal. To exploit the quote from Lyons above, it
makes no sense to allow a person to do something yesterday. Likewise, it makes little sense
e.g. to order a person to bed, if this person is already in bed. Thus, I want to claim here that it
is irrelevant for the root reading of a modal whether or not the situation embedded under the
modal may be construed as 'already holding'. The root modal states that 'from now on, the
following situation must/may/will/shall etc. hold', it makes no reference to the present
situation. This is, I believe what is meant by various descriptions of the 'future-projecting'
properties of root modals.
Unlike root modals, epistemic modals are concerned with the truth value of the
embedded proposition. Thus, they do not require the embedded situation to take place in the
future; on the contary, epistemic modals are perfectly comfortable with propositions denoting
events in the past w.r.t. the modal (the exception is the epistemic root modal ville, denoting
'prediction').  Thus, we may state these generalizations by means of the following illustration,
slightly simplyfying the facts:
(76)
'past'    S       'future'
         modal
      Epistemic only Root possible
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With these assumptions, it is possible to explain the various reading of the modal in the
sentences in (74), repeated here as(77). The aspectual ha, being stative, is construed as
contemporaneous with the modal unless forced into a future reading by means of the future-
denoting adverbial, like it is in  (77)b. But since the participle is always construed as 'past
relative to ha' a contemporaneous reading of ha places the participle in the past w.r.t. S, cf.
the illustration in (78).
(77)
a. Jon må ha spist.            ha [-PAST, -FIN] ¬ (eMÅ   > eHA) &
   Jon mustPRES have eaten           spist [+PAST,-FIN]    (eHA  > eSPIST )
   'Jon must have eaten' 
b. Jon må ha spist før han kommer                 ha[-PAST, -FIN]   ¬ (eMÅ  > eHA) &
    Jon must have eaten before he arrives       spist  [+PAST,-FIN]  (eHA  > eSPIST )
   'John must have eaten before he arrives'
a. Jon må ha spist før han kom.                           ha [-PAST, -FIN] ¬ (eMÅ   > eHA) &
    Jon must have eaten before he arrived           spist [+PAST,-FIN]   (eHA  > eSPIST )
   'John must have eaten before he arrived'
 (78)
 S
                  ¬ (S  >  eMÅ )
                                    må
 (eHA  > eSPIST )        ¬ (eMÅ  > eHA )
spist ha
Thus, the main event (i.e. the eating) is 'past w.r.t. modal', hence the root reading is not
felicitous. However, since the aspectual ha is infinitive, it encodes a non-past relation, and
this non-past relation may be specified to encode 'future' by means of an appropriate
adverbial. This places the main event in the future55 w.r.t. the modal, and the root reading is
possible, as seen in  (79) below:
                                                
55 Note that this is one possibility, not the only possibility. The temporal information encoded by the participle is
simply that it is 'past w.r.t. ha'. There is no limit on the construal as to how far back in the past w.r.t. ha the event
denoted by the participle is situated. Thus, the participle could in principle be construed as 'past w.r.t. the modal'.
But again, this is inference and not morphologically encoded information.  
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 (79)
     S          Jon's arrival
     ¬ (S  >  eMÅ )
  må
 (eHA  > eSPIST )             ¬ (eMÅ  > eHA )
                               spist             ha
Finally, adding an adverbial denoting a point in the past once again gives rise to the epistemic
reading of the modal, since the main event is 'past' w.r.t. the modal, hence not a suitable
complement for a root modal, which requires its complement to be construed as 'future':
(80)
                                          Jon's arrival       S
                                                                ¬ (S  >  eMÅ )
                                                                          må
(eHA  > eSPIST )                                        ¬ (eMÅ  > eHA )
        spist                                                            ha
Thus, we have an explanation for the fact that a modal preceding an aspectual ha 'have'
typically gets an epistemic reading – the main event described by the participle is typically
construed as temporally prior to the eventuality-time of the modal. Simultaneously, we have
an explanation for the fact that a temporal adverbial denoting a point in the future w.r.t. the
modal's eventuality-time or a purpose clause (which has the same type of temporal function)
may give rise to a root reading of the modal, even though the complement of the modal is the
non-finite perfect. The participle is even in this case construed as past w.r.t. ha, but ha is
forced into a future reading by means of the adverbial, hence the participle as well may be
construed as future relative to the modal. Finally, a temporal adverbial denoting a point in
time prior to the modal's eventuality-time does not have the same effect as a temporal
adverbial denoting a point in time subsequent to the modal's eventuality-time. This is because
the participle in this case is once again construed as prior to the modal. Thus, the root reading
is impossible, since the root reading requires a non-past complement, and the epistemic
reading is the only possibility.
Thus, what this outline has shown is that it is the temporal properties of the perfect
that is responsible for its behaviour when embedded under a modal, crucially in addition to its
aspectual properties. Likewise, we have seen that even for the infinitive the aspectual
properties of the verb are of crucial importance to the reading of the modal. A (single-event
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construal of a) dynamic verb typically gives rise to a root reading of the modal, and a stative
infinitival complement facilitates the epistemic reading, without excluding a root reading of
the modal.
Finally, there is one type of complement that is lacking in the preceding section, and
for good reasons. Small clause complements of modals certainly fulfills the aspectual
requirements of a prototypical root modal complement, in that they are construed as dynamic.
However, we have said little about the temporal properties of these complements, although
we have suggested that they have a 'future' reading w.r.t. the modal. However, nothing in the
discussion above explains why an epistemic reading of the modal should be exluded in these
constructions, since we have seen that epistemic modals too may take [+dynamic,+future]
complements (cf. e.g. 5.3.2).  We return to this question in section 5.4.3, but for now, we will
simply list these complements as complements of root modals only.
(81)
Past complement: Epistemic reading only
Non-past complement, future construal: Root reading preferred
Non-past complement, present construal: Epistemic reading preferred
Stative infinitival complement:  Epistemic reading preferred
Dynamic infinitival complement: Root reading preferred
Iterative/Progressive construal: Epistemic reading preferred
Dynamic small clause complement: Root reading only
5.3.3.3 More on the temporal function of ha
As mentioned in section 2.3.1, there exist cases where a Norwegian modal takes a bare perfect
participle as a complement. This is illustrated in the following sentences.
(82)
a. Jon burde (ha) vært på  kontoret.
'Jon should (have) been in his office.'
b. Marit kunne (ha) svømt.
'Marit could (have) swum.'
c. Pasienten måtte (ha) blitt behandlet straks.
'The patient had to (have) been treated immediately.'
d. Begge skulle (ha) reist i morgen.
'Both (of them) should (have) left tomorrow.'
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e. Myndighetene ville (ha) revet huset.
'The authorities would (have) demolished the house.'
As suggested by the data, it is possible to add the auxiliary ha 'have' in all such cases,
crucially without altering the reading of the sentence; an observation that has caused the
phenomenon to be known as ha-omission. Ha-omission as a phenomenon exists in Swedish as
well as in Norwegian; moreover, the constructions where ha-omission is possible in
Norwegian constitute only a subset of the constructions where it is allowed in Swedish. I will
not go into the differences between Norwegian and Swedish in this respect here, instead I
refer the reader to Julien (2000b), who presents a survey of various works that has been
concerned with this phenomenon in Swedish and Norwegian respectively. I will address the
conditions for Norwegian ha-omission only, and I refer to Swedish only for those
constructions that correspond to the instances where ha-omission is allowed even in
Norwegian.
The constructions where ha-omission is possible in Norwegian turn out to be rather
limited. Firstly, ha-omission is possible only when the auxiliary ha is non-finite56 (cf. (83) a
vs. b). Secondly, ha can never be omitted when it is governed by the infinitival marker å (cf.
(83) c), which means in effect that ha can only be omitted when it follows a modal, since only
modals take bare infinitival complements57, and the auxiliary ha is formally an infinitive. And
thirdly, the modal must be marked 'preterite' for ha-omission to be allowed, neither a modal
marked 'present' nor an infinitival modal makes ha-omission possible (cf. (83)d and e
respectively).
(83)
a.   Jon skulle (ha) kommet.
    'Jon should have come.'
b. Jon *(har/hadde) kommet.
    'Jon has/had come.'
c. Jon ble påstått å *(ha) kommet.
   'Jon was claimed to have come.'
d. Jon skal *(ha) kommet.
    'Jon is supposed to have come.'
                                                
56 Note also that there exists a lexical verb ha 'have', which means to 'have' or 'possess'. As mentioned in
Wiklund (1998), this lexical ha can never be omitted, neither in Swedish nor Norwegian.
57 This is a simplification since a verb like pleie 'use to', especially when it is negated, also takes an infinitival
complement: Jeg pleide ikke høre på ham 'I didn't use (to) listen to him'.
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e. Jon vil kunne *(ha) kommet før tirsdag.
   Jon will canINF have come before tuesday
  'John will possibly have arrived by tuesday.'
Now, as noted by Julien (2000b), two important observations concerning ha-omission in
Norwegian are presented by Taraldsen (1984) and Wiklund (1998), respectively. Taraldsen
(1984) observes that ha cannot be omitted after a modal verb that does not have a
counterfactual reading, cf (84):
(84)
Han krevde at vi skulle *(ha) gjort det innen mandag.
'He demanded that we should have done it by Monday.'
Wiklund observes that ha can only be omitted if the combination of ha and the participle does
not require "a perfect state reading". She supports her claims with the following Swedish
sentences taken from Wiklund (1998:15); cf. also Julien (2000b:41) for similar data.
(85)
a. Han skulle ha läst boken på måndag.
   he should have read the-book on Monday
    I. He should have read the book on Monday.
   II. He should have read the book by Monday.
b. Han skulle läst boken på måndag.
   he should read (Participle) the book on Monday
   I. He should have read the book on Monday.
  II. *He should have read the book by Monday.
Julien explains the grammaticality judgements in (85) by means of her analysis of the perfect
as being a non-finite past. Thus, the ambiguity of (85) a resides in the fact that the perfect
provides both an R and an E, both of which can be specified by the temporal adverbial på
måndag (Julien op.cit. 43, details omitted):
 (86)
[ Han skulle (T1) [ ha   läst (T2) [ boken  på måndag]]]
   he should           have read        the-book on monday
T1 = Past: S after R            E                R              S
T2 = Past: R after E        |                  |               |
If the temporal adverbial specifies E, the predicate event, we get reading I of (85)a. When this
adverbial specifies R, however, we get reading II of (85)a. Julien goes on to claim that the
lack of ambiguity in (85)b is explained on the assumption, based on Taraldsen's (1984)
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observation referred above, that the modal in these cases does not instantiate a T(ense) head at
all, but a M(ood) head. This means that the only T head in this sentence is the one instantiated
by the participle, which means that T in this case is spelled out by a non-finite past:
(87)
[ Han skulle (M) [  läst (T1) [ boken  på måndag]]]
   he should    read (Participle)         the-book on monday
T1 = Past: S after E            E         S
|                                |
While this accounts for the observed data, I am reluctant to accept that the modal in these
cases is inserted in a Mood head. If that were the case, there would be a range of Norwegian
sentences where no T head would be spelled out at all. That is, if we accept the proposal made
by Julien (2000a, 2001) that the infinitive has no temporal properties (a claim that was
disputed in the previous section). What is sometimes known as "the modal use of past" (cf.
e.g. Palmer 1986:210 ff) is by no means excluded for modals with an infinitival complement,
cf. (88).
(88)
a. Dette kunne være løsningen.
   'This might be the solution.'
b. Jeg ville bli en fantastisk statsminister.
   'I would be an exellent prime minister.'
The natural reading of the modal in these cases, especially out of context, is absolutely not
'past'; they certainly have a mood-like reading, although it is 'hypothetical' rather than
'counterfactual'. In any case, I believe that data like these constitute a problem for Julien's
explanation, since in her system, the modal would presumably be inserted in a Mood head,
whereas nothing spells out the T head. Thus, we would have sentences with nothing to relate
even E to S, which is the minimal temporal relation58.
Instead, I will assume here that the 'R' provided by the perfect does indeed reside in ha
'have' itself, as suggested in section 5.3.3.2 above. Specifically, the aspectual ha denotes an
event (or rather a state, but this is the wide-sense reading of state), which takes part in
temporal construal, as proposed above. This explains that the omission of ha prevents a
temporal adverbial from specifying the event denoted by ha (i.e. R, in Juliens terms); this is in
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fact expected on the approach developed above, since temporal adverbials can only specify
temproal relations explicitly expressed by tense elements, in this case the tense element
expressed by the infinitival form of ha (non-finite non-past). Hence, it seems clear that ha
does fulfill an important temporal function, since the omission of ha leads to the absence of at
least one temporal relation present in the corresponding construction where ha is not omitted.
Moreover, it seems to be a sound generalization that the modal gets a counterfactual reading
in the constructions where ha is omitted. However, unlike Julien, I will not ascribe this fact to
the modal's insertion into a Mood head. Instead, I will simply assume that the preterite may be
used for modal purposes in Norwegian (like in many other languages), even though it
occupies a Tense head. I simply reject the idea that there exists a Mood head in Norwegian
clause structure at all, on the basis of the fact that Norwegian lacks morphologically encoded
Mood affixes different from tense affixes (unlike Old Norse)59.
Finally, I would like to remark that the counterfactual vs. hypothetical readings of the
modal depending on the past (i.e. participle) vs. non-past (i.e. infinitive) property of the
complement is another piece of evidence that supports the hypothesis of the infinitive and the
perfect participle as non-finite tenses in Norwegian. This is so because "distal" forms like the
preterite is often used for modal purposes, as discussed in Palmer (1986: 208 ff). "Distal" is in
fact Langacker's (1978:855) term employed to cover both 'past tense' and 'unreality', whereas
Joos (1964: 121-122) suggests that the essential common feature is 'remoteness, in time or
reality'. Be that as it may, the fact remains that 'past tense' is employed in many languages to
signal a greater distance to reality than 'present tense'. We would expect this to be the case for
non-finite tenses as well as finite ones. And this is exactly what we find. Thus, in Norwegian,
we find a gradually increasing "distance to reality" in the following modal constructions:
(89)
a. Dette kan være en løsning.
              Non-past      Non-Past
   'This may be a solution; i.e. potential'
                                                                                                                                                        
58 Note that this problem would go away if we assume that the infinitive does indeed encode temporal properties,
as I have suggested above.
59 Recall from section 5.2 that epistemic modals were described as a Mood-like category. However, this regards
the reading, i.e. the semantics of these modals. I do not assume that these epistemic modals are inserted in a
functional projection corresponding to inflectional Mood in other languages. Recall also that e.g. German
employs inflectional Mood as well as epistemic modals and even epistemic modals may have the subjunctive
inflection, in addition to their having an epistemic reading (E.g. Das dürfte wahr sein 'that might be true'). One
might think that the modal and the inflection in this case would compete for the same head position. Although
this problem might be solved, e.g. by means of allowing the Mood Category to be recursive, I do not assume that
epistemic modals are situated in a Mood Projection corresponding to inflectional Mood in other languages.
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b. Dette kunne være en løsning.
                Past      Non-Past
   'This might be a solution; i.e. hypothetical'
a. Dette kunne  (ha) vært en løsning.
                Past      Past
   'This might  (have) been a solution; i.e. counterfactual'
Thus, we might conclude that the participle alone does encode a "distal" relation. However,
for the perfect to fulfill its potential range of temporal functions, ha cannot be omitted, since
ha  provides the tense-chain with one additional event.
5.4 The tense of modals
In this section, I want to start out by focussing on the possible differing properties of root and
epistemic modals as regards finite (or "absolute") tense marking and temporal interpretation.
Initially, I want to present and briefly discuss some recent proposals concerned with these
questions. In the second subsection I will investigate how root and epistemic modals relate to
finiteness; an investigation which involves questioning some "canonical truths" within the
literature on these issues.
5.4.1 The relative ordering of modals and tense
Several proposals have emerged lately where the alleged differences between root and
epistemic modals as regards temporal properties are ascribed to their fixed position relative to
Tense in a Universal Hierarchy, pace Cinque (1999). Recall from section 3.2.4 that Cinque
takes epistemic modals to scope over tense whereas root modals scope under tense. That is,
the designated functional projection for epistemic modals is situated higher in the Universal
Hierarchy of functional projections than the projections hosting past and future Tenses,
whereas the designated projections for root modals are situated below these Tense
projections60. The author supports his assumptions with evidence from various languages
where this order is displayed e.g. by overt TMA particles (op.cit.: 60); the following data are
found in Sranan, a Creole language spoken in Surinam:
                                                
60 Cinque also proposes a third Tense projection for anterior tense, but we will have nothing to say about this
projection here. See also Julien (2000a, 2001), who argues against the existence of this third tense projection.
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(90)
a. A ben kan nyan.
   he PAST can eat.
  'He could eat.'
b. A kan ben e nyan.
   he may PAST PROG eat
  'He may have been eating.'
According to Cinque, the modal particle gets a root reading when it occurs to the right of the
tense marker, as in (90)a. The same modal particle kan appears to be interpreted epistemically
when it occurs to the left of the tense marker, as in (90)b61. Cinque takes these data as direct
evidence for this ordering of the relevant functional categories, conflated here for the sake of
simplicity (note that, in what follows, "x  > y" encodes that x scopes over y):
Modepistemic > Tense > ModRoot
Now, these data make a case for the proposed relative ordering because the surface
positions of the epistemic and root modal particles support this hypothesis. However, as noted
by Roberts and Roussou (2000), who adopt Cinque's hierarchy as "the null hypothesis", the
proposed relative ordering may seem somewhat counterintuitive for e.g. the Mainland
Scandinavian languages:
It may seem strange to propose that epistemic modals in Danish occupy a very high
functional position like ModEpistemic when the evidence is that all verbs, including
modals, occupy just two positions in this language: The V2 position (presumably C)
and what appears to [be] the base V-Position (see Vikner 1995 and the references
given there). The problem really concerns associating the epistemic interpretation with
the low position.
As alluded to in this quote, e.g. Vikner (1995:143 ff) provides evidence that although main
clauses in MSc display V2 (i.e. I-to-C movement of the finite verb), the finite verb in
embedded clauses remains in situ, i.e. it remains in its base position in V. To illustrate, let us
construct one such sentence with an epistemic modal:
(91)
a. Jon kunne plutselig ha tatt boka.
   'Jon might suddenly have taken the book'
                                                
61 I want to point out the remarkable similarity between these readings and assumptions and the data discussed in
section 5.2. Many authors have assumed that a modal gets an epistemic reading when it occurs to the left of a
perfect auxiliary have wheras the same modal gets a root reading when occurring to the right of have (an
assumption that was shown to be too crude, cf. section 5.2) . Recall also that the perfect auxiliary have is part of
a non-finite PAST in the tense system advocated here. Thus, the phenomena are apparently related.
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b. Marit mistenkte [at Jon plutselig kunne ha tatt boka].
   Marit suspected that Jon suddenly might have taken the book
  ' Marit suspected that Jon might suddenly have taken the book'
In the main clause in (91)a, the finite epistemic modal moves past the adverbial
plutselig,unlike what is the case in the embedded sentence in (91)b, where the verb is said to
remain in situ. Now, I cannot determine exactly which of Cinque's many projections would be
the most likely candidate to host an adverbial like plutselig 'suddenly' in its specifier position,
but it seems clear that it must be one of the numerous Asp heads, perhaps the same head that
hosts quickly, i.e. AspCELERATIVE. For clarification, let us look at Cinque's hierarchy once
more.
(92)
[ franklyMoodspeech act [ fortunatelyMoodevaluative [ allegedly Moodevidental
[ probably Modepistemic [ once T(Past) [ thenT(Future) [ perhaps Moodirrealis
[ necessarily Modnecessity [possibly Modpossibility [usually Asphabitual
[ again Asprepetitive (I) [ often Aspfrequentative (I) [ intentionally Modvolitional
[ quickly Aspcelerative (I)  [ already T(Anterior) [ no longer Aspterminative [ still Aspcontinuative
[ always Aspperfect (?) [ just Aspretrospective [ soon Aspproximative
[ briefly Aspdurative [ characteristically(?) Aspgeneric/progressive [ almost Aspprospective
[ completetly AspSgCompletive (I) [ tutto AspPlCompletive [ well Voice [ fast/early
Aspcelerative(II) [ again Asprepetitive (II) [ often Aspfrequentative(II) [completetly AspSgCompletive(II)
Observe that the Asp heads are situated lower in the hierarchy than the designated position of
the epistemic modal. But if the adverbial plutselig is situated in the specifier of an AspP, and
the epsitemic modal follows this adverbial, as in Norwegian embedded sentences, the surface
position of the epistemic modal must be lower in the structure than any of the modal heads,
not to mention the designated position of the epistemic modal, i.e. the head position of the
designated functional projection. Roberts and Roussou (2000) go on to emphasize that this
problem is a general one for MSc languages, and not one that is created by assuming Cinque's
hierarchy:
This problem is just an instance of the general problem that arises in Mainland
Scandinavian languages [...] of associating functional information (at the very least
Tense) with the in-situ verb, and as such is not created by assuming the Cinque
hierarchy. Whatever the technical device we postulate to associate tense with the in-
situ verb (affix-hopping, chain-formation, LF-movement, etc.) can be exploited to
associate an epistemic modal with its functional position.
Thus, we need some "technical device" to associate the modal in a "low" surface position with
the 'high' position of the functional category ModEpistemic. The same type of problem turns up
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in Hungarian as well, cf. the following data from Bartos (2000), who investigates scope
variability/scope inversion in Hungarian :
(93)
Vár-hat-t-ak.
 wait-poss-past-3pl
'They were allowed to wait/They may (possibly)have waited.'
I.  It WAS [Possible [for them to wait] Past  [Poss [...]] T > Mod
II. It is       [Possible [that they waitED] Poss [Past  [...]] Mod > T
Bartos adds (footnote 4) that scope inversion in this example is accompanied by a switch in
modality from permission (I) to possibility (II), i.e. from deontic to epistemic modality. He
goes on to speculate that an analysis might be proposed in which these two modalities are
treated apart in syntax, represented by two different projections embracing the projection of
tense, an approach which would in fact be compatible with Cinque's proposal. However,
Bartos emphasizes that such an analysis would have to face the "crucial problem of deriving
the identical morpheme orders". That is, the relative ordering of affixes does not change, it is
the same morpheme order that gives rise to the two different interpretations.
Unlike Bartos, Stowell (2000) does not seem to consider the association of a 'low'
surface position with a 'high' logical position a crucial problem. This author simply states that
the generalization of the logical scopal relations as Modepistemic > Tense > ModRoot  holds
"regardless of the syntactic ordering relation of tense/modal pairs within a single clause":
 (a) As implied by Cinque's hierarchy (whatever its ultimate explanation), tenses can
scope over at least some root/deontic modals:
John can move his arm with great difficulty (he is able)
After the crash, John could move his arm only with great difficulty (he was able)
John had to take care of the cat (he was obligated to do so)
(b) with epistemic modals (at least those with an evidental interpretation), the modal
logically scopes over tense:
John could be in that house (Past tense construal of modal disallowed)
John could have been in that house (It is possible that he was in that house)
John must/might be in that house
John must/might have been in that house
(c) These generalizations hold regardless of the syntactic ordering relation of
tense/modal pairs within a single clause; thus we encounter cases of tense/modal
reversal, where the modal is syntactically subordinate to the tense but is obligatorily
construed above it [...]. This is suggestive of a logical (LF?) checking domain for the
epistemic modals above the tense. (LF modal movement?)
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Thus, what is implied by Stowell's and Roberts and Roussou's approaches is that epistemic
modals, although they may overtly surface subordinate to tense, logically and
interpretationally scope over tense, indeed "are outside the scope of absolute tense altogether"
(Cinque 1999:79).
Iatridou (1990b) presents some interesting facts about what she calls metaphysical
versus epistemic predicates which may shed some light on the conjecture above. Note initially
that Iatridou's use of the term epistemic should not be confused with epistemic modals, since
(at least some) epistemic modals are identified by Iatridou as metaphysical predicates. The
author starts out by observing a difference, that holds in various languages, between two types
of adjectival predicates taking propositional complements in the frame [It was/will be AP that
S]. Evidently, predicates like evident/obvious are fully acceptable in this context, whereas
predicates like possible and probable are not; observe the difference between (94)a and (94)b:
 (94)
a. It was/will be evident that John stole the tapes.
b. #It was/will be possible/probable that John stole the tapes.
c. It is possible/probable that John stole the tapes.
The oddness of  (94)b must be due to the incompatibility of predicates like probable/possible,
i.e. 'metaphysical' predicates, with future or past tense, since these predicates are fine with the
present tense, cf. (94)c. Moreover, Iatridou suggests that predicates like possible/probable, i.e.
metaphysical predicates, are temporally independent:
Let us assume that the metaphysical modalities are predicates of propositions and are
temporally independent; that is, they can be said to lack a time variable [...]. This
hypothesis would explain why they are incompatible with tense. Epistemic predicates,
on the other hand, are sensitive to time; that is, they do have a time variable:
P(p) : It is possible that p.
Obvious (x,p,t)  : It is obvious to x at time t that p.
The assumption that metaphysical predicates lack a time variable also explains the following
contrast, according to Iatridou, since adverbials like often are predicated of a time variable:
(95)
a. It is often obvious (to me) that you don't study enough.
b. * It is often possible that you don't study enough.
Furthermore, if metaphysical modality predicates are temporally independent, then the
apparent present tense in (94) c is not interpreted semantically and is essentially pleonastic.
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And, Iatridou continues, if this is correct, then one would predict – in analogy with other
pleonastic elements, like expletives or the copula – that there exists at least one language
where metaphysical modality is not tensed at all. Basque is such a language. A metaphysical
predicate in Basque can only carry the irrealis morphology, while present and past tenses are
excluded:
(96)
a. Baliteke    lamiak erreketan bizitzea.
   be-Irr         fairy-PL-Abs river-PL-Loc   live-Inf
   'It is possible that fairies live in rivers.'
b. #Badaiteke    lamiak erreketan bizitzea.
      be-Pres     fairy-PL-Abs river-PL-Loc   live-Inf
c. #Bazitekeen    lamiak erreketan bizitzea.
      be-Past     fairy-PL-Abs river-PL-Loc   live-Inf
Iatridou claims that in Basque the present tense is "real" and is not used as a default marker as
in English. Since the language makes available a form that does not anchor a sentence in time,
that form must be used in metaphysical modality.
Now, there is a striking semantic similarity between what Iatridou calls metaphysical
predicates and at least some epistemic modals. Unlike metaphysical predicates like possible,
epistemic (and evidential) modals are in fact compatible with an adverbial like often in the
sense that this type of adverbial may co-occur with epistemic modals; however, it remains a
sound generalization that the adverbial cannot take scope over the epistemic (or evidential)
modal:
(97)
a. Ofte skal Jon ha ertet Marit.
  # I. 'It is often supposed that Jon has teased Marit'.
    II.  'It is supposed that Jon has often teased Marit.'
b. Dette vil ofte bli et problem.
   # I. I often predict that this becomes a problem.
     II. 'I predict that this often becomes a problem.'
c. Marit må ofte ha vært syk.
   # I. It must often be the case that Marit has been ill.
     II. 'It must be the case that Marit has often been ill.'
This behaviour distinguishes epistemic modals from root modals, since root modals allow an
adverbial like often to scope over them:
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(98)
a. Ofte vil Jon på fotballkamp når jeg vil på kino.
  Often wants Jon to footballmatch when I want on cinema
   'Often, Jon wants to see a footballmatch when I want to go to the movies.'
b. Marit må ofte passe lillesøsteren.
   Marit must often watch baby sisterDEF.
   'Often, Marit must watch her baby sister.'
c. Ofte kan ikke sykkelen tas med på bussen.
   Often can not bicycleDEF takePASS on busDEF.
    'Often, one cannot take one's bicycle on the bus.'
Interestingly, the incompatibilty with an adverbial like often extends beyond metaphysical
predicates and epistemic modals, it is a phenomenon that encompasses so-called generic (or
gnomic) sentences as well, cf. (99):
(99)
a. #Two plus two often equals four.
b. #The earth is often round.
c. #Lions are often mammals.
Furthermore, generic sentences also exhibit the same rejecting of past and future tenses that
we find with metaphysical predicates:
(100)
a. #Two plus two was/will equal four.
b. # The earth was/ will be round.
c. # Lions were/will be mammals62.
Carlson (1988:167) states that
Epistemologically, a generic sentence is one expressing a truth (or falsehood) the truth
value of which cannot, in general, be ascertained solely with reference to any
particular localized time. For instance, the present tense sentence "Dogs bark" is true,
even though at the present time there may be no dogs barking.
Faced with these data and assumptions, we may be inclined to agree with Iatridou (1990b)
that there are certain types of predicates that are insensitive to temporal reference, e.g.
because they lack a time variable. The properties she observes for metaphysical predicates
apply to epistemic modals and generic sentences as well, thus it is tempting to try to find a
common semantic trait for all three types of linguistic expressions, i.e. metaphysical
predicates, epistemic modals and generic sentences. Intuitively, the common semantic trait is
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that all three types of expression focus on the unchanging truth of a(n embedded) proposition
rather than solely asserting the (potential) existence of the state-of-affairs described by this
proposition. This intuition is shared w.r.t. epistemic modals by numerous authors who have
claimed that one essential trait distinguishing epistemic modals from root modals is that the
former qualify the truth value of the sentence (cf. e.g. Hofmann 1976, Platzack 1979, Vikner
1988, Thráinsson and Vikner 1995, section 4.6 of this dissertation). Furthermore, Iatridou
(1990b) identifies at least some modals typically referred to as 'epistemic' as metaphysical
predicates. And as seen in the quote above, Carlson (1988) states that generic sentences
express 'truths'. Thus, let us assume that the common semantic trait between epistemic
modals, metaphysical predicates and generic sentences is that they accentuate and sometimes
qualify the truth value of a(n embedded) proposition.
Although these expressions accentuate the truth value of the (embedded) proposition
rather than the state-of-affairs described by this proposition, neither of the aforementioned
lingustic expressions need an explicit reference to the truth value of the (embedded)
proposition,  like e.g. 'it is true that p', although such an explicit reference may be added:
(101)
a. It is possible [that it is true] that John stole the tapes.
b. It must [be true] that John stole the tapes.
c. [It is true] that lions are mammals.
Hofmann (1976) speculates that the infrequency of explicit reference to the truth of p is
explainable by the dictum that to assert a sentence to be true is equivalent to asserting simply
the sentence. Thus, the (embedded) proposition p may be said to carry the implicit assertion
that p is true. By assumption, epistemic modals, metaphysical predicates and generic
sentences target this implicit assertion [p is true] and qualifies it in stating that it is possible,
necessary, probable – or in the case of generic sentences, simply that the truth of p holds.
In accentuating (and qualifying) the implicit statement [p is true], these linguistic
expressions seemingly abstract away from temporal reference, although they are syntactically
associated with 'pleonastic tense'. This could be linked to Stowell's proposal of LF-movement
of modals in the following way. Assume that metaphysical predicates, epistemic modals and
probably some generic operator ("Gen"), where the latter could be stipulated to give rise to
the generic reading of a sentence, all move 'higher than tense' on LF. This LF-movement
would render these elements (i.e. epistemic modals, metaphysical predicates and Gen)
                                                                                                                                                        
62 Observe the apparent exception Boys will be boys.
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insensitive to temporal distinctions, since they would be, to quote Cinque once more, "outside
the scope of absolute tense altogether". Let us leave this question open at the moment, while
we investigate other possibilities.
5.4.2 Sequence-of-Tenses
Firstly, let us turn to another property that concerns the temporal features of metaphysical
predicates, epistemic modals and generic sentences alike. These linguistic expressions,
although they are said to be incompatible with "real" tense, are still all subject to Sequence-
of-Tenses phenomena, characteristic of e.g. indirect speech; (102)b is from Iatridou 1990b,
fn.1:
(102)
a. Marit påstod at Jon måtte være morderen.
    Marit claimed that Jon mustPAST be killer-DEF.
   'Marit claimed that Jon had to be the killer'
b. Colombo said that it was possible that John had stolen the tapes.
c. The vikings believed that the earth was flat.
Iatridou claims that past tense in such contexts is irrelevant to anchoring that clause in time
(and so does not contradict her descriptive generalizations), which is what she means by her
statement that past tense in these contexts is not a 'real' tense. Once more, it seems, we have
evidence in support of the view that these linguistic expressions lack the ability to interact
with 'real' tense.
However, there exist certain snags to the conjecture that Sequence-of-Tenses
phenomena should be considered as some kind of morphosyntactic reflex which does not
signal any 'real' anchoring of the embedded clause in time. For instance, Enς (1987) objects to
this understanding of the Sequence-of-Tenses phenomenon, i.e. solely as a copying of the past
of the matrix onto the complement present. For starters, she notes that the Sequence-of-
Tenses phenomenon is not obligatory, cf. the following data (some of which are taken from
Enς, op.cit).
(103)
a. John heard that Mary was pregnant.
b. John heard that Mary is pregnant.
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(104)
a. We found out that John loved Mary.
b. We found out that John loves Mary.
(105)
a. Sally told me that John was very depressed.
b. Sally told me that John is very depressed.
Now, if the Sequence-of-Tenses phenomenon was merely 'morphological copying' of past
tense from the matrix verb to the embedded verb, and if, in addition, this rule is optional, one
would expect the a. and b. sentences above to be synonymous, since the past tense of the
embedded sentence by assumption is "pleonastic", therfeore, it should be semantically
vacuous. This is not what we find, however. There is an observable interpretational difference
between the a. and b. examples, which must be due to the alternation between past and
present tense marking of the embedded verb, since all other elements are identical. Comrie
(1985) claims that the present tense on the embedded verb signals that the proposition
expressed by the embedded sentence has "present relevance". Enς  sets out to make this
statement more precise. She claims that the difference between the a. and b. examples is that
past tense on the embedded verb signals that the embedded proposition should be evaluated
not at the speech time S but at the past time given by the matrix tense. On the other hand,
present tense on the embedded verb signals that the proposition expressed by the embedded
sentence should be evaluated at the speech time S, i.e. now.
Now, when we look at epistemic modals, this approach is a tempting path to follow.
Recall (section 4.6) that I assume epistemic modals to be two-place predicates on Conceptual
Structure, i.e. these predicates are always restricted to some individual's belief system. In the
default case, this individual is the speaker, but in Sequence-of-Tenses contexts this individual
is typically the matrix subject63; cf. the difference between (106)a and b:
(106)
a. Jon må være morderen.
   'Jon must be the killer.'
b. Marit påstod at Jon måtte være morderen.
   'Marit claimed that Jon had to be the killer.'
                                                
63 Consider an apparent counterexample, brought to my attention by Tor A. Åfarli:
Marit forstod ikke at Jon måtte/må være morderen.
'Marit did not understand that Jon had to/must be the killer.'
In this sentence, it seems that the speaker is the individual holding the belief, although the present modal
facilitates this reading; the preterite does not seem to give the same effect.
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The "outmost" speech event S in (106)b consists of the speaker asserting that [Marit claims
that p]. But there is another speech event here, notably Marit's asserting that [Jon must be the
killer]. On the face of it, the epistemic modal takes its cue from this 'inner' speech event,
where Marit's belief system produces the conviction and the assertion that Jon must be the
killer. If the modal relates to Marit's convictions rather than the speaker's convictions, why
should not the tense marking of the modal relate to Marit's speech event rather than the
speaker's speech event? This way, all relevant reference points would be shifted in Sequence-
of-Tenses contexts; the 'individual anchor' would shift from the speaker to the subject, the
assertion of the modal and its complement would shift from the outmost to the "inner" speech
event, and the temporal reference would shift from S – the outmost speech event, to the
"inner" speech event. All points of reference are shifted at once, nicely and symmetrically.
However, this warranted symmetry does not hold up against closer scrutiny. If we
replace the Past marking of the embedded sentence with Present, it is still Marit's belief
system, not the speaker's conviction, which is expressed by the modal må 'must':
(107)
  Marit påstod at Jon må være morderen.
   'Marit claimed that Jon must be the killer.'
The speaker is no more committed to the truth of the embedded proposition [Jon must be the
killer] if we replace the embedded Past with Present, i.e. Marit is still the individual anchor,
and her conviction is still the one expressed. Intuitively, the difference between (106)b and
(107) can be stated as follows. In (106)b, the speaker asserts that the truth of the proposition
[Jon must be the killer] was (seemingly) compatible with Marit's belief system at some
previous point in time, without any reference to whether or not the truth of this proposition is
entailed by Marit's belief system at present. This previous point in time is in this case taken to
be contemporaneous with the matrix event64, i.e. Marit's claiming that Jon must be the killer,
since Marit, if she is truthful, must believe the proposition to be true at the point in time where
she states this proposition.
On the other hand, in (107), the truth of the embedded proposition [Jon must be the
killer] is construed as entailed by Marit's belief system at present, i.e. the speaker has no
                                                
64  A contemporaneous reading between the matrix event and the embedded event in Sequence-of-Tenses
requires that the embedded predicate is construed as a stative predicate. This is another indication that epistemic
modals are stative predicates; cf. below, and also Barbiers (1995), Stowell (2000).
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reason to believe that Marit's system of beliefs has changed since she made the claim [Jon
must be the killer]. That is, the speaker asserts that Marit made the claim  [Jon must be the
killer], and by endowing this embedded proposition with the present tense, the speaker signals
that he believes this proposition to still belong to Marit's system of beliefs. Hence the
following contrast:
(108)
  a. #/??Marit påstod at Jon må være morderen, men det tror hun ikke lenger.
      Marit claimed that Jon must be the killer, but that believes she not longer
     'Marit claimed that Jon must be the killer, but she no longer believes that.'
b.  Marit påstod at Jon måtte være morderen, men det tror hun ikke lenger.
      Marit claimed that Jon mustPAST be the killer, but that believes she not longer
     'Marit claimed that Jon had to be the killer, but she no longer believes that.'
Faced with these facts, it seems tempting to adhere to the proposal in Enς (1987), that the past
tense on the embedded verb signals that the embedded proposition should be evaluated, not at
the speech time S, but at the past time given by the matrix tense. In Enς (1987), this "shift in
evluation time" correlates with the requirement that the embedded proposition relates
temporally to the matrix event instead of the outmost speech event S.
However, there exist data where this assumption does not seem to yield the correct
result. For instance, we can easily construct examples where past tense of the embedded verb
must be constructed as non-contemporaneous to the matrix past time, e.g.
(109)
a. Jeg hørte at du strøk på prøven.
   I heard that you failed on test-DEF
  'I heard that you failed the test.'
Conceptually, your failing the test will precede my hearing about it, which means that in this
case, the embedded predicate must be construed as past relative to the matrix past. Enς needs
an elaborated apparatus to account for the fact that the past tense of embedded sentences
sometimes gives rise to what she calls 'shifted readings' (i.e. past relative to matrix past) and
sometimes not (i.e. present relative to matrix past). But let us explore instead the idea that the
past-past reading arises in some cases simply for conceptual reasons.
Thus, consider (109). This sentence could be given a context where the speaker was
standing outside the open window at the very minute where the adressee failed the test and
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that the speaker actually heard it happen. In this case, the two events would be
contemporaneous. However, the more natural reading out of context would be the
aforementioned past-past reading. Let us further assume that the past of the embedded
predicate does not signal that this embedded event must be temporally related to the event of
the embedding verb. The temporal relation between these two events must be established on
conceptual grounds only. We have already shown that the past of the embedded predicate
may give rise to a reading where the embedded event is previous to the matrix event, as well
as a reading where the embedded event is simultaneous to the matrix event. What we have not
mentioned so far is that the past of the embedded predicate may even give rise to a reading
where the embedded event is subsequent to the matrix event. This is shown  in (110):
(110)
Jon er en stor spåmann. Han forutså at du strøk på prøven.
Jon is a great fortune teller. He predicted that you failed testDEF
'Jon is a great fortune teller. He predicted that you would fail the test.'
Again, on conceptual grounds, the prediction event must precede the failing event, since
otherwise it would not have been a prediction. Thus, these facts support the idea that the past
of the embedded predicate does not force any particular temporal ordering of the embedded
event w.r.t. the matrix event. The temporal relation between the embedded event and the
matrix event depends entirely on the conceptual construal arising from the aspectual and
conceptual properties of the two predicates involved.
Thus, all that is expressed by the tense system in Sequence-of-Tenses is that the event
of the embedded sentence, e.g. your failing the test, is past relative to S, just like my hearing
about it/Jon's prediction of it is past relative to S. No temporal ordering between the two
events is imposed by the tense elements expressed on the two verbs. This assumption is
supported by the fact that the Sequence-of-Tense phenomenon is optional, since this shows
that if there were a temporal ordering between an embedding verb and a finite embedded
predicate, at least this ordering cannot possibly be obligatory. Recall that even Enς agrees that
the embedded predicate may relate to S, namely whenever the embedded predicate is present
instead of past. I suggest that there is no reason to expect that the temporal ordering between
the embedded event and the matrix event should suddenly be obligatory when the embedded
proposition shows past tense instead of present tense. Furthermore, the possible construal of
the embedded event as past, simultaneous or subsequent relative to the matrix event
depending on the predicates involved supports the idea that the past of the embedded
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predicate does not signal a temporal ordering between the matirx event and the embedded
event. Instead, the past of the embedded predicate signals one particular temporal ordering of
the embedded predicate w.r.t. S, notably that the event expressed by the embedded predicate
is situated at a point in time previous to S.
Now, it is possible to give these facts and assumptions an account within the system of
tense-chains suggested in section 5.3.3.2. Recall that whereas non-finite tense elements (i.e. in
Norwegian, the perfect and the infinitive) must take the event argument of a c-commanding
verb as their first argument, finite tenses were claimed to take the speech event S as their first
argument. Recall from section 5.3.3.2 that the preterite signals a past relation between S and
the event argument of the verb carrying this past tense (S>e1), whereas finite present tense
signals a 'not-after' relation between S and the relevant verb. Let us see how these claims fares
w.r.t. to the observed difference (and note that here, "x > y" encodes that x is after y, i.e. x is
temporally subsequent to y).
(111)
a. John heard that Mary was pregnant.  (S  > eHEAR ) (S > eBE PREGNANT )
b. John heard that Mary is pregnant.     (S  > eHEAR) ¬ (S  > eBE PREGNANT)
The non-past relation between S and eBE PREGNANT  is taken to be the temporal relation of
simultaneity, given that the embedded verb is construed as stative. At least for Norwegian, a
dynamic verb in the same position would give rise to a 'future' reading (cf. also section
5.3.3.2):
(112)
a. Jeg hørte at du kommer på festen?
   I heard that you attend to party-DEF
  'I heard that you will attend the party?'
a. Jeg hørte at du stryker på prøven.
   I heard that you fail on test-DEF
  'I heard that you will fail the test.'
In neither of these cases is there any requirement of temporal ordering imposed by the tense
system between the embedding predicate and the embedded predicate. This ordering has to be
made on conceptual grounds. Instead, both the embedded event and the embedding event
relate temporally to S, since they are event arguments of verbs carrying a finite tense marking,
and finite tenses take S as their first argument.
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If this is on the right track, then Sequence-of-Tenses phenomena are in fact instances
of "real" tenses, in opposition to Iatridou's (1990b) claims presented above. Contrary to her
claims, tense in these constructions is by no means irrelevant for temporal anchoring of the
embedded proposition, on the contrary, tense anchors the embedded proposition w.r.t. S, just
like any other finite tense. One might object to Iatridou's approach that since epistemic
modals and metaphysical predicates do partake in Sequence-of-Tenses, they must contain a
time-variable; i.e. they must contain a tense element which is able to relate the event-
argument contained in the modal to S, just like other verbs. To further weaken Iatridou's
claims, we could go on to assume that the reason why epistemic modals, metaphysical
predicates and generic sentences are incompatible with adverbials like often, is that they are
stative, and stative predicates are in general incompatible with these types of adverbials:
(113)
a. #Jon liker ofte pannekaker.
   'Jon often likes pancakes'
b. #Marit har ofte store ører.
  'Marit has often big ears'
Another reason for these types of predicates to be rather insensitive to temporal reference is
that they qualify or accentuate truth values. They describe what is conceived as unchanging
truths as well as what is ontologically possible/necessary given an individual's model of the
actual world. That is, these linguistic expressions deal with what is possible, probable or
given for this model to be a coherent model. If an individual's model of the world is an
adequate model of the actual world, what is construed as 'possible' or 'necessary' within such a
model, is not likely to switch value from one moment to another. Thus, in order for me to
utter (114)a, I have to believe that my model of the world will change from the present model
to a different model in the future. Likewise, for me to utter (114)b, I have to admit that what
constituted my model of the world yesterday turned out to be an inadequate model, since I
obviously no longer entertain this model:
(114)
a. It will be possible that John is the killer.
b. Yesterday, it was probable that Mary was killer.
Note that if we invoke a context of e.g. writing a novel, where the writer is free to contruct his
own fictional minature model of the world, i.e. the discourse universe, and change this
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universe as he pleases from one day to the next, (114)a and b seem felicitous. The reading of
(114)a would imply that the author intends to change the novel's universe in such a way that it
will be possible that John is the killer, although the present universe may not give rise to this
possibility. Likewise, (114)b implies that yesterday's version of the novel's universe gave rise
to a probability that Mary was the killer, although today's version of this universe may not
give rise to the same probability. However, in the actual world, where the events take place in
a unidirectional manner, we cannot go back to erase or delete those events that would lead to
another set of contingent possibilities/necessities. Therefore, many of the propositions we
accept and live by may seem like unchanging truths.
As it happens, there exist (in fact, many) examples where what is conceived to be an '
"unchanging truth" turns out to be false. In these instances, one would expect e.g. generic
sentences to be sensitive to temporal reference, cf. e.g.(115).
 (115)
a. Jorda har faktisk vært rund i over 500 år.
   earth-DEF has in fact been round for 500 years
  'The Earth has actually been round for 500 years.'
b. Hvaler var fisk før, men nå har de vært pattedyr lenge65.
   whales were fish before, but now have they been mammals long
   'Whales used to be fish, but they have been mammals for a long time now.'
The only natural interpretation for these sentences is, crucially, not that we used to have a
state-of-affairs such that the earth was flat, and that at some point it changed into a round
shape. On the contrary, the natural way to interpret this sentence is that five hundred years
ago, we started to conceive the proposition [the earth is round] as true, whereas this
proposition used to be conceived as false before that time. Likewise,  (115)b must mean that
we used to consider the proposition [whales are fish] to be true, but nowadays we consider the
proposition [whales are mammals] to be true, and we have held this belief for a long time
now. Given our knowledge of the world, it would be unnatural for a species to change – over
night, so to speak– from being fish into being mammals. Admittedly, predicates that relate to
our model of the world and what is possible/probable/timeless truths within this model do not
seem to be very dynamic either. But since the sentences above deal with specific propositions
of which we know that they have "changed truth-values" in the sense that they used to be
                                                
65 Cf. also Hofmann (1976) for similar data, although his grammaticality judgements differ from these.
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conceived as false whereas they now are conceived to be true, this interpretation is the more
natural.
If these thoughts have any merit, then metaphysical predicates, epistemic modals and
generic sentences are still sensitive to temporal reference, even though they accentuate the
truth value of a proposition rather than the state-of-affairs described by this proposition. They
may be less sensitive to such reference than are many other types of predicates, but they are
not totally insensitive to temporal distinctions, as witnessed e.g. in Sequence-of-Tenses
constructions. We will elaborate further on these claims in the next section, concentrating
once more on epistemic and root modals.
5.4.3 Modals and finiteness
Recall from the previous section that Iatridou (1990b) points out Basque as a language where
metaphysical predicates carry irrealis mood marking only and reject present and past tense
marking. As regards epistemic modals, we have seen that they first and foremost get a present
tense marking in Norwegian (like in English), but that they accept a past tense marking in
Sequence-of-Tenses contexts. In German we find that epistemic modals accept present tense
indicative as well as subjunctive mood, which makes German epistemic modals  a mixed case
in this respect:
(116)
a. Er kann es gesagt haben.
   he canPRES it sayPERF haveINF
  ' He may have said it.'
b. Er könnte es gesagt haben.
    he canSUBJUNCTIVE66 it sayPERF haveINF
   'He might have said it67.'
It is a quite widespread assumption that the common trait between Mood and Tense is that
they both express finiteness. Cf. e.g. Holmberg and Platzack (1995:23):
A category related to tense and mood is the category of finiteness [...]. In traditional
grammar finite has roughly the meaning 'restricted to the particular situation', i.e. the
finite form of a verb indicates the existence of a predication at the time of the
utterance [...]. Thus, in a way, finiteness is a prerequisite for tense and mood: Unless a
predication is related to the time of utterance via the concept of finiteness, we have no
                                                
66 This is the mood called 'Konjunktiv II', which is a more 'distal' mood than 'Konjunktiv I'. Accroding to Reiten
(1990:207), there is no temporal distinction between these two forms, although 'Konjunktiv II' is sometimes
referred to as the 'Konjunktiv Präteritum'.
67 These data are taken from Reiten (1990).
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basis for expressing the relative position in time of the situation expresssed by the
predication vis-à-vis the utterance, and we cannot relate the attitude of the speaker to
the situation.  
In Platzack and Rosengren (1998:189 ff), this idea is further developed. These authors
implement the idea that Tense and Mood are related to finiteness by assuming that the
category Fin0 (i.e. finiteness) attracts a feature [finite] that present in Tense and Mood, in
other words, that both Tense and Mood may instantiate finiteness. Moreover, the semantic
function that is ascribed to finiteness is that of referentiality. That is, finiteness endows the
proposition with rerefence; Platzack and Rosengren (1998:191):
Let us finally consider the contribution of Tense/Mood and Finiteness to the finite
clause. Generally speaking, Mood indicates whether the event described is relevant for
our world (indicative) or for some other world (subjunctive) whereas Tense relates the
event or situation referred to by the clause to a time line. Finiteness, finally, anchors
the event in time and space, by identifying a point on the time line with the speaker's
here and now. In other words, a finite utterance is referring to an event in the speaker's
world or some other world [...].
I want to exploit this idea by assuming that finiteness is an inherent part of a statement or
assertion (this idea will be refined and modified below). That is, I want to invoke a distinction
between producing an assertion, which I define to be"'stating the actual or potential existence
of an event (in the wide sense; encompassing states)", and a proposition, which I define to
consist solely in a subject-predicate relation68. Thus, (117)a is a proposition but no assertion,
whereas (117)b is both a proposition and an assertion because of the presence of a finite
verb69:
(117)
a. Unicorns (to be) in the garden.
b. Unicorns are in the garden.
One crucial difference between a proposition, as defined above, and an assertion is that the
latter has a truth value, unlike the former. The linguistic expression Unicorns (to be) in the
garden does not have a truth value, because it is not anchored w.r.t. the moment of utterance,
neither by means of Tense, which would anchor the event on a time line, nor by means of
                                                
68 In fact, this statement needs further refinement, since I take a predication relation to hold between a thematic
subject and a predicate only. An expletive subject+ a predicate still constitute a proposition, although there is no
predication relation between them, cf. Åfarli and Eide (2001).
69 The notion of assertion may be seen as taking part in another opposition not addressed here, notably the
opposition between questions, assertions and commands (cf. e.g. Stenius 1967).
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Mood, which would anchor the event w.r.t. reality70. It is of course not a novel idea that a
truth value depends on the presence of Tense, cf. e.g. Higginbothham (1997:27):
[...] it is attractive to take the logic peculiar to tenses as intentional, so that sentences
of natural languages can be evaluated as true or false only relative to moments or
intervals of time [...].
A similiar statement is found in Larson and Segal (1995:510):
Tense thus brings in an important element of deixis or indexicality. Tenses force
sentences to be evaluated relative to the moment of utterance.
I will combine the assumption mentioned in the quote from Higginbotham above with the
assumptions of Platzack and Rosengren (1998) that finiteness is what endows the event
described by a proposition with referentiality. I want to claim that this referentiality is what
turns a proposition into an assertion and gives rise to a truth value.  In what follows, we will
concentrate on Tense as the expression of finiteness, since Norwegian does not employ Mood
(except as relicts). But one should bear in mind that even Mood provides a proposition with
finiteness and by assumption, turns a proposition into an assertion.
Now, recall from section 2.1 that Norwegian root modals behave much like other
verbs w.r.t. displaying a full paradigm of finite and non-finite forms (with the exception that
all modals lack present participles). On the other hand, it was stated that epistemic modals are
much less comfortable with non-finite forms than are root modals. A much stronger version
of this statement is found in Denison (1993:311), referring to Old and Middle English: "[T]he
modal in the infinitive is non-epistemic71."
Moreover, Plank (1984:314), objecting to Lightfoot (1979), states that
[P]remodals when used epistemically in general do not seem to have occurred non-
finitely in OE and ME in the first place. (Note that an identical finiteness requirement
characterizes epistemic modals also in other Germanic languages where there can be
no question of modals not being verbs; in fact, a requirement to this effect can
presumably claim general rather than language particular validity.)
Furthermore, according to Roberts and Roussou (2000), Vikner (1988) and van Kemenade
(1985) make similar claims for epistemic modals in Danish and Dutch, respectively. If this is
correct, it is tempting to speculate what it is about epistemic modals that forces them to occur
                                                
70 In taking Mood  to anchor the event w.r.t. reality, I gloss over the fact that several recent approaches to Mood
suggest that the realis/irrealis division is inadequate and impressionistic and, at the very best, is too coarse-
grained to account for the observed interpretations of e.g. the subjunctive; cf. Quer (1998).
71 He does however comment on three examples that show a slight possibility of an epistemic interpretation
although the modal is infinite.
Chapter 5
306
in finite forms only. I want to assume here that the reason for this is that epistemic modals
partake in assertions72. Epistemic modals qualify the truth value of an embedded assertion, i.e.
the assertion expressed by the modal's complement (including the subject). By doing so, they
express an assertion about this truth value. An assertion about the truth value of an another
assertion could be argued to require that both are finite73, cf. the following contrast:
(118)
a. It is absolutely true/false/likely that Elvis has left the building.
b. *To be absolutely true/false/likely that Elvis has left the building.
c. *It is absolutely true/false/likely for Elvis to have left the building.
However, it is easy to find examples that contradict this claim. Epistemic modals exclusively
take infinitival complements, i.e. non-finite complements, cf. (119):
(119)
a. Jon må være på kontoret.
    Jon must be in officeDEF
   'Jon must be in his office.'
b. *Det må at Jon er på kontoret.
    it must that Jon is in officeDEF
c. Det må være sant at Jon er på kontoret.
    it must be true that Jon is in officeDEF
   'It must be true that Jon is in his office.'
Note that even in (119)c, the complement of the modal is an infinitive. Thus we need to refine
our hypothesis. This is possible by means of the system of tense-chains developed above.
Recall that an infinitive, by assumption, contains the tense element [-PAST,-FIN]. The
tense element of a non-finite verb takes as its first argument the event argument of the closest
c-commanding verb and the event argument contained in the infinitival verb as its second
argument. The tense element of the infinitive furthermore encodes a non-past relation; i.e.
¬(e1> e2). If the verb is stative (as is in general the case with the complement of epistemic
modals; cf. section 5.3.2 ), the non-past relation is taken to be one of simultaneity. Now, the
                                                
72 Again, this is a simplification, since epistemic modals may be employed in questions as well:
(i)  Ok, so John is a thief. Must he therefore be a murderer?
In this case, the truth value of the 'modal assertion' is left open; thus, the sentence could be paraphrased as
follows: What is the truth value of [it is neccesary true [that John is a murderer]?
73 I will modify this view below.
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closest c-commanding verb in the cases under consideration is the epistemic modal. This
modal is finite, and a finite tense element takes S as its first argument and the event argument
of the modal as its second argument. Since the finite tense in this case is the present, the
relation between S and the event argument of the modal is the non-past relation, i.e. ¬(S > e1).
Again, this non-past relation is construed as simultaneity, since the modal is stative. This
gives the following relations:
(120)
Jon må være på kontoret.
Jon must be in officeDEF
'Jon must be in his office'
må [-PAST,+FIN] ¬ (S > eMÅ ); eMÅ is stative -> simultaneity
være [-PAST, -FIN] ¬ (eMÅ > eVÆRE ) eVÆRE is stative -> simultaneity
This amounts to saying that the complement of the modal is in fact "finite by inheritance"; i.e.
it is explicitly anchored on the time-line w.r.t. S, via its relation to eMÅ, the event argument of
the modal. To maintain our hypothsis that epistemic modals constitute assertions about
assertions, we need to say that this explicit semantic temporal anchoring w.r.t. S suffices to
give the complement of a modal a truth value; i.e. converts it from a proposition to an
assertion. Thus, the generalization we are looking for is not that a proposition must be
endowed with a finite verb in order to be interpreted as an assertion, but that a proposition
must contain at least one member of a tense-chain in order to be interpreted as an assertion. A
sentence becomes the member of such a tense-chain by means of an overtly expressed Tense
element; i.e. finite or non-finite. If the sentence contains a finite tense element, the assertion is
directly linked to S; if it contains a non-finite tense element, it is indirectly linked to S by
means of at least one intermediate member of the tense-chain, where the topmost tense
element relates to S.
Now, for a proposition to become an assertion, then, it must contain a tense element
which is the member of a tense-chain with a finite verb as its topmost member. In Norwegian,
only verbs carry such tense elements, and it is possible to claim that verbs are inherently
temporal at least in Norwegian, which does not employ Mood as a productive grammatical
category. Thus, verbs in Norwegian cannot not express tense, since there is no verb form that
does not carry a finite or non-finite tense element. The only way to express a seemingly tense-
less verb is to employ a non-finite verb which is not member of a tense-chain with a finite
verb as its topmost member. In this latter case, there would be nothing to instantiate the first
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event argument of the tense element, since non-finite tense elements cannot relate directly to
S, they require the event argument of a c-commanding verb as their first argument. In short,
for an embedded clause to be interpreted as an assertion, it must contain a verb.
This hypothesis would straightforwardly explain the ban on non-verbal small clauses
as the complement of an epistemic modal. Only verbs are equipped with tense elements; thus,
non-verbal small clauses  do not contain a tense element. Thereby, they cannot be interpreted
as assertions, only as propositions. But propositions as defined above consist solely in a
subject-predicate relation and do not give rise to a truth-value. Thus, the bracketed parts of
these sentences are propositions, not assertions, because of their lacking a tense element:
(121)
a. MaritI skal [ tI hjem].
    Marit shall home
   'Marit intends to go home.'
b. JonI må [ tI  på butikken].
    Jon must    in storeDEF
   'Jon must go to the store'
c. GreinaI vil ikke [ tI av ].
    branchDEF wants not off
   'The branch won't come off.'
Since these small clauses lack a tense element74, which is a requirement in order for a
proposition to be interpreted as an assertion, they have no truth value. Since they have no
truth value, there is nothing for an epistemic modal to qualify. Thus, the epistemic reading is
exluded, and the root reading is the only possibility.
Now, this works quite nicely so far. But how does this prevent an assertion about the
truth value of another assertion from having non-finite forms? After all, it seems that all we
would need is to embed the 'truth-value' assertion under another predicate, notably, one with a
finite tense element, and by the assumptions invoked so far, this would make the truth-value
assertion 'finite by inheritance' as well. Thus, we would expect 'truth-value' assertions to show
up with a non-finite tense element when embedded under another, finite, predicate. And this
is exactly what we find. For instance, the unacceptable (118)b embedded under a finite
epistemic verb straightforwardly gives rise to a perfectly acceptable structure, cf. (122):
                                                
74 Cf also Guéron and Hoekstra (1995:101) who argue, on quite different grounds, that non-verbal small clauses
lack an 'independent T(ense)-Operator', either they are resultatives (e.g. John ran [the pavement thin]) or
epistemic small clauses (e.g. John considered [students boring]).
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(122)
John considered [it to be absolutely true/false that Elvis has left the building].
This type of data support the hypothesis that it is not the finiteness per se, but the semantically
explicit temporal anchoring of the 'truth-value assertion' (to be true/false that p) which yields
the truth-value assertion possible. That is, to be absolutely true/false, containing a non-finite
tense element, is construed as contemporaneous with considered, and this verb is finite. Thus,
considered is 'past relative to S', whereas to be absolutely true/false is construed as
contemporaneous to consider. Therefore, the truth-value assertion is explicitly temporally
anchored, which is why it is possible in (122), as opposed to in (118)b, where there is no
embedding verb from which the truth-value assertion may inherit an explicit temporal
anchoring75.
However, if this is on the right track, we would expect that epistemic modals too
should be able to surface in a non-finite form exactly in the same type of configuration as
(122). Even if epistemic modals function as assertions about truth-values of embedded
assertions, this would not explain their lack of non-finite occurrences. On the contrary, we
have already seen that a non-finite truth-value assertion is acceptable when embedded under a
finite verb.  Moreover, resorting to an explanation where 'epistemic modals belong to the out-
most functional layer of a clause' (which they evidently do, since they e.g. always scope over
root modals and not the other way around) would not suffice either; we would still expect
epistemic modals to be able to turn up as non-finite complements of at least certain predicates,
namely, as the non-finite complement of a finite epistemic or evidential predicate. Thus,
regardless of the claims in Plank (1984) that epistemic modals are finite in Germanic
languages, we would expect there to exist non-finite epistemic modals in this specific
configuration. Incidentally, our expectations are indeed borne out, cf. the following rasing
constructions76:
                                                
75 Admittedly, this would still not explain why (118)c is unacceptable:  *It is absolutely true/false for Elvis to
have left the building.. However, note that raising predicates behave just as predicted, e.g. Elvis is
likely/unlikely/supposed/presumed to have left the building.I have no explanation to offer for this difference at
present, except for resorting to pointing out the obvious syntactic difference between these two constructions.
76 Confer also Faarlund et al. (1997: 578), where there are two examples where the modal skulle occurs in the
infinitive and still has an epistemic reading, where the modal is the leftmost verb in an infinitival clause:
De påstås å skulle ha reist (= ...at de skal ha reist)
'They are claimed to be supposed to have left' (= Present claim: that they supposedly have left)
De ble påstått å skulle ha reist ( =... at de skulle ha reist)
'They were claimed to be supposed to have left' (Past claim: that they supposedly have left)
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 (123)
a. Marit påstås å skulle være morderen.
   Marit claimPASS to shall be the killer
  'Marit is claimed to be supposed to be the killer.'
b. Jon antas å måtte være ungkar.
   Jon supposePASS to must be bachelor
   'Jon is supposed to have to be a bachelor.'
c. Ti tusener blir rapportert å kunne være drept.
    Ten thousands reportedPASS to may be killed
    'Tens of thousands are reported to possibly have been killed.'
d. Dette fryktes å kunne bli et stort problem.
    this fearPASS to may become a big problem
   'This is feared to potentially become a big problem.'
The natural reading of the modal in all these sentences is the epistemic reading, although in
(123) d, a root reading is possible in addition to the epistemic reading. Crucially, though, these
modals are all non-finite, i.e. they are infinitives, and nevertheless, they undoubtedly have an
epistemic reading. That is, the generalization made in Plank (1984) above that Germanic
epistemic modals are subject to a finiteness requirement does not hold. Instead, the relevant
generalization is that epistemic modals must be explicitly temporally anchored, i.e. member
of a tense-chain whose topmost member is a finite verb, in order to function as assertions.
This property is common to epistemic modals and root modals alike; neither root modals or
any other verb may partake in an assertion if not explicitly temporally anchored.
One crucial difference between epistemic modals and root modals, though, is that the
former qualify truth values; specifically, the truth value of the complement of the modal
(where the complement includes the subject trace). Since epistemic modals qualify truth
values, they require their complement to be explicitly temporally anchored as well, since
explicit temporal anchoring is the distinguishing feature between a proposition and an
assertion, and only the latter may function as the complement of an epistemic modal. Since
only verbs are able to provide a tense element which performs this explicit temporal
anchoring, this amounts to saying that epistemic modals require their complement to contain a
verb.
Moreover, given the system of tense-chains alluded to in this discussion, it seems
futile at best to seek the once-and-for-all ordering of epistemic modals w.r.t. to one or two
fixed tense projections, as is the approach chosen in several recent proposals, e.g. Cinque
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(1999), Stowell (2000) and Roberts and Roussou (2000). The reason why this seems futile is
that the behavior, requirements and interpretations of root and epistemic modals and their
complements vis-á-vis tense marking suggest instead that every verb comes with its own
tense-package, which orders the event argument of the verb on a temporal line relative to the
verb c-commanding it (if it carries a non-finite tense-package) or to the speech event S (if it
carries a finite tense-package). In fact, this is so irrespective of the relevant verb's status as an
epistemic or root modal, a metaphysical predicate, the matrix verb of a generic sentence or a
plain lexical verb in any old sentence.
5.5 Modals and negation
This discussion on modals and negation will not be concerned with the entire spectrum of
data and previous analyses on the subject, although several analyses exist (cf. e.g. Öhlscläger
1989:80 ff and the references given there, in particular fn. 54 p. 84). Instead, I would like to
present a set of intriguing Norwegian data consisting of sentences containing modals and
negation. These data display a surprising asymmetry as regards the modal's scope relative to
negation, seemingly depending on the placement of the subject. As far as I know, this is a
novel observation for Norwegian, and I have no knowledge of a corresponding observation
for any other language either.
Although I present a sketchy analysis to account for the observed facts, I want to point
out that this is work in progress which makes no claim of telling the whole story. First and
foremost, the discussion focusses on the discussion of the interaction between the modal
kunne 'can' and the clausal negation ikke 'not'; the other Norwegian modals are mentioned just
briefly at the end. Moreover, I have concentrated on the root reading of kunne and do not
investigate to which extent these claims hold for the epistemic reading of kunne, not to
mention the epistemic readings of all the other modals.   
5.5.1 The data
I take as my point of departure the data listed in  (124). Crucially, some of these sentences are
ambiguous w.r.t. the relative scope of the modal and the negation, whereas others are
unambiguous. The possible readings are indicated by means of the "diamond" encoding
'possibility' and the negation sign. The relative ordering of the two encodes the relative scope
of the two operators in the reading at hand, such that ¬◊  paraphrases as 'it is not possible for
the medicine to work', whereas ◊ ¬ means 'it is possible for the medicine not to work'.
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 (124)
a. Dermed kan medisinen ikke virke.
thus can mediscineDEF not work
'Thus, the medicine can not work (ambiguous: ◊ ¬/ ¬◊).'
b. ...fordi medisinen ikke kan virke.
because mediscineDEF not can work
'...because the medicine cannot work (unambiguous:  ¬◊).'
c. Dermed kan ikke medisinen virke.
thus cannot medicineDEF work
'Thus, the medicine cannot work (unambiguous: ¬◊).'
d. Dermed kan ikke medisinen ikke virke.
thus cannot medicineDEF not work
'Thus, the medicine cannot not work (unambiguous: ¬◊ ¬).'
e. */??...fordi medisinen ikke ikke kan virke.
because mediscineDEF not not can work
f. */??...fordi medisinen ikke kan ikke virke.
because mediscineDEF not cannot work
g. */??...fordi ikke medisinen ikke kan virke.
because not mediscineDEF can not work
It is not a new obeservation that Mainland Scandinavian (sentence) adverbials may appear to
the right of the subject, as in  (124)a, or to the left of the subject, as in  (124)c. Holmberg (1993)
explains this phenomenon as the optional movement of the subject phrase from [Spec,TP] to
[Spec,AgrSP], assuming that the adverbial has a fixed position in the structure. Note also that
weak (i.e. unstressed) subject pronouns are assumed to move obligatorily, since the data
suggest that weak subject pronouns cannot surface to the right of the sentence adverbial,
unlike non-pronoun subjects and stressed (i.e. strong) pronoun subjects. (cf. also Vikner
1995:45, Platzack 1986:45). Åfarli (1997), on the other hand, rejects the hypothesis that the
adverbial occupies a fixed position on the basis of the observation that a sentence adverbial
may occur simultaneously to the immidate right and left of the subject, cf. (125):
(125)
a. Har möjligen nogon student inte läst boken? (Sw.)
has possibly any student not read the book
b. Bøker har faktisk studentane aldri lese. (Norw.)
books have in fact the students never read
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Åfarli assumes instead that the adverbial may "float" to the left of the subject because of one
property specific to adverbials: Adverbials originate in a third dimension of phrase structure,
cf.  (126):
(126)
                Advl
AgrSP
NP        AgrS'
Åfarli too assumes that AgrSP77 is what licences the sentence adverbial, but since adverbials
are 3D elements, they have to be forced into a linear ordering w.r.t. the other elements in the
string, a process referred to as "bending". A leftward bending will result in the adverbial
occurring to the left of the subject, a downward bending results in the adverbial occurring to
the right of the subject, and finally, a rightward bending results in a sentence-final adverbial.
Now, compare the two strings in  (124) a. and  (124)c, repeated here for convenience
as  (127) a and b :
 (127)
a. Dermed kan medisinen ikke virke.
thus can mediscineDEF not work
'Thus, the medicine can not work (ambiguous: ◊ ¬/ ¬◊).'
b. Dermed kan ikke medisinen virke.
thus cannot medicineDEF work
'Thus, the medicine cannot work (unambiguous: ¬◊).'
Although both Holmberg's and Åfarli's analyses are able to derive these two word orders,
none of them are able to explain the fact that whereas  (127)b is unambiguous (' It is not
possible for the medicine to work'),  (127)a has two possible readings ('It is not possible for
the medicine to work' vs. 'It is possible for the medicine not to work).  On the contrary, on
both these analyses, one would expect the scope possibilities of the negation w.r.t. the modal
to be identical. To exemplify, the analysis of Åfarli would give us something like the figure in
(128).
                                                
77 He also mentions that AgrIOP may serve as an attachment site for adverbials.
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(128)
CP
                              C'
Dermed                      AgrSP
         C              AgrS'                 
      kan SUBJ       
         medisinen                 TP
  (ikke)                           AgrS                                     T'
      (ikke)    tKAN         tSUBJ
   T                   VP...
            tKAN         virke      
thus      can   (not)   the medicine (not)                     work
On Holmberg's analysis, the optional movement of the subject from [Spec, TP] to [Spec,
AgrSP] derives the right word orders. But it seems hard to relate this optional movement of
the subject to a change in the relative scope possibilities of negation w.r.t. the modal – why
should this movement influence the possible scope of negation? Likewise, another important
question emerging from the data in  (124) remains unanswered on these two analyses: Why
doesn't the embedded sentence in  (124)b give rise to the same ambiguity? In my approach, I
will seek an answer to both questions.
First of all, let us investigate the possible relative ordering of full subject phrases
versus subject pronouns relative to sentence adverbials in MSc main clauses and embedded
clauses. We will employ two sentence adverbials, since, as pointed out by Åfarli (1997), a
sentence adverbial may occur simultaneously to the immediate right and left of the subject.
 (129)
Main clauses:
a. Dermed har sannsynligvis studentene aldri lest boka.
b. Dermed har studentene sannsynligvis aldri lest boka.
c. Dermed har de sannsynligvis aldri lest boka.
d. *Dermed har sannsynligvis de aldri lest boka78.
'Thus, the students/they have probably never read the book'
                                                
78 Note that this sentence is fine when the pronoun is stressed. Here, we are only concerned with the unstressed
pronouns.
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Embedded clauses:
e. ...fordi studentene sannsynligvis aldri har lest boka.
f.* ...fordi sannsynligvis studentene aldri har lest boka79.
g. ...fordi de sannsynligvis aldri har lest boka.
h. *...fordi sannsynligvis de aldri har lest boka.
' because the students/they probably never have read the book'
The relevant generalization for embedded clauses is that even a full subject phrase cannot
intevene between the two adverbials, as opposed to main clauses, where this is possible. In
fact, the data suggest that weak pronoun subjects occur in the same position as full subject
phrases in embedded clauses. On the other hand, in main clauses, full subject phrases and
weak pronoun subjects are seemingly subject to different restrictions, since full subject
phrases may occur to the left of both adverbials, just like weak pronouns, but in addition, full
subject phrases may intervene between the two adverbials. That is, in main clauses, the full
subject phrase may intervene between the two adverbials, whereas nothing may intervene
between these two adverbials in embedded clauses.
5.5.2 The analysis
Now, throughout this dissertation, I have confessed my attraction to the Real Minimalist
Principle, as stated in Thráinsson (1996: 261):
Assume only those functional categories that you have evidence for.
Thráinsson goes on to admit that "what counts as "evidence" in this connection is by no
means obvious", and I agree. In my view, the postulation of a functional projection should
preferably correspond to some kind of morphological marker, as is envisaged by Åfarli (1995:
140, his (6)). However, I want to argue here that the word order patterns in (129) constitute
evidence for a functional projection present in Norwegian main clauses and absent from some
Norwegian embedded clause types.
Thus, I want to argue that it is possible to explain the word order patterns observed in
(129) by making the following assumptions/stipulations.
                                                
79 The sentence is possible with a paranthetical reading of sannsynligvis. The paranthetical reading is
characterized by a 'comma-intonation' in speech and a comma on each side in written text. This means that fordi,
sannsynligvis, studentene aldri har lest boka is perfectly fine. Now, crucially, this comma-intonation in speech
or punctuation in written text is not at all required for (109) a to be acceptable. Paranthetical readings of
adverbials, characterized by comma-intonation are typically taken to "signal that [the adverbial] is not actually
part of the syntactic representation"; cf. Browning (1996:238, n.2) and Cinque (1999: 181,  n. 87).
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a. Main clauses contain one functional projection which is absent from embedded
clauses. Let us dub this projection ForceP80.
b. ForceP provides an additional adjunction site for sentence adverbials, which means
that main clauses contain two possible adjunction sites for sentence adverbials, (let us
dub the other one FinP) whereas  embedded clauses contain only one adjunction site
for such adverbials (namely FinP). Each adjunction site may contain more than one
adverbial, and the adverbial is adjoined to Fin'/Force'.
c. Weak pronoun subjects move to <Spec, ForceP> when possible (i.e. when this
position is present), whereas full subject phrases remain in <Spec, FinP>.
Now, let us see whether or not these assumptions do in fact account for the observed patterns.
 (130)
CP     C/V2   [Spec,ForceP]     SA        [Spec,FinP]            SA              VMAIN           DO
a.    Dermed     har   sannsynligvis   studentene          aldri          lest boka.
b.   Dermed    har                                              studentene  sannsynligvis aldri  lest         boka.
c.   Dermed    har           de        sannsynligvis                              aldri                 lest         boka.
d. *Dermed    har                       sannsynligvis         de                 aldri                 lest         boka.
CP     C/V2   [Spec,ForceP]     SA        [Spec,FinP]            SA           VAUX/MAIN       DO
      Ø    Ø
e.           fordi studentene sannsynligvis aldri   har lest       boka.
f.    *     fordi                 sannsynligvis   studentene aldri       har lest      boka.
g.          fordi de          sannsynligvis aldri  har lest      boka.
h.   *     fordi                 sannsynligvis   de                                aldri           har lest     boka.
Now, if we make these assumptions, we see that  (129)d is unacceptable because the weak
pronoun has failed to move to <Spec, ForceP>, whereas  (129)f and h are unacceptable
because the adverbial sannsynligvis 'probably' is adjoined to a functional projection that does
not exist in embedded clauses. The weak pronoun subject does not move to <Spec,ForceP> in
(129)g because this position simply does not exist in embedded clauses81.
                                                
80 I will not argue here that these labels are the only conceivable lables for the functional projections involved.
However, invoking the label ForceP is meant to signal that this projection may be connected to basic sentence
modality (e.g. statement vs. command), whereas FinP corresponds to the old 'unsplit' IP, containing e.g. Tense.
Thus, I have assumed (Eide 2001) that Norwegian imperatives contain a ForceP but no FinP,  that some
embedded clause types contain a FinP but no ForceP, and that main clauses contain both.
81 One should be aware here that there exist types of embedded clauses that does not behave this way, e.g.
embedded conditionals seem to employ ForceP in addition to FinP, and at 'that'- clauses, when complements of
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Now, to our next mission. Are we in a position to explain the relative scope of modals
and negation if we make these assumptions? I will argue that this is so. Before we proceed
however, we need to make another assumption about the syntactic category of negation in
Norwegian. Following Zanuttini (1996, p. 191) I will propose that the negation ikke, 'not', is
an adverbial in Norwegian. Furthermore, I will assume that it typically behaves as a sentence
adverbial (except in those instances where it negates lexical constituents). Since, by
assumption, Norwegian has two possible adjunction sites for sentence adverbials in main
clauses, there exist exactly two positions in a main clause where the Norwegian negation ikke
may occur; adjoined to Force' and adjoined to Fin'. The choice between these two adjunction
sites for ikke will give us the two strings in  (127)a and b, repeated here as (131), where the
different projections are indicated:
(131)
a. [CP Dermed [C kani [ForceP [Force ti [ FinP medisinen [Fin' ikke[Fin ti [VPvirke]]]]]]]].
thus can        mediscineDEF not       work
'Thus, the medicine can not work (ambiguous: ◊ ¬/ ¬◊).'
b. [CP Dermed [C kani [ForceP [Force' ikke [Force ti [ FinP medisinen [Fin ti [VPvirke]]]]]]]].
thus can not medicineDEF work
'Thus, the medicine cannot work (unambiguous: ¬◊).'
As additional evidence for this structure, recall the sentence in  (124) d, repeated as (132):
(132)
Dermed kan ikke medisinen ikke virke.
thus cannot medicineDEF not work
'Thus, the medicine cannot not work (unambiguous: ¬◊ ¬).'
Here, we see that both adjunction sites are occupied at once. The result is a string which is
unambiguous w.r.t. the relative scope of the two instances of negation and the modal.
However, we still have to explain the ambiguity vs. the unambiguity of the strings in (131)a
and b respectively. This is what we turn to next.
Roberts (1985) claims that Modern English modals are directly inserted into I(nfl)0, as
opposed to Middle English modals, that were inserted in V and subsequently  raised to I0.
Roberts (1993) further claims that Mainland Scandinavian modals behave like Middle English
modals e.g. because they supposedly have theta-assigning properties, but I will reject this
                                                                                                                                                        
bridge verbs (factive verbs and verbs of saying and believeing) behave like main clauses w.r.t. the phenomena
observed here.
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latter assumption here and simply stipulate that Norwegian modals may be inserted directly
into I0 as well, or in the present approach, into Fin082. In addition, we will make use of the
device head-adjunction (Chomsky 1995) to account for the possible readings of (131) a and b
respectively. The proposed structure of the ambiguous string in (131)a is depicted in (133).
(133)
CP
        C'
ForceP
XP        Force'
       C0          FinP
  Fin'
               Force   C              Force0           Fin'
  Subj    VP
     VMOD     Force VMOD Force     NEG      
Fin0 V' ...
             VMOD             tSUBJ
                  V ...
Dermed  kan          medisinen          ikke           virke
The ambiguity of this structure w.r.t. the relative ordering of the negation and the modal stems
from the (sub)chain consisting of the modal's trace in Force0 and the trace in the root position
of the modal in Fin0. At this point, the chain envelopes the negation and gives rise to the
ambiguity, depending on the possibility to interpret the tail (the lower trace) of the modal
chain or the intermediate trace in Force0. In the latter case, the modal will scope over the
negation. In the former case, negation will scope over the modal. The subject is stuck in
[Spec,FinP], since [Spec,CP] hosts a topicalized element, and the subject being a full noun
phrase, it cannot raise to [Spec,ForceP] either. So the subject constitutes a clear indicator of
where negation is adjoined, Fin'; i.e. the lower adjunction site is the relevant one. And as the
structure shows, employing the lower adjunction site gives rise to the scopal ambiguity. Now,
let us see what happens in the other proposed structure. Making use of the upper adjunction
site available for sentence adverbials/negation apparently does not give rise to this scopal
ambiguity. The proposed structure of the string in (131) b is depicted in (134) below.
                                                
82 A Norwegian modal also may be embedded under a perfective/aspectual auxiliary. In these cases, the modal
may of course be part of the VP. The point here is that a finite auxiliary may be directly inserted into Fin0,
whatever its status as modal or aspectual may be. This would not work for main verbs, though. If it is a sound
assumption that VP is the lexical domain where theta-properties and theta-relevant principles like the projection
principle are monitored, cf. e.g. Brody (1993), a lexical verb with theta-properties would have to leave a trace in
V0 to uphold these properties and principles.
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(134)
CP
        C'
ForceP
XP   Force'
       C0              Force'
      FinP
               Force   C     NEG                                           Fin'
 Force0    VP
     VMOD     Force                         Subj      
                                      VMOD  Force    Fin0 V' ...
                VMOD             tSUBJ
   
                  V ...
Dermed        kan                  ikke                  medisinen           virke
In this structure, employing the upper adjunction site for the modal, we likewise have a head-
chain enveloping the negation. But this subchain does not consist of the modal and its trace. It
consists of the Force0 head and its trace. The attributive semantic properties of the modal as
an operator encoding 'possibility' are irrelevant at this point, and too deeply embedded in the
adjunction structure of the complex head to provide any semantic input to the C head. The
modal functions solely as a phonetic matrix, a syntactic head fulfilling the requirements of the
principle responsible for the V2 phenomenon. Thus, the lack of scopal ambiguity in this string
stems from the lack of a relevant head-chain enveloping the negation. There is no chain in
this structure that will allow us to intepret the modal as scoping over the negation.
Recall that I proposed some specific properties of [Spec,ForceP] as well, claiming that
it hosts weak or unstressed pronouns. This proposal is easy to test against this structure.
Assume we replace the subject DP medisinen 'the medicine' with an unstressed pronoun den
'it'. If unstressed pronouns obligatorily move to [Spec,ForceP], we would predict that this
replacement ought to result in an unambiguous string, just like the structure above. This
expectation is indeed fulfilled, cf. (135).
(135)
Dermed   kan-den-ikke        virke.
thus    can-it-not         work
'Thus, it cannot work (¬◊).'
The modal, the pronoun and the negation forms one item prosodically, which clearly indicates
that they are structurally adjacent. This prosodic indicator suffices to supply the language user
with the relevant information to form the scopally unambiguous string: The modal sits in
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C/V2, the pronoun is unstressed and therfore it occupies [Spec,ForceP], and the negation must
be adjoined in the upper adjuction site to be able to partake in this prosodic item83.
Now, ls take a closer look at those data in  (124) that regard embedded sentences in
Norwegian. For starters, these data suggest that Norwegian embedded sentences headed by
fordi 'because' do not allow for double negation;  (124) e, f and g, repeated here as  (136) a, b
and c are all attempts to force the embedded structure to accept two instances of negation.
Neither works; they are all ungrammatical84.
 (136)
a. */??...fordi medisinen ikke ikke kan virke.
because mediscineDEF not not can work
b. */??...fordi medisinen ikke kan ikke virke.
because mediscineDEF not cannot work
c. */??...fordi ikke medisinen ikke kan virke.
because not mediscineDEF not can work
This supports the assumption that embedded clauses contain only one adjunction site for the
sentence adverbial/negation. However, if embedded clauses contain only FinP and not
ForceP, why is it that embedded clauses do not exhibit the kind of ambiguity found in main
clauses (cf.  (124)b)? Recall that employing the lower adjunction site, Fin', was the move that
gave rise to the ambiguity in main clauses, and embedded sentences are obviously scopally
unambiguous, cf. (137):
                                                
83 Notice that a pause between the weak pronoun subject and the negation allows for the other reading; as
expected. The pause indicates that negation does not form a prosodic item with the verb+subject; in which case it
is not structurally adjacent to the subject, but adjoined to Fin', the lower adjunction site.
84 A couple of comments are in order here. Firstly, the negation ikke is typically less restricted in its distribution
than are many of the other sentence adverbials. Hence, we may encounter embedded clauses where the negation
ikke occurs between the complementizer and the subject of the embedded clause. Secondly, as mentioned
previously (fn.81), some types of embedded clauses more readily accept an adverbial in what appears to be an
'upper adjunction site', whether this adverbial is the negation ikke or not. Seemingly, clauses headed by the
complementizer fordi 'because' belong to the more restrictive clause types w.r.t. allowing an adverbial between
the complementizer and the subject. Thirdly, one of my linguist informants judges  (136) b to be dramatically
worse than either a. or c., although all are judged to be unacceptable. Interestingly, my non-linguist informants
reach the exact opposite conclusion about this sentence, and judge it to be slightly better than the other two. I
believe the reason for this discrepancy to be as follows. The linguist informant knows that no adjuction site for
sentence adverbials exist to the right of a finite verb, which may influence on this person's judgments. My non-
linguist informants, on the other hand, find  (136)b better than the other two because they construe the sequence
ikke-virke as a verb, meaning rougly 'avoid working'. These informants find this sentence more acceptable
because the scope of the two instances of negation is logically easier to construe; notably as 'not-possible' and
'not-work'.
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(137)
...fordi medisinen ikke kan virke.
because mediscineDEF not can work
'...because the medicine cannot work (unambiguous:  ¬◊).'
It is correct that employing the lower adjunction site gives rise to the ambiguity in main
clauses. But recall also that the ambiguity witnessed in main clauses stems from two different
properties of the relevant main clauses, notably adjoining the negation to Fin' pluss the modal-
chain created by the modal's movement from Fin0 to Force0 . In embedded clauses, however,
no movement of the modal to Force0 can take place, since Force0 does not exist in embedded
clauses. Hence, there is no modal chain to give rise to the scopeal ambiguity; hence, the
negation will always scope over the modal. This is depicted in (138):
(138)
        CP
         C'
             FinP
Fin'
             C0                Fin'
 Subj                                                              VP
  NEG           V'
        Fin0
                     VMOD                          tSUBJ
           V
       fordi     medisinen        ikke        kan           virke
        because medicineDEF not           can                      work
It seems that the observed pattern could be accounted for along these lines. If this theory
holds up against closer scrutiny, then, the interaction of modals and negation may give
important cluse to the functional outfit of Norwegian main and embedded clauses.
As mentioned in the introduction to this subsection, I have not taken on an
investigation of all the other modals w.r.t. the phenomena discussed here. However, it seems
that the modals skulle 'will' and måtte 'must' behave differently from kunne 'may, can' at least
in embedded clauses. For instance, when these modals co-occur with negation in embedded
sentences, they seem to be ambiguous, unlike kunne:
(139)
a. ...ettersom vi ikke skulle/måtte åpne den døra
      since    we not should/mustPAST open that door
     I'...since we were not obligated to open that door'
     II...since we were obligated not to open that door'
Chapter 5
322
I have no explanation to offer at present as to why other modals should behave differently
from  kunne in this respect. However, Palmer (1995), who investigates the scopal possibilities
for modals and negation in various languages, shows that the 'necessary-not' form typically
gives rise two an 'irregular construal'; i.e. scope inversion, in a range of these languages. By
contrast, the 'not-possible' form is usually regular. He notes that even elsewhere in language
the scope of negation is not accurately indicated  by the grammar, as shown e.g. by the
example I don't think he will come (= I think he won't come), but he does not provide any
explanation for the differences between modals encoding possibility and those encoding
necessity w.r.t. scope possibilies relative to negation. I leave this question for future research.
5.6 Summing up
The subject of this chapter has been how modals interact with other categories. We have
studied how modals relate to aspectuals, to stative and dynamic complements, to tense and
finally, to negation. Our investigation of modals and aspectuals revealed that modals may
precede or follow an aspectual, and contrary to wide-spread assumptions, the position of the
modal relative to an aspectual is not decisive for the reading of the modal as epistemic or root.
Furthermore, we have seen that epistemic modals prefer stative complements whereas root
modals prefer dynamic complements in the sense that an epistemic reading arises much more
easily with a stative complement, whereas a root reading arises much more easily with a
dynamic complement.
As regards the temporal properties of the complement of a modal, we have seen that
root modals prefer future-denoting complements, whereas epistemic modals accept past-
denoting complements. To give a systematic account of the temporal properties of the
complements of a modal, we constructed a new model of tense-assignment wherein temporal
relations are determined by tense elements encoded in any Norwegian verb-form. Norwegian
employs four different tense elements; [+PAST,+FIN] encoded by the preterite, [-PAST,
+FIN] encoded by the present, [+PAST,-FIN] encoded by the perfect participle and finally
[-PAST,-FIN] encoded by the infinitive. All and only verbs encode tense elements, which
means that e.g. small clauses do not take part in the construction of a tense-chain.
In our investigation of modals and tense, we reached the conclusion that a once-and-
for-all ordering of modals and tense in a universal hierarchy of functional projections (as
suggested by e.g. Cinque 1999, Stowell 2000) cannot be maintained because each modal, like
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any other verb, comes with its own tense package. Thus, the number of tense elements (or T-
projections, in Cinque's terminology), will be determined by the number of verbs present in a
clause, and each verb carries one tense element. Furthermore, we found that the widely
assumed finiteness-requirement on epistemic modals does not hold. This finiteness
requirement should be replaced with a requirement that the epistemic modal must be
explicitly temporally anchored by means of being member of a tense-chain with a finite verb
as its topmost member.
Finally, we looked at some interesting data concerning modals and negation in
Norwegian. To explain the observed interpretational asymmetry of these sentences, we
assumed that Norwegian main clauses contain a projection absent from (most) Norwegian
embedded clauses. It was shown that this assumption, along with some auxiliary hypotheses,
does account for the observed patterns.
6 Conclusions
In this dissertation, I have systematized the inventory of Norwegian modals with respect to
their syntactic and sematic properties. Based on these properties, I have divided this inventory
into two main types, namely modal main verbs and modal auxiliaries. Furthermore, I have
made a further subdivision of the modal auxiliaries into root modals and epistemic modals,
where the set of root modals consists of deontic and dispositional modals, whereas the set of
(wide sense) epistemic modals consists of evidential and (narrow sense) epistemic modals, as
follows.
(1)
       Norwegian modals
Modal main verbs                 Modal auxiliaries
Kunne 'know'
Ville 'want-to'
Trenge'need'
Behøve 'need' Root Epistemic (wide sense)
Deontic Dispositional  Evidential           Epistemic
Burde 'should' Kunne 'can/know' Skulle 'be supposed to'       Burde 'should'
Måtte 'must' Ville 'want to'         Måtte 'must'
Kunne 'may'                    Kunne 'may'
Skulle 'be required to'        Ville 'will'
Ikke trenge 'need not'           Ikke trenge 'need not'
           Ikke behøve 'need not'                      Ikke behøve 'need not'
Considering the argument-taking properties of Norwegian modals, we find that the modal
main verbs behave like transitive lexical verbs, assigning one external and one internal theta-
role, i.e. they take a subject and a direct object. Dispositional modals are different from other
modal auxiliaries in not accepting expletive subjects, whereas all other modal auxiliaries do.
The two dispositional modals are also the only modal auxiliaries that do not allow for their
subject to scope under them, and they are always construed as two-place relations; i.e. they
always assign an external theta-role.
Deontic root modals may be construed as one-place relations or two-place relations,
and we reached the conclusion (chapter 3) that these modals are optional assigners of an
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external theta-role. Epistemic and evidential modals never assign an external theta-role, and
they are always construed as one-place relations.
It has often been claimed that there exist a range of formal differences between root
modals on one hand and epistemic modals on the other. In subjecting these claims to scrutiny,
however, we find that most of these alleged differences between root modals and epistemic
modals do not exist. Thus, root modals and epistemic modals alike take non-argument
subjects (e.g. expletives), none of them passivize, and both groups have non-finite forms,
contrary to the wide-spread claim that epistemic modals are subject to a finiteness-
requirement.
Furthermore, it has sometimes been claimed that modals get an epistemic reading
when they precede an aspectual, whereas they get a root reading when they follow an
aspectual. We have seen that this is not correct. Both epistemic and root readings are available
when the modal precedes an aspectual (this was shown to hold for English and Dutch in
addition to Norwegian). Moreover, non-standard Norwegian dialects also allow for an
epistemic reading, in addition to a root reading, of a modal following an aspectual.
However, there do exist certain differences between root modals and epistemic modals
as regards their complement-taking properties. Firstly, root modals accept, whereas epistemic
modals reject a non-verbal small clause complement. I have suggested (section 5.4.3) that
epistemic modals take assertions as their complements. Assertions are propositions with a
truth-value. A prerequisite for a truth-value is explicit temporal anchoring, and this anchoring
is provided by a verb. Thus, non-verbal small clauses are propositions with no truth-value,
since they do not contain a verb. As such, they cannot function as the complement of an
epistemic modal.
Secondly, root modals accept, whereas epistemic modals reject a pro-predicate dette
'this' as a complement (this is pointed out by Lødrup 1994). Interestingly, it turns out that only
subject-oriented root modals; i.e. root modals construed as two-place relations, are felictious
in this construction, cf. ( 2)a, where we have a subject-oriented modal vs. ( 2)b, where we
have a proposition-scope modal:
( 2)
a. Jon må spise puddingen ==> Jon må dette.
   'Jon must eat porridge-DEF ==> Jon must this.'
b. Det må komme noen straks =|=> Det må dette.
' There must come someone immediately =|=> There must this.'
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Thus, this property of root modals is evidently related to their ability to be construed as two-
place relations; a property which epistemic modals do not possess. Note however, that this is
not a property which separates all epistemic modal from all root modals, since proposition-
scope root modals do not accept dette as their complement either, as observed above.
One difference between root modals and epistemic modals that seems to hold
universally, is the fact that root modals can never scope over epistemic modals, it is always
the other way around. I account for this fact by adhering to the assumption that there exists a
universal relative semantic scope of semantic operators (cf. section 5.1) as described e.g. in
Muysken and Smith (1995:11ff). I suggest that root modals and epistemic modals instantiate
two different semantic operators, where the operator instatiated by an epistemic modal scopes
over an operator instantiated by the root modal. I am of course aware that this amounts to a
stipulation which in a sense consists solely in restating the facts, but at least this stipulation
captures what seems to be a universal restriction on the relative scopes of root and epistemic
modals.
On the other hand, I have objected to the assumption made in several recent proposals,
e.g. Cinque (1999), Stowell (2000) and Roberts and Roussou (2000), that  there exists a once-
and-for-all ordering of root and epistemic modals w.r.t. tense in a universal hierarchy of
functional categories. Instead, I suggested that each verb comes with its own tense-package,
which orders the event-argument of the verb on a temporal line relative to the verb c-
commanding it (if it carries a non-finite tense-package) or to the speech event S (if it carries a
finite tense-package). In fact, I have suggested that there are no non-tensed verbs in
Norwegian, each and every verb comes with a non-finite tense-package or a finite tense-
package. Furthermore, I reached the conclusion that the Norwegian tense system employs a
past vs. non-past distinction only. The different verb forms employed in the Norwegian tense-
system is displayed in the following table.
(3)
          +Finite        -Finite
            +Past         preterite         participle
            -Past          present         infinitive
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The system of tense-chains developed in chapter 5 represents one theoretically innovative
model that I had to construct in order to account for specific properties of root and epistemic
modals.
Another theoretical innovation of this kind is the proposal in section 4.6. that modals
are always construed as two-place relations on a certain semantic level; i.e. on the level of
Conceptual Structure. The idea of a two-level semantics for (certain) linguistic expressions
was adopted from Bierwisch and Lang (1989), who assume that there exist one semantic level
which is relevant to syntax, namely Semantic Form (SF), and another semantic level closer to
conceptual organization; i.e. Conceptual Structure (CS). My contribution consists in applying
this idea to modals and showing that certain combinations of  CS and SF arguments give rise
to specific readings of modals, e.g. 'obligation', 'promise', 'permission' etc. This allows us to
describe the core semantics of any given modal by means of a more abstract representation
and the various nuances in meaning as a result of specific combinations of CS and SF
arguments.
A certain assymetry w.r.t. interpretational ambiguity observed with modals and
negation lead me to propose that Norwegian main clauses typically contain a functional
projection which is absent from certain types of finite embedded clauses (section 5.5). This
"extra" functional projection provides an additional adjuction site for adverbials in main
clauses as compared to the relevant embedded clauses.
Moreover, the behavior of modals in pseudoclefts, as compared to raising verbs and
control verbs, lead me to a rejection of the wide-spread assumption (stemming from May
1977, 1985) that wide-scope and narrow-scope readings e.g. of indefinites are encoded in
subject positions of raising structures. Instead, what is known as wide-scope and narrow-
scope readings of indefinites was shown to amount to two in part different phenomena.
Firstly, there is the specific/non-specific ambiguity that I suggest (following Enς 1991) is an
inherent property of indefinites which is not encoded in syntactic positions. Secondly, there is
the "no supposition of existence" effect, which I suggest results from the occurence of an
indefinite within the scope of an intensional predicate. Nor this effect is encoded in specific
syntctic positions, since it arises with all indefinites in any syntactic position, provided they
semantically belong to a proposition within the scope of an intensional predicate. This
intensional predicate may even be an adverbial (e.g. allegedly), which serves to show that this
is not a phenomenon confined to raising constructions.
In suggesting that the Case-assigning properties of a certain raising verb may vary
independently of its property of assigning an external theta-role, I signal a radical opposition
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to Buzio's generalization, which states that there is a biunique relationship between these two
properties. For instance, the Norwegian dispositional root modal ville 'want-to' was claimed to
be a raising verb which does assign an external theta-role without assigning Case to a DP that
it governs.
I see as one main contribution of this dissertation that it presents a range of data which
serve as counterevidence to a number of myths about modals existing in the literature. To take
one example, although there have been a number of proposals throuhgout the years suggesting
that root modals in fact share as many properties with raising verbs as they do with  control
verbs, these proposals have not gained enough attention to discredit the control versus raising
analysis, which still seems to be the "null hypothesis" for analyzing root and epistemic
modals. Thus, a number of recent works on Scandinavian modals, e.g. Thráinnson (1986),
Vikner (1988), Thráinnson and Vikner (1995), Lødrup (1996) and Dyvik (1999) employ this
analysis in one form or other. Hopefully, the present work serves to nuance this picture and
make a case for a different view.
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